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The meaning and experience of ‘empathy’ was investigated for this thesis. A 
mixed approach was utilized, with a strong qualitative accent. There was evidence of 
an ‘intuitive’ social understanding which appears to be theoretically and experientially 
distinct from the two prevailing models of empathic understandings (intellectual, or 
explicit simulation theories; and sympathetic, or implicit simulation theories). 
Phenomenological views on intersubjectivity were the principal interpretative 
framework.  
The first Chapter reviews two main theoretical meanings of empathy: empathy-
as-knowing, or understanding someone’s experience (empathy), and empathy-as-
responding to someone’s experience (sympathy).  
The second Chapter describes the study of the folk psychology stories and 
definitions of ‘empathy’; and their resemblance to the various theoretical meanings.  
The third Chapter summarizes Edith Stein’s phenomenological views about 
empathy-as-knowing; and compares these views with more contemporary approaches.  
The fourth Chapter describes the study of the essential qualities of the 
experiences of ‘insight into’ the experiences of another (resonance), alongside 
experiences of feeling understood by another (reception). Social understandings 
happened by thinking, listening, perceiving and experiencing. 
The fifth Chapter describes the study where pairs of participants were invited to 
share their stories of a prior happy experience with each other, and then to scrutinize 
their recent interpersonal understandings during joint ‘cued-recall’ interviews. There 
were intuitive, sympathetic and imaginative social understandings. 
The sixth Chapter is an overview of the overall findings associated with 
sympathetic, intellectual, and intuitive understandings. 
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Back and forth 
and to each thing asking 
its name1 
 
I became interested in empathy as a research object partly due to my prior 
psychotherapeutic and clinical experience (I trained in a humanistic and objects 
relations psychodynamic background). This was (one) starting point of the journey I am 
about to narrate.   
I am influenced by what I have retained from these areas. For instance, in these 
approaches it is the other who matters, rather than what I might personally think or 
feel about the other’s situation of life. The core of therapeutic attention focuses on the 
other person; and on the way that other experiences, and gives meaning to the world - 
the therapist being a tool to facilitate the clients’ self-insight. From this beginning, I 
was therefore concerned with understanding others’ experience.  
For Carl Rogers, ‘father’ of humanistic psychotherapy, the way that people 
presently experience their world - that is, peoples’ lived experiences or 
phenomenology - was the centre of reasoning and practice. On the other hand, for 
Sigmund Freud, ‘father’ of psychodynamic psychotherapies, the interpretation of these 
experiences was central. He developed a conceptually consistent interpretation system 
to be applied to give meaning to every single lived experience. Consequently, at the 
                                                 
1 Freely translated from Sofia de Mello Breyner Andersen’s (2005) original:“Ía e vinha/ E a cada coisa 
perguntava/ Que nome tinha”. 
  
 
outset, the two aspects of empathy which mattered to me were relative to these two 
levels of analysis: the experiential and the conceptual. 
Psychodynamic and humanistic approaches share the view that empathy is a 
form of understanding others. This was my starting point. I aimed to study the 
experience of understanding other people’s experiences, the associated psychological 
mechanisms as these were experienced at this level, and how these resonated with 
available contemporary empathy models. The framework which most satisfactorily 
answered my queries and resonated with this background was phenomenological. It is 
from this standpoint that I have attempted a dialogue across psychology areas (social, 
clinical, cognitive, developmental, and phenomenological).  
It is critical to start an investigation by defining the research object with rigour; 
understanding that which has been said about it, and this should be a collaborative 
process. When arriving at this area of research, with my own ideas about the nature of 
empathy, I had the impression that everyone was standing in the middle of the 
‘empathy’ room shouting at different corners – myself among them. That is, everyone 
was talking and no-one quite talking about the same thing, let alone talking to each 
other. 
This is partly because the term empathy is used in a variety of contexts and has 
been explicated by means of disparate constructs and mechanisms, even when 
restricting ourselves to the psychological domain. This obliged me to make a slight 
detour from my initial goal. Despite the complexity of the task, and this conceptually-
chaotic state of affairs, I felt the necessity of addressing this matter directly.  I thus 
  
 
begin this thesis by carefully reviewing these ‘shouts’ about the nature of empathy, as 
they appear in literature (Chapter I) and in Folk Psychology (Chapter II). I hope to 
provide readers with a guide which will permit them to follow what will be pursued 
here - even if the reader might begin from a different corner to me.   
This is the spirit of the two first chapters of this thesis; I have asked of ‘each thing 
its name’. This means that the thesis begins with the possibility of multiple ‘empathies’ 
(there are, of course, corners which I have not explored).  
After Chapter II, I narrow down the focus to examine the phenomenon which 
appealed to me the most, perhaps for being closer to my original interest (empathic 
interpersonal understandings). In Psychology, social understandings are usually 
explicated via mechanisms such as perspective-taking and empathic accuracy 
(‘intellectual’ understandings; e.g., explicit simulation processes); or via mechanisms 
such as contagion and identification, understood to be associated with additional 
implicit simulation or projective mechanisms (‘sympathetic’ understandings, e.g., 
implicit simulation theories).  
Chapter III is dedicated to the exploration of Edith Stein’s phenomenological 
description of a particular form of understanding that, in the light of the lived 
experience, is not properly explained by any of the two prevailing models above. For 
Stein, empathy is a way of knowing, directly and intuitively, what someone is 
experiencing in a particular moment. This view of empathy is reasonably consensual in 
the field of phenomenology; though certainly not consensual in psychology. Thus, the 
  
 
contentions thereby raised between hers and alternative contemporary explications 
for empathic understandings are also explored for this chapter. 
Following this, there are two further empirical studies which aim to investigate 
this particular phenomenon: through written accounts, and the description of its 
essential experiential qualities and processes (Chapter IV); and through joint ‘cued 
recall’ interviews (Interpersonal Process Recall), and the description of its experiential 
qualities and processes (Chapter V). The locus of attention is always upon the 
experience of empathy, its prereflective and reflective qualities. These studies yelled 
that there was an alternative form of social understandings, lived and described as a 
non-mediated, instant, intuitive, sensory, perceptive and/or experiential 
understanding, that was consistent with phenomenological (e.g., Stein) and humanistic 
(e.g., Rogers) models of empathy. This form of understanding is proposed here as new 
conceptual and experiential category for social understandings. 
Chapter VI reviews these findings, by proposing that ‘sympathy’ could be the 
actual focus of many researchers claiming to be examining ‘empathy’ – certainly of 
those who are interested in the way that people respond to another’s experience by 
experiencing, say, pity. ‘Empathy’ would then exclusively refer to an interpersonal 
understanding, in (at least) either of its intuitive, intellectual or sympathetic forms.  
In conclusion, although you might start from a different corner of the big room 
called empathy, I wish to share with you the journey that allowed me to uncover a 
particular understudied form of social understandings (intuitive) – so that you may 










































                                                                CHAPTER I 
The aim of this chapter is to show how, in psychology, empathy is an umbrella term that 






This chapter shows how empathy assumes many meanings, within and beyond the 
field of psychology, some of which are perhaps irreconcilable. This is a common, but 
unresolved, observation in many psychology domains (cognitive, developmental, social, 
psychotherapeutic, and phenomenological). It sometimes requires the adoption of 
particular empathy research strategies. These strategies, and those meanings of 
empathy which are of relevance for the present thesis, are reviewed here. 
 
A big drawer called empathy 
 
  Empathy is understood in very dissimilar manners across fields of research, and 
even within the same field, namely, psychology. During the last two decades of research 
into empathy, this observation is a common experience (Batson, 2009; Churchill & 
Bayne, 1998; Davis, C.M., 1990; Davis, M.H. 2009; Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg & Eggum, 
2009; Gladstein, 1983; Preston & Waal, 2002; Reik, 1948/ 1971; Waldinger, Hauser, 
Schulz, Allen & Crowell, 2004; White, 1997; Zepf & Hartmann, 2008). For any committed 
researcher, this is probably the first impression – that one’s understanding of the nature 
of ‘empathy’ is one among many. 
  This divergence in the meanings of empathy is not a superficial one. As Batson 
(2009, p.3) realizes, “the term empathy is currently applied to more than a half-dozen 
phenomena (…) each conceptually distinct, stand-alone psychological state. Further, each 
of these states has been called by names other than empathy”. Then, to complicate the 
 4 
 
picture, each of these diverse concepts and psychological states has been called other 
things.  
 Therefore, empathy seems to be an umbrella term, used, in an extensive body of 
publications, to designate all sorts of experiences. Empathy is a big drawer that stores all 
sorts of objects, and as such, a cause of controversies and conceptual chaos.  The quotes 
included in Figure 1 illustrate how some of these meanings of ‘empathy’ can appear to 
be irreconcilable.  
 
Figure 1: “Example of contrasting psychology views about the meaning of empathy” 
 
  To the left of the arrow, there is Mark Davis’ (2009) stake, as published in a 
psychology encyclopaedia. Despite recognizing that there are common “disagreements 
over the ’proper’ definition of empathy”, in his view, these disagreements can be solved 
“In the broadest sense, 
empathy refers to the 
reactions that one person 
has to the observed 
experiences of another.” 
(Davis, 2009) 
“Empathy and validation have 
been defined differently by 
different investigators, but the 
core aspect of both terms 
involves an understanding and 
recognition of a partner’s 
thoughts and feelings” 
(Waldinger et al., 2004) 
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by realizing that “underlying all of these definitional approaches is one core assumption: 
that empathy in some way involves the transformation of the observed experiences of 
another person into a response within the self”. Davis’ conclusion is that all these 
constructs refer to ways of responding to someone else’s observed experience; for 
example, pitying another’s visible distress. 
  To the right of the arrow, there is Waldinger et al.’s (2004, p.60) conclusion. 
Although Waldinger et al.’s starting point is also the acknowledgement of empathy’s 
multiplicity of meanings, they conclude that the underlying connective link to current 
meanings of empathy is the assumption that empathy is a way of knowing, or 
understanding, that which another person is experiencing; for example, imagining that 
another perhaps missed the bus.  
 These two conclusions would only be reconcilable if knowing someone’s 
experience was the same as a responding to that experience. Although, in some 
circumstances this is precisely the case, knowing (e.g. imagining that someone missed 
the bus) and responding (e.g. pity) may be utterly distinctive experiences. Indeed, 
knowing and responding to someone’s experience are commonly conceived of as 
distinctive phenomena, with the implication that the two conclusions in Figure 1 are 
irreconcilable.   
It is by asserting this knowing-responding difference that Max Scheler (1913/ 1979, 
p.8) begins his dissertation on the phenomenon of sympathy: 
Any kind of rejoicing or pity presupposes, in principle, some sort of 
knowledge of the fact, nature and quality of experience in other people (…). 
It is not through pity in the first place that I learn of someone being in pain, 
 6 
 
for the latter must already be given, in some form, if I am to notice and then 
share it. One may look at the face of a yelling child as a merely physical 
object, and one may look at it (in the normal way) as an expression of pain, 
hunger, etc., though without therefore pitying the child; the two things are 
utterly different. Thus experiences of pity and fellow-feeling are always 
additional to an experience in the other which is already grasped and 
understood. 
 
  For Scheler, on the one hand, there is one’s knowledge of another’s experience of 
pain; and, on the other, there is a personal response to that experience of pain (e.g. 
pity). This clarifies that these are two possible-to-distinguish, perhaps independent, 
phenomena. One may know about another’s peril without necessarily responding to that 
distressing situation with a feeling of pity (or any other kind of responsive psychological 
state). Secondly, by definition, a response is a response to a stimulus. In the case of 
empathy, the ‘empathic’ response is generally2 assumed to be provoked by some sort of 
‘empathic’ knowledge of another’s experience - which acts as the stimulus. In this case, 
knowing and responding are associated in a cause-effect manner; are distinguishable 
phenomena; and both are sometimes called ‘empathy’.   
 Consequently, neither of the conclusions included in Figure 1 is independently 
true to the picture of contemporary psychology research on empathy. Rather, 
responding to someone’s experience is one side of the coin, and knowing someone’s 
                                                 
2 For Scheler (1913, p.12), the only situations during which a knowing act does not precede the subject’s 
response are extreme or “purer” cases of emotional contamination, an experience characterized by a 
“complete lack of mutual ‘understanding’” (p.12), that does not “presuppose any sort of knowledge of the joy which 
others feel” (p.15).  
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experience is the other. Each of these viewpoints alone cannot be said to be a 
transversal common characteristic across meanings of empathy. 
This distinction between knowing and responding helped Batson (2009) to order 
the multiplicity of phenomena that are currently called empathy, as well as other things, 
in psychology. He divided these phenomena into two groups that I here call empathy-as-
knowing; and empathy-as-responding. Within each group there are several meanings of 
empathy-as-knowing and of empathy-as-responding. 
  The knowing-responding strategy that is adopted here to deal with the observed 
multiplicity of empathy’s meanings is not the only, nor the most common, strategy 
offered by academic psychology literature. I therefore first review the main strategies in 
the following subsections, with the purpose of contextualizing my own approach 
(knowing-responding).  
 
Discriminate, agglomerate – a matter of strategy 
 
  Batson’s binomial (two groups) strategy of dealing with the diversity of empathy’s 
meanings  is a common strategy in psychological literature. However, the most 
widespread binomial distinction (Davis, M.H., 1983; Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg & 
Eggum, 2009; Gladstein, 1983; Goubert, Craig & Buysse, 2009; Hassenstab, Dziobek, 
Rogers, Wolf & Convit, 2007; Kerem, Fishman & Josselson, 2001; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007) 
is not in terms of knowing-responding. Rather, it distinguishes between affective 
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empathy (also called sympathetic, emotional, hot, or automatic); and cognitive empathy 
(also called intellectual, simulative, cold, and deliberated).   
  Duan and Hill (1996) noticed that these affective and cognitive labels can refer to a 
particular quality of the empathizer’s experienced content (say, personal emotions 
against personal thoughts); but they can also refer to the underlying process (Preston & 
Waal, 2002); that is, emotional mechanisms as opposed to intellectual mechanisms.  
Either way, this strategy limits responses to affective phenomena; and understandings to 
intellectual acts. Moreover, each of these two groups (affective and cognitive) contains 
an array of essentially distinctive empathic phenomena that cannot be seen as 
equivalent either, and the set of phenomena is seldom the same across approaches. 
An example is provided by Mark Davis’ (1983); and it is associated with the 
development of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). IRI is a paper-and-pencil 
empathy assessment, recently found to be one of the few with satisfactory psychometric 
characteristics (Hemmerdinger, Stoddart & Lilford, 2007). It is composed of the following 
subscales, or empathic phenomena: Perspective-Taking (assuming another’s 
perspective), Fantasy (projecting into the experience of fictional characters), Empathic 
Concern (sympathy for someone), and Personal Distress (emotional reactive distress at 
the sight of another’s distress). Davis further considers that these four phenomena can 
be grouped into the two formerly identified groups: affective (Empathic concern; 
Personal distress) and cognitive (Perspective-taking; Fantasy) - they are just finer 
distinctions of distinctive affective and cognitive phenomena. We might even see in this 
 9 
 
association an acknowledgement of the responding (Empathic concern; Personal 
distress) and knowing (Perspective-taking; Fantasy) approach. 
 
Limitations of the discrimination-agglomeration strategy 
 
  As with Scheler, Davis (1983) proposes that there is an inaugural perceptive 
moment (observing the experience of another), during which one becomes acquainted 
with another’s experience (“empathy in the broadest sense refers to the reactions of one 
individual to the observed experiences of another”, p.113). Then, from this inaugural way 
of knowing may follow any of the responses assessed via the IRI’s subscales (empathic 
concern; personal distress; perspective-taking; and fantasy).  Therefore, in Davis’ theory, 
perspective-taking is conceptualized as a response, because it follows the prior knowing 
gained during the observational act. For instance, seeing an inexplicable gesture 
performed by another person would provoke in the observer a perspective-taking 
response, during which one imaginatively considered the motivations behind such 
gesture. In this sense, perspective-taking can be understood as a response. 
  This is in contrast with Batson’s proposition, for whom perspective-taking is 
included in the knowing drawer. Since the purpose and/or outcome of perspective-
taking is knowing what another’s experience may be, it is also justifiable to conceive of it 
as a way of knowing another’s experience, rather than a response.  Secondly, for Batson, 
the seeing of the gesture and the imagination of the reasons behind the gesture are 
both experiences that are explained through perspective-taking cognitive mechanisms. 
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Since the ‘inaugural’ moment of perceiving another’s experience is seen as a 
perspective-taking act, then the knowing act is less naturally conceived of as a response.  
  In conclusion, perspective-taking is conceptualized as both a way of knowing 
another’s experience; and as a way of responding to another’s experience.  
Consequently, even the issue of which phenomena should be included in which drawer 
is not consensual.   
  Regardless of these more detail-related disagreements, what these strategies 
have in common is that they identify several phenomena, while, at the same time, 
claiming that these are all rightfully called empathy. It is a discriminate and agglomerate 
strategy. It deals with the multiplicity by identifying many phenomena called empathy 
and putting these into distinctive (two or more) conceptual drawers (discrimination side 
of the strategy), and then asserting that all these phenomena are ´empathy´ 
(agglomeration side of the strategy).  
  First of all, none of these drawers are a dichotomy. For instance, the logical 
opposite of knowing is not responding - it is rather ‘not knowing’. Secondly, what is 
achieved is merely a slightly more organized chaos. Everyone’s opinion is validated, but 
the disparity is not assertively solved. The chaos is still there to be found. We are still 
faced with a huge set of phenomena that are called empathy, sometimes related to each 
other by no other aspect than the name of the group each of them belongs to. Not 
surprisingly, then, empathy becomes a “complex” (Greenberg, Watson, Elliot & Bohart, 
2001, p.380) phenomenon. Although I am aware that the purpose of the revised 
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strategies was probably the opposite, I find this discrimination-agglomeration procedure 
rather unhelpful.  
  For instance, what does it really mean to say that someone with autism is not 
empathic? Or that someone with psychopathy lacks empathic skills? As Jones, Happé, 
Gilbert, Burnett and Viding (2010) found, the meaning of ‘not empathic’, associated with 
each of these diagnoses, is not the same. More precisely, in their paper, people with 
autism were found to have some difficulty with perspective-taking, whereas those with 
psychopathy seemed to feel little concern for another person and for themselves. A 
‘non-empathic-autistic’ is someone who has difficulties in imagining another’s 
perspective, whereas a ‘non-empathic-psychopath’ is someone who doesn’t really care. 
Hence, they conclude that “the types of ‘empathy deficit’ characteristic of psychopathic 
tendencies and ASD [autistic syndrome disorder] are specific to each psychopathology” 
(Jones et al., 2010, p. 7).   Each deficit denounces a distinctive ‘type’ of lack of empathy. 
  Thus, we have observed that the affective and cognitive dimensions are held to 
have independence (one needs not to imagine another’s perspective in order to care for 
another, as their study shows), low co-variation (Davis, 1983), or unclear relationship 
(Duan & Hill, 1996); differences in meaning, process, and psychological experience 
(Batson, 2009); and their differential association with other variables such as 
psychopathological syndromes. Why are these phenomena still called empathy, as if 
they were one and the same thing? It may be rather that I am unable to see what binds 
them all together, or that they are indeed different concepts, dealing with different 
psychological experiences.   
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  For me, this agglomeration hinders the dialogue across theories and associated 
findings. In some papers, I found that findings relative to different phenomena were 
juxtaposed in a rather puzzling manner.  Take, for instance, the following research 
hypothesis: “it is conceivable that highly accurate observers would be characterized as 
oversensitive, suffering unduly (Shalder & Cialdini, 1988) and having difficulties in 
delivering effective helping behaviour” (Goubert et al., 2009, p.156). For these authors, 
in the light of available literature, it seems plausible that knowing with exactitude 
another’s experience (from the authors’ viewpoint, via a perspective-taking act) is 
associated with an inability of helping another person. 
  In a way, Goubert et al. are saying that only the ‘socially blind’ would do such a 
(consequently daft) thing as helping another person… Reasoning that there is a 
‘plausible’ negative association between perspective-taking and prosocial behaviour is 
probably a consequence of the agglomeration strategy. Concepts such as emotional 
distress and perspective-taking are joined under the same umbrella term, an apparent 
similarity that provokes a non-sensitive or discriminative generalization of findings of 
one ‘empathic’ phenomenon (distress) to the remainder (perspective-taking). 
 
The one true empathy 
 
  A rarer strategy consists of electing a particular meaning of empathy as the 
genuine meaning of empathy, as is implicit with Preston and Waal (2002). These authors 




Figure 2: “Preston & Waal’s (2002) empathic phenomena” 
Copyright©2002 by Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission.  
 
  This circle is populated by smaller circles (subclasses), each representing distinct-
but-related empathic phenomena (a good example of the differentiating-agglomerating 
strategy). In it, I notice a separation, down the middle of the circle, putting affective 
phenomena in the left side; and, in the right side, intellectual phenomena – the most 
widespread binomial distinction.  
  One of the identified subclasses goes under the name of “‘true empathy’”. It 
amounts to “any process where the attended perception of the object’s state generates a 
state in the subject that is more applicable to the object’s state or situation than to the 
subject’s own prior state or situation” (p. 4) – more or less in line with understandings of 
empathy as a form of responding to another’s experience.  As Scheler and Davis 
emphasize, this is preceded by a perceptive knowledge of that very same experience.   
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  Moreover, their ‘true empathy’ is placed in the affective side of the circle, and it 
overlaps with the emotional contagion subclass. This suggests that, for them, the 
observer’s empathic response is affective, at least in terms of process; and it is similar to 
the phenomenon of emotional contagion. It is not any kind of emotional response. It is, 
as defined, an emotional state responsive to an observed (and, hence, known) state that 
matches the state of the observed “at a representation level” (p.5). This means that 
subject and object states are necessarily similar, if not identical. In principle, this 
similarity is in terms of neural activation, but also, as their presentation continues to 
argue, in terms of experience as well. To say it differently, the empathizer must feel 
what the other person is experiencing for the response to be considered an empathic 
response. One must feel as another is feeling.  
  In summary, Preston and Waal elevate a very particular kind of responsive 
emotion to the status of ‘empathy’, because it is: 1) elicited by a perceptive act; 2) 
similar to the observed emotion; 3) more ‘appropriate’ to the target’s situation, 
whatever that might mean; and 4) potentiated by factors such as familiarity, similarity 
and salience (e.g., p.5).  
  More important for the present argument, is that, through the given label, and 
their argument, I have the impression that phenomena which do not fit these criteria 
should not be called empathy – including the remainder of identified subclasses. These 
authors acknowledge empathy’s multiplicity of meanings, while at the same time 
defending that there is a one and only authentic empathy.  This is a tricky solution, in the 
sense that those who have been studying the remainder as empathic phenomena might 
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immediately and instinctively oppose their proposition (their paper is followed by 29 
pages of open peer commentary raising issues about their theory). Secondly, it is not the 
name given to a phenomenon that is the centre piece of their study, but the 
phenomenon itself. Whether it is the one which should deserve the name empathy is a 
detail the investigation and theory in question. ‘True’, or ‘untrue’, Preston & Waal know 
precisely what they are studying, and this is what is important.  
  But in terms of a strategy for dealing with the current state of affairs, electing it as 
the authentic meaning of empathy is quite a controversial strategy; and one which does 
not facilitate constructive dialogue between empathy researchers.  In this thesis, I have 
refrained from nominating my one and only true empathy. I am not arguing that it is 
only my corner that deserves the name empathy.  What matters to me is calling 
attention to an understudied research object. What matters to me is an essence, a 
particular phenomenon - not its name. However, for communication purposes, as in a 
thesis, these names become fundamental.  
Thus,  instead of adopting the term ‘empathy’ to designate these (too) many 
different things, I have attempted to deal with this multiplicity in a very objective 
manner. I will employ exclusive terms or nouns for each of these ‘empathic’ phenomena 
throughout these pages, none of which are elected as the one true empathy. For 
instance, perspective-taking is to be called perspective-taking, never empathy. In a way, 
this means that the word empathy per se will tend to become obliterated, or, better, 




Meanings of Empathy 
  
  This section examines those theoretical3 meanings of empathy that are relevant 
for the present thesis (Figure 3).  Batson’s listing of meanings of empathy-as-knowing is 
the starting point, from which follow a few additional meanings of empathy-as-knowing 
that are absent from his listing. Finally, empathy-as-responding phenomena are 
discussed, though following less closely in Batson’s footsteps.  
 
Figure 3: “Examples of empathy-as-knowing and empathy-as-responding phenomena” 
 
                                                 









Inference from behaviour 




















Batson’s Meanings of Empathy-as-Knowing 
 
  Batson’s meanings of empathy-as-knowing are restricted to those proposed by 
simulation theories. These theories claim that we are able to know what another person 
might be experiencing by means of an implicit or explicit simulation process. That is, 
understanding occurs via the imaginative act of ‘simulating’ someone else’s experience 
and attributing to another person this imagined experience, via an act that can be said to 
be ‘imaginative’, ‘simulative’, or ‘inferential’ (Gallagher, 2007; Zahavi, 2008a,b; 2007; 
2001). In brief, it can be said to be an intellectual act; and exclusively subjective, 
performed by the empathizer. 
  By restricting one’s ability to know other people’s experiences to an intellectual 
act, Batson is simultaneously addressing two questions: the what (knowing another’s 
experience); and the how (imaginative act). For him, there is no knowledge about 
another’s experience that is not intellectual, imaginative or logical (inferred/ deduced), 
and a by-product of a simulation process.  This is Batson’s underlying assumption. 
  This is my reading of his exposition. As a consequence of it, I can synthesize his 
six empathy-as-intellectually-knowing concepts into two main groups: inference from 
felt-feeling (implicit simulation theories); and perspective-taking and inference from 
behaviour (explicit simulation theories). These are Batson’s main meanings of 





  Explicit simulation theories: Perspective-Taking 
 
  This phenomenon is commonly called cognitive empathy, mind reading, 
perspective-taking, or role-taking (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Batson, 2009; Decety & Jackson, 2006; Duan & 
Hill, 1996; Kerem et al., 2001; Lobchuk, 2006; Preston & Waal, 2002; Gladstein, 1983; 
Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). It consists of “intellectually taking the role or perspective of 
another person” (Gladstein, 1983, p.468). 
It is explained by Batson (2009) as a higher-order reasoning about available 
information or “cues” (Batson, 2009, p.4) related to the other’s experience or 
situation, such as “what she says and does and your knowledge of her character, 
values, and desires” (Batson, 2009, p.7). These cues are used to simulate, conjecture, 
and/or predict another person’s experiences. One formulates a ‘theory of mind’ 
(hence, explicit simulation) that might correspond to the other’s experience.  
Therefore, perspective-taking can be said to be an intellectual act, mediated by a 
(hopefully logical) reasoning process. One has to reason about available information in 
order to know another person’s experience. This view of empathy-as-knowing 
corresponds to the conception put forward by explicit simulation theories (e.g., 
Gallagher, 2007; Zahavi, 2008b).  
Batson further distinguishes between two types of perspective-taking: 
intellectually imagining the world from another’s viewpoint (imagine–other); 
intellectually imagine how one would feel in the other’s situation (imagine-self). They 
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both culminate in the attribution of a conjured state to another person; and represent 
intellectual imaginative ways of knowing people’s experiences. I adopt the distinction 
between imagine-self and imagine-other, wherever relevant. 
To these imaginative experiences, and in line with phenomenology, I added 
Batson’s understanding of the inaugural perceptive moment. This is because Batson 
argues that first one sees behaviour (cue). This observed behaviour has the value of a 
symbol that must be intellectually and subsequently infused with meaning. That is, the 
behaviour and the meaning-making ‘reasoned’ act mediate people’s social 
understandings. You need both of these acts to know the other’s experience. Hence, 
were it not for the pre-acquired knowledge that one possesses about the meaning of a 
cue, one would know nothing of another’s experience. An example would be seeing 
someone laugh, and subsequently, and intellectually, reasoning that, since 
conventionally laughing people are happy, the laughing person is (probably) happy too 
– and, if one knew not the meaning of a smile, one would not understand that the 
other was happy in any way.   
This is then an intellectual process, here called inference from behaviour: one 
sees the particular (behaviour), and during the subsequent, additional, interpretative 
act, generalizes its reasoned meaning to an overall experience (another’s experience). 
The particular becomes the general (inference). This amounts to the construct 
‘empathic accuracy’ studied in a few cognitive approaches to empathy (e.g., Batson, 
2009; Blairy, Herrera & Hess, 1999; Hall & Mast, 2007; Hancock & Ickes, 1996; Hess & 
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Blairy, 2001). In this area, researchers are interested in studying how people see 
behaviour-as-cue and intellectually interpret this cue. 
 Some authors highlight that inference from behaviour should not be conceived 
as a simplistic act, such as seeing a smile and from it inferring that the smiling person is 
happy. For instance, Hess and Blairy (2001, p.131) propose that emotional expressivity 
is an overall behaviour that includes “facial, vocal, postural, etc.” displays; and all these 
aspects “can be used to draw inferences regarding the presumed emotional state of the 
sender using a pattern-matching approach”. Regardless of the complexity and speed of 
this process, these authors have described it as an inferential intellectual act that 
culminates, as they so well acknowledge, in the knowing of a “presumed” imagined 
state - one which I will sometimes make reference to through the smile example, for 
simplicity’s sake. 
 At a theoretical level, then, the mechanisms of perspective-taking, and inference 
from behaviour (or empathic accuracy) are both conceptualized as ‘intellectual’ 
mediated processes; they are explained as the result of a ‘reasoning’, an inference, a 
‘higher-order’ decoding process. Hence, they are here used as examples of intellectual 
ways of knowing other people’s experiences. Note that, for this thesis, this 
classification is not dependent upon the qualities of this reasoning (slow or quick, 
complex or simple, deliberated or spontaneous, implicit or explicit, higher-order or 
lower-order), but of its necessity. Intellectual acts may have varying degrees of higher-
order processing and speed, but this does not change the process as conceptualized 
(its underlying explanatory psychological model). 
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As noted by Scheler, this implicitly implies that the empathizer relates with other 
people as if they were ‘mere physical objects’. The perceiver is consequently obliged to 
intellectually and subsequently embed the cue with some possible experiential 
meaning; “yet mental life can be quite different from observable behaviour; and 
inferring mental life from behaviour entails recourse to reductive logic, which can never 
be conclusive” (Zepf & Hartmann, 2008, p.747). This view also clashes with the 
phenomenological stance, which proposes that people ‘normally’ relate to one 
another directly, that is, one directly sees the behaviour and its meaning; another’s 
happiness; another’s expressive (and hence meaningful) behaviour.  
  In summary, for Batson, perspective-taking, and the perceiving moment, are, in 
terms of process, given meaning as an intellectual reasoned imaginative process that 
deals with ‘objective’ cues so that a hypothetical intellectual knowledge of another’s 
experience can be produced.   
 
 Implicit simulation theories: Inference from felt-feeling 
 
  The remaining meanings of empathy-as-knowing proposed by Batson (2009) are 
relative to studies about mimicry and emotional contagion. To imitate another’s 
behaviour, or to be contaminated by another’s experience, are first and foremost, 
usually conceptualized as an individual response to a perceptively known experience. 
One automatically responds to an observed state by imitating it and/or being 
contaminated by it.  
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  This responsive side is explored in the appropriate empathy-as-responding 
subsection. However, since those who theorize about imitation and contagion 
commonly transform these responses into a simulative way of knowing someone else’s 
experience, this perspective must be explored in this section too.  
  The most obvious example of how a response is transformed into a way of 
knowing someone else’s experience can be observed in the description of the process 
put forward by Jabbi, Swart and Keysers (2007, p.1744):  
(a) observing the states of others activates representations of similar states 
in the observer; (b) these activations, which represent a form of simulation 
of the observed states, are sensed by a network of brain areas that 
represent bodily states; and (c) the sensed states are interpreted and 
attributed to the other individual, distinguishing them from the observer’s 
own emotions. (…) The processes of simulating and sensing the simulated 
state of others, hypothesised earlier (Gallese et al., 2004, Keysers and 
Gazzola, 2006), would be common to emotional contagion and empathic 
understanding (for reviews see Critchley, 005; Adolphs, 2006). Thus only 
the third process of attribution, that enables an observer to associate 
his/her own simulated emotional state to that of the observed, 
differentiates early emotional contagion from more mature empathic 
understanding. 
 
Firstly, one observes another’s behaviour. Secondly, similar representations are 
activated (that is, one is contaminated). Thirdly, one’s mind intellectually decodes 
these personally active neural networks into an experience. Fourthly, and finally, this 
experience is interpreted and inferentially attributed to the observed target. That is, 
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one starts with the particular case of one’s personally felt experience; and then 
generalizes it to the experience of another person. This is why this process is named 
here inference from felt-feeling. One infers from one’s experience the experience of 
another. It would be by means of this linear, sequential, causal process (observation – 
contamination - interpretation - attribution) that the inference of empathic knowing 
from felt-feeling would come about. A simple example of this experience could be 
feeling happy, and ending up realizing that this happiness was, after all, another’s 
happiness – not one’s own.  
 This particular contagion-based and mimicry-based process amounts to an 
implicit simulation theory (Gallagher, 2007; Zahavi, 2008b), and it is a very common 
theory in neurocognitive empathy studies4 (e.g., Hatfield, Rapson & Le, 2009; Darling & 
Clarke, 2009; Jabbi et al., 2007; Decety & Jackson, 2006; 2004; Preston & Waal, 2002). 
Across these implicit simulation models of empathy, it is claimed that an unconscious 
automatic response becomes, after a sequence of lower-order causally-related 
processes, the basis of one’s knowledge of another person’s experience. The usual key 
processes are: 1) contagion and/or mimicry as the starting point; 2) followed by, or 
equivalent to, an implicit simulation of another’s experience from one’s own feeling; 
and 3) an act of self-other discrimination.  
This discrimination, equivalent to Jabbi et al.’s attribution stage, is necessary in 
these models partly because it is presupposed that, at a given point of the contagion 
                                                 
4
 Implicit simulation theories, associated here with the social neurosciences psychology field, can also be found, for 
example, in some psychotherapeutic (Zepf & Hartmann, 2008) and developmental approaches (Gladstein, 1983; 
Hoffmann, 2000). Nevertheless, this area is the mainstream and within this area, this is the most widespread view on 
empathy-as-knowing. This justifies the association established in this thesis, although inexact and for simplicity’s sake, 
between implicit simulation theories and neurosciences. 
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and imitation process, subject and object are merged, fused, or overlapped with each 
other. Since there is a point where everything gets fused, there has to be a point 
where everything gets ‘defused’ once more, for the felt-state to serve as a basis of 
knowledge of another’s experience. Consequently, self-other discrimination 
mechanisms, or equivalent processes, are a common party to implicit simulation 
models of empathy, and are thought to “play a crucial role in maintaining a boundary 
between self and other” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.57). Thus, implicit simulation 
theories envisage the overall process as a mediated one. 
Implicit simulation can be distinguished from explicit simulation principally 
because of the information used in these processes: one’s affective reaction, for 
implicit simulation; and available cues, for explicit simulation. Despite this, and as a 
consequence of the underlying philosophical stance of cognitive approaches, both 
theories propose that knowing another’s experience is the result of a step-wise model 
that involves ‘reasoning’ (about one’s experience or about available cues). 
Phenomenology tends to describe these models as ‘inferential’, not because of the 
quality of the processing level or the extent of the empathizer’s awareness; but 








Beyond Batson’s meanings of Empathy-as-Knowing 
 
  Analogy and Identification   
 
  Identification has been proposed as synonymous with empathy (Davis, C.M., 
1990); a level, a pathway, or a constituent of empathy (Gladstein, 1983; Håkansson & 
Montgomery, 2003; Kerem et al., 2001; Tempel, 2007; Zepf & Hartmann, 2008); a way 
through which empathy expresses itself (Bachelor, 1988; Boulanger & Lançon, 2006); 
the result of losing the empathic ‘as if’ quality (Barrett-Lennard, 1981); and a “a 
prerequisite to feeling sympathy and empathy” (Decety & Chaminade, 2003, p.590). 
Thus, it has been positively and negatively related with ‘empathy’, but it is also 
established as a synonymous, or a ‘subcomponent’, of empathy - and commonly the 
affective component of empathy, as with Preston & Waal (Figure 2). 
  Identification stands for the establishment of an analogy or similarity between 
two or more elements. In the case of empathy, these elements are the subject and the 
object; or a particular quality of their situations or experiences. This comparison can 
happen at a very primordial level of analysis: “starting from my own mind (…) I infer 
that the foreign body is probably also linked in a similar manner to a foreign mind” 
(Zahavi, 2001, p.151). In this case, analogy is the presupposition that another person’s 
body is probably linked to a mind, as one’s own body also is. One inspects one’s 
experience and from it analogically imagines that the other person’s experience or 
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identity is similar to one’s own. Identification-as-knowing is an intellectual act, built 
upon an intellectual comparative act. 
  At a more psychological level, it involves finding qualities that are ‘common’ or 
‘shared’ between involved people; and an assumption that the other person is 
probably feeling as one does or did, in a similar past situation. For example, a person 
would observe a “similarity between what the target is experiencing and something 
the empathizer has experienced in the past” (Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003, p. 272). 
This analogy, established in the light of one’s past experience and cues relative to the 
other’s experience, is sometimes thought to: 
evoke emotions that match the target’s situation. For instance, if we have a 
distressing experience, and later observe someone in a similar situation, 
cues in the other’s situation that remind us of our own past experience 
may evoke a feeling of distress in us again (Håkansson & Montgomery, 
2003, p. 270). 
 
  For Håkansson and Montgomery, the observed ‘cues’ evoke a memory of a past 
experience with similar elements to the observed one (intellectual comparative act). 
This reminiscence may involve a reliving of the past experience, and be used to 
imagine another’s probable experience. Analogy is then an intellectual way of knowing 
another’s experience. It involves an intellectual comparative (or analogical) act, a 
similarity assumption.  
  Analogy is often described in Psychology as a projective way of knowing other 
people’s experience; the seeing of oneself, or of one’s experience, in another’s 
‘screen’. As such, identification was said to be the very own antithesis of an empathic 
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understanding (Stein, 1917; Zahavi, 2001; Zepf & Hartmann, 2008), or responsible for 
“cognitive bias” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p.1090), because it is only revealing of 
another’s experience indirectly, intellectually, comparatively and projectively, via one’s 
personal experience. 
 Some argue that identification is more of an empathy-as-responding 
phenomenon, close to the concept of contagion; an automatic affective sympathetic 
response (Gladstein, 1983; Hoffman, 2000; Scheler, 1913) that is similar to that of 
another person. Then, it also has, at its heart, the establishment of an analogy (the 
other is feeling like one does). In this particular sense, it has been associated with a 
feeling of oneness (e.g., Zepf & Hartmann, 2008) and a sense of belonging, 
inclusiveness, and bond forming (Decety & Chaminade, 2003). A parallel can be drawn 
between this oneness idea, and the neurocognitive assumption that contagion involves 
a self-other merging. Moreover, the associated empathy-as-knowing process also 
resembles implicit simulation theories: one projects/ attributes one’s felt-level 
affective response onto the other-as-screen; one infers from one’s emotional response 
the other’s experience. It is then only revealing of another’s experience in an indirect, 
projective, ‘inferential’, ‘reasoned’ or ‘intellectual’ manner.  
  As a response or a knowing, it utilizes a very particular source of information 
(one’s personal experience), and, by being limited to this particular source of 
information, becomes an intellectual act that can be distinguished from perspective-
taking (imagine-other). What matters for analogy and for identification experiences is 
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what is held in common between people. It has been non-consensually called 
empathy.   
  In this thesis, I will prefer the term analogy to designate the knowing side of this 
experience (analogy-as-knowing); and the term identification to designate the 
responsive side of this experience (identification-as-responding). 
 
  Understanding 
 
  Barrett-Lennard’s (1981) “empathic understanding” is one of the most 
fundamental meanings of empathy-as-knowing, for the purpose of this thesis, and one 
which is still very influential in psychology (Barkham & Shapiro, 1986; Duan & Hill, 
1996; Greenberg et al., 2001; Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003; Kerem et al., 2001; 
Watson & Greenberg, 2009; White, 1997), though principally in the area of 
psychotherapy. 
  Although empathy as an understanding of someone’s experience is a common 
conception of empathy (as the Oxford dictionary online indicates), Barrett-Lennard’s 
empathic understanding is more than a mere intellectual reasoned experience, and is 
distinguished here from explicit simulation theories and their view of empathy-as-
knowing. Barrett-Lennard’s empathy is not simply ‘imagining what another’s 
experience might be’ in order to intellectually understand it. On the contrary, it is a 
very particular kind of interpersonal understanding, typified by his ‘Cyclical 
Interpersonal Model of Empathy’.  
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  This cycle, developed with therapeutic settings in mind, though generalized to 
daily rapport, involves four stages. These are: 1. Resonance: the empathizer is “actively 
attending” (p.94) to another’s present experience and expressiveness, and “reads and 
resonates” (p.94) with the experiencing target (empathee); 2. Communication: the 
empathizer “expresses or shows in some communicative way” (p.94) that which was 
understood during resonance; 3. Reception:  the empathee attends to the 
empathizer’s “response sufficiently at least to form a sense or perception of the extent 
of” (p.94) the empathizer’s “immediate personal understanding” (p.94); and 4. 
Feedback: the empathee confirms, or disconfirms, the accuracy of the empathizer’s 
understanding.  
  From this model, I offer here a more detailed reflection on the resonance 
experience (the experience of the subject of empathy) – the one that has been, so far, 
under scrutiny.  Barrett-Lennard (p.92) explains this resonance stage as follows:  
Qualitatively it [empathic understanding] is [a] an active process of [ai] 
desiring to know [b] the full present and changing awareness of another 
person, of reaching out to receive [bi] his communication and meaning, 
and [c] of translating his words and signs into experienced meaning that 
[ci] matches at least those aspects of his awareness that are most 
important to him at the moment, [d] 'It [the synthesis of a through c] is an 
experiencing of the consciousness ‘behind’ another's outward 
communication, but [e] with continuous awareness that this consciousness 
is originating and proceeding in the other.  
 
  Above, Barrett-Lennard defines resonance as a moment-to-moment deliberate 
‘desire to know’ another person’s present experience. In itself, this here-and-now 
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moment-to-moment understanding is an experience, which one is aware of, in the 
manner of attention, as being another’s experience (nothing gets fused, or needs to be 
defused). Finally, the empathizer’s attention, or awareness, has two foci: 1) verbal and 
non-verbal behaviour (Batson’s ‘cues’) which must be translated into an ‘experienced 
meaning’; and 2) another’s experience beyond this behaviour. That is, it involves a 
reaching out to the ‘meaning’ of the behaviour, the experience that brought the 
behaviour about, or, in his terminology, another’s ‘consciousness’. This attention must 
be enough for the empathizer to ‘form a sense or perception’ of another’s current 
experience, as with reception experiences, that is partly faithful (accurate) to the 
foreground of the empathee’s experience. 
  His description of an experiential understanding can be interpreted in two 
manners. First, it can be seen as a simulative experience, as with perspective-taking 
and inference from behaviour. In the end, he does emphasize a process, and one which 
uses ‘cues’ and ‘translates’ these cues into experience.  Therefore, one could use the 
cues to imagine another’s experience in an intellectual reasoned manner. For Bachelor 
(1988), Barrett-Lennard’s empathy test taps precisely into this intellectual type of 
understanding.  
  Nevertheless, for the empathizer’s experience to amount to an ‘experiential’ 
type of understanding, this intellectual act would have to involve other experiential 
sides as well (sensitive, emotional), even if merely provoked as a consequence of the 
imaginative act. Otherwise the experiential quality of the definition would be lost.  
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The alternative interpretation accommodates this more experiential side: for 
Gladstein (1983), Barrett-Lennard’s understanding is an affective empathy-as-
responding experience.  I would like to offer yet another alternative interpretation, 
more in line with phenomenological views. As I understand Barrett-Lennard’s claims, 
there is an emphasis on our ability to reach out to receive both ‘communication and 
meaning’; on knowing another ‘consciousness’; on forming a ‘sense or perception’; on 
an experiential here-and-now moment-to-moment knowing; and on the necessity of a 
present awareness, that seems to amount to the phenomenological conception of 
empathy. 
  That is, ‘experientially understanding’ someone could be achieved by the 
empathy-as-knowing experience of gaining access to another’s present experience 
directly. This is a ‘how’, a process, that must be distinguished from the formerly 
considered intellectual meanings of empathy-as-knowing, and it is not quite an 
affective, sympathetic or contamination response. It is explored in the next section. 
 
  Direct Empathy 
 
Direct empathy is perhaps an experience very similar to the experience of the 
perceiver who is not aware of the reasoning behind his/ her quick inference from 
behaviour. Yet, the underlying models are conceptually very different. Simulation 
models stipulate that one only has access to other people’s behaviour. That is, people 
are seen as separated, “isolated” (Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003) from each other, 
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as if they were tightly sealed opaque boxes. Thus, to know what is inside the other 
box, one must simulate its content (explicitly or implicitly), and assume it as another’s 
experience. The ‘reasoning’ is conceptually necessary to explain how the percept or 
cue becomes meaningful, and thereby the act transformed into an access to another 
separate inner mind. This is how the gap between individuals is surmounted. This 
transforms empathy-as-knowing into an imaginative, exclusively personal act. Social 
understandings are always ‘intellectual’, step-wise individual processes, for simulation 
theorists.  
The phenomenological model allows us to look at empathy from a fresh perhaps 
enlightening angle. It is there argued that people are not separated from each other by 
a non-transposable barrier; and that the world can be given to oneself directly. 
Because the box is neither sealed nor opaque, a separate, meaning-making, individual, 
detached process is not required.  As a consequence of this epistemological stance, it is 
proposed that there is a way of knowing someone else’s experience, sometimes called 
empathy, that is not exclusively subjective; nor does it involve inference or projection 
or reasoning or the other 'intellectual' processes (it is not mediated by any of these 
acts, it is not a step-by-step process). Instead, people have direct access to others 
(behaviour and mind), and thus perceive another’s meaningful never-purely-inner 
experience directly. That is, empathy is argued to be grounded upon a direct route: the 
intersubjective underlying link between individuals. Empathic understandings are 




This is why this experience is here called direct empathy. It is not because it does 
not involve neural activation or spread of information, and all that implies. In 
phenomenology, it goes without saying that experiences are both embodied 
(experiences of a body), and situated (experiences of a body in a particular place). 
Direct empathy is no exception. But the mechanism behind interpersonal 
understandings is explained as a direct access to other minds. This view is then 
incompatible with more cognitive standpoints: either people are separated from each 
other, and must simulate another’s experience; or they are connected, and may 
directly know it. 
 Direct empathy is an intersubjective, embodied, situated, direct knowing. It is to, 
there-and-then, directly experience another’s unfolding present experience (Depraz, 
2008, 2001; Gallagher, 2007; Gurmin, 2007; Hart, 1999; Prinz, 2006; Scheler, 1913; 
Stein, 1917/1989; Thompson, 2001; Zahavi, 2008b; 2007; 2001).  (Depraz, 2008, 2001; 
Gallagher, 2007; Gurmin, 2007; Hart, 1999; Prinz, 2006; Scheler, 1913; Stein, 
1917/1989; Thompson, 2001; Zahavi, 2008b; 2007; 2001). One experiences another’s 
meaningful experience, and simultaneously5 knows that this is the experience of the 
target, without the necessity of, say, an additional discrimination between self and 
other. One needs not to aposteriori assume (project, infer, attribute, hypothesize) that 
one’s simulation perhaps translates the other’s experience, because the empathic 
experience is informative of another’s present experience at the outset, at once.  
                                                 
5
 From a phenomenological viewpoint, the term ‘simultaneous’ applied here should not be read as implying a separate 
process. Rather, the empathized experience, its meaning, and the knowledge this experience is another’s 
experience, as intrinsic parts of the whole, of the overall empathic experience. 
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It is most often exemplified with descriptions of direct perceptive acts, but 
experiencing and perceiving are not such distinctive, separate phenomena in 
phenomenology. Perceiving is in itself an experience, grounded on the notion of 
intersubjectivity. Through direct perceptive acts, one simultaneously sees another’s 
behaviour and its meaning; this is, in itself, an intersubjective experience. Hence, one 
directly knows another’s meaningful experience “not by inference, but directly, as a 
sort of primary ‘perception’” (Scheler, 1913, p. 10). This ability is present from infancy, 
when already “in a non-mentalizing way, I am able to see meaning, intention, and 
emotions in the actions of others, and in their gestures or facial expressions” 
(Gallagher, 2007, p. 354). That is, one does not necessarily imagine the happiness, nor 
imitates the smile, nor catches the other’s emotion. One just directly and immediately 
senses (perceives, experiences) that the other is happy, and perhaps simultaneously 
smiling.   
In Batson’s exposition, where meanings of empathy-as-knowing are restricted to 
simulation theories, there is no room for a ‘non-intellectual’ form of knowledge-
gaining. On the other hand, phenomenology, by accepting that self and other are 
embodied, embedded and minded, and in direct relationship with each other and with 
the world, contends that people may have a non-mediated (hence direct) access to 
another’s ongoing experience. The divergence between these approaches is 
conceptual, and process-related; but it is also a fundamental epistemological and 




 In this section, I wish to leave you with the thought that there is an empathic 
knowing which is said to be gained directly, rather than intellectually; and 
intersubjectively, rather than subjectively. Since I dedicate the greater part of this 
thesis to describing this experience, and building a case for its further investigation, I 
hope that this serves as a sufficient introduction for the time being. 
  In summary, I have shown how empathy-as-knowing can be seen as both a direct 
way of knowing someone’s experience (directly experiencing it, directly understanding 
it), but also as an intellectual way of knowing (perspective-taking, or explicit simulation; 
inference from behaviour; inference from felt-feeling, or implicit simulation; analogy; 
and intellectually understanding). This is one side of the coin of possible meanings of 
empathy. The other is about conceptions of empathy as a response to someone’s 
experience.  
 
Meanings of Empathy-as-Responding 
 
  Empathy is often confused with sympathy. The Oxford dictionary online further 
adds that these are to be distinguished, because empathy is understanding someone’s 
state (empathy-as-knowing), and sympathy amounts to feeling pity for another person 
(empathy-as-responding).   
  In the next sections, I discuss how, in academic psychology literature, many (if not 
all) meanings of empathy-as-responding can be said to be sympathetic responses to 
another’s known experience; and how these meanings include phenomena other than 
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pity (e.g., Batson, 2009; 1997; 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Scheler, 1913). I 
continue by discussing in more detail a few of these meanings. 
 
  Empathy as a sympathetic responsive emotion 
 
  The particular quality of the emotional response appears to be of primary 
importance for someone who is on the responding side of the coin.  Most psychological 
meanings of empathy-as-responding are distinguished by the quality of the experienced 
emotional response. It is the emotional quality of that response which decides whether 
the subject is empathizing with another person or not. That is, empathy-as-responding 
contemporary researchers are usually not interested in the way one’s responsive 
emotional reaction comes about6. They are not so interested in the ‘how’ (as those 
belonging to the empathy-as-knowing group), but in the ‘what’ (in the qualities of the 
emotional response, in the content of these responses).  
                                                 
6 Hoffman (2000) is an exception. He is also concerned with processes, with underlying mechanisms. His 
five distinctive modes of ‘empathic arousal’ (reactive cry; emotional distress; quasi-egocentric empathic 
distress; veridical empathic distress; and empathy/compassion) are ever increasingly more 
developmentally mature and complex responses, linked to particular ways of knowing (mimicry, classical 
conditioning; automatic analogy; deliberated analogy; and perspective-taking). In the light of my present 
reasoning, it could be said that, in Hoffman’s theory, someone’s sympathetic response (empathic arousal) 
varies in function of the way one came to know that experience. For instance, if one mimics another’s 
behavior, one reactively cries; and one feels compassion when one assumes another’s perspective. 
Hoffman’s (2000, p.4) ‘empathic arousal’ is “more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own”, as 
with Preston & Waal’s ‘true empathy’. For him, the first ‘empathic’ level is a “passive, involuntary affective 
response, based on the pull of surface cues, and requires the shallowest level of cognitive processing. This 
simple form of empathic distress is important, however, precisely because it shows that humans are built in 
such a way that they can involuntarily and forcefully experience another’s emotions” (Hoffman, 2000, p.5). 
Yet, the quality of the response (distress against compassion) is of primordial importance, the quality of the 
emotion is of essence. 
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  For instance, Batson, Early and Salvarini (1997) propose that an ‘imagine-other’ 
process (a subtype of perspective-taking) is responsible for an ‘empathic’ response 
(ratings for sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, tender, and moved); whilst an 
‘imagined-self’ process (a subtype of perspective-taking) would provoke a non-empathic 
emotional distress response (ratings for alarmed, grieved, troubled, distressed, upset, 
disturbed, worried, perturbed). If the subject responded with a ‘positive’ affective 
response, then ‘empathy’ was experienced; and if the subject responded with a 
‘negative’ affective response, than the subject was not sympathizing, but rather 
emotionally distressed.  
  Therefore, for Batson (2009; 2002; 1997; 1996), empathy is synonymous with 
sympathy (‘sympathetic’ and ‘compassion’ adjectives). It is a very particular type of 
responsive emotion (‘positive’ feelings, other-oriented, congruent with the target’s 
imagined experience/ situation), that is to be distinguished, by function of the quality of 
the responsive emotion, from a non-empathic reaction (‘negative’ feelings, self-oriented, 
congruent with another’s experience/ situation). 
  Conceiving empathy as an emotion was, for me, at first, the most puzzling of 
empathy’s meanings, and, I believe, a phenomenon found only in psychology. This was 
because in emotion theories that I was acquainted with neither empathy, nor sympathy, 
figured as emotions (Damásio, 1999; 1994; Eckman, 1999; Plutchik, 1982; Russell, 1980). 
 There are, however, exceptions, such as Parrott (2001), for whom sympathy, 
compassion, caring and pity do figure in the listing, as tertiary emotions (though note 
how empathy is still absent from this listing). Tertiary emotions are higher-order 
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emotions, more cognitively complex and associated with moral judgments of value.  It is 
more or less in Parrot’s sense that Eisenberg (2000) justifies her understanding of 
sympathy and empathy as emotions. Empathy and sympathy are for her emotional 
responses ethically ‘congruent’ with another’s experience, they have a moral value.  
  I argue that empathy-as-responding equates to Scheler’s conception of sympathy
For Scheler (1913, p.6), sympathy is “essentially a reaction”, an affective reaction to 
someone else’s experience, associated with moral functioning. Secondly, the set of 
phenomena that Scheler identifies as examples of sympathy (community of feelings, 
fellow-feeling, emotional infection and emotional identification) amount to the 
meanings of empathy-as-responding in Psychology7. Those interested in empathy-as-
responding phenomena are, for me, interested in sympathetic phenomena - empathy 
and sympathy being confused terms, as the oxford dictionary highlights. 
 
  Congruent responsive emotions: pity, sympathetic concern, emotional distress and 
sympathetic joy 
 
 There are many kinds of emotional responses being studied in the empathy-as-
responding literature, though their labels are usually particular to each theory. For 
                                                 
7 The only sympathetic phenomenon identified by Scheler that is absent from psychology empathy-as-
responding studies is the phenomenon of ‘community of feelings’. This is even a common folk psychology 
meaning of sympathy. It illustrates, for instance, the experience of supporting another’s cause, that is, of 
sympathizing with another’s cause, of sharing another’s views. During these experiences, there is a 
common or single intentional object (the cause) towards which two people feel similarly. It cannot amount 
to the psychological phenomenon of emotional distress because theoretically, in psychology, distress is 
seen as a self-oriented non-sympathetic or ethical response, in contrast with Scheler’s conception of 
community of feelings. 
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example, for Batson (2009) pity is equivalent to the non-‘empathetic’ (non-sympathetic) 
phenomenon of emotional distress. Conversely, Eisenberg’s (2000) ‘sympathy’ is a 
particular kind of emotional response that consists of “feelings of sorrow or concern for 
the other” (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009, p.72). Sympathy is thus composed of the 
experience of pity (sorrow for another), and of the experience of sympathetic concern 
(concern for the welfare of another).  These are to be further distinguished from the 
empathic  emotional distress reactions (“self-focused, aversive affective reaction to the 
apprehension of another’s emotion, associated to a desire to alleviate one’s own, but not 
the other’s distress”, Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009, p.72). 
  Thus,  in contrast with Batson,  for whom pity and distress are non-sympathetic 
phenomena, for Eisenberg (2000) and Hoffmann (2000) pity is a sympathetic response; 
and emotional distress is a developmental antecedent of sympathy, a sympathy-to-be 
phenomenon.  I adopt their perspective here. 
  Pity and sympathetic concern are particular forms of responses, in which the 
personal affective response is a negative emotion, usually qualified as ‘congruent’ with 
another’s known negative situation/ experience. As I understand it, this congruency 
means simply that the valences of self-other experiences match, say being proud 
(hypothetically a positive emotion) for someone’s achievement (hypothetically a positive 
event). This is what makes of these responses ethical emotions. 
  In psychology, this congruency is usually opposed to the criterion of similarity, in 
one’s differentiation of types of sympathetic responses. On the one hand there are 
congruent responses that equate to Scheler’s fellow-feelings; and on the other hand 
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there are similar responses.  In the having of a responsive similar emotion, the subject 
must experience an emotional state that is very similar, if not equal, to another’s 
experience, say, feeling happy too, rather than proud. Indeed, Eisenberg reserves the 
term ‘empathy’ to describe an experience that is not only congruent but also similar to 
that of another (happy), and ‘sympathy’ is used to describe congruent non-similar 
affective responses (proud). Once more, the importance of the quality of the emotion 
transpires in this division. 
  Hitherto, I distinguished several affective responses, all of which are, in terms of 
valence, negative emotions (pity, concern, distress).  Since psychology studies about 
empathy-as-responding are usually performed in the context of another’s traumatic 
negative experiences, we would probably have some difficulty in finding descriptions of 
Scheler’s sympathetic ‘joy-with-him’ (Stein, 1917, p.14), an example of a fellow-feeling.  
  For Scheler, the valence of the emotion is not a core discrimination criterion. 
Rather, sympathetic responses can occur in either positive or negatively valenced 
experiencing contexts. I came up with the expression sympathetic joy to designate a 
congruent positive response, because it suggests the valence of the experience, its 
interpersonal sense, and the phenomenon from which it is a derivative. An example is 
the hypothetical pride directed towards another’s achievements. 
  In summary,  as examples of sympathetic congruent responses, there is pity, 
sympathetic joy and sympathetic concern . Emotional distress and pity sometimes are not 
considered as ‘empathic’ responses (Batson); and emotional distress is usually taken as 
an egocentric response across approaches, and belittled as a non-moral - hence not 
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really sympathetic - response. It is, for me, in contrast with the remainder of ‘congruent’ 
affective responses, possibly rather a similar response. One becomes distressed too.  
 
  Altruistic and Egotistic experiences 
 
  What binds together pity, sympathetic joy and sympathetic concern is that they 
are about the experience of ‘feeling for’ another person and their experience.  On the 
other hand, emotional distress is commonly described as ‘self-oriented’, or self-focused 
response. Therefore, psychologists also discriminate emotional reactions in terms of 
their intentional object (oneself, for emotional distress experiences; and another person, 
for sympathetic experiences). However, in this field, the intentional object criterion 
appears to be the fruit of an underlying ethical judgment of value (in some cases more 
explicitly than others).  
  Indeed, those studying empathy-as-responding are partly concerned with that 
which is responsible for the occurrence of ethical feelings and behaviours, and this 
connection is sometimes understood in the light of Darwin’s theory. There is also an 
echo of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s reflection about the noble savage in these empathy-as-
responding theories. For instance, Batson formulates his empathy-altruism hypothesis in 
the light of these theories. For him, emotional distress is associated with egotistic self-
oriented behaviour, whereas ‘empathy’ (compassion, sympathy) is associated with 
altruistic other-oriented prosocial behaviour. Those who are compassionate towards 
someone else’s suffering are not seeking to promote their immediate survival, they are 
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not ‘egotistical’, they are the noble savages; whereas those who get very upset by 
another’s suffering, are fighting for their own individual survival, they are the bad 
savages.  
  There is a clear judgment of value, and an ethical judgement, associated with this 
classification (distress is egotistic and bad; and sympathy is altruistic and good); and it is 
this ethical judgment that enables me to make sense of the prompt dismissal of 
emotional distress and pity as examples of sympathetic reactions in his approach. 
  On the other hand, emotional distress and sympathy are much more closely 
connected in Hoffman’s (2000, p.6/7) developmental approach to sympathy. Here, 
sympathy is said to evolve from a largely automatic, involuntary and passive innate 
distress reaction. Although his criterion is not ethical, but developmental, in a way, the 
judgement of value is there too. The ‘other-orientedness’ of the response, and its 
implicit altruistic ‘good’ connotation, is fundamental. It is said that only infantile people 
feel distressed; whereas more mature people feel compassion instead. One needs to 
‘educate’ the bad primitive savage within oneself so that moral altruistic behaviour can 
be developed. Robert Trivers, with his studies about reciprocal altruism in the animal 
kingdom, might have something to say about this developmental and ethical judgement. 
I would like to side with him, I drop the issue as tangential to this thesis. 
  Either way, it is the sympathetic emotional response to another’s known state 
that is prone to ethical considerations, and is associated with moral development 




Similar responses: identification, contagion, imitation 
 
  Identification is an affective response to another’s known experience, associated 
formerly with analogy-as-knowing. It is one of Scheler’s (1913, p.12) sympathetic 
phenomena (“true emotional identification”).  The qualities of this response are very 
similar to those of contagion experiences. Indeed, for Scheler (1913, p.18), identification 
is a “heightened form” of contagion. Since contagion is a more recurrent phenomenon in 
the literature, and across psychology areas, it is to the latter that I will dedicate a greater 
attention. 
  For many researchers empathy is, or involves, what Scheler calls emotional 
infection, and is nowadays commonly called emotional contagion. An example of its 
lived experience follows: 
You might enter a bar and be swept over by the jolly atmosphere. A 
distinctive feature of what is known as emotional contagion is that you 
literally catch the emotion in question (Scheler, 1954, p. 15). It is transferred 
to you. It becomes your own emotion. Indeed you can be infected by the 
jolly or angry mood of others without even being aware of them as distinct 
individuals. (Zahavi, 2008b, p.516) 
 
  Contagion is the experience of being contaminated by an overall emotional 
atmosphere; or, as usually studied in psychology, by other people’s present emotional 
states.  In order to be contaminated by another’s present state, one must at least have 
perceived the other’s state in some way, even if subliminally (Gallese, 2003). Thus, it is a 
response and one which follows an inaugural implicit or explicit knowing moment, even 
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when this knowing and responding both happen beyond awareness, when these are not 
part of the ‘conscious’ lived experience. 
  Contagion is even defined as an ‘unconscious’ responsive emotional phenomenon 
in most neurocognitive theories. It is about “sharing emotions without self-awareness 
(…) total identification without discrimination between one’s feelings and those of the 
other’s” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p.75).  In brief, this approach defines contagion as an 
unconscious, automatic response that translates the existence of a personal experience 
that is similar, or even ‘totally’ equal, to another’s current experience. During contagion 
experiences, subject and the object’s ‘representations’ are thought to overlap in terms 
of “cognitions, feelings, and behaviour” (van Baaren, Decety, Dijksterhuis, van der Leij & 
van Leeuvwen, 2009, p.33).  
  Contagion researchers commonly backup their empathy theories on cross-species 
studies of emotional contagion, social imitation, and the work of audiovisuomotor 
neurons/ mirror neurons (van Baaren et al., 2009; Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Decety & 
Jackson, 2006, 2004; Dinstein, Thomas, Behrmann & Heeger, 2008; Gallese, 2003; 
Goldman, 2006; Hatfield et al., 2009; Preston & Waal, 2002). In short, a team of 
researchers, while experimenting on macaque monkeys, found that there was some 
neurons who were active both when performing a goal-directed action, as well as when 
observing it being performed by another monkey or person. They called them mirror, or 
audiovisuomotor, neurons. 
  Since this discovery, there has been a boom in research about mirror neurons. 
During mirror neuron activation, neuropsychological contagion researchers argue that 
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the subject literally experiences another’s emotions for oneself; one ‘feels as another 
does’, or, at least, a “weaker version of the same emotion” (van Baaren, 2009, p.32).  
  This similarity in the subject’s and object’s neural network activation is, as 
remarked, often read as a sign of one’s merging with the other person, one’s 
“entanglement” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.56) with another person, to the extreme 
extent that the observer becomes unable to distinguish that which is a personal, from 
that which is another’s experience. There is no self-other ‘discrimination’, in these 
theories, they claim, because a similar network of neurons (mirror neurons) is 
automatically activated during a perceptive act. This is an interpretation of a neural 
activation that is refuted by more phenomenology-informed theories (Thompson, 2001). 
   In some models, contagion is associated with the experience of covert or overt 
imitation, two concepts which have been said to be “sometimes defined in overlapping 
terms” (Hess & Blairy, 2001, p.130). An example of such a model is proposed by Hatfield 
et al. (2009, p.26). They argue that, as a consequence of the linear stepwise process of 
initially automatically mimicking another’s visible observed behaviour, a feedback 
process occurs. This feedback shapes the empathizer’s experience to match that of the 
empathized person. Therefore, first empathizers see behaviour, secondly they mimic 
that behaviour, thirdly they become contaminated, and finally they would be “able to 
feel themselves into those other emotional lives”.   
  Contagion and imitation are, objectively speaking, a personal response to 
perceived stimuli. They correspond to a possible meaning of empathy-as-responding, 
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and one of Scheler’s sympathetic phenomena. Through contagion and/or mimicry, one 
responsively feels an emotion that is similar to what the other person is experiencing.  
  For Scheler, these are to be distinguished from direct empathic experiences, 
because there is nothing in contamination that reveals the otherness of the 
contaminated felt experience. Its ‘cause’ is not even necessarily a person or another’s 
genuine experience. Therefore, it can only become a source of interpersonal 
understanding in an intellectual manner, such as via the attribution process proposed by 
Jabbi et al. (2007) – unlike direct empathy. Indeed, phenomenologists accept that, for 
these responses to become a way of knowing someone else’s experience, it would 
indeed have to be via a reasoned act based on, say, “causal considerations” (Scheler, 
1913, p.15) – precisely as described by implicit simulation theories. 
As described by neuropsychological stepwise models, every step of the experience 
follows in a cause-effect manner, with several “mediating” factors (van Baaren et al., 
2009). Contagion is a starting point, and, via the mechanisms such as ‘inference from 
felt-feeling’ and self-other discrimination, one achieves some form of ‘intellectual’ social 
understanding. This is how mirror neuron activation and contagion become a way of 
“understanding the meaning and intentions of observed actions, learning by imitation, 
feeling empathy, formation of a ‘theory of mind’ (…)” (Dinstein et al., 2008, p.13). One 
has to feel for oneself to be able to know what another person is feeling. 
  In brief, the contamination unconscious response is transformed into a mediated 
way of knowing another’s experience. This kind of sympathetic response, based upon 
covert mimicry and/ or contagion, is consequently said to be a rudimentary and 
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automatic kind of empathy-as-knowing, lower-order empathy, lower-level mindreading, 
or basic empathy. Its higher-level counterpart is perspective-taking, or explicit 
simulation. Both acts involve inference, and are mediated, in the sense of the 
‘intellectual’ meanings of empathy-as-knowing as outlined in this chapter.   
  Phenomenologically speaking, contagion is a phenomenon that must be 
distinguished from an empathic knowing. It should not be confused with empathy, not 
even when used as the grounds of an ‘inference from felt-feeling’ type of knowing 
(Scheler, 1913; Stein, 1917; Zahavi, 2008b).  For phenomenologists, empathy is the 
having of an experience that is, at the outset, another’s, given with its otherness. This 
empathic knowing occurs at the most at a pre-reflective level (rather than an 
unconscious one); is not explicated in a stepwise manner; nor experienced as a personal, 
or a merging, or a sympathetic experience; and is never a source of an inferential 
knowledge of another’s hypothetical experience (e.g., Depraz, 2001; Stein, 1917; 
Thompson, 2001). Contagion and the phenomenological meaning of empathy-as-
knowing are two conceptually distinctive phenomena. 
  In non-neurocognitive approaches, contagion is generally not transformed into a 
knowing act. For example, Eisenberg (2000) and Hoffman (2000) would see in the 
neuropsychological illustrative examples of contagion a prototype of adults’ compassion, 
that goes under the name of empathy, in Eisenberg’s theory; and under the name of 
emotional distress, if Hoffman’s theory.  For them, ‘contagion’ is thought to represent 
the beginning of an emotional response that may evolve into feelings of sympathy, pity, 
empathic concern, and the like. This is closer to Scheler’s perspective on sympathy.  
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  I hold that awareness, of lack of it, should not change the essence of a 
phenomenon (just think of subliminal perception, which, despite its automaticity, is still 
rightfully called perception). For me, the phenomenological and psychotherapeutic 
contagion and identification (sympathetic, affective, unconscious or conscious 
phenomenon); the developmental distress or empathy (sympathetic, affective, 
unconscious or conscious phenomenon), and the neurocognitive psychological 
contagion (unconscious responsive emotional phenomenon) are the same phenomenon, 
and defined by virtue of the similarity and automaticity of the response - though labelled 
differently across theories, related to other variables in different manners. This typifies 
for me the dialogue that currently exists between the several corners of the big 
conceptual room called empathy.  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
  Encountering the multiplicity of theoretical meanings of empathy, I felt the 
necessity of organizing these meanings to contextualize my research. Drawing upon 
Batson’s (2009) argument, I have split these meanings into two main groups of 
phenomena: those relative to ways of knowing another’s experience (perspective-taking 
and inference from behaviour; inference from felt-feeling; analogy; understanding; and 
direct empathy); and those relative to ways of responding to someone’s experience 
(sympathetic concern; emotional distress; pity; sympathetic joy; identification; 
emotional contagion; and imitation).  
 49 
 
  The responding-knowing organizing strategy seemed a necessary procedure, but it 
is not exempt from criticism. At times, this division depends upon the angle one looks at 
the phenomenon, or how one values one aspect against another. As noted, ‘knowing’ 
phenomena can sometimes be conceptualized as responses, and vice versa. This means 
that the line that separates empathy-as-knowing from empathy-as-responding is not 
clear cut.  
  By reflecting upon the reasons that led me to consider a given experience as being 
about knowing or responding, I realized that the purpose (having the intention of 
knowing another’s experience) or the result (having the experience of knowing the 
other’s experience) of the empathizer’s activity is important. That is, when the 
empathizer’s objective, or when the act’s result, is knowledge-related, then these 
activities become, for me, a way of knowing.  
  On the other hand, a response does not necessarily have a purpose; and, in this 
thesis, if it does have a purpose, it is not a knowledge-pursuing goal, since that would 
make it an empathy-as-knowing experience.  Similarly, if it does have a clear outcome, it 
is not a knowledge-related outcome, since that would transform the experience into a 
way of knowing.  
  The listing of meanings offered in this chapter is not intended to be exhaustive. 
There are more meanings of empathy, such as those relative to empathy as a 
communication skill fostering therapeutic alliance. My objective was to identify each of 
those phenomena that have previously been named ‘empathy’; and which have, at 
some point of my research, demanded some theoretical revision.  
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  It seems important at this point to have demonstrated that experts understand 
empathy in very dissimilar ways, sometimes even opposing ones; and use the same 
labels to describe different phenomena, as well as different labels to describe the same 
phenomenon. And, to complicate the picture, some authors argue that empathy is all of 
these things, some of these, or yet even another thing.  ‘Empathy’ is a (too) big drawer, 
even when restricting the search to psychology. 
  Secondly, I wanted to emphasise that, when researching empathy, this multiplicity 
of understandings, explanations and definitions is the first complicated matter at hand. 
Each meaning is associated with distinctive lived experiences, underlying mechanisms, 
and psychological states. Consequently, each probably relates differently to other 
psychological variables – such as with Jones et al.’s study. It is thus necessary to 
recognize what each of these phenomena is, what it is named in competing approaches, 
and to situate our own understanding amidst this chaos. I hope that, in this manner, I 
have helped you find your own standpoint, and hence more easily relate to what is 
proposed in this thesis. A glossary follows, spelling out the meaning of each 
phenomenon that was mentioned in this chapter; and one which might be useful 
throughout this thesis. 
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Glossary of Theoretical Meanings of Empathy 
 
Analogy: assuming that another person has an experience that is similar to one’s own, 
via the establishment of similarities between subject and object, or their experiences or 
situations. Sometimes synonymous with projection, and associated with identification 
responses. It is seen as an act of knowing act in this thesis. 
Contagion/ Contamination: personal emotional response of automatically catching 
another’s experience, exclusively because the other person is feeling it; and is associated 
with the ‘inference from felt-feeling’ act in neurocognitive theories. Plausibly equivalent 
to some developmental concepts (e.g., emotional distress). It is seen as a response in 
this thesis. 
Direct Empathy: Intersubjective, moment-to-moment, embodied, situated direct 
perceiving or experiencing of another’s present experience. It is seen as a knowing act in 
this thesis. 
Emotional distress: personal, negatively valenced, emotional reaction to the sight of 
another’s suffering. As a developmental concept, it is often qualified as a ‘congruent’ 
and ‘egotistic’ response (felt because of another, but not for another), and is sometimes 
synonymous with pity and empathy. It is seen as a response in this thesis. 
Identification: personal affective response to the empathee’s experience that is similar 
to the empathee’s known experience. It is close to the concept of contamination and 
associated with analogy-as-knowing. It is seen as a response in this thesis. 
Imitation: Explicit (behavioural) or implicit (activation of a neural network responsible 
for the behaviour) imitation of another’s expressive behaviour; and associated with the 




Inference from behaviour: inferring from another’s visible behaviour that which the 
other might be possibly experiencing. Synonymous with empathic accuracy. It is seen as 
a knowing act in this thesis. 
Inference from felt-feeling: inferring from one’s own contamination experience that 
which another might be possibly experiencing. It is seen as a knowing act in this thesis. 
Pity: personal, other-oriented , congruent,  emotionally negatively valenced, response, 
consisting of feelings of sorrow, pity, or the like. It is feeling for another. It is seen as a 
response in this thesis. 
Perspective-taking: conjecture, imagination, or intellectual simulation of another’s 
experience. Particular cases are imagining the world from another’s perspective 
(imagine-other); and or oneself in another’s situation (imagine-self perspective-taking). 
Synonymous with role-taking and ‘cognitive empathy’.  It is seen as a knowing act in this 
thesis. 
Sympathetic concern: personal, other-oriented, congruent emotionally negatively 
valenced response, consisting of feelings of concern for the welfare of another. It is 
‘feeling for’ another. It is seen as a response in this thesis. 
Sympathetic Joy: other-oriented congruently emotionally positive response, consisting 
of feelings of joy and the like. It is ‘feeling for’ another. It is seen as a response in this 
thesis  
Sympathy: personal, emotional, similar of congruent response to another’s known 
situation or experience. It is seen as a response in this thesis 
Understanding: intellectual, partly interpretative, knowing of another’s experience. Can 
result from any of empathy-as-knowing experiences, or be synonymous with any of 
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                                                                Chapter II 
The aim of this chapter is to describe a study about the understanding of ‘empathy’ of 





The ability to be clearer about a meaning transforms someone into a good 
communicator. To be truthful, I sometimes have not felt like a good communicator 
when asked about my research theme (empathy). People’s subsequent topics of 
conversation were the evilness of human nature; mind-reading and its potentials; the 
in-session8 manipulation of clients’ behaviour and perceptions; the marvellous 
experience of being transformed by a work of art; objects’ affordances; the Dalai 
Lama’s infinite wisdom, insight and compassion….  
And it was always so unexpected, diverse and puzzling that I even stopped 
talking about it, or intentionally avoided the word empathy. Simultaneously, I felt 
impelled to understand the implications of this observation in the work I was 
developing. This means that the study that is described here is a consequence of the 
literature review presented in Chapter I, as well as a consequence of personal 
reflections about my daily experience with the word under study. I became interested 
in exploring ‘non-experts’, or lay people’s, understandings of ‘empathy’.  
What does it mean to answer, in a survey, that one believes oneself to be a very 
empathic person?  Would it mean that the person in question sees (or wants to be 
seen, to accommodate for social desirability effects) oneself as someone who usually 
worries about other people? Or someone who cries at every encounter with other 
people’s misery? Or someone who often spends time imagining what another person 
                                                 
8 ‘Neurolinguistic programming therapy’, or so I was told its name was, amidst my disbelief that a therapist 
would see in such non-empowering treatment an ethically responsible therapy. 
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may be experiencing (say, a writer)? Someone who is very compassionate and 
forgiving (say, a priest)? Someone who imitates everyone (say, a ‘wanna-be-mime’)?  
In the light of the literature review, claiming oneself to be an empathic person 
could mean any of the above. This is not, for me, just a superficial question. A word 
that can mean almost anything does not mean anything at all, and a study about it is as 
good as nothing. Since I planned to inquire, in the future, about peoples’ empathic 
experiences, I felt the necessity of defending myself from this potential 
misunderstanding, and this possibility of lack of construct validity. This is the main 
reason for the conduct of the study I am about to describe.  
In a very straightforward way, I asked people to write about an empathic event 
from their own experience, and then to define the term empathy. This allowed me to 
interpret the lived experience in the light of an interpretation of the word empathy 





There are also theoretical differences in the meaning of empathy. Batson (2009) 
suggested that so-called ‘empathic’ phenomena can be grouped under two main 
categories: empathy-as-knowing (perspective-taking; inference from behaviour; 
inference from felt-feeling; analogy; understanding; and direct empathy); and 
empathy-as-responding (sympathy; emotional distress; pity; sympathetic joy; 
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sympathetic concern; identification; contagion and imitation).  A summary of each of 
these is provided in Chapter I’s glossary.  
The here adopted knowing-responding organization strategy, at least in this 
thesis, is a theoretical response to this observed multiplicity of meanings of ‘empathy’. 
Its adoption intends to promote the dialogue across research areas and knowledge 
construction; and avoid unnecessary controversy. It is also an example of the most 
common theoretical strategy for dealing with the evidence of empathy’s multiplicity of 
meanings; it is a discriminate, agglomerate strategy. In terms of empirical work, 
alternative strategies are found.   
Some of the empirical studies which investigated empathic experiences avoided 
the term empathy under the suspicion investigated here, that is, that people gave 
meaning to ‘empathy’ in varied distinctive manners.  Instead, researchers explicitly 
inquire about, for example, experiences of understanding another person; and 
subsequently link their results to empathy (e.g., Kerem et al., 2001). Another 
(additional or complementary) strategy is providing participants with a very long 
definition of empathy, such as in Barkham and Shappiro (1988) and in Pistrang, 
Picciotto and Barker (2002), in an attempt to approximate the phenomenon people 
think of, when faced with the word empathy; and the researchers’ understanding of 
the very same word.  
Often then, the issue of the meaning of the word is bypassed, by either avoiding 
the word empathy (and further along the line framing results as being about empathy), 
or by specifying how the word empathy should be interpreted as part of the 
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instructions. Before adopting any of these strategies, I realized I could benefit from 
addressing this difficulty head-on, to inform future research. This means that the study 
in this chapter has a grounding nature, in the sense that, by going to the source of this 
problem, most of my subsequent methodological choices are a direct consequence of 
its findings.  
At least two previous studies have been concerned with how empathy is given 
meaning. One of these studies is Carlozzi, Stein and Barnes’ (2002) research on five 
distinctive ways of defining empathy across psychotherapeutic approaches. Their point 
of departure is realizing that Beck’s cognitive-behavioural theory defines empathy as a 
“process that fosters collaborative alliance” (p.161); Rogers’ experiential-humanistic 
theory as “sensing another person’s feelings as if one were that person” (p.162); and 
Kohut’s psychodynamic theory as “experiencing the inner life of another person while 
retaining objectivity” (p.162). They developed a questionnaire, which was sent to a 
large sample of clinical psychologists (response rate of 556 over 600), aiming to study 
whether the psychotherapists’ conceptions of empathy was consistent with the 
therapeutic approach they identified most with.  
There are two main reasons for considering that this particular study is of only 
partial interest for the present one. First, it is conducted with clinical psychologists. As 
implicitly demonstrated by this paper, considering a clinical psychologist a non-expert 
in empathy is not quite accurate, since it is a word taught, practiced and discussed in 
this area. Hence, Carlozzi et al.’s findings would provide a limited insight into wider 
meanings of empathy. Secondly, most unfortunately, their paper only reports on one 
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main factorial analysis, through which two factors are delineated (‘feeling focused’ and 
‘communication’), that account for only 5% of the total variance, and which have an 
unknown relationship to each of the psychotherapeutic approaches; and three 
excluded factors (for unknown reasons and of unknown nature). Hence, at the most, 
this study alerts us for the possibility of finding conceptions of empathy relative to 
either of these two factors.  
The other study, published by Håkansson and Montgomery (2003), bears a 
greater resemblance with what was done here. It is an analysis of people’s written 
texts about an empathic episode from their own experience; that the authors describe 
as a follow-up of a previous study9, in which they inquired directly about people’s 
definitions of the word empathy.  
Their aim was to find ‘universal’ components in the stories people remember 
when asked to write about an empathy story. In their own wording, they wanted to 
nominate ‘constituents’, that is, “qualities that, in conjunction, form the experience of 
empathy” (p.268) – implicitly suggesting that these qualities are supposedly present in 
“each” (p.273) empathic experience.  In contrast, the present objective was to study 
possible meanings of empathy, possibly only a few among many existing others. Thus, 
whilst my aim was to particularize, they sought ‘universal’ generalized features in 
people’s lived experience texts. However, the empathic experience of a ‘wanna-be-
mime’ is perhaps very distinctive from the experience of the writer, or of the priest.  
For me, people’s stories and qualifying features would probably vary in accordance 
                                                 




with people’s definitions of ‘empathy’, and therefore represent a less than sound basis 
of generalization attempts. Consequently, I primarily wanted to characterize meanings, 
the one aspect which was perhaps behind the qualities manifested in people’s stories. 
These authors attempted to adopt a phenomenological viewpoint (a possible 
basis of comparison), though this was not consistently adopted, either for explaining 
the individual in ontological terms, or their results. For instance, they open their article 
by claiming that empathy “connects two otherwise isolated individuals” (p.267). Given 
that, for Håkansson and Montgomery, empathy is not an intersubjective self-other link, 
but instead a combination of four components (understanding, emotional response, 
similarity impression and felt concern for another), most phenomenologists would 
contest their claim that individuals are ‘isolated’ were it not for empathy. 
Although they did not identify the method adopted for the analysis10, they 
mostly report upon frequencies of easily observable categories (manifest content). 
This was the principal (but not exclusive) essence of their findings: tables of 
frequencies of categories such as the gender of the involved people; and the valence 
of experienced emotions. In conclusion, Håkansson and Montgomery’s study can only 
be indirectly related with the present one, not only in terms of objectives, but also in 




                                                 





This study was an exploratory study that was largely concerned with non-
experts’ (lay people) ways of giving meaning to ‘empathy’. Data were analysed by 
means of an inductive-deductive Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), as described by 
Mayring (2000), and Graneheim and Lundman (2004). In summary, this method is said 
to offer the advantages of quantitative content analysis (theory reference, deductive 
categories, category led, and criteria for reliability and validity), as well as the strengths 
of qualitative analysis (inductive categories, summaries and context analysis). 
In contrast with quantitative content analysis, QCA explores both implicit (how 
is) and explicit (what is) content, forming categories inductively (bottom-up, from data 
to theory) and deductively (top-down, from theory to data). Therefore, categories 
relate to data in more complex, sensitive and qualitative manners. With QCA, the 
analysis becomes grounded in participants’ discourse, rather than in theoretical 
aspects alone, approximating it to other kinds of qualitative research. Through it, I 
identified empirical11 meanings of ‘empathy’, as participants’ themselves explicitly 
defined and exemplified the term; language-in-use; and how these meanings related 
to theoretical meanings of ‘empathy’.   
Qualitative inductive research is said (Morse & Mitcham, 2002) to have two main 
frailties: the pink elephant (the impossibility of bracketing out an idea which has 
previously been pointed out to us); and the conceptual tunnel vision (seeing 
                                                 




everything as linked to the phenomenon under study). Morse and Mitcham further 
argue that prior knowledge and conceptually focused qualitative research does not 
necessarily jeopardize inductive reasoning, because these possible biases can be 
controlled through processes of saturation, replication and verification; by increasing 
sample sizes; by constantly looking for alternative explanations; and by asking critical 
questions about the data. Inductive research can be a systematic process which 
“progresses sequentially from deconstruction of concept analysis of the literature to 
the use of these data as a skeleton, or to using prior knowledge as a scaffold” (p.33).  
Thus, as long as rigorous methodological procedures are installed, an extensive 
prior review of existing information about the object of research does not necessarily 
skew inductive research findings. In this study, and in the remainder of the studies 
conducted for this thesis, the concepts detailed in Chapter I were used as an ever-
evolving skeleton (one which pre-established a few observable dimensions), or as a 
scaffold (a comparative supportive template). This does not mean that the reasoning 
behind became deductive. Rather, it means that the inductive reasoning was guided by 
conceptual concerns and knowledge. I never shaped the findings to fit the concept, 
and always gave priority to the data itself. If there was something in need of change, it 
was my theoretical understanding of a particular feature, and never participants’ 
claims and their inductively derived meaning. 
A rigorous data analysis method that reduced the risk of falling into these biases 
was fundamental here because I wanted to understand how theoretical meanings of 
‘empathy’ were reflected in empirical meanings, while simultaneously remaining open 
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to the appearance of new meanings, of new perspectives. QCA offered this possibility 
for a moderately large sample. It showed how my personal experience with ‘empathy’ 






The opportunity sample of 62 participants was composed of all those who 
anonymously voluntarily completed an online survey. They were all connected in some 
way to the University of Birmingham (students/ former students/ employees), and all 
were informed about the aims of the study and gave their consent.  
Participants had a mean age of 26.6 (SD=10.67) years, ranging from 18 to 62. 
They were mainly females (N=47, 75.8%), British (N=53, 85.5%) and full-time students 
(N=51, 82.3%). There was almost an even number of both undergraduate (N=33, 
54.1%) and postgraduate students (N=29, 45.2%). In terms of area of studies, many 
were psychology students (N=22, 35.5%), though the majority was from a variety of 
other courses, including disciplines such as engineering, philosophy, nursing, theology 
and economics.  Eight participants did not identify their particular area of studies. This 
means there were few working people (N=11, 17.8%); and few non-British (N=9, 






The protocol for this study12  was ethically reviewed and approved. After a pilot 
study, 32 online answers were collected between December 2009 and March 2010; 
and an additional 30 were gathered between June and July of 2010.  
Participants were recruited by advertising the online survey’s link in the 
participants’ recruitment website (usually credit-paid psychology students); in the 
subjects’ recruitment day (non-psychology students that were monetarily rewarded, 
by the organization committee, and guided to a computer were the link was available 
for immediate use); through the university’s mailing list (non-rewarded participants); 
and in the university’s personal announcements webpage (non-rewarded participants). 
This last webpage add was explicitly directed to “non-psychology students 
(undergraduate or postgraduate) and staff”. The interest was in gathering higher 
amount of answers from non-psychologists, because the preliminary analysis, 
conducted mid-way data collection, suggested that participants’ academic 
backgrounds (psychology or other) might be responsible for significant differences in 




                                                 
12 This study was a variation of another study, to be presented in Chapter IV. 
13 There was a preliminary analysis of findings, disseminated in the form of posters (an example is included 





The instrument used for data collection consisted of a purpose-built online 
survey (Appendix II). I aimed to obtain a wide and rich picture of the variety of 
empathy’s meanings and thereby have a more accurate idea about what to expect, 
when asking people about their empathic experiences. This more standardized data 
collection procedure is appropriate for the analysis of moderately large sets of 
qualitative data, hence suitable for achieving this goal. 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections, preceded by an informative box 
describing the aims of the study. Section A asked for “a story of empathy from your 
own experience”.  It was intended to gather participants’ stories about an empathic 
event they had experienced in the recent past. Section B solicited participants to 
classify the degree of closeness to the other person in their story, if any. This was done 
in two ways. Firstly, via a closed question offering the following randomly presented 
options: Family member; Partner; Friend; Acquaintance14; Strangers; No-one. 
Secondly, via an open-ended question, that asked participants to briefly and 
qualitatively describe the relationship in question.  
                                                 
14 This particular option was included mid-through data collection, as a consequence of a suggestion. In 
retrospect, I regret this choice.  First, changing a standardized data collection instrument mid-way data 
collection is a questionable research procedure. Secondly, the objective of this question was principally to 
have an idea of how the closeness of a relationship was related to participants’ stories and definitions of 
empathy, since it has been said that closeness and/or familiarity both enhance and hinder the experience 
of ‘empathy (’Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003; Hancock & Ickes, 1996; Marangoni, 
Ickes, Garcia & Teng, 1995; Noller, 2006; Preston & Waal, 2002; Pistrang et al., 2002; Vignemont & Singer, 
2006). To study this relationship, I only needed to see if people would write episodes involving strangers, 
one side of the spectrum; any mid-spectrum category; and family members or partners, the other side of 
the spectrum. Hence, I collapsed the categories ‘acquaintance’ and ‘friends’ for the purpose of this 
chapter’s data analysis.   
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Section C consisted of a single question, asking individuals to define empathy, 
with the prompt “what is empathy for you”. Its objective was the gathering of non-
experts’ definitions of empathy; and it was placed after the request for a lived 
experience description in the hope that participants would reflect on their daily use of 
the word, rather than turning towards a dictionary definition.  
Section D asked participants to leave feedback about the experience of 
completing the online interview. It was included for the pilot study, but answers to it 
were interesting, because they provided an overview of the way the individual related 
to the survey, and of their experience of fulfilling the questionnaire, so it was kept 
throughout the study. Finally, section E gathered demographics (age, gender, 




The analysis of participants’ texts followed the Qualitative Content Analysis 
(QCA) guidelines (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Mayring, 2000). The overall analytical 








• Criteria for category formation: ‘meanings of empathy’. 
• Coding rules for theory-driven categories. 
Reading 
• Reading participants’ paired texts (story and definition).  
Category 
formation 
• Re-reading and interactively categorizing data, until coding rules 
for data-driven categories are established and coding rules for 
theory-driven categories are clarified. 
Taxonomy 
creation 
• Development of a taxonomy, hierarchically organizing theory and 








• Composition of a comprehensive coding agenda for cross- 
consistency check; and coding rules revision. 
Recategoriz
ation 
• Final recategorization of data.  
 68 
 
The core interest was the survey’s sections A (stories of empathy) and C 
(definitions of empathy). For these, the starting point was defining the theoretical 
criterion for the formation of categories (short descriptive labels illustrative of 
recurrent meanings), namely, meanings of empathy. Theory-driven categories were 
defined at the outset (Chapter I’s glossary), and the coding rule was to categorize a 
meaning unit as belonging to a category when it described that particular pre-defined 
phenomenon.  
Having these set, the next step was reading participants’ paired texts (story and 
definition), to have an idea of the whole. Then, in a constant reading, re-reading, 
categorizing and reviewing process, additional inductive categories were iteratively 
formed. During this process, both theory-driven and data-driven categories were 
clarified; and their coding rules defined in the light of data. This culminated in the 
creation of the taxonomy (set of hierarchically organized categories), with three levels 
(higher, mid and lower order categories), that is shown in Figure 5. 
Guided by the coding rules of each of these categories, every meaning unit 
(content unit, or constellation of words that relate to the same central meaning), that 
was related to a possible meaning of empathy (deductively or inductively) was then 
categorized. This procedure was followed by the composition of a coding agenda. 
Although Appendix III offers a few examples for each category, it originally consisted of 
a comprehensive listing of every single meaning belonging to that particular category. 
This was done for the purpose of cross-checking the consistency and overall coherence 
of the categorization across accounts.  
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This led to a re-categorization of data, in the light of revised categories and more 
clearly objectified coding rules. In Appendix IV, there are nine randomly chosen 
categorized paired texts (story and definition), illustrating the final outcome of the 
categorization stage. 
Moreover, QCA offered the possibility of assessing the frequencies of each 
category by transforming it into a dummy nominal variable. This allows frequencies to 
be recorded; and for the examination of quantitative statistical relationships between 
categories. Since most of the quantitative data is categorical, the statistical tests used 
(SPSS v.16) were mainly association tests, chosen as appropriate for each case. 
 Finally, I use the participants’ number, preceded by reference symbol (#), to 
identify the person responsible for the quote transcribed from an anonymized 
account; and, at times, fictitious names. Their texts were corrected for minor typing 
misspellings. 
 
Coding specifications and examples 
 
The final taxonomy (Figure 5) consisted of three higher-order categories 
(immediately knowing, intellectually knowing and responding), that further collapsed 
into Batson’s binomial division (empathy-as-knowing and empathy-as-responding). It 
listed empirical meanings of empathy, that is, meanings that were proposed by 





Figure 5: “Hierarchical taxonomy of empirical meanings of empathy” 
 
Both texts were read and analysed together. That is, the definition and the story 
texts were analysed in parallel, so that the content of one was used to illuminate the 
other. Consequently, the analysis is mainly based upon manifest content, but, in many 
circumstances, a manifest content-in-context, that is, in the wider context of two texts 
(story and definition). No answer was excluded as irrelevant/ invalid/ unworthy of 
consideration, and each was valued in a way that attempted to be faithful to the 
participant’s intended meaning.   
• Perceiving: perceptively knowing another's experience 
• Feeling: having an intuitive feeling amount another's experience 
Immediately knowing 
• Analogy: comparison between oneself and another 
• Perspective-taking: imagining another's experience 
• Reasoning: logically determining another's experience, including 
inference from behaviour. 
• Understanding: "understand" and "relate" 
Intellectally knowing                                                                                                                                     
• Sympathy for: 'feeling for' another person, including pity and 
sympathetic joy 
• Sympathetic sharing: feeling as another does, including fellow-feeling 
and contagion-like 
• Impact: reactions to another's experience, including emotional distress 
• Altruistic experiences: willing another's wellfare, including sympathetic 




Lower-order categories, very detailed and grounded in data, were the result of a 
continuous and systematic questioning of coding-related decisions, aimed to avoid the 
pink elephant and the tunnel vision biases. These were excluded from Figure 5, but a 
complete listing of categories, specifying coding rules and examples, is offered in 
Appendix III, so as to clarify the relationship established here between these two 
higher-order levels, lower-order levels and language-in-use. Every meaning unit 
describing a way of knowing or a way of responding was coded.  
 Empathy-as-knowing categories were concerned with categorizing the ‘what’ of 
empathy (knowing another’s experience), but also the ‘how’15, that is, the way 
participants proposed that this knowing came about. As a consequence of the interest 
in the ‘how’, two higher-order categories were established: immediately knowing and 
intellectually knowing (the terms immediate and intellectual referred to this how). 
 An example of intellectually knowing was reporting that “I could imagine the 
speaker's embarrassment” (#12). In this statement, I observed that: 1) another’s 
experience was “embarrassment”; 2) and the knowledge-gaining activity was 
perspective-taking (the associated lower-order category was, in this case, imagine-
other). Then, another’s embarrassment was an imagined one; and this knowing was 
achieved via an intellectual act. Indeed, what linked intellectually knowing categories 
                                                 
15 For a meaning unit to be classified as about knowing, the participant had to literally associate, to the 
experience of knowing another’s described experience, a particular ‘how’. For instance, descriptions of 
how one came to know about another’s situation (e.g., being texted with the news), do not amount to the 
knowing of an experience, but rather to being informed about another’s situation.  This particular type of 
experience amounted to the verbal information contextual category. Furthermore, being verbally told 
about another’s experience was a content included in the contextual category communicated knowledge 
(e.g., she told me she was happy); and another’s described experiences there were not associated with a 
‘how’ were included in the contextual category general knowledge. None of these figures in the taxonomy 
because they were not proposed as a meaning of empathy in definition texts. 
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together was precisely participants’ association of an intellectual act with the knowing 
of another’s experience.  
 The above meaning unit, part of the story text, illustrated well Vivian’s definition 
of empathy: “Empathy is when you can understand how a person is feeling in a certain 
situation and put yourself in their shoes” (#12). That is, for this participant, empathy 
was understanding another person’s experience (understanding as the mid-order 
category) via a perspective-taking mechanism (perspective-taking as the mid-order 
category). Then, the meaning of empathy in both texts converged to a conception of 
empathy as an intellectual way of knowing another person’s experience, and one 
which involved a perspective-talking act. 
 The alternative non-intellectual way of knowing another’s experience was the 
immediately knowing higher-order category. This category was inspired by 
phenomenological theories about the experience of being immediately aware of 
another’s experience in a non-intellectual manner. Since, to my knowledge, no-one has 
ever attempted to empirically study how these experiences were narratively described 
by non-experts, the analysis of this category was a challenging task.  
 Meaning units included in the immediately knowing higher-order category were 
not descriptive of an intellectual experience. For example, they neither illustrated an 
inference from behaviour16, nor an inference from felt-feeling17. I have labelled it as 
immediately knowing, because this study does not seem appropriate to make 
                                                 
16 This amounted to a reasoning experience. 
17 Inference from felt-feeling was an envisaged deductive category, inspired by neuropsychology views of 
the way contagion is used to determine another’s experience, but one which bore no echo in present 
findings; and if it did have manifested itself, it would have amounted to a reasoning experience. 
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theoretical epistemological claims about the possibility of this knowledge being, or not 
being, direct – simply that the knowing appears to be (i.e., is understood to be) 
immediately given to participants.   
 The immediately knowing categories were applied to meaning units which 
portrayed a way of knowing another’s experience18 that happened, as written, 
immediately.  For example, “seeing someone who you care about and who you have 
shared so much with this upset” (#24). From this, I observed that: 1) another’s 
experience was “upset”; 2) and the knowledge-gaining activity was ‘seeing’, that is, 
perceiving (the associated lower-order category was, in this case, perception of 
experiences). That is, another’s distress was a perceived one.  
 The associated definition text mentioned that empathy happened when “you are 
upset because someone you love is crying and upset” (#24). For Andrew (#24), the 
meaning of empathy involved the act of perceiving someone’s distress experience 
(perceiving mid-order category). Therefore, the meaning of empathy converged across 
texts, in that it was proposed that the meaning of empathy involved a perceptive 
knowing act. 
Note that all of these empathy-as-knowing mid-order categories can be argued 
to be an understanding of another’s experience, though one of different natures.  
Consequently, for this study, I opted for an in-vivo19 categorization coding rule for 
                                                 
18 Again, of essence was identifying in writing another’s experience, and associating to this knowing a 
particular non-intellectual ‘how’. For example, plain descriptions of another’s behaviour, or actions, 
counted as the contextual category observed behaviour. 
19 This mid-order category understanding was attributed to the terms ‘understand’ and ‘relate’. These two 
terms have a slightly distinctive connotation, with ‘relate’ closer to an analogical form of understanding. 
However, they co-occurred in 6 out of the total of 7 definitions in which ‘relate’ was observed; hence I 
opted for merging these two in-vivo categories. 
 74 
 
‘understanding’. The use of this term was more frequently connoted as an intellectual 
act, via its association with other intellectually knowing mid-order categories, and it 
was thereby included in the intellectually knowing higher-order category. 
 Finally, there was the higher-order category empathy-as-responding. Responding 
categories were applied to meaning units which illustrated a personal response to 
another’s experience. For these categories too, both the what (responding) and the 
how were important. An example was saying “i felt sorry for him” (#8). From this, I 
observed that 1) one responded to another’s experience; and 2) the response was 
pitying (the associated lower-order category was, in this case, pity).  Congruently, 
Gloria’s (#8) definition text proposed that “empathy is when you feel sorry for someone 
or a group of people” (#8). Therefore, both texts revealed the responding sympathetic 
meaning that empathy had for Gloria.  
Each answer was usually associated with several of these categories.  For 
instance, perspective-taking and pity were two categories through which Gloria (#8) 
defined empathy, in the sense that it was claimed that empathy was a pity experience 
consequent of the act of imagining another’s experience. Hence, the two categories 
(pity and perspective-taking) were necessary to illustrate the way empathy was given 
meaning in that answer.  
 In addition to the above taxonomy, there were additional data-derived 
categories, named contextual categories. These resulted from the analysis of paired 
texts, as well as of the remaining sections of the survey, such as people’s descriptions 
of their relationship with the object of empathy (survey’s section B). They helped 
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characterizing the context in which empathy happened, in these texts. They were 
excluded from the above taxonomy, for clarity sake, but can be found in Appendix III. 
These were: Closeness (perceived closeness to the object of empathy); Fondness 
(affective appreciation of the object of empathy); Familiarity (pre-acquired knowledge 
about the object’s past life experiences); Target’s situation (another’s intentional 
object or situation); Emotional Valence (positive or negative); and Participant’s role 




In general, interpretations of findings were explicated throughout the chapter; 
and exemplified by the use of verbatim quotations from several participants, in order 
to increase the study’s transparency - hence, its trustworthiness.  
Dependability was enhanced by having gathered answers within a relatively short 
interval of time; by having used a standardized questionnaire; by gathering a relatively 
large sample; and by having relatively small amounts of data.  
Nevertheless, transferability may be questionable because, for example, the 
taxonomy developed for the preliminary analysis (Appendix I) had to be refined in the 
light of the overall sample. It may be that this approach is too data-driven, hence 
sample-specific. However, I argue that most of the defined categories would most 
probably be found in a replication study, as I did find that some of the new answers 
were still suitably described by the initial taxonomy. Furthermore, since data is not 
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extensive and is partly interpreted by the participant for the definition answer, the 
interpretative gap is diminished; and findings are easily observable in manifest content 




This section describes a few contextual categories which are of relevance for the 
overall thesis. It follows an overview of findings relative to the frequencies of higher-
order and mid-order categories in story and definition texts. I continue by exploring 
the meaning of the observed discrepancy in the incidence of categories across 
questions. Finally, the statistically significant effect of people’s academic background is 
discussed.  
 
Degree of Closeness to the empathee 
 
 The survey (section B), asked participants to describe the relationship held with 
the object of empathy in accordance with pre-established degrees of closeness 
(strangers, friends, partner, family member, none). This was complemented with an 
open-ended question.  The frequencies of participants’ choices are illustrated in Figure 
6. The highest degree of intimacy was represented by kinships (N=5) and partnerships 
(N=4), which were the contexts of 14.5% of the total of gathered stories of an 
empathic event.  It followed the Friend/ acquaintance option (N=38, 61.3%). This was 
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the most frequent category, probably because it grouped a wide variety of degrees of 
closeness, from “old”, “close” or “best” friends (N=14) to “not very close friends” (N=4), 
ex-best friends (N=1) and more distant acquaintances (N=5). There were also two 
participants who described events which happened between a group of people, some 
closer to the participant than others. 
  
 
 On the other side of the spectrum there was the category stranger, which had 
the second highest frequency (N=13, 21%). In two cases, the empathic experience was 
felt towards a group of strangers. There were also episodes (N=3) involving strangers, 
though these strangers were: fictional characters (a book character and a television 
character); and a TV-seen-only Prime Minister. In these three instances, participants 
were probably slightly familiar with their stories (fictional or not). Hence, they were 




strangers, in the sense that participants did not know these people personally, yet they 
were, in a sense, better called acquaintances. Despite this, the majority of strangers 
relationships contexts involving people the participants had never seen before the 
reported event, hence properly called strangers (N=9). 
 Finally, two participants chose the no-one category. The latter option was 
included as a safeguard, a logical possibility. Even though, through these no-one 
answers, I suddenly realized that I never, throughout the survey, specified that I 
expected the lived experience to happen in an interpersonal relational context. I never 
demanded of participants to report upon an episode involving another person. I even 
included the ‘no-one’ option. But, albeit classified as no-one, these events still involve 
living beings. One of them is a pet; the other is oneself. 
Even in these circumstances, it can be argued that, empathy was always seen as 
an interpersonal experience, in the sense that it always involved both a subject, and an 
object of the empathic act. Even in the one example where empathy was experienced 
towards oneself, by considering his definition of empathy (#58: “intimate emotional 
connection”), I still had the impression that he was suggesting that there were two 
sides that were linked through empathy, in this case, say, the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. 
 As with experts’ theoretical opinions about the importance of closeness, in 
participants’ empathy-related paired texts there were opposing views on the 
relationship between empathy and closeness (being “close” to the object of empathy), 
familiarity (being familiar with the object of empathy, on knowing about another’s past 
life events), and fondness (liking, or being fond of the object of empathy). In particular, 
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in definition texts, there were a couple of participants who argued that one (or more) 
of these aspects, was essential for the occurrence of the empathic experience (N=4), 
whereas others supported the opposite position, that is, that these aspects were 
irrelevant (N=2). An example is Nina’s (#40) reflection: 
I think an element of likeability comes into this, if a dangerous criminal 
with a penchant for the torturing or murdering of other people was in a 
similar situation, I think that knowledge would prevent me from 
empathising with him. 
 
 Nina, who continued her definition text by telling a story about a situation 
during which she felt unable to ‘empathize’ with someone she was not fond of, is 
arguing that fondness is probably a necessary condition for ‘empathy’ (understanding 
by analogy) to occur. On the other hand, Carmen (#54) presented a straight-to-the-
point affirmation: “I don't think you need to know someone in order to experience 
empathy, you don't even have to like them very much”. For Carmen, one does not need 
to either know or like the other person in order to ‘empathize’ (feeling, perspective-
taking, altruistic experience). 
 In conclusion, non-experts argued20 in favour, as well as against the importance 
of closeness, familiarity and fondness for empathy; and the degree of intimacy does 
not seem to restrict the occurrence of an empathic experience. Each of the offered 
categories was a chosen relational context, strangers and partners alike. Empathy, 
regardless of the way it was given meaning, happened in a wide variety of 
                                                 
20 It was not adequate to study whether these relations were influenced by participants’ particular 
conceptions of empathy, because these comments were overall rare occurrences. 
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interpersonal contexts, of extremely different degrees of intimacy.  One experienced 
pity towards a stranger in the same way one experienced pity towards one’s mother. 
One imagined a close person’s experience, in the same way one imagined a stranger’s 
experience. ‘Empathy’ was even experienced in relationship to a pet, groups of known 
or unknown people, fictional characters, and oneself – though it always seemed relate 
a subject to an object. 
 
Target’s situation, Emotional Valence and Participant’s role 
 
In the story text,  the most common reported situations involved: deaths (N=11); 
diseases/hospitalizations/accidents (N=17); relationship conflicts (N=15); and 
course/work-related difficulties (N=9). Thus, as described in the empathy story text, 
the target’s situation, or intentional object, was usually a “difficult or troublesome 
situation” (Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003, p.277). 
 In addition to these recurring scenarios, the texts were rather homogeneous in 
several ways. Firstly, gathered stories were usually about how the subject empathized 
with another’s experience (resonance). There were only three participants 
(interestingly, all male) who reported upon their own reception experience; that is, 
about how another person empathized with them. There were also two participants, 
one male and one female, who described themselves, in the empathic episode text, as 
simultaneously the empathizer and the recipient of another’s empathy.  
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 Furthermore, with one exception, empathy was never defined as a reception 
experience. At the most, and simply because the agent of empathy was not identified, 
it was both a resonance and reception experience (N=3). An example was defining 
empathy as “a feeling of emotion from one person to another” (#25), in which the 
agent and the recipient of the transferred feeling were not established. Thus, normally, 
empathy was conceptualized through the angle of the resonant empathizer – even 
when participants remembered and described being the recipients of another’s 
empathic experience.  
 Another rather homogenous aspect was the emotional valence of the 
experiencing context, which was predominantly negative.  This negative valence was 
even perhaps upgraded, from its contextual character, to a defining characteristic of 
empathy, for someone who defined empathy as a pity or emotional distress response. 
Despite this, some participants agreed that empathy was not restricted to negative 
emotions or situations (N=6), that “It could be happiness, but it could also be sadness” 
(#25); and there were three empathic episodes’ texts (N=3) depicting positive 
situations and positively valenced emotions.  
Yet, empathy was habitually an experience associated with emotionally negative 
contexts of experiencing, as conceptualized in definition texts, (N=20, 32.3%) and/or as 
remembered in the empathic episode question (N=59, 95.2%). With a few exceptional 
cases, what was observed was that “I'd say if you use the word empathy it's more in 
the context of empathising with someone's sorry or bad fortune, rather than 
empathising with someone's happiness” (#52).   
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 To conclude, there was an overall homogeneity in these texts relatively to these 
contextual dimensions. Then, when we inquire about an empathic experience, what 
we will probably obtain is a story about how the subject empathized with someone 
else (resonance), in the context of another’s disturbing emotionally negatively valence 
situation.  This is what comes to mind to most people when thinking about an 
empathic event from their own experience.   
 
Overall frequencies of higher-order categories for meanings of empathy 
 
 One of the objectives of this study was exploring how the folk psychology 
definitions of ‘empathy’ were related to theoretical meanings of ‘empathy’. This was 
partly answered via the development of the taxonomy (Figure 5). Batson’s theoretical 
knowing and responding distinction was a useful broad approach to these participants’ 
texts, because participants’ definitions of empathy could be fittingly conceived as 
either a way of knowing another’s experience, and/or a response to another’s 
experience.  Thus, Batson’s conceptualization seems a largely robust reflection about 
some commonly expressed broad understanding of the meaning of ‘empathy’.  
 Table 1 illustrates the representativeness of each of these categories (highest 
frequencies were shaded). In both questions, the co-occurrence of these two 
categories (knowing and responding) was a more frequent event than the preference 
for one without the other. That is, most commonly, empathy was defined and lived as 




In almost half of definition texts (46.8%), empathy was simultaneously seen as a 
knowing and a response, rather than 
one of these acts alone (Knowing: 
35.5%; Responding: 17.7%). For 
instance, Gloria’s (#8) definition text 
offered that: “empathy is when you 
feel sorry for someone or a group of 
people because you can put yourself 
in their position” (#8). For her, 
empathy was a personal emotional 
response (empathy-as-responding) to 
the imagined experience of another (empathy-as-knowing). 
 By adding the frequencies of the knowing and responding categories to the 
frequency with which they co-occurred separately, we find that knowing was 
mentioned in 82.3% of definition texts, a frequency higher than that of responding 
(64.5%). On the other hand, in story texts, the frequencies of each of these categories 
are above 80%, and very close to each other. This means that, although participants 
usually described a story of empathy that involved both a way of knowing another’s 
experience and a response to this knowledge, in definition texts they less frequently 
suggested that empathy was both of the acts they described in the story  - being more 
often knowing the preferred defining aspect (N=22).  Consequently, story texts were 
Table 1: “Overall frequencies of higher-order 






Knowing 22 (35.5%) 7 (11.3%) 
Responding 11 (17.7%) 10 (16.1%) 
Both 29 (46.8%) 44 (71%) 
Answers’ total 62 (100%) 61* (98.4%) 
*One participant discussed the contexts in which 
empathy happened, rather than offering a definition 
of the term. 
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more similar to Håkansson & Montgomery’s results than definition texts, in that many 
participants selected one of these higher-order categories to define the term, rather 
than both; and principally a knowing category.   
 In conclusion, as with theoretical meanings of empathy, it seems appropriate to 
talk about everyday meanings of empathy as being about responding, and/or as 
knowing another’s experience. Non-experts give meaning to empathy in these two 
ways.  Most participants’ described both of these experiences in their lived experience 
texts; they were both equally important for the sharing of an empathic episode. 
Similarly, they most commonly proposed that empathy could be defined as 
simultaneously knowing and responding to someone’s experience. However, some 
participants restricted the meaning of empathy to one of these acts, principally to 
knowing acts.  
   
Mid-order categories for meanings of empathy  
 
 Relationship between theory and folk psychology 
  
  There was also a link between theoretical and folk psychology meanings of 
‘empathy’ in what came to mid-order categories. To begin with, as with theoretical 
meanings, the multiplicity increased when looking at the differences between 
particular ways of knowing and responding that were associated with ‘empathy’.  In 
this study, ten mid-order categories were devised (Figure 5); six mid-order categories 
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illustrated empathy-as-knowing meanings, and four mid-order categories illustrated 
empathy-as-responding meanings.  
 Empathy-as-knowing was an immediate act when it translated the experience of 
perceiving another’s experience (perceiving); and of feeling, intuitively feeling even, 
that which another person was experiencing (feeling). These two mid-order categories 
were the result of breaking into two separate parts the theoretical meaning of direct 
empathy. Phenomenologically speaking, perceiving is experiencing, and therefore 
these two aspects are usually not theoretically discriminated. In this study, however, 
the methodology did not allow for their merging into a single category. 
 Empathy-as-knowing was an intellectual act when the interpersonal knowledge 
was the result of a comparison between empathizer and empathee’s identities or past 
experiences (analogy); of a perspective-taking imaginative act (perspective-taking); of 
a logical reasoning act (reasoning); or of an “understanding” act (understanding).   
There were examples of perspective-taking (imagine-self and imagine other) and 
analogy - as with theoretical meanings (Chapter I). However, in contrast with the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter I, understanding was categorized here as an 
intellectual act for methodological reasons; and reasoning referred to the logical use of 
available cues to determine another’s experiences, but was not limited to the 
‘inference from behaviour’ theoretical meaning of empathy, and could not be merged 
with perspective-taking. There were no examples of the inference from felt-feeling 
theoretical meaning of ‘empathy’.  
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 As for empathy-as-responding, there were participants who argued that 
empathy was feeling for another person, most frequently pity21 but also sympathetic 
joy (sympathy for); sharing another’s known experience, that is, experiencing similar 
feelings (sympathetic sharing); reacting to another’s known experience, that is, feeling 
the impact of another’s experience upon oneself, such as when one becomes 
emotionally distressed (impact); and intending to welcome, support, “be kind” (#32) 
and help others (altruistic experience). 
With the exception of sympathy for (Scheler’s fellow-feeling), most empathy-as-
responding mid-order categories did not manifest themselves as theoretically 
discussed. In particular, sharing included several affective responses that were 
distinguished in the glossary: contagion, identification, and Scheler’s community of 
feelings (the having of an experience similar to that of another, directed towards a 
common intentional object). Impact included any emotional reaction to another’s 
known experience, and was inclusive of experiences that resembled the phenomenon 
of emotional distress and the very rare phenomenon of sympathetic concern. Even 
though, the only exclusively empirical meaning of empathy-as-responding was 
altruistic experiences.  
In conclusion, the match between theoretical and empirical meanings of 
‘empathy’ was not absolute, because there was one additional meaning of ‘empathy’ 
(altruistic experiences); understanding was here limited to intellectual acts for 
methodological reasons; and a significant amount of theoretical meanings had to be 
                                                 
21 Most frequently, the term pity was negatively connoted, who preferred expressions such as ‘feeling bad 
for’ to pity.   
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reformulated (direct empathy; inference from behaviour; emotional distress; and 
contagion and identification). Despite this, there was an overall sufficient fit between 
that which is theoretically said and that which folk psychology had to say about 
‘empathy’. 
  
 Overall Incidence of mid-order categories 
 
 Figure 7 illustrates the incidence (inscribed inside the bar) of each of the mid-
order categories in participants’ definition texts (in yellow, to the right) and story texts 
(in green, to the left). The total amount of mid-order categories (‘total’ bar) needed to 
faithfully categorize participants’ answers was lower in definition texts (N=133); than 
in lived experience texts (N=167). The difference in the total amount of utilized 
categories across questions is (but only) partly justifiable in the light of the texts’ 
length. Generally, story texts (mean of 158.2 words, SD=31.7) were longer, and 
perhaps more reflected and detailed, than definition texts (mean of 39.6 words, 
SD=104.5), which sometimes were straight to the point and non-elaborated. 
 None of the mid-order categories consisted of a general ‘universal’ definition of 
meaning. The most common category was understanding (N=32, 51.6%), whereas the 
rest of the categories represented far less than half of these participants’ opinions 
about the meaning of empathy. That is, the meaning of empathy was rather non-






Figure 7: “Frequencies of mid-order categories across paired narratives” 
   
  In Figure 7, a line is drawn because it helps to accentuate the differential 
importance of each mid-order category for either defining empathy or narrating a lived 
empathic experience. For example, perspective-taking was registered in 25 out of the 
62 definition texts; whilst this category was recorded in only 16 out of the 62 story 
texts. This category was thus more frequent in definition texts than in story texts; and 
the thus the definition bar extends itself to the left of the line, that is, is bigger than 
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the story bar. Sharing, Understanding and Perspective-taking were all more important 
to define the meaning of empathy, than for communicating a story of a lived empathic 
episode. 
 On the other hand, altruistic experiences, impact, sympathy for, reasoning, 
analogy, feeling and perceiving were more important to describe an empathic episode 
than in definition texts, because the opposite was observed (the story bar extends 
itself to the right, being bigger than the definition bar). These categories were then 
common experiences in people’s empathy stories, though they were not so useful for 
defining the meaning of empathy.   
 In summary, there was only a category more consensually descriptive of 
participants’ definitions of ‘empathy’ (understanding). Secondly, understanding, 
perspective-taking and sharing seemed to be more useful to define empathy, whereas 
the remainder of the categories were more useful to describe a lived experience.   
 In the following section, I show how some explanations for this differential 
incidence of each of the mid-order categories’ across texts (definition and story) were 
tested. This matters insofar that it reassured me about the taxonomy’s credibility; and 
the moderate autonomy of each of these mid-order categories. 
   
 Excessive discrimination, flawed taxonomy? 
 
 There is a difference in the distribution of higher and mid-order categories across 
questions; and the incidence of each mid-order category per question was tested. 
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Table 2 shows the statistically significant differences across questions relative to the 
presence or absence of each mid-order category; and in which question they were 
more often observed. 
 
Table 2: “Significant differences in the incidence of mid-order categories 
across questions (definition, story)” 
 
Mid-order category Χ2 results Significance 
(2α) 
More frequent in… 
Perceiving Χ2(1)=5.554a p=0.018* Story 
Feeling Χ2(1)=24.09 a p≤0.001** Definition 
Understanding Χ2(1)=2.296 a p=0.13  
Analogy Χ2(1)=15.114 p≤0.001** Story 
Perspective-Taking Χ2(1)=2.273 p=0.132  
Reasoning Χ2(1)=5.295 a p=0.021* Story 
Sympathy for Χ2(1)=4.412 p=0.036* Story 
Sharing Χ2(1)=24.037 a p≤0.001** Definition 
Impact Χ2(1)=9.25 a p=0.002* Story 
Altruistic experiences Χ2(1)=2.99 a p=0.084  
a Yates’ correction for expected cell frequency  less than 5 (Fisher exact test more accurate 
results were not preferred to simplify presentation of findings). 
** Significance ≤ 0.01 
* Significance ≤ 0.05 
  
 
 The results in Table 2 surprised in that, for example, understanding, which was 
the most frequent category in definition texts, and one of the least frequent in story 
text, did not yield a significant difference. The most significant differences (≤ 0.001), 
perhaps the only ones which deserve attention, were observed for feeling, analogy 
and sharing:  whereas feeling and analogy were very frequent in participants’ stories, 
sharing was more frequent in definition texts.   
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 Nevertheless, the results have to be interpreted with care, because, in many 
circumstances, observed and expected frequencies were very low. Speculating about 
significant differences regarding the category feeling, registered merely five times in 
story answers, and three times in definition texts, does not seem very interesting or 
credible.  Therefore, this category is excluded from these considerations. 
 This leaves us with the sharing category (significantly more frequent in definition 
texts) and the analogy category (significantly more frequent in story texts). This finding 
could perhaps suggest that, for some participants, ‘empathy’ would be the responsive 
experience of sharing another’s experience, a defining meaning that translated the 
lived experience of comparing oneself to the object of empathy, and thereby gain 
some knowledge of their experience analogy).   
 Then, perhaps these two categories could have been collapsed, and still validly 
translate the participants’ meaning-making of ‘empathy’. The taxonomy would then be 
flawed by an excessive discrimination derived from the analysed question. It is possible 
that, in certain cases, the amount of categories was perhaps exaggerated. For 
example, participants often proposed a causal link, in definition texts, between 
understanding and perspective-taking (Understand by Perspective-taking: N=8); and 
between analogy and understanding (Understanding by Analogy: N=9.  This makes of 
understanding a common objective (N=17) of imaginative and/or analogical acts, as 
illustrated by definition texts; and of analogy and perspective-taking means towards an 
understanding end. Their stories would then be about how they imagined or 
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remembered a similar experience, and the definition texts would clarify that this act 
had the purpose of understanding another person. 
 However, sometimes participants proposed a distinctive association between 
mid-order categories (for example, for Gloria, the finality of perspective-taking was 
pity), as, by merging22 these categories together, we would still observe that this 
analogy-perspective-taking-understanding single category was more frequent21 in 
definition texts (N=69) than in story texts (N=49). The same would be observed 
relatively the hypothetically sharing-analogy experience across questions: this single 
category was more frequent in participants’ stories (N=36) than in definition texts 
(N=27). Consequently, although fewer categories, in certain cases, could have been 
created and still translate the participants’ intended meaning, this would not explain 
the difference in their incidence across questions.  
  Furthermore, there were reasons for not collapsing these categories, namely, 
views and associations which were contradictory, as with the importance of analogy. 
For instance, at the same time that someone claimed that empathy “is when you feel 
bad for someone over something which you do not have experience in” (#33), another 
participant defended the opposite perspective: “Empathy is understanding how 
another person feels due to your own experience of life” (#55). Hence, by collapsing 
perspective-taking, analogy and understanding I would be acting against some of these 
participants’ manifested claims about the meaning of empathy – and some categorical 
discrimination became consequently more important and necessary.  
                                                 
22 Please note that this simple addition of the frequencies should be divided by the number of merged 
categories. I have not adopted this procedure here for simplicity and confirmation sake; and, since the 
denominator remains a constant, the concluding observation would be the same.  
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 In the end, the higher-order categories were created precisely to highlight less 
sensitive to data findings, that is, more conceptual and generic levels of analysis. That 
is their purpose. Thus, there seemed to be no need or reason for collapsing a few mid-
order categories. 
 
 Oversensitivity to language-in-use, flawed taxonomy? 
 
 The categorization of participants’ answers drew upon the content of both texts. 
Meaning units were categorized in parallel; the language-in-use in one illuminated the 
language-in-use in the other. Then, although it is arguable that people adopted a 
particular jargon in the story text, and another in the definition text, and that this 
question-specific language-in-use was responsible for the observed difference in the 
incidence of mid-order categories across questions and for a flawed taxonomy, this 
methodological procedure of analysing paired texts dealt directly with this issue. The 
examples included in Table 3 were chosen precisely to illustrate how this procedure 
worked with each mid-category.  
These were exceptions to the categorization procedure, because usually the 
language-in-use was very similar across questions. Nevertheless, when there seemed 
to be some language-in-use disparity, it was usually always possible to find the 
category used to define empathy in the story text, perhaps with a slightly distinctive 
jargon, but, nevertheless, there and categorized as such.   
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Table 3: “Examples of story and definition answers for each mid-order category” 
Categories Exemplary Definition Exemplary Story 
Perceiving “Watching someone in pain (physical or 
emotional)” (#14) 
“There was an old man on the table 
next to us with his granddaughter, he 
looked quite fragile when helping 
himself to the buffet.” (#14) 
Intuitively 
feeling 
“When you kind of get a feeling of how 
someone's feeling without them having to 
say anything. I suppose I would also call it 
'gut feeling'." (#18) 
“After a few minutes I looked up and 
glanced at her back and just had the 
feeling that all was not well with her” 
(#18) 
Analogy “Based on having had an experience 
oneself which is roughly (sometimes very 
remotely) comparable” (#47) 
“She was longing to tell someone but 
didn't want to appear to be boasting 
and I knew exactly how she felt, having 
been in similar positions when my 




“A feeling that you can imagine what it 
would be like for them in a particular 
situation” (#2) 
“If I had not done this, then maybe he 
wouldn’t have gotten into trouble” (#2) 
Reasoning "Empathy is the realisation and 
acknowledgment of another person’s 
current bad situation." (#26) 
“As I had been in lectures with him and 
were assisting each other in doing the 
practical based coursework, I knew how 
much had gone into it” (#26) 
Understand
ing 
“Empathy is the way in which we can 
understand another person’s feelings.” 
(#49) 
“Because we knew each of us knew the 
pain the other felt, it was hard to sit 
and talk about it to each other” (#49) 
Sympathy 
for 
“When you feel sorry for someone or a 
group of people” (#8) 
“I felt sorry for him” (#8) 
Sharing "Like sharing an emotion or the reason of 
an emotion with someone." (#24) 
“I shared her feelings of uncertainty for 
her, for we were very close” (#24) 
Impact "I don't necessarily feel the same 
emotions that they were feeling at the 
time but I have a strong emotional 
reaction to their experience, such as 
feeling angry when someone has been 
hurt" (#15) 
“I felt annoyed with him that he is still 
treating people in this way. She is not 
manipulative at all and is very much a 
team player so his comments are 
completely unjustified” (#15) 
Altruistic 
experience 
"Action of showing kindness to a person” 
(#32) 
“This story relates to how she helped 
me recently (…). She has managed to 
help me and make me look on the 
bright side” (#32) 
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 For instance, in Table 3, Betsy’s (#49) definition of empathy was in terms of 
understanding; and this was the only knowing act that she described in the definition 
text.  Consequently, to give meaning to the sentence “each of us knew the pain the 
other felt”, central to this study, I turned towards the definition text and classified it as 
about understanding. Another example is how an ‘appearance’ of fragility (#14) 
became associated with the category perceiving. 
 In conclusion, the differential incidence of mid-order categories across questions 
does not seem plausibly explained by oversensitivity to language-in-use, one which 
could hypothetically differ in accordance with the type of question posed.  
 
 Contextualized stories and spontaneous use of the term ‘empathy’ 
 
  In the light of data, there are two more plausible explications for the detected 
discrepancy across questions. First, participants were asked to share a story about 
‘empathy’ and to provide contextual details. Thus, it is expectable that they would do 
as requested, and describe an empathic experience, but also the relevant (for them) 
context in which it occurred – a ‘context’, a sequence of events, that might involve 
additional experiences that amount to other people’s understanding of the meaning of 
empathy. Then, I am suggesting that many of these phenomena were necessary to 
properly describe an empathic episode, although only a few of them, or one, 
amounted to the meaning of empathy for that participant.  
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 For instance, although empathy often occurred in the context of helping another 
person (altruistic experiences), this category seldom corresponded to what that 
participant saw as the empathic phenomenon in the whole narrated story. This is, for 
me, one the most plausible justification of the disparity of the incidence of each mid-
order category across questions. 
  Secondly, these two questions probably involve accessing different kinds of 
information. Stories probably involved a more spontaneous and applied use of a 
concept, the way one related to the term in one’s daily life, an everyday meaning of a 
word. This applied meaning of the concept is not necessarily the same as its 
conceptual meaning, that is, the one comes up with when asked to conceptually define 
that term.  Thus, the concept being described in the story text could be an applied one, 
whereas the concept being described in the definition text could be a conceptual and 
abstract one. 
 This reflection resulted from noticing that the spontaneous use of the word 
empathy in the participants’ stories texts sometimes seemed to differ from its meaning 
in definition answers. This does not mean that the defined phenomenon was not part 
of the lived experience, but that the use of word seemed to bear distinctive qualities. 
For this purpose, I counted those accounts in which the expression feeling ‘empathy 
for’/ ‘empathy towards’ appeared (N=13). Eleven of these meaning units were written 
by participants who define empathy as knowing (N=12); sometimes even exclusively as 
nothing but knowing (N=3).  
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 When someone defines empathy as perspective-taking and writes, in the paired 
text, does this mean that they felt empathy for the object that they imagined and 
thereby experienced a state because of the object? It is possible, but, at least for me, a 
rather unusual use of expression ‘feels empathy for’. This observation becomes more 
intelligible by accepting that the spontaneous use of the word empathy was often 
closer to the concept of sympathy, but that, when asked to define the concept, their 
reflection suggested otherwise.  
 In conclusion,  I believe that the difference in the incidence of mid-order 
categories across questions is partly explained by accepting the above explications: a 
preference for one of the described lived phenomena as the ‘proper’ definition of 
empathy; and an applied meaning of empathy (empathy-as-responding) distinctive 
from its more common conceptual ‘proper’ meaning (empathy-as-knowing). 
 
Academic background and the meaning of empathy 
 
 Empathy’s meanings seemed to be partly affected by one’s academic 
background. Regarding empathy-as-knowing categories, psychology students more 
often defined empathy as perspective-taking, in contrast with non-psychology 
students. Concretely, fifteen23 perspective-taking definitions were provided by the 
group of 22 psychologists, whereas only eight definitions along these lines were given 
by the group of 32 non-Psychologists. This difference was highly significant (Pearson’s 
                                                 
23 This total of fifteen represents the 14 definitions in which perspective-taking was observed, plus the 
answer in which perspective-taking and analogy were both registered. 
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X2(1)=9.942, 2αp=0.002). Thus, perspective-taking was a much more common stance 
among psychologists. In addition, psychologists more often define empathy as 
understanding, though in this case the difference is less significant (Pearson’s 
X2(1)=5.968, 2αp=0.015). This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: “Frequencies of definitions of empathy-as-knowing involving perspective-
taking and analogy, per area of studies” 
 
  On the other hand, there was only one psychologist involving analogy in the 
definition of empathy, in contrast with the nine non-psychologists who anchor the 
meaning of empathy in analogy, a statistically significant difference (Pearson’s 
X2(1)=4.804, 2αp=0.028).   
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 Non-psychologists then defined empathy less often in terms of analogy and/or 
perspective-taking (yellow bar).  They also more often defined it in terms of analogy 
alone - whereas psychologists never did so. This does not mean that psychologists did 
not write about having remembered a similar past experience during an empathic 
episode in the story text. In fact, this statistical difference was not observed for the 
comparison of these groups’ story texts. It only means that psychologists did not 
commonly see in analogy a defining meaning of empathy: only one psychologist 
offered analogy, in combination with and perspective-taking, as empathy’s definition. 
Rather, psychologists tended to prefer the perspective-taking conceptual meaning of 
empathy.   
 As for empathy-as-responding categories, eleven non-psychologists involved, in 
the defining meaning of empathy, an altruistic experience;  whereas there was only 
one psychologist defining empathy in this manner (Fisher exact test, 2αp=0.009).  
Overall, then, non-psychologists more often defined empathy as an altruistic 
experience; less often as an intellectual ability of knowing another’s experience, by 
perspective-taking or analogy; and, when they did identify empathy with intellectually 
knowing another’s experience, analogy was preferred. 
 These differences, consequent of participants’ area of studies, and considering 
that the proportion of psychologists in this sample (35.5%) is not representative of the 
vaster population’s education level and academic area, strongly emphasised that these 
frequencies should not be generalized without first attending to this variable.  With a 
study more balanced in terms of participants’ academic backgrounds, it is probable 
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that empathy-as-responding, and that a few meanings of empathy-as-knowing like 




The variety of lived empathic experiences, as well as definitions of the concept, 
suggests the findings are moderately representative of folk psychology stances. 
Batson’s knowing and responding approach to theoretical meanings of empathy was 
effective for the organization of empirical meanings of empathy.  Most commonly, 
empathy was defined as both a way of knowing and responding to another’s 
experience, although their combination was more important for the sharing of an 
empathy story, than for defining ‘empathy’. There was also an overall sufficient fit 
between theoretical and empirical meanings of empathy. That is, theoretical claims 
bore an echo in participants’ texts and opinions. Nevertheless, the inductive 
categorization procedure was a very adequate methodological choice because this fit 
was far from absolute. 
 Empathy-as-knowing appeared as a more common form of defining empathy. 
However, in comparison with the general population, this sample included a larger 
number psychologists, who more often defined empathy-as-intellectually-knowing 
another’s experience. Consequently, the empathy-as-knowing meaning is probably 
overrepresented. We should expect to find more people defining empathy-as-
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responding, in a sample more balanced in terms of participants’ academic 
backgrounds. 
 As a consequence of a prior interest in the phenomenological theoretical 
meaning of empathy (direct empathy), this meaning was isolated as a separate 
empathy-as-knowing higher-order category. It had two mid-order categories 
(perceiving and feeling). Despite their median (in story texts) or low (in definition texts) 
frequency, the appearance of these ideas is important; as it even sometimes 
corresponded to the unique meaning of empathy (e.g., for the participant in Table 3, 
used to  illustrate the feeling category). It was thus an unavoidable meaning, not just 
some pink elephant or tunnel vision of mine. It suggests that ‘immediately knowing’ 
might represent some people’s understandings of what empathy is. Although this 
phenomenon appeared to be a moderately common lived experience, since its 
frequency on definition texts was rather low, the term empathy should be avoided 
when inquiring people about experiences such as these.  
 With a few exceptions (e.g., #40: “This day, however, he was stumbling over his 
words but almost enthusiastically so.”), perceiving was not about seeing particular 
meaningful behaviours. Indeed, the seen ‘behaviour’ could be as non-illustrative as 
another’s “back” or totally absent from the text.  Perceiving was rather about the 
knowing of another’s experience, there-and-then, through a sensitive act, for which 
intellectual processes seem of little relevance, if contributing at all. Moreover, in texts 
descriptive of this immediate knowing, both perceiving and feeling were sometimes 
closely associated phenomena: “After a few minutes I looked up and glanced at her 
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back and just had the feeling that all was not well with her” (#18). That is, Mimi’s (#18) 
intuitive feeling was linked to a perceptive act, to a ‘glance’ thrown at another’s 
direction.  Nevertheless, the coding rules did not allow for their merging.  
 The alternative knowing higher-order category was about intellectually knowing 
another’s experience. This intellectual empathy-as-knowing was a much more frequent 
meaning of empathy, principally among psychologists and in terms of perspective-
taking. Therefore, even though in psychology both sympathy (empathy-as-responding) 
and perspective-taking amount to possible theoretical meanings of empathy (e.g., 
Batson, 2009; Davis, M. 2009), perspective-taking seems to be a more usual meaning 
of empathy in this academic area.  On the other hand, non-psychologists more often 
defined empathy as a way of responding to another’s experience; and when they did 
define it as an intellectual act, it was analogy that became a more useful category. 
 In my opinion, these intellectual forms of knowledge-gaining seemed to have the 
character of an in-depth intellectual exploration of another’s experience. That is, in 
empathy stories, some sort of introductory knowledge preceded every single non-
immediate way of knowing, such as initially being told about someone else’s 
experience (communicated knowledge); or immediately perceiving an experience. It 
was only after this ‘initial knowledge’ that intellectual knowing acts was put in action. 
Intellectually knowing represented as a second step, a follow-up to some introductory 
knowledge relative to another’s situation/ experience. By being a second step, 
intellectually knowing another’s experience can equally be conceived of as a response, 
though not a reactive personal response, as with sympathy; but as a cognitive 
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knowledge-pursuing response, one which allows us to understand another’s 
experience in “a way that you couldn’t otherwise” (#3). This is in line with Davis’ (1983, 
2009) stance, but also in line with Batson (2009) in terms of purpose (i.e., knowing 
another’s experience in a light). Non-immediate ways of knowing are not seen here as 
incompatible with immediate ways of knowing. Indeed, in people’s paired texts, it was 
possible to find examples of their complementary use. For example, Mimi (#18) 
continued her story text about her intuitive feeling by describing imagined reasons 
behind the intuited experience.  
 I suggest that immediate and non-immediate ways of knowing may co-occur, and 
complement each other, but that they are not one and the same phenomenon. Each is 
described in different manners and illustrates very different experiences and contexts. 
For example, there was a participant who perceived another’s fragility, and reacted 
with an intense distress and pity experience for unknown reasons; and never 
attempted to intellectually understand the object’s experience. She was just puzzled 
with her reaction, and one which she attributed to a very particular cause (perceiving 
another’s experience). Therefore, immediately knowing was not always described in 
association with intellectual knowing acts, and this observation is suggestive of their 
independence. 
 Empathy-as-responding categories portrayed the experience of being affected by 
another’s known experience, in one, or another way; and were generally suitably 
described as sympathetic emotional responses to another’s experience. Sympathy and 
knowing were not mutually exclusive meanings of empathy; and, in many cases, 
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definition answers included mid-order categories from both groups. These two 
experiences (responding and knowing) were even sometimes causally related by 
participants in a cause-effect manner that was similarly to the one proposed by Scheler 
(Chapter I). Those who partly defined empathy as sharing, implicitly or explicitly, 
presupposed that what they were feeling was similar to what the object of empathy 
was feeling. This was the only way through which I was able to detect the presence of 
an ‘inference from felt-feeling’. It was not quite along the lines of contagion theories, 
because the reflective movement, as written, was: 1st the object had a known state; 
2nd the subject felt a state; 3rd self and object were having what was implicitly 
suggested as a similar/ common/ shared experience. Hence, the similarity was, at the 
most, inferred from what was known from both the object’s and subject’s experiences, 
not of the subject’s known reactive experience alone (e.g., #19: “I could tell that she 
was really nervous, because she was blushing bright red everywhere and her hands 
were shaking slightly (…). I became aware during her practice talk that I was starting to 
feel nervous too”). 
 As for the impact category, and despite the occasional high level of reported 
personal distress, what I found was not so much an egotistic self-oriented 
individualistic response (as emotional distress is theoretically connoted), but a very 
intense personal emotional response which superimposed itself to another’s known 
experience, obliterating it, precisely due to the intensity of one’s response. Just like 
someone who has two aching injuries might focus upon the more intense pain, while 
sending the other to the background of experiencing.   
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 Although there were differences in the incidence of mid-order categories across 
each questions, it seemed that this difference was not a consequence a flawed 
taxonomy (e.g., unable to detect the same meaning for both questions). Instead, this 
difference seemed to derive from the distinctive meanings of an applied concept (story 
text) and an abstract concept (definition text). The more spontaneous applied use of 
‘empathy’ seemed closer to the concept of sympathy, whereas the abstract concept 
was closer to an empathy-as-knowing meaning.  
 Finally, contextually speaking, empathy appeared as an experience that puts an 
object and a subject in relationship with each other, by means of an empathic act. and 
that occurred regardless of the emotional valence of the experiencing context, and the 
degree of closeness of the involved people. Nevertheless, it was usually associated, 
principally as a lived experience, to negatively valenced emotional contexts, and 
defined and remembered from the perspective of the empathizer. 
 
Discussion 
   
 ‘Empathy’ is often understood as an interpersonal act (Barret-Lennard, 1981; 
Boulanger & Laçon, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003; Stein, 
1917/1989; Thompson, 2001). In this study, it put in relation two poles, a self and an 
object, even when that object is an animal, a group of people, a fictional character, a 
stranger, a partner, or even oneself. ‘Empathic’ experiences happened in a wide 
variety of ‘interpersonal’ contexts, regardless of the way empathy is given meaning by 
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a particular individual. I found examples of immediate knowing, intellectual knowing, 
and sympathetically responding happening in-between strangers, as well as in-
between close others. That is, for none of these types of empathy, closeness, or lack of 
it, seems of essence; ‘empathy’ happened in spite of it.  
 Although there were a few stories involving partners, people did recall less 
empathic episodes happening in this context (it was the lowest frequency among pre-
established degrees of closeness); and Håkansson and Montgomery gathered none. 
This suggests that people prefer to discuss empathic experiences occurred in non-
romantic relational contexts; or it pends in favour of Pistrang et al.’s (2002) suggestion 
this particular context may sometimes work as an impediment, rather than a 
facilitator, as some proposed (Kerem et al., 2001; Noller, 2006; Preston & Waal, 2002; 
Stinson & Ickes, 1992; Zaki, Bolger & Ochner, 2007). 
 The open-endedness of questions was fruitful. For instance, I would never have 
thought of predefining an animal as the object of empathy (albeit theoretically 
proposed, Scheler, 1913; Stein, 1917; Thompson, 2001); nor of empathy as, ‘tout 
court’, an act of kindness (#32). This is one of the reasons for conducting exploratory 
qualitative studies. By being, now and again, surprised by participants’ answers, I have 
the impression that it was a very useful choice.   
 The experience of categorizing data was not a simple task. To solve many 
decision difficulties, I sometimes turned towards the lived experience. However, an 
example of a lived event from one’s experience is merely a possible concretization of 
an abstract concept. Lived experience accounts are like shedding the light upon one 
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single facet of the multiple facets of a conceptual mirrored ball. It is not, therefore, 
representative of the whole experience, or of the whole meaning behind it – if that can 
even be found. As a consequence of this procedure, the weight of explicit content, and 
the particularizing goal, I might have narrowed down participants’ intended meaning 
to its visible facet. Nevertheless, this procedure made me feel more reliant on the 
overall trustworthiness of these findings; Batson’s criterion is perhaps broad enough to 
compensate for the effect of these more detail-related decisions; and the size of the 
sample gives to the findings an increased strength. There is, in some cases, strength in 
numbers. 
 My methodological choices were a conscious and effortful strategy of avoiding 
biasing the interpretation to support some conscious (or unconscious) belief of mine, 
partly derived from reflections relative to Håkansson and Montgomery´s (2003) data 
analysis. Since my goal was not, as theirs, to find ‘universal’ constituents of empathic 
experiences, but precisely to understand patterns in the meanings of empathy, I 
thought that I could afford focusing on differences, instead of identities, derived from 
latent content or from a less  systematically categorization method. Objectivity (as 
with this QCA approach) can be a cruel strategy (for a researcher holding a very strong 
belief about some data’s latent meaning). But I defend that it is also a more faithful (to 
the data) strategy. As these categories were established here, there is a lower margin 
for multiple competing interpretations.  
Håkansson and Montgomery´s results bear a much stronger echo in findings 
relative to these participants’ empathy stories (the basis of their analysis too), than in  
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those relative to the meanings of empathy. For example, they nominated both 
empathy-as-responding (emotional response, felt concern) and empathy-as-knowing 
(understanding, similarity impression) as empathy’s constituents, and in this study, the 
co-occurrence of these higher-order categories was 71% in participants’ texts about a 
story of empathy. However, the co-occurrence of these in definition texts is much 
lower (46.8%), and therefore these constituents seem less representative of people’s 
ways of giving meaning to ‘empathy’. 
 This implies that we cannot derive, from descriptions of a lived empathic story, 
and without a great margin of misunderstanding, what was empathic for the individual 
in the overall narrative – though we might suggest that a particular set of phenomena 
often co-occur, that they often go hands-in-hands with an ‘empathic’ experience.  But 
by no means did this study’s high-order or mid-order categories appear here as 
‘universal constituents’ of ‘empathic experience’, or as universal meanings of empathy. 
There was a high variability, then, low consensus, across questions and in-between 
participants. 
 Secondly, the emotional valence (the way Håkansson and Montgomery 
operationalized the ‘emotional response’ constituent) appeared in this study as a 
contextual category, definitely not a constituent. For example, there was a participant 
who described how she imagined the speaker’s embarrassment and did not report 
feeling any responsive emotion.  
 There were examples of positive experiencing contexts, but the vast majority of 
participants’ story texts involved at least another’s negative emotions. It seems that 
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the term empathy principally evoked the recollection of disturbing life events of 
another. Although this might partly result from the pity and distress meanings of 
empathy, I believe the reason for this is unrelated to the concept of empathy. For 
instance, it is known that people more often feel the need to talk about traumatic 
negative experiences, as a sort of catharsis, then positive ones; or that discussing a 
positive even might feel like a ‘bragging’ act to avoid. People also tend to question less 
(reflect less) about an offered candy, than a slap in the face.   
 Understanding was the most common category, even under the strict ‘in-vivo’ 
coding rule. This finding partly supports Kerem et al.’s (2001) and Tempel’s (2007) 
choice of the word understanding for gathering empathy-related data – though 
understanding alone would not be enough to represent everyone’s beliefs about the 
meaning of empathy. Secondly, in half of these cases, understanding was often 
(though not always) associated with two intellectual acts, perspective-taking and 
analogy. This could explain why their findings concentrated around intellectual ways of 
knowing, and justifies Kerem et al.’s (2001) conclusion: “it seems rare that empathy 
will exist without any cognitive understanding” (p.727). But this was not always the 
case, as with the participant that was distressed at the sight of another’s frailty. 
  The main objective of this investigation was realizing whether non-experts 
provided, as experts, multiple definitions for the term empathy. And, indeed, this 
objective was accomplished, because I found many distinctive empirical meanings of 
empathy, most of which corresponding to theoretical meanings of empathy, though 
also some additional few. This supports the initial supposition, one which has a major 
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implication. We cannot go around asking people about empathic experiences, and 
believe they will talk about what we intend them to talk about. Empathy is then a term 
prone to misunderstandings (lay people and experts alike). One should not study 
empathy without starting to clarify very clearly what one understands by such word, 
both to oneself, to the team of involved researchers, to participants, and to readers. At 
least while this current state of affairs perseveres. And if one is really interest in 
‘understanding’, ‘helping’, ‘sympathy’, ‘perspective-taking’, and so forth, why not call 
each just that? 
 And it is precisely this advice that I have taken from this study.  In the following 
chapters of this thesis, I concentrate upon the immediate ways of knowing, an 
experience which I distinguish from sympathetic and imaginative ones. This 
phenomenon is a kind of an immediate understanding of another’s experience that I 
approximate to the phenomenological conception of empathy. Since this seldom was 
the meaning behind people’s interpretations of ‘empathy’, I do not attempt to ask 
people about ‘empathy’ and hope that perceiving is what comes to their minds. I 
simply avoid the word empathy altogether, and try to make people talk about this 
phenomenon with alternative expressions. But I am reassured that this phenomenon 
appears in people’s lived experiences, even if not always under the label ‘empathy’. 











































                                                                Chapter III 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate Edith Stein’s phenomenological descriptive 





Empathy’ entered everyday discourse surprisingly recently. The German 
philosopher Theodor Lipps was influential in this.  In 1903, Lipps24 adopted the German 
term Einfühlung, derived from the Greek empatheia (from em- 'in' and pathos 
''feeling'), in his thesis on aesthetic experiences. This concept was translated by 
Titchener into English as ‘empathy’. It was used to describe the “process of humanizing 
objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them" (Duan & Hill, 1996, p.261, cf. 
Titchener, 1924, p. 417). At the core of this concept is the idea of “going into a strong 
feeling-connection with another” (Barrett-Lennard, 1981, p.91).  
Soon after this, Max Scheler’s (1913) work on sympathy appeared, (Sympathie/ 
mitgefühl), followed by Edith Stein’s thesis on empathy (1917/1989). Lipps, Scheler 
and Stein proposed theoretically distinct views of these interpersonal phenomena 
(sympathy and empathy), which over time have been confused with one another. It is 
possible to draw a parallel between Lipps’ proposal and current neuropsychological 
views on contagion and mimicry, as a step towards one’s inferential knowledge of 
another’s experience (Chapter I); and between Scheler’s work on sympathy and ethics 
                                                 
24 This is a common contemporary historical view, though Duan and Hill (1994, p.261) were able to track 
down the use of Einfühlung to Robert Vischer (1873), in the aesthetic field, which would be the 
“predecessor of empathy, to mean humans' spontaneous projection of real psychic feeling into the people 
and things they perceive”. On the other hand, Zepf and Hartmann (2008, p.56) remarked that the word 
empathy was first used by Lotze, in 1858, to describe how “we can deploy our imagination to place 
ourselves in, and participate in the experience of nature”, as well as to Herder, in 1774, to describe how 
one ‘feels oneself into everything’. Therefore, although there are alternative historical versions, in these 
early beginnings, empathy was a term that described an act that connected a subject to an object (person 
or other) by means of which some sort of knowing of that object occurred.   
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with the contemporary meanings of empathy as sympathy and pity offered by 
developmental approaches (Chapter I). 
Edith Stein’s thesis, “On the problem of empathy” (1917; Zum Problem der 
Einfühlung), was conducted under the supervision of Edmund Husserl. It is a rare, 
canonical example of orthodox, Husserlian, phenomenological inquiry. In this work, 
Stein provides one of the most systematic, complete, and thorough applications of a 
phenomenological and descriptive approach to experience; in particular, to the 
psychological experience of ‘empathy’. 
Stein’s clarity about the limits and nature of empathy was achieved by means of 
the descriptive phenomenological method. This required her to establish the essential 
features of empathy, and to rule out of her account those simulacra of empathy which, 
without close examination, might be mistaken for empathy itself. This means that she 
discriminates without agglomerating (after Chapter I), electing a particular meaning as 
her one true empathy - as Preston and Waal (2002) implicitly did. Given that the field 
of empathy studies is in some conceptual disarray, and that the term itself has a 
relatively recent academic history, Stein’s conceptual and experiential clarity is worthy 
of re-discovery and offers a sound basis for further psychological research.  
Unfortunately, the conceptual clarity of her thinking is not mirrored by the 
accessibility of her work. The text of her thesis on empathy is embedded within the 
dense and specialist phrasing of the German phenomenologists. Therefore, Stein’s 
ideas are unpacked here for psychology readers, in the hope that you find it as 
illuminating as I did. I believe that this theoretical journey is fruitful, because, through 
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it, a new clearly defined meaning of the term empathy arises; and one which is 
remarkably contemporary and theoretically coherent.  
I turn towards Stein’s understanding of empathy, for many reasons. Stein is 
concerned with the experience of directly knowing what someone is presently 
experiencing, there-and-then. This is largely what Stein conceptualizes as an empathic 
experience. For some, it is the inaugural moment which precedes the ‘proper’ 
empathetic experience (e.g., Davis, M., 2009; Preston & Waal, 2002). I believe that this 
phenomenon, particularly as Stein explains it, has not been given enough attention in 
psychology literature. Secondly, it has definitely not been given the attention which 
Stein dedicated to its lived experience. Stein’s work then assumed a greater relevance 
here. 
Stein’s understanding of empathy, as a concept, permeates the reasoning and 
research choices throughout this thesis. For instance, it has already manifested itself 
theoretically (direct empathy as a theoretical meaning of empathy, in Chapter I), but 
also empirically, by being responsible for the attention paid to immediate ways of 
knowing someone’s experiencing (perceiving and feeling mid-order categories of the 
folk psychology study in Chapter II).  Finally, it was precisely its discovery that 
grounded my view and impelled me to elect it as my research object. Subsequent 
empirical studies presented here are precisely about its lived experience. 





Stein’s brief biography 
 
Edith Stein25 (1891-1942) was born at Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, into a 
Jewish family. In her youth, she declared herself an atheist. Stein began her doctoral 
thesis while working as an assistant to Husserl at the University of Göttingen, but her 
studies were interrupted by the war, and the death of Husserl’s son. For a period, she 
worked as a nurse at a field hospital in Austria. In 1916, the field hospital was 
dissolved, and Husserl took up a new post at Freiburg im Breisgau, so Stein returned to 
the town of her birth, where she completed her doctorate in 1917.  Stein worked 
alongside Martin Heidegger, who was also an assistant to Husserl during this period.  
Professorial posts were not easily obtained by women at this time, nor by Jews in 
Germany; and Stein appears to have struggled to find a niche for herself. She held 
posts at Freiburg and Göttingen, before working as a schoolteacher for some years. 
Academically, she retained an interest in phenomenology, philosophy and psychology, 
but in the 1920s she also converted to Catholicism, and an increasingly theological 
focus informed her later work. She left her final teaching post and entered a convent in 
1934, and was smuggled into Holland in 1938. She was arrested by the Gestapo in 
1942, and sent to Auschwitz, where she was killed together with her sister. Stein was 
beatified in 1987. Her life and work are as important to the Catholic Church as they are 
to students of philosophy. I have taken her work in its own right, but of course I 
recognise that the story of her life and death is remarkable. 
                                                 
25 For a biography, see Oben (1988/2010), and Macintyre (2006). 
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 Stein’s work on empathy was written before her conversion to Catholicism, and 
it is not in any way a mystical artefact - although this misunderstanding does exist (see 
Boulanger & Lançon, 2006, p.505). As a writer of her time, Stein was not alone in 
having to address, and reflect upon, the relationship between her ideas and the 
concept of God; the concept of God was central to the concerns of her readership and 
peers.  This does not transform her early work into theology: in the work discussed 
here, the concept of God, in itself, is never used to explain the essence of the 
phenomenon of empathy, or of human beings.  
 
Stein and contemporary psychology 
 
Even though her particular conception is absent from Batson’s (2009) listing of 
psychological meanings of empathy, according to the binomial strategy adopted in this 
thesis, Stein’s views can be included in the ‘empathy-as-knowing’ drawer. It is a 
commonly overlooked ‘empathic’ knowing and it is also sometimes misinterpreted, or 
only partially portrayed. Recently, however, there has been a growing resurgence of 
interest in some of her doctoral claims, in philosophy and in psychology (e.g., 
Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Depraz, 2008, 2001; Gallagher, 2007; Geist, 2009; Gurmin, 
2007; Hart, 1999; Hobson, 1985; Prinz, 2006; Reik, 1948; Rockwell, 2008; Rogers, 
1957/2007; Thompson, 2001; White, 1997; Zahavi, 2008b; 2007, 2001).  
I think that her proposition has the potential to clarify the concept of empathy 
for psychology, and to open up new directions for researchers in this field.  I focus here 
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upon the key aspects of Stein’s thesis, drawing out those which have most relevance 
for the contemporary psychology of empathy.  Stein’s views sometimes contradict 
widely-held contemporary views about empathy, but they are developed with a logic 
and elegance which is persuasive and logically consistent.  I am then suggesting, to 
those interested in the nature of empathy, that, through its study as a lived experience, 
a theoretically and coherently grounded understanding of ‘empathy’ can be produced, 
and guide research in an insightful illuminating manner.  
 
Stein’s empathy phenomenon 
 
Empathy as a way of knowing 
 
To introduce what Stein means by empathy, I begin by clarifying the 
epistemological assumptions behind her reasoning, which are drawn from the first 
phases of Husserl’s phenomenology (Gurmin, 2007).   
The first of these is that people are embodied, minded and embedded in the 
world. Secondly, the world is objectively ‘out there’ to be perceived, in the sense that 
it is not merely a subjective representation inside the mind. Thirdly, people relate to 
the world by means of an intentional act of consciousness. This intentional act is what 
brings the world and its objects into consciousness, as phenomena. Consciousness is 
always intentional - it connects in consciousness a self to an object, worldly or other - 
and it is always relational - in the sense that it places a self and an object in relation to 
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one another, by means of an intentional act.  Fourthly, phenomena (objects as 
appearing in consciousness) bear in themselves essential qualities of the given object. 
Finally, through phenomenology, it is possible to inspect these phenomena and 
identify an object’s essential qualities. 
For Stein (p.6; p.21), empathy is an intentional act in this phenomenological 
linked-in-consciousness sense. However, it is a very particular kind of intentional act, 
because its object is the present experience of another. For Stein, empathy deals with 
the givenness, to oneself, of this foreign experience; and it is through empathy that 
“foreign experience is comprehended” (p.6). This is also a core contemporary 
assumption, referred to in the literature as the alterity, otherness or foreign quality of 
an empathic experience.  
To begin with, then, for Stein, empathy is a way of knowing another’s present 
experience. Among Scheler, Lipps and Stein, there is, indeed, the agreement that 
empathy is a way of knowing or understanding others: "There are three spheres of 
knowledge. I know about things, about myself, and about others.... The source of the 
third type of knowledge is empathy” (Barrett-Lennard, 1981, p.91, cf. Allport, 1937, 
p.351). This was then a consensual meaning of empathy in philosophy in the beginning 
of the twentieth century, and one which contrasts with contemporary psychological 
theories that view empathy as a response to another’s experience (Chapter I).  
Many psychologists would hold that empathy is (only or also) a response to 
another’s experience. This is often conceptualized as  empathy’s affective component, 
that is,  one’s personal emotional congruent response to the affective state of another 
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person (Batson, 2009; Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Decety & Jackson, 2006; 2004; 
Depraz, 2001; Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Gladstein, 1983; Håkansson, 2003; 
Hoffman, 2000; Hassenstab et al., 2007; Hatfield et al., 2009; Jabbi et al., 2007; Kerem 
et al., 2001; Preston & Waal, 2002). Two forms of affective responses commonly 
investigated by these authors are contagion and emotional distress; and their 
importance in current empathy-related literature is evident in the following:  “All 
forms of empathy involve some level of emotional contagion and personal distress” 
(Preston & Waal, 2002, p.4).  
Stein explicitly rejects this idea, not because these responses do not exist, but 
because, for her, it is not the response, in itself, that is empathic. For Stein, empathy is, 
by definition, a means through which knowledge is acquired about another person’s 
experience – and not the subsequent reaction or response to that understanding. That 
is, empathy amounts to an empathy-as-knowing experience that does not necessarily 
involve a personal emotional response, it “amounts to experiencing, say, the other 
person’s emotion without being in the corresponding emotional state yourself” (Zahavi, 
2008b, p.517). Contagion and distress are ruled out as a mere simulacra of empathy, 
precisely because these are personal and responsive experiences - not another’s 
experience:  
Feelings are aroused in us by witnessed ‘phenomena of expression’ (…) we 
speak of contagion or transference of feelings in such cases. It is very plain 
that these actual feelings aroused in us (…) do not announce a foreign 




Stein is not entirely alone in her understanding of empathy as a way of knowing, 
rather than a personal response, but there is a further process-related distinction to be 
made between her views and those of others. According to Batson (Chapter I), there 
are two prevailing approaches to empathy-as-knowing: explicit simulation (reasoning 
about available information, for an imaginative theory of mind to be formulated; 
perspective-taking, empathic accuracy), and implicit simulation theories (contagion 
response that acts as an unconscious replication of another’s experience, and is 
subsequently used to determine another’s experience; inference from felt-feeling)   
 From Stein’s perspective, these two approaches are similar in that it is argued 
that the basis of empathic knowledge is acquired by means of an ‘intellectual act’. The 
processes implied here suggest a mediated, inferential, intellectual knowledge of 
another’s experience. Stein’s view is distinct from these approaches in this point. 
For Stein, empathy is, by definition, the direct givenness (immediate and 
experiential) to oneself of another’s experience. Empathy is a non-intellectual 
givenness of foreign experiences. She does not ignore the existence of these other 
processes, or that “our understanding of others comes in many shapes and forms” 
Zahavi, 2008b, p.515) but, for her, empathy is a very particular and immediate form of 







Empathy as an interpersonal experience 
 
Stein’s empathic experience involves at least two perspectives, self and other, 
throughout the process. It is an interpersonal experience in that there is always an 
empathizer who relates with an empathee26, personal and foreign experiences 
connected via an intentional empathic act. On the other hand, in the models of 
empathy proposed by her predecessor, Lipps, and in some contemporary theories, a 
kind of ‘merging’ of empathizer and empathized is hypothesised.  
For Stein, Lipps’ ultimate level of empathy is a unity between self and other, 
captured by a feeling of “oneness” (p.16).  Lipps describes a kind of ‘inner participation’ 
in other’s experiences (p.12), which is only complete when there is no longer a 
distinction between oneself and the other. This is explained with a theory of imitation, 
which resonates with contemporary ideas about contagion and mirroring (e.g., Hatfield 
et al., 2009). 
Perhaps as a consequence of Lipps’ work, we find a number of recent authors 
asserting that empathy is, or involves, a lack of “self-other distinction” (Preston & 
Waal, 2002, p.4, tab. 2), or a “total identification without discrimination between one’s 
feelings and those of the other” (Decety & Jackson, 2004, p.75);  or a ‘merging-with’, 
where subject and object function as an unique body (Finlay, 2005); or a feeling of “at-
oneness” (Davis, C., 1990, p.709),  or a connection that “temporarily unites the 
separate social entities of self and other” (Davis, M., 2009).   
                                                 
26 This claim is sustainable even regarding situations when one empathizes with one’s own experience – 
Stein’s “reflexive” sympathy (p.18; p.88). 
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Stein irrevocably rejects the idea that empathy is the experience of ‘oneness’ 
with another: “empathy is not the feeling of oneness” (p.17). Empathy as this 
‘oneness’, “entanglement” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.56), fusion, or confusion, is, for 
Stein, an impossible position27, simply because “what my body is doing to my body and 
the foreign body is doing to the foreign body would then remain completely obscure” 
(p.16). This degree of perceptual, embodied and experiential confusion is simply not a 
phenomenological characteristic of people’s experiences of empathy, and it lacks 
persuasive face validity. At the most, this oneness is illusory (“a feeling in another that 
is unconsciously taken as one’s own”, Scheler, 1913, p.18), and not empathic at all 
because it does not reveal another’s experience to oneself. As Gallagher points out: 
At the phenomenological level, when I see the other’s action or gesture, I 
see (I directly perceive) the meaning in the action or gesture. I see the joy 
or I see the anger, or I see the intention in the face or in the posture or in 
the gesture or action of the other. I see it. I do not have to simulate it. And 
I immediately see that it is their action, gesture, emotion, or intention, and 
it is extremely rare that I would be in a position to confuse it with my own. 
(Gallagher, 2008, p.359) 
 
Lipps’ empathy implies a blurring of one’s self-identity with the identity of 
another person, in a manner which is not consistent with most people’s experiences of 
empathy-as-knowing, even in its direct knowing sense. This oneness feeling is perhaps 
a very platonic, romantic idea, but, in a clinical sense, this degree of fusion is usually 
seen as either infantile or pathological. For example: 
                                                 
27 Despite Stein’s clarity on this, she is still portrayed by White (1997) and C. Davis (1990) as supporting the 
notion of empathy-as-oneness. 
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From object relations theory to transpersonal psychology, there is a presumption 
that the newborn experiences the world in a preegoic fusion with the primary 
caregiver and the world at large. (…) There may be similar empathic fusion in 
adults who have unusually permeable boundaries and a symbiotic relational style 
(see Johnson, 1994). In conventional diagnostic formulations, this may occur with 
some regularity in Borderline or Dependent personality disorders. The symbiotic 
character style may “know” the other by introjecting, or swallowing whole, the 
other’s experience without digesting the experience so as to understand or 
appreciate it as the other’s. (Hart, 1999, p.113/114). 
  
For Stein, empathy involves a self-object connection, not a self-object fusion. 
This is perhaps more in line with Heidegger’s mitsein (‘being with’), than with Lipps’ 
Einfühlung. Stein explicitly denies that empathy is a fusion - or even an analogical 
feeling or knowing (p.87), as Håkansson and Montgomery´s (2003) propose.  Empathy 
is not this contaminated responsive feeling, nor a personal identification with another 
person. Rather, it is an intersubjective experience. 
To summarise (Figure 9), then, for Stein, empathy is neither a reaction to 
another’s experience (e.g., contagion, imitation, identification, oneness, sympathy); 
nor any form of intellectually-reasoned knowledge about another’s experience (e.g., 





Figure 9: “What Empathy is not: Stein’s logical path towards a phenomenological 
definition of empathy” 
 
Figure 9 is an illustrative (not comprehensive) table that intends to clarify Stein’s 
understanding of what is, and what it is not, empathic in nature. It shows how Stein 
applies her phenomenologically-derived criteria (right column) to nominate simulacra 
of empathy (middle column) that should be regarded as non-empathic in nature.  
It sketches the reasoning behind Stein’s derivation of the essence of empathy, 
and one which concludes that empathy is the interpersonal process of directly and 
non-intellectually coming to know another’s experience, as it unfolds in the present.  
Empath
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Or, better, more in line with a contemporary phenomenological view, empathy is the 
intersubjective experience of directly knowing what someone is experiencing, there-
and-then. This is Stein’s one true empathy.  
 
Three levels of empathy 
 
There are three levels to Stein’s understanding of empathy, which merit further 
exposition. The term ‘level’ – which Stein employs – may be slightly misleading. There 
is not a strongly hierarchical element to her account.  She notes that while one might 
usually progress through the levels (from first, to second, to third) this is not always 
the case. Rather, it is possible to imagine one can skip level 2, for example (p. 70). 
However, for reasons which will become obvious, it is unlikely that Stein considered 
that someone could be said to be having an empathic experience via level 3 alone. 
Each of these described levels has a particular defining essential characteristic, 
but they all are experiences which directly bring another’s experience to our 
awareness. This is what makes of these acts essentially empathic, their common 
essential empathic feature. This means that, in a way, these levels can be seen as 
different kinds of empathic phenomena, or different ways into empathy.  
I have attempted to label them in ways which are reasonably clear and 
meaningful to the contemporary reader28, namely: 1. Directly perceiving (the 
immediate perception of another’s present, minded, embodied, embedded, 
                                                 
28 For reference, in Stein’s (p.10) thesis, these are: 1) the “emergence of the experience”; 2) the “fulfilling 
explanation”; and 3) the “comprehensive objectification of the explain experience”. 
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experience); 2. Experientially projecting (the non-intellectual experience of another’s 
unfolding experience); and 3. Interpretatively mentalizing (the higher-level recognition 
and interpretation of one’s knowledge of another’s experience). In the following 
subsections, I expand upon each of these levels in more detail.  
 
Level 1: Direct immediate perceiving 
 
For Stein, empathy is a founding or fundamental act. In this level, it has a status 
analogous to perception. Empathy in this level is “a kind of an act of perceiving ‘sui 
generis’” (p.11), though which one directly perceives another’s experience, in its 
embodied, embedded, minded  present givenness; and it is not the product of 
deliberated intellectual processes (e.g., p. 10, p. 14; p. 20, p. 24, p. 27). 
 
What it is that we perceive [another’s experience] 
 
Direct perception is a special case of perception because what is immediately 
perceived is the foreign experience. That is, it is not an external meaningless cue, such 
as a meaningless gesture or a facial expression, into which some meaning is 
subsequently, imaginatively, and intellectually, infused. Even though “we grasp the 
other’s experience with the same perceptual intention that we grasp a thing” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p.94) there is a contrast, between ordinary perceptive acts and 
empathic perceptions.  
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Whilst ordinary perception brings to one’s awareness ‘concrete’ worldly objects 
(physical objects, “closely wedded in appearances”, Prinz, 2006, p.434), empathic 
perceptions bring into one’s awareness an experience. From a more dualistic inside-
outside perspective, it would then be argued that empathy allows the perceiver to see 
there (concrete behavioural situated appearance) and beyond (its experiential 
meaning, another’s “consciousness”, Barrett-Lennard, p.92). In empathic perception, 
one perceives an embodied embedded experience, an expressive gesture: the foreign 
gesture and its foreign meaning given immediately and together to the perceiving 
subject.  
Stein refers to this possibility of perceiving the body and its experience as 
empathy’s “con-primordiality” (p.57), or ‘double given-ness’ (p.43) – by which she 
means that seen, hidden and co-seen sides are given to the perceiver at once. As 
Zahavi (2001) would add, “experiences are not internal, they are not hidden in the 
head” (p.153). The perceiving of another’s experiences is a phenomenologically 
acceptable possibility.  
 
How we do this [directly, immediately, non-inferentially] 
 
At the outset, Stein determines that “empathy deals with grasping here-and-
now” (p.7).  She stresses (p.10) that empathy is always the “primordial”29 act (one’s 
                                                 
29 I understand this adjective, in Stein’s thesis, to mean ‘here-and-now’. Bournemark (2005, p.124) 
translates it as “original” instead. ‘Original’ accentuates a facet relative to the ‘authenticity’, the source 
location, the propriety, the entitlement. When Stein defines empathy as “an act which is primordial as 
present experience though non-primordial in content” (p.10), it would be precise to infer that empathy’s 
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present perceptive act) with a ‘non-primordial’ intentional object (the non-present to 
oneself experience of another). These two aspects both contribute to the nature of 
empathy: for the perceiver, whilst the perceptive act occurs ‘here-and-now’; the 
content of this act (perceived foreign experience) is not happening in the now. The 
perceived experience is not presently occurring to the perceiver, but to the perceived 
person. This intrinsic otherness quality of the perceived experience, then, distinguishes 
empathy from memory and fantasy, whereas the non-primordial quality distinguishes 
it from contagion and sympathy. 
Hence, we directly know the foreign experience without any intellectual, 
underlying act (fantasy, memory); and without deriving it from one’s personal current 
experience (contagion, sympathy). These are key features of empathy: an act of 
perception that is responsible for our immediate direct knowledge of another’s 
present experience; and that has the foreign embodied embedded experience for its 
intentional object.   
In short, much like any ordinary perceptive act, empathy happens here-and-now, 
but specifically to bring to our awareness the experience of another. In everyday 
language we might understand this sort of perception in terms of having a ‘sense,’ an 
                                                                                                                                               
content is located in the other (empathy being responsible for its subsequent givenness to the perceiver). 
However, when Stein discusses acts of memory (p.8), she highlights that memory deals with ‘non-
primordial’ phenomena. And, in memory, the source is the perceiver; the recalled experience is personal, 
authentically entitled to the self – it is simply not a present experience, but a past one instead. Hence, the 
term primordial cannot be read as relative to the source location. To avoid this interpretation of primordial 
as meaning ‘located in the self’ and of non-primordial as ‘located in the other’, I define primordial as 
present, actual, and here-and-now. Thus, in the former quote, I understand that Stein means that the 
empathic experience is happening in the now for the perceiver, but its content (foreign experience) is not 
happening in the now for the perceiver – it is, after all, another’s experience, happening in the now merely 
to the other, not oneself. The perceived experience is always another’s, throughout the empathic act. It 
never becomes personal and located in the self as a present experience. Or, better, empathy is an 
intersubjective experience that links a personal intentional act to a foreign experience. 
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intuitive knowledge, or a ‘feeling about’ another’s experience. Stein’s preference is 




Stein’s model of empathic perception has a gestalt quality, in a con-primordial 
sense. Here-and-now and moment-to-moment “the averted and interior sides of a 
spatial thing are co-given with its seen sides. In short, the whole thing is ‘seen’” (p.57). 
She uses a visuo-spatial metaphor to unpack this. 
Imagine that you perceive a chair. When you perceive it, you see the presenting 
sides of the chair (those facing you), and you see the surrounding area (the context). 
You would not literally see the back of the chair (averted sides) or its underlying 
structure (hidden sides), of course, but the chair is still perceptively given to you in its 
wholeness (i.e. as a composite of its seen and averted and hidden sides). Under normal 
conditions we do not perceive a fragmentary chair, composed only of what is 
concretely accessible to our gaze.  
In empathy, this means that one simultaneously perceives at the same time (‘co-
perceives’) the other’s outward, expressive, visible (seen sides) and non-visible 
behaviour (averted sides), as well as the other’s experience (structure). This is the 
meaning of direct perception for Stein. In empathy, we directly co-perceive body-and-
mind, together, at once, in their context. We perceive another’s minded, embodied, 
embedded, expressive experience. We have access to this gestalt ‘other’ through 
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empathic perceptive acts. This is a core feature of empathy, and she wishes to 
emphasise that there is an unmediated gestalt quality to this act. 
 
How might this be understood? 
 
Stein names this level “the emergence of the experience” (p.10). This might 
suggest that she sees empathic experience as a process, and one which begins at this 
level, but this is not necessarily the case. Stein emphasises that “in a concrete case 
people do not always go through all levels” (p.10), and that one’s empathic lived 
experience may be carried out in a manner different from her own order of 
presentation (p.14/15; p.70; see also Depraz, 2001, for a similar formulation).  
In line with Zahavi (2007; 2001), she sees direct perception as the most 
fundamental mechanism underlying our daily interpersonal understandings. Empathy, 
he argues, makes people intelligible to one another in a direct, immediate manner, and 
is the core form of interpersonal knowledge. 
 
Level 2: Experientially Projecting 
 
Why empathy is a form of ‘projecting’  
 
Stein herself names this level “the fulfilling explication” (p.10), for reasons to be 
soon explained. On the other hand, the nomenclature here adopted highlights one of 
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this level’s qualities: during this empathic experience the empathic act involves a kind 
of transposal or projection30 of the self.  
 By examining Stein’s step-by-step elimination of what empathy is not about in 
this level, I conclude that empathic projections: 1) are experienced (not reasoned, or 
imagined, or simulated, p.14); 2) are a means of accessing genuinely foreign 
experiences (not hypothetical “probable” experiences, p.27; nor conjured, or 
projected,  experiences, p.20); and 3) are a direct access (not based in any kind of past 
knowledge, such as the empathizer’s past experiences, p.27).  
In more common usage, ’projection’ is understood as the process of projecting 
into the world some pre-acquired knowledge, one’s own experiences.  In contrast, 
Stein’s projection is a very particular kind of projection. It is an experiential, non-
intellectual, and intuitive (p.20) kind of projection that is not a ‘personal’, ‘primordial’ 
experiencing of another’s current experience.  This notion is much closer to Lipps’ 
understanding of empathy, though it can be distinguished from his theory and 
contemporary neuropsychology theories because this is still a non-intellectual 
simulative experience; it directly reveals moment-to-moment the genuine experience 
of another, rather than one’s own, as mirrored by another person. That is, the 
experienced projection is not an intellectual simulation or a mimicking, and is co-
perceived as a foreign experience throughout the empathic experience. 
 
                                                 
30 Thompson (2001) offers a similar reading by explaining this level as a kind of projection. This supports 
my reading, even though, explicitly, in her text, Stein never connects empathic projections, discussed at 
length, with the second level as put forward in the beginning of the dissertation. Though, after careful 





Imagine that you are watching a novice acrobat balancing on a wire. At first, you 
directly see his/her fear of heights (direct perception). You may also experience this 
fear to some degree, but for that experience to be an empathic one, the fright could 
not be our own personal fear (e.g., contagion), or an imagined probable fright 
(simulated, remembered), or a fear for the safety of the acrobat (Scheler’s fellow-
feeling). Instead, it would have to be the acrobat’s fright, given to you via experiential 
projection.  
While you observe the acrobat, you can empathically and directly project into 
their experience, turning ‘with them’ towards the wire and the depths below. At such a 
point you are empathically being given an ‘experience’ of the acrobat’s own fear. 
Critically, you experience it, not in the fullest sense (the sense with which you might 
experience our own fear, for your own safety), but only partially – and as the acrobat’s 
fear.  The fright, for you, as the empathising observer, is not happening in here-and-
now, nor is it located in yourself. After all, it is not you who are fearfully balancing on 
the wire – you are just watching the acrobat and having an empathic experience. As 
Stein puts it, “I am not one with the acrobat, but only “at” him. I do not actually go 
through his emotions but quasi” (p.16). This distinguishes projection from contagion.   
Empathic perception has another’s experience for intentional object (e.g., the 
acrobat’s fear). For empathic projection, the intentional object shifts – the subject 
focusing on the intentional object which is at the center of another’s experience (e.g., 
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the high wire, the looming depths below). Regardless of this intentional object shift, 
subject and object are not one, they are not having the very same single experience – 
neither in empathic projections, nor in empathic perceptions. The otherness of the 
experience, implicitly a self-other differentiation, is one of empathy’s defining 
attributes throughout these levels. The observer does not really feel any fear (only 
‘quasi’ fear), but gains access to the acrobat’s fear by feeling it with him/her. 
Metaphorically speaking, it is a ‘second-person’ fear, where we are ‘with’ the 
other, experiencing the other’s extant ongoing state, almost as if we were having the 
experience ourselves, but aware that we are not. In the acrobat’s example, for you, the 
fear is not happening here-and-now, and nor is the act of wire walking. And yet, you 
are with the other, experiencing it. Hence, Stein claims that this level “exhibits the non-
primordial parallel to the having of the experience” (p.10). 
In a way, this experience is similar to the experience of identification, during 
which one experientially, at a very embodied and emotional level, believes oneself to 
be experiencing someone else’s experience. Theoretically, the difference between 
these two acts is that identification is usually conceived of as involving a retrospective 
act, during which one has access to one’s similar past experiences; an intellectual act, a 
self-other comparison and intellectual projective attribution of the recalled personal 
experience to another person; and oneness, or at least, a personal responsive affective 
experience. Identification, as when you identify with a movie character, is usually 




For example, the acrobat’s observer would only be able to understand what the 
acrobat was experiencing by remembering their own fear of heights; and by attributing 
this personal recollected experience to the acrobat. On the other hand, Stein’s 
proposal argues that there is an experiential projective act that is direct. That is, one 
needs not to remember a similar past experience, nor reason that in such 
circumstances one would feel fear, nor imagine that the acrobats experience is 
probably fear, nor compare oneself to the acrobat in any way, for the direct 
experiential projective understanding to happen. In this level, as with perception, the 
only personal intervention for the knowing to come about is that the act itself is 
personal, it is the observer that is empathizing. Through experiential projection, then, 
we would be able to ‘quasi’ experience familiar as well as unknown never-experienced-
before experiences. 
For Stein, empathic experiences can be about sensations just as easily as they 
can be about emotions; and they involve visual perception but also other sense-
perception. The perceiver is not required to literally see an emotion, by using his eyes. 
Rather, he/she may see in other ways, using other senses; and see non-emotional 
aspects of another’s present experience.  This makes sense when we think about the 
features of her approach, but it is a dimension of empathy which is not always 
included in contemporary writing. In Stein’s description, the movement from 
perception to projection is identical, regardless of whether the observed experience is 
an emotion or a sensation: a ‘feeling into’ and then a ‘feeling with.’ This idea is 
explored in her thesis as ‘sensual empathy’ (p.58/60). 
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Why Stein calls this the ‘fulfilling explication’ 
 
Stein uses the term self-transposal. This delineation is applied in some 
contemporary work, too, such as when Depraz (2001) describes an equivalent stage as 
being about a spontaneous, highly embodied, imaginative and kinaesthetic self-
transposal to another’s experience.  
Returning to the novice acrobat’s fear of heights, recall that, initially, one 
empathically perceived the acrobat’s fear. However, it is only through projecting into 
this experience, that one is able to explore this foreign experience, and inspect its 
many sides. By directly projecting into this experience, one would, for instance, 
acknowledge that the acrobat is looking beyond the trembling wire into the void, 
searching for a safety net and getting ever increasingly more upset for its absence. This 
happens in an exploratory lived manner, unfolding in the present with the foreign 
experience. Then, through this act, other sides of the foreign experience are revealed, 
such as acknowledging the trembling wire and the absence of a safety net. 
Consequently, one fulfils (the term adopted by Stein) one’s awareness of another’s 
experience – or, at least, one’s awareness is enriched. This act is an explication 
precisely because it details, in a more fulfilled manner, that which was initially 
perceived as merely fear.  
Here, I refrained from using the word ‘imaginative’ in association with the self-
transposal level because this might be incorrectly understood in the usual conception 
of imaginative acts, that is, in an intellectual sense.  Calling it an imaginative projection, 
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such as with Depraz (2001) and Thompson’s (2001) exposition, falls short of this level’s 
experiential, present, intuitive sensing-in essence - and so does, and probably in the 
same manner, the word projection. These words have the potential of leading to the 
misperception that Stein’s view is closer to intellectual conjecture, an interpretation 
which, by now, hopefully, will not seem adequate to you either. As Stein points out, 
this experience is not about the ‘feeling’ of one’s own experience via another’s 
“screen” (p.20). It is about how we come to feel the experience of another, a concept 
is perhaps closer to the notion of a ‘sensing-in’, a ‘feeling-at’, a feeling “with” (p.58), 
than an imaginative act – and an intersubjective experience all along and throughout.  
However, it is not easy to find an unequivocal suitable descriptive qualitative 
label for this act. 
 
Level 3: Interpretatively Mentalizing  
 
Since empathy is often given meaning, in psychology, as (partly or wholly) an 
intellectualized ability, this level is probably the aspect of Stein’s account which is most 
familiar to a contemporary readership. Thompson (2001) claims that, in this level, “the 
experience faces me again, but now in a clarified or explicated way” (p.16). This is 
because this level is usually seen as following on from the explicative, experiential 
second level. However, for me, this is not its most distinguishing characteristic.  
What is fundamental, and fundamentally different, is that, for the first time, 
empathy includes a clearly intellectual facet, responsible for its more intellectual 
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comprehensibility. With this level, Stein describes the point at which the interpersonal 
direct process of empathic knowing reaches its inevitable conclusion – that is, where 
one actively interprets the intuitive experience. Empathic knowing, in this level, 
becomes more explicitly and linguistically accessible as ‘knowledge’, though it is still 
distinguishable from a purely intellectual act because its intentional object is a directly 
given foreign experience (not a deduced, inferred one). It is an intellectual act 
bounded to a direct knowing experience. 
 
What is mentalized [the foreign experience] 
 
Here, for the first time, that which was directly intuitively given (during direct 
perception and/or experiential projection) about the foreign experience is 
represented, in awareness, as an intellectual form of knowledge of the foreign 
experience. That is, the content of the intuition is mentalized, becoming, in awareness, 
an intellectual idea about the foreign experience. This is most transparent when Stein 
defends that empathy can only, and properly, be seen as an intuitive idea about 
another’s experience at this level. Before this level, empathy is not an idea, not a 
representation, but intuition only (p.20). At this level, we face a form of knowledge 
about the foreign experience, in the usual conception of the word knowledge, but only 
at this level. Through it, then, empathic understandings become not only 
intersubjective intuitive understandings but also partly intellectual understandings. 
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Through mentalization - the making of an experience into a mental object - 
empathy becomes comprehension (“a part of the interpretation of foreign experience”, 
footnote 24). This is the quality particular to this level that I chose to emphasize. 
During this level, the empathizer is finally given the foreign experience in an 
intelligible, partly interpreted, manner. Consequently, the foreign experience becomes 
once more, as it was during direct perception, the intentional object of the empathic 
act – with the difference here that now the other’s experience is not the target of a 




To extend the example of the acrobat, the fear was directly perceived (first 
level). Then, the perceiver projected into it, to explored some of its non-initially given 
sides (second level), such as the escalating intensity of the acrobat’s fear. Then, finally, 
the perceiver gives to the intuition an intellectual form – what could hypothetically 
translate into the empathizer saying to him/herself that the acrobat is experiencing 
something that could be called fear of heights (third level).  In this intellectual manner, 
the acrobat’s experience is partly, or fully, comprehended; the empathic experience 
completed. Hence, it is only through this level that empathy is an act through which 
“foreign experience is comprehended” (p.6). 
These three aspects (occurring after experiential projection; requiring the making 
of the experience into a mental object; and being an interpretative activity), in 
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conjunction, somehow seem enough to justify the name given by Stein to this level:  
“comprehensive objectification of the explain experience” (p.10). 
 
The importance of the mentalization level 
 
This interpretative, mentalizing act is simply the giving of an intellectual meaning 
to an intuition. For Stein, the empathic experience can only be completed with the 
intellectual interpretative act (representation is the term she adopts). More than that, 
she even tells us that the “empathic representation is the only fulfilment possible” 
(p.57).  
In order to understand the meaning behind this claim, we must inspect the term 
‘fulfilment’. I used it in relation to the second level, and translated it in terms of the 
experiential enrichment and revelation of the non-perceptively given aspects of the 
other’s experience. I also noted that Stein sees the third level as the fruition and end of 
the empathic process. Metaphorically-speaking, we might imagine a river flowing 
through the earth, exploring the surroundings as it goes. This would be the experiential 
fulfilment. At the point where the river reaches the ocean, in a sense, it ceases to be a 
river - but by ceasing to be, its path is complete. This would be the representational 
act.  When Stein claims that the empathic act can only be completed by establishing an 
intellectual representation, it is as though the empathic act arrives at its destination, 
and in doing so, the process of knowing is complete and transformed, partly becoming 
something else – less of an experience, and more of an interpretation.  
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Summary of Stein’s approach 
 
Stein’s phenomenological equation includes the self, the intentional act 
(empathy) and its object (foreign experience; foreign intentional object).  With this 
equation, Stein is able to detect three kinds of empathic phenomena: direct 
perception; experiential projection; and interpretative mentalization. And although 
these ways into empathy are about the knowing of the foreign experience, it is only 
the latter (mentalization) that can be properly qualified as a form of knowledge. The 
first two are intuitive, not ideational. 
The first level, direct perception, is about the direct, non-mediated (e.g., by 
inference from behaviour or aprioristic knowledge) perceptive co-givenness of another 
person’s present embodied, embedded, minded experience. Here, one immediately 
‘sees’ the foreign experience. The second level, experiential projection, is about 
exploring, as if with the other person, their unfolding experience. Here, one ‘feels’ 
aspects of the foreign experience, some of which may not have been perceived at level 
1. Finally, in the third level, interpretative mentalization, empathy is an intellectual, 
interpretative act. During this level, one recognises and intellectually represents the 
other’s experience, one intellectually interprets what was intuitively given of it. And, 
since this act is bounded to an intuitive act, although of a more intellectual nature, this 
is still an empathic act. Through it, the empathic experience is completed.  
Although organized in a sequential manner, people may perhaps enter into 
empathy at any of these levels, and may even skip a few (p.10, p.70). Nevertheless, 
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level 3, alone, cannot count as an empathic experience because it must always be an 
interpretation of level 1, 2, or both; one may be more aware of it than of the intuitive 
associated acts due to its intellectual nature, but alone it is not essentially an empathic 
experience. 
These levels share some essential characteristics that distinguish them from non-
empathic acts of consciousness. First, the act of empathizing is immediate, direct and 
embedded, it is a “here and now experience” (p.7). Secondly, it is an intentional act of 
consciousness that links the empathizer to aspects of another person’s present 
experience. Thirdly, this experience is mostly direct, non-intellectual and non-
mediated. Fourthly, empathy is specifically about the knowing of another’s experience, 
rather than responding to it. Finally, what is given through empathy is always a second-
person experience. It is not an authentic personal experience. This is what essentially 
defines empathy as a phenomenon across the three levels: empathy is the direct and 
experiential coming-to-know of another’s unfolding embedded embodied experience, 
where the subject and the object “experiences are actually different in themselves” 
(p.23). 
 
Deception and limits in empathy 
 
Direct empathy does not necessarily reveal to oneself the foreign experience in 
its entireness, as there is perhaps as well a “sphere of absolute privacy” (Scheler, 1913, 
p.10).  Both self and other are never perceived as complete. To use Stein’s expression, 
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each is always “’absently available’” (Stein, p.19), to oneself and to another. 
Nevertheless, to only be given a partial aspect of another’s experience does not make 
our access less direct, less experiential, less accurate, or less empathic: “there is so to 
speak more to the mind of the other than what we are grasping, but this does not 
make our understanding non-experiential” (Zahavi, 2008b, p.520).  
As Barrett-Lennard (1981, p.92) noted, empathic understandings are about the 
knowing of “at least those aspects of his awareness that are most important to him at 
the moment”. In fact, “it is exactly this inaccessibility, this limit, which I can experience 
(cf. Husserl, 1973a, p. 144). And when I do have an authentic experience of another 
subject, I am exactly experiencing that the other eludes me” (Zahavi, 2001, p.153). 
There is then a limit to that which can be accessed through empathy. Imagine that the 
acrobat was fearful, but also thrilled with the performance’s suspense. By noticing only 
the fear, the observer is still having an experience that is suitably described as an 
empathic experience.  
Empathically knowing another’s experience is not incompatible with the use of 
other knowing acts. For example, “when I empathize the pain of the injured in looking 
at a wound, I tend to look at his face to have my experience confirmed” (p.84) via an 
intellectual act. The combination of empathic acts and reasoned intellectual acts (e.g., 
drawing upon “meaning contexts”, p.85), helps “accurately interpreting ‘equivocal 
expressions’” (p.85), such as, experiences which have a dissonant or incongruent 
feature to them (e.g., the acrobat restraining any visible manifestation of the felt fear). 
The combination of this intuitive empathic act with an intellectual confirmative act, 
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drawing upon available ‘cues’ (after Batson, 2009), works progressively, to transform 
our knowing of another’s experience into a more accurate one. This implies that these 
two acts can work in parallel, to contribute to a more accurate interpersonal 
understanding (p.85; p.87). Secondly, this shows the difference between an empathic 
experience and, say, inference from observable behaviour. Their natures, one 
reasoned and intellectual, and another intuitive and direct, generate distinctive types 
of interpersonal knowledge. 
The interpretative act of level 3 is more evidently permeable to the empathizer’s 
past experiences and knowledge, more vulnerable to the influence of idiographic 
perspectives, preconceptions, or habits. But so is the intuitive act, because empathic 
experiences are shaped by the empathizer’s “life-long habits of intuiting and thinking” 
(p.62). That is, the intuitive act is also a gained habit. Although these habits are not 
necessarily responsible for inaccurate knowing (for example, they may just condition 
the selectiveness of the empathizer’s attention), through them empathy becomes 
susceptible to deceptive knowledge.  Stein wishes to emphasize that inaccuracy can be 
prevented by combining reasoned and empathic acts; their combination is a way of 
reducing the odds of inaccurate knowing. 
Nevertheless, this potential inaccuracy is not restricted to empathic acts. Indeed, 
for Stein, non-empathic acts more frequently generate deceptive knowledge. For 
example, if the interpretation draws upon one’s similar past experiences (analogy) 
there is a heightened risk of deception: “we come to false conclusions if we 
empathically take our own individual characteristics as a basis” (p.87).   
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In conclusion, the empathic knowing can be partly inaccurately interpreted and 
subjected to habits of intuition; and it does not necessarily reveal to the empathizer all 
there is to know about the foreign experience. Despite this, accuracy can be enhanced 
by complementing consecutive empathic acts (moment-to-moment empathy) with 
non-empathic intellectual acts.  They can be used in a complementary fashion, with 
the goal of correctly interpreting that which was empathically experienced, but they 
are to be distinguished by their nature.  
Empathy’s fallibility justifies Barrett-Lennard’s (1981) need to introduce the 
notion of feedback. For him, the empathizer and the empathized continue interacting 
and feedingback on the accuracy of the empathic content, in an attempt to validate, 
confirm, disconfirm, or correct it.  Although relevant in therapeutic settings, the notion 
of feedback is less relevant in an orthodox phenomenological framework. It transforms 
an investigation of individual consciousness, into the expanded investigation of at least 
two individual consciousnesses. The bracketed equation is merely the self, the 
empathic act and the foreign experience as given to the empathizer.  Any subsequent 
communicative or interactive act is, properly speaking, out of the equation. It is 
another act.   
 
Empathy as an everyday experience 
 
Across the three levels, empathy has two sides, it has two “essences” (p. 19), 
namely: 1) the foreign experience; and 2) one’s own experience. More concretely, “if I 
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have an emotion that is given to me as one of another’s, I have it given twice” (p.34), 
once as my own, and once as another’s. It is perhaps better said that empathy is an 
intersubjective experience, in the sense that it is an act of consciousness that does not 
exist in the absence of a foreign experience. The act is personal, but its content is 
foreign. Then one empathically has an intersubjective experience, co-generated in-
between involved people; one experiences another’s experience. 
Empathy is the common intersubjective experience of everyday interpersonal 
understandings; not such a ‘special’ case but rather a fundamental interpersonal 
experience. It is “how human beings comprehend the psychic life of their fellows” 
(p.11) and even the key to one’s individuality. As Stein proposes while exposing the 
concepts of reflexive sympathy (p.18; p.88; Reik’s ‘recurrent reflections’), empathy is 
the way through which “I’m given to myself as a psycho-physical individual in the full 





As a consequence of her phenomenological analysis of the bracketed equation, 
Stein is opposed to views of empathy as contagion, sympathy, perspective-taking, 
simulation, analogy, oneness and so forth (Figure 9). That is, to the great majority of 
the phenomena studied in Chapter I. Despite this, she is still able to distinguish three 
types of empathic experiences, none of which are commonly called empathy in the 
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psychological literature. In this section, I compare her views to more contemporary 
approaches, starting with those that are closer to her views.  
 
Correspondence with psychotherapeutic theories 
 
There is no other area which is so fundamentally concerned with other people’s 
genuine experiences as psychotherapy. And, in contrast with neurocognitive and 
developmental psychology, some humanistic and psychodynamic approaches to 
psychotherapy more commonly offer a view of empathy much closer to Stein’s 
conception. In this particular ‘Steinian’ sense, empathic understandings are conceived 
as a key aspect of the therapeutic process. The therapists’ claims can be received by 
the client as ‘correct or incorrect’, but, through the continuous maintenance of an 
empathic rapport, the client develops “a sense of realness, an awareness of being 
alive, personally present, and invested” (Geist, 2009, p.64) to the point when the 
accuracy of the intervention is less important (with both ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
commentaries serving as an invitation for exploration, and each responsible for 
personal growth).  
For example, Rogers (Bozarth, 2009, p.103, cf. Rogers, 1959, p.210) proposes 
that “experiencing an accurate, empathic understanding of the client’s awareness of 
his own experience” is a necessary condition for the success of therapy. For him, 
empathy is sensing, perceiving (Stein’s level 1) and ‘as if’ experiencing (Stein’s ‘quasi’ 
quality of level 2) the client’s experience and meaning: 
 148 
 
The state of empathy, or being empathic, is to perceive the internal frame 
of reference of another with accuracy, and with the emotional 
components and meanings that pertain thereto, as if one were the other 
person, but without losing the ‘as if’ condition.  
 
For Rogers, empathy is the perceptive ability of knowing another’s experiential 
meaning; and it involves an experiential resonance side that is never to be confused 
with a genuinely personal experience. For Freud, I believe that this experience 
corresponds to a temporary, partial, identification mechanism, used to get into 
another’s feelings without being directly implicated; and a mechanism helpful for the 
psychoanalyst’s comprehension of what is felt as foreign in the self of another person 
(e.g., Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Zepf & Hartmann, 2008). Similarly, for Reik (1948; 
Arnold, 2006), psychoanalytic listening involves an intuitive detection of the client’s 
experiential meanings, a perceiving of the tip of the iceberg of another’s initially 
unknown psychic dynamics. From these perspectives, as with phenomenology, 
empathy fosters a moment-to-moment understanding of that eluding otherness, that 
foreign, hence strange and perhaps estranged, experience. 
A moment-to-moment awareness, from these phenomenological, 
psychodynamic and humanistic perspectives, involves an experiential resonation, an 
‘emotional’ (though the emotional adjective falls shorts of the meaning of experiential) 
and ‘personal’ side. Therapy is a “meeting between two experiencing subjects (an I and 
a Thou) here and now” (Hobson, 1985/1989, p.xiii), a relationship between two 
experiencing people. In the above frameworks, “the impressions aroused in the 
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individual are experienced as belonging to an object” (Zepf & Hartmann, 2008, p.749), 
the location of clients’ and therapists’ experiences are clearly differentiated, their 
belongingness clearly given to the therapist throughout the empathic experience. 
Thus, in the light of Stein’s work and these approaches, there is no need to 
become an emotional stone-therapist, or to introduce a distance between subject and 
object, as some have proposed (e.g., “in the experience of empathy, individuals must 
be able to disentangle themselves from others. This distance is a key characteristic in 
psychotherapy”, Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.56).  Since there is no merging to begin 
with, any ‘defusing’ or distancing is irrelevant. 
To conclude, Stein’s writings, thorough and detailed, can inform the research, 
practice and teaching of psychotherapy, by illuminating empathy’s lived experience, 
from the empathees’ side, one which is not commonly studied in this area (Greenberg 
et al., 2001).  
 
Stein and contemporary empathy theories 
 
Presently there seems to be a return to some of Stein’s phenomenological claims 
about the nature of empathy, principally in phenomenological and phenomenology-
informed theories. These are, for instance, Depraz’s (2001) empathy theory; 
Gallagher’s (2007) views on situated cognition; Rockwell’s (2008) ‘vectorial’, 
‘multidimensional’ and experiential mind-reading; Prinz’s (2006) argument about the 
possibility of perceiving directly complex conceptual qualities of the worldly intentional 
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objects; and Zahavi’s (2008b, 2001) argument about direct perception. As an example 
of this return, I would like to offer a brief review of Depraz’s (2001) paper on empathy, 
also described in detail by Thompson’s (2001). 
 Depraz (2001, p.172) names the first level “Paarung” (after Husserl, usually 
translated as pairing); or “coupling” (after Maturana, 1975). The risk of using Husserl’s 
pairing to explain direct perception is allowing for misinterpretations along the lines of 
analogy (e.g., Moustakas, 1994, p.37). Pairing and intersubjectivity are not about 
analogy, not even in Husserl’s perspective, at least according to Zahavi’s (2001) reading 
of Husserl’s work. Similarity is a slightly misapplied accent on the core of 
intersubjectivity, though it could explain how Stein’s empathy can be read as being 
about an appreciation of similarity (Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Gallese, 2003).   
Therefore, describing empathy via the notion of coupling seems less prone to 
misinterpretations. Indeed, Depraz (2008), in a following paper, distinguishes 
coupling31 from Paarung because coupling implies “the far broader relationship 
between an organism and its environment. This bodily link is not symmetrical but 
inclusive” (Depraz, 2008, p.239/240). Therefore, Stein and Depraz’s first levels seem 
equivalent; both not about an analogical act, but a direct knowing. 
Depraz’s second level is about the act of ‘imagining oneself into’32. The 
connection between Stein and Depraz’s views is found in the necessity of the 
preposition ‘into’; Stein’s feeling ‘with’. Both illustrate that this imaginative act is not a 
typical imaginative individual experience, but an interpersonal one. Secondly, they 
                                                 
31 Originally, ‘acoplamiento’ (after Maturana 1975). 
32 Originally named ‘Sich Hineinphantasieren’ (Depraz, 2001). 
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both highlight its experiential nature. Since Depraz does not explore this notion at 
length, this superficial approach nevertheless suggests that the two levels might be 
equivalent in their theories.  
The situation is slightly different regarding the third level. This is because Depraz 
joins together two distinguishable (for me) phenomena: ‘Interpretative Understanding’ 
and ‘Communication and Expression’. Both of these titles are used, in conjunction to 
label her third empathic level. I claim them to be different phenomena because one 
does not need to overtly communicate with the object of empathy about that which is 
empathically understood. And, by separating the communicative act from the 
interpretative act, as two different phenomena, I establish a parallel between Depraz’s 
‘interpretative understanding’ and Stein’s third level. 
Hence, these three levels (perception, projection and interpretation) are 
identified by both Depraz and Stein as empathic experiences.  
Finally, Depraz’s fourth level, ‘ethical responsibility and affect’, is given to me, 
and to Thompson (2001), as connected to the notion of sympathy. As Scheler, Geist 
and Zahavi argue, “it is possible to empathize with someone without feeling any 
sympathy” (Zahavi, 2008b, p.516). It is neither a part of the bracketed equation; nor of 
the essence of empathy. Direct empathy may allow for the creation of a more attuned 
reaction to another’s present experience (Geist, 2009), that is, become responsible for 
a more attuned sympathetic action, but these are two distinctive acts. 
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In conclusion, Depraz identifies a couple of empathic phenomena that, for Stein, 
are non-empathic: communication and sympathy. Otherwise, there is a good 
convergence between their ideas about the nature of empathy. 
These propositions are not restricted to phenomenologically-informed theories. 
Even from a distinctive theoretical background, relative to the study of artificial 
intelligence, a similar claim can be found: “there is a kind of mind reading which is in a 
certain sense purely ‘‘perceptual’’ and unaided by any verbal theoretical elements” 
(Rockwell, 2008, p.54). Hence I claim that this convergence is not restricted to the field 
of phenomenology; and that these lines of research denounce a rediscovery or return 
to Stein’s stance. 
 
Explications for direct empathy 
 
So far, I have been concerned with describing the experience of empathy from 
Stein’s standpoint. I have also distinguished it from acts that are perhaps used for 
similar purposes, but are conceptually distinctive experiences and processes in 
themselves. Stein’s approach is phenomenological and descriptive - not explanatory. 
She does not discuss the psychological mechanisms behind the experience of empathy 
beyond the experiential (reflective and pre-reflective) and conceptual levels. For these, 
we must turn elsewhere. 
In neurocognitive psychology, mirror neuron activation is read as a 
contamination or contagion response. This phenomenon is a discrete individual 
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personal reactive phenomenon that “does not presuppose any sort of knowledge of the 
joy which others feel” (Scheler, 1913, p.15). It is an experience in which “there is 
nothing in the mournful feeling itself to point to its origin; only by inference from causal 
consideration does it become clear where it came from” (Scheler, 1913, p.15). It may 
even happen beyond awareness, “in the sense that we ‘get into’ these states without 
realizing that this is how this comes about” (Scheler, 1913, p.16/17).  
Mainstream neuropsychology transforms this contamination into a way of 
knowing another’s experience via causal considerations, via the inference from felt-
feeling act (Chapter I) – this amounts to an interpretation of the mirror neuron 
activation called here contamination-as-knowing. 
In phenomenologically-informed research areas, the same neurobiological and 
behavioural evidence is often interpreted in a coupling-as-knowing sense (Depraz, 
2008, 2001; Gallagher, 2007; Thompson, 2001). The difference between the 
neurocognitive contamination-as-knowing interpretation and the 
neurophenomenological coupling-as-knowing reading of the same evidence is 
irreconcilable; they cannot both be accepted to explain the same evidence. As offered 
by their authors, one excludes the other. 
The term coupling originated from Humberto Maturana’s biological research 
(1975) on autopoiesis (explanatory theoretical description of the inter-relationships 
between living beings and the environment), currently most often associated with his 
student, Francisco Varela and his neurophenomenological approach to psychology.  
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Coupling is a self-other linkage occurring at a biological cellular level. It is a pre-
reflexive, permanently dynamic and co-generative self-other link. For him, both 
environment and organisms are said to be constantly changing and co-determining 
each other, even at a cellular level. This theory is sometimes criticized for its solipsism, 
though given the intrinsic intersubjective meaning of coupling, this criticism is 
somehow, for me, a misinterpretation. Claiming that the observer and observed 
change one another at such a primordial level of analysis is not an elegy to solipsism, it 
is not a defence that the world is nothing but a subjectivity inside one’s mind.  
Rather, it is accepting that the world is intersubjectively constructed, in the more 
Heideggerian sense of being-in-the-world. This view does not obliterate or clash with 
the premise, stated in the introduction of this chapter, that there is a world out there 
to be perceived and experienced. Subject and object are still two different entities, 
despite their mutual influences upon each other. Coupling is not merging, or a 
dissolution of self and other identities as some tend to suggest (e.g., Finlay, 2005). It is 
simply an interaction occurring at a biological level. Gallagher (2007, p.356) gives a 
good example of this coupling mechanism:  
If we think of perception as an enactive process (e.g., Hurley, 1998; Noë, 
2004) - as involving sensory-motor skills, rather than as just sensory 
input/processing; as an active, skilful, embodied engagement with the 
world rather than the passive reception of information from the 
environment - then it may be more appropriate to think of the resonance 
processes as part of the structure of the perceptual process when 
perception is of the action of conspecifics. Fogassi and Gallese, despite 
their simulationist interpretation, put this point clearly: ‘‘perception, far 
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from being just the final outcome of sensory integration, is the result of 
sensorimotor coupling’’ (2002, p. 27). Mirror activation, on this 
interpretation, is not the initiation of simulation, it is part of a direct 
intersubjective perception of what the other is doing. 
 
Gallagher does not dissociate the mirror neuron activation from empathic 
experiences; he reads it as a sign of the phenomenon of coupling; and associates it 
with the meaning of direct perception. This illustrates the coupling-as-knowing 
interpretation of neurological evidences. Through coupling, the empathizer’s 
experience is composed of 1) a perceptive side; 2) a self-felt resonant personal side 
(inclusively, mirror neuron activation) – Stein’s two-sidedness of the experience. For 
him, mirror neuron activation is part of the empathic perceptive act; but it is a 
response insofar as a perception can be conceptualized as a ‘response’ (to the 
existence of an object in the environment). This is a radically different interpretation of 
the mirror neuron activation; and one which does not involve an inferential act, as 
with the contamination-as-knowing neurocognitive interpretation. These two 
competing theories are illustrated in Figure 10.  
As illustrated there, coupling-as-knowing (intersubjective empathic direct 
experience) is not to be confused with the contamination-as-knowing theory (a 





Figure 10: “Comparison between the neurocognitive and neurophenomenological 
explanations of empathy-as-knowing” 
 
  
Both these interpretations imply that empathy involves an embodied resonation 
with other people’s experiences, empirically translated by the mirror neurons 
activation. They are, however, fundamentally different in the way the process, and the 
qualities of this experiential resonation, are explicated. 
Neurocognitive  perspective:  
contamination-as-knowing 
Foreign experience 
Perception of external cues 
Imitation and contagion-as-
contamination  responses 
Simulation of an experience 
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experience via an intersubjective 




The neurocognitive perspective suggests that the mirror neuron activation 
translates the experience of contagion. Empathic understandings are said to start with 
a subjective (quality) resonance experience that belongs exclusively to the subject. This 
resonance experience is typically conceptualized as developing, in a step-by-step 
(hence, linear) manner, with each step (the cells identified in the column to the left) 
following on from the preceding: perception, then mimicry, then contagion, then 
simulation, then discrimination, then understanding. This is so, even when a few of 
these steps are collapsed as equivalent to each other. Thus, the process is indirect, 
mediated by several components - a quality that is here described as ‘inferential’.  
Note that it is one thing to say that mirror neurons are probably “doing an 
internal simulation of such actions” (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001, p.20); it is, after 
all, a valid way of giving a linguistic meaning to an empirical observation (better would 
be referring to it as similarity in neural activation). It is another to claim that this 
simulation is attributed to the object, that it is a form of understanding others (implicit 
simulation theories). It can just be a form of, say, learning by imitation (about actions, 
and about communication of emotions). Learning by imitation teaches more about the 
action or the expression, than about the other person and their present experience 
(except, perhaps, if I will, in an indirect manner). The mother who is behaviourally 
reinforcing the child’s liking for vegetables with an approving smile, is teaching the 
child that vegetables are good. The focus of attention is upon the vegetables – not 
another’s inner experience. Secondly, if this is to serve as an everyday form of 
understanding, that which is known of the other person must reach the threshold of 
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awareness (prereflectively, reflectively); and be used for that particular purpose. It 
cannot be an implicit process all along and throughout.  
Conversely, neurophenomenology argues that mirror neuron activation 
illustrates a coupling intersubjective experience and the process. There are no causal 
steps, first resonation, and then attribution. One experiences another’s state (process), 
and recognizes it as another’s (quality), at once, simultaneously. This is why the 
process is here called direct empathy. It is not because there is not a set of neural 
networks involved. 
Secondly, in phenomenology, the resonated state is a very particular embodied 
meaningful state. One might not be able to properly verbally describe what kind of 
state it is, or describe it accurately. But I argue that this does not make the experience 
meaningless. Just think of a first-time ever felt emotion, say, a first-time ever felt lust. 
Just because one does not quite know what one is experiencing does not mean that 
the experience is meaningless, and does not have a suitable name, or that it is not 
possible to categorize it, subsequently, through reflection (an act described by Stein as 
amounting to the interpretative mentalization level for the particular case of empathic 
experiences). When one sees an unusual never-seen-before object, one directly sees it 
at an experiential level, even if one does not know its name.  
Note then that the meaning of ‘meaning’ in this argument is not associated with 
a linguistic and formal aspect: “the movement from silence to speech is not a 
movement from nothing to something” (Spurling, 1977, p.51). Moreover, the ‘meaning’ 
of an experience is shaped by the context and past of the people involved (Anderson, 
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2003). This is responsible for individual variation, but it does not imply that the percept 
has not arrived directly to the empathizer in an unmediated manner; that this percept 
was not meaningful at once, at the outset, in a particular idiographic manner. It does 
not change the route or the act, or the observation that a perceptive meaningful 
experience happened. My experience of lust is different from your experience of lust, I 
can even take mine or yours for anxiety, but that does not change its direct 
experiential meaningfulness. Then, the meaning of ‘meaning’ in this argument is closer 
to an overall experiential configuration, to an arrangement of the many aspects that 
compose the experience of lust, in its distinctiveness from other types of experience. 
This is also how the ‘meaning’ of the other’s experience is not based upon an 
analogical act. In analogy, the starting point is always one’s past experiences, and it is 
in the light of these that the other person becomes an experiencing person. For 
instance, someone tells you that they have found a job, and because you were happy 
in a similar situation, you now imagine that they are happy - and, were it not for this 
analogical act, you would not know that they were having a meaningful experience at 
all. Phenomenologically speaking, the other person is an experiencing person at the 
outset. Their happiness is transmitted to you directly, experientially (regardless of the 
way you linguistically interpret this state, or of the way your own characteristics 
moulded this experience). The colour blind person would directly have a meaningful 
perceptive experience, even if that was a never-seen-before object, and the overall 
configuration slightly different from the non-colour blind person. Then, in the same 
way one experiences new experiences for oneself, or sees never-seen-before objects, 
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one is directly exposed to the other’s perhaps unknown meaningful experience. 
Analogy and direct empathy are two distinctive processes, even given that former 
knowledge and experiences might be helpful with the subsequent interpretation of the 
directly presented phenomenon, or shape the overall empathic experience. 
In the perceptive act, the question of the otherness of the emotion does not 
pose itself so poignantly. We seldom doubt the distinctive identity of perceiver and 
object. On the other hand, felt-level resonance experiences, such as coupling and 
contagion, are hypothesized to be more distributed, embodied, global, responsive 
experiences than a perceptive act is usually conceived to be. Here, the question of the 
state’s alterity is perhaps more pertinent for the observer (but not for the experiencing 
person, according to Stein) – at least in the light of the literature. Are subject and 
object merged? Are they similarly activated, with two separate emotional personal 
experiences that are causally related? Or, as phenomenology would offer, are they 
experiencing another’s state?  
One of the fundamental differences is then one of the location, or alterity 
(personal or merged, for contagion; and foreign, for coupling) as given in 
consciousness, This difference might have a neural translation, say, a particular area or 
route responsible for an experience to be felt as one’s own (neurocognitive claim) or 






Evidence for competing explanations 
 
Both mimicry and the mirror neuron activation are well established interpersonal 
phenomena that happen when a perceiver observes (even implicitly, see Gallese, 
2003) particular behavioural expressions and actions. The hypotheses in Figure 10 are 
much debated hypotheses that try to make sense of this empirical observation, and in 
particular for emotional displays. They equate mirror neuron activation with emotional 
resonance (contagion or coupling), and each proposes an alternative explanation for 
the way this resonance might be useful as an interpersonal understanding. The two 
level of analysis, theoretical and empirical, have to be clearly and objectively 
discriminated.  
These hypotheses relate mirror neuron activation with an outcome for the 
perceiver, precisely, the ability to know what another person is experiencing. 
Understanding, knowing, recognizing, accurately identifying, empathic accuracy: these 
are a few of the terms used in the literature to designate this outcome. Therefore, to 
test these hypotheses one must study the relationship between the neural activity and 
the nominated outcome. Studies of the brain activation of participants-as-passive-
observers of visual displays of emotions (e.g., Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito & 
Matsumura, 2004) clarify little about the relationship between emotional resonance 
(mirror neuron activation, contagion or coupling) and the perceiver’s understanding. 
Secondly, the neucognitive hypothesis argues that this happens in a sequential 
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manner. Consequently, testing it involves proving the causal links between mimicry, 
then contagion, then understanding.  
There is evidence of the relationship between certain neural regions and 
emotion recognition, principally as derived from the study of selective brain damage 
(reviewed by Adolphs, 2002). These measure both the neural activation and that which 
the participant knows of the target’s state. In this case, it is important to understand 
what, within the participants’ neural activation, amounts to emotional resonance; and 
in what way this recognition is an interpersonal understanding.   
In relationship to the assessment of resonance, are the target and the object’s 
experiences (brain activation, lived experience accounts) assessed, compared and 
found to match at that specific level? For mimicry, this matching is easier to assess 
because it resumes itself to behavioural data. The variable is visible behaviour of both 
target and perceiver. Even when the mimicry is implicit, automatic and minimal, there 
are forms of assessing muscle contraction, and this is used as an indicator for this 
matching. There is evidence that mimicry happens in certain circumstances, for certain 
emotions (e.g., Blairy, Herrera & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Gallese, 2003).  
Yet, it is not enough to show a picture, observe mimicry, and conclude that 
someone is contaminated at any other level beyond the observed motor response. 
This conclusion is not empirical, but results from one’s theoretical presumptions about 
a particular phenomenon; theory and data get confused through this process. For 
emotional resonance, there are at least two different forms of measuring and 
matching: the perceiver and the target’s brain activation for that observing moment 
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(neural level); or the perceiver and the target’s experience for that perceiving moment 
(lived experience level). I argue that, presently, the lived experience should be included 
in these assessments. This is because one of the main differences between these 
hypotheses is conceptually grounded on the otherness of the felt-state, and there is 
not yet, I believe, neurological evidence undoubtedly showing that there is a neural 
area or route responsible for this otherness quality. Also, since the main dispute 
between the hypotheses in Figure 10 concerns the interpretation of emotional 
resonance, I will exclude further mimicry-related considerations. 
With regard to the recognition issue, brain lesions clarify the relationship 
between active neural areas (to my knowledge, often not matched; thus not a very 
precise measure of emotional resonance), and the perceiver’s ability to categorize a 
particular emotional stimulus correctly. There are many ways via which this 
categorization can happen. For example, the perceiver might remember what that 
expression conventionally means for most people; and use this as a source of 
knowledge of the meaning of that expression for the answering task. In this case, one 
would be evaluating perceiver’s ability to identify the meaning of an expression, and 
not the target’s experience itself. This is described in this thesis as intellectual act, and 
may be performed with various levels of speed, effort, and deliberation.  
This answer (experience of another) can only be assumed to be correct if the 
target’s experience (not behaviour) is assessed. From a cognitive standpoint, if the 
participant is guessing what is ‘inside the box’, it is necessary for the experimenter to 
know what is ‘inside the box’ (instead of presuming its content in the light of 
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conventions). It is only in this manner that the experimenter can rate the participant’s 
answer as correct or incorrect, or otherwise risking to resume the study to an 
investigation of the ability of knowing the meaning of emotional displays alone. The 
box might be tattooed with smiles on the outside; and hold inside a hand-full of tears. 
In short, one has to match the answer with the stimulus at the very same level of 
analysis. If the stimulus is say, a photo of a smiling person, of whom we know nothing 
of the internal emotional state for lack of measure, then the answer must be smile. If 
the stimulus is happiness (for the state of the target was assessed), than the answer 
can be happiness. The recognition task must be matched to what was assessed of the 
target. 
Adolphs (2002, p.172), who objectively differentiated theory from evidence, 
suggested that there were several neurological routes via which emotional resonance 
experiences might contribute for interpersonal understandings. One of these routes 
amounted to a feedback process that, as he acknowledged, “might” be read along the 
lines of implicit simulation theories (via the the amydgala, and the orbitrofrontal 
cortex, in their connections with the motor structures and the somatosensory 
cortices). But this is offered as one among other alternative routes, and as an 
interpretative hypothesis. The other route, for example, consists of a feedforward 
processing that allows for the categorization of the stimuli as a function of its 
structural proprieties.  
We can see in these two routes the single process described by implicit 
simulation theories (and, hence, the step-wise quality should translate into differences 
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in promptness of activation, with the feedforward and other knowledge-related routes 
starting after the feedbackward route). This would translate the experience of inferring 
from one’s reaction alone the experience of another at a neurological level. We can 
also see in these routes two separate processes, translating, say, the mechanisms 
described by explicit (feedforward) and implicit simulation (feedbackward) theories; 
and the categorization experience as an act distinctive and possibly dissociated from 
the resonance experience. For this reading, the timeline is not central. Finally, we can 
also see in these routes a one and only distributed process, as the one described by 
neurophenomenology. For this reading, the timeline is not central either. This would 
amount to the experience of directly experiencing another’s meaningful experience, 
whilst knowing that it was the experience of another. 
 The study of lesions is the study of interruptions to the normal processing of 
stimuli. A particular lesion might affect similarly the resulting experience, regardless of 
whether we see in these routes two separate processes, or one distributed process. It 
is then perhaps not sufficient as the basis of a decision of which is the best 
interpretation. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that these are not isolated routes 
either; the neural network is a network, and, as such, links to other areas of and these 
become part of that experience. In conclusion, presently, I feel that much still rests on 
the way we look at evidence and interpret it in conceptual process-related terms. 
To review, developing, and then testing the hypotheses in Figure 10 requires an 
interpersonal study, anchored in the constructs of matched behaviour, experience, and 
recognition. In my opinion, the measures must be gathered at the same level of 
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analysis for target and perceiver, for theory and evidence to be clearly discriminated 
for what they are.  Consequently, there must be four matched variables under study: 
the subject’s behaviour - the target’s behaviour; the subject’s emotional neural activity 
- the target’s neural activity; the subject’s experience – the target’s experience; and 
the recognized dimension – assessed dimension. I have not found many studies that 
satisfy these requirements (matching mimicry; matching emotional resonance; and 
matching recognition), because resonance (experience and neural activity) and 
recognition are often not matched. Hence, in my view these are not properly assessed; 
and the gap is filled in in the light of current knowledge or theories. 
Among those found, there is some disconfirmatory evidence for the 
neurocognitive interpretation gathered within a cognitive paradigm (Blairy, Herrera & 
Hess, 1999; Blairy & Hess, 2001). Hess and Blairy (2001) set out to study Lipps’ model 
(‘father’ of contemporary implicit simulation theories). In short (Blairy et al., 1999, 
p.6), it states that people mimic an observed person’s affective behaviour. Through 
feedback, imitation generates the “corresponding affective state in the observer”. 
Finally, the experienced state is a “shared affect” that is used to understand the 
target’s state. It is through this process that people know someone else’s emotions, via 
what was here called an ‘inference from felt-feeling’. To achieve this purpose, these 
authors (properly) assessed the causality between the three variables (mimicry, 
contagion and accuracy); and conducted the matching at approximately the same 
empirical level for both perceiver and target.  
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It was found that participants mimicked dynamic observed non-“prototypical” 
(p.130) facial expressions of happiness, anger and sadness, as assessed with EMGs; and 
reported being contaminated for the similarly pre-assessed happiness, anger and 
sadness of the target. However, there was no evidence of a causal “link between 
mimicry and contagion”33. Further, mimicry and contagion did not directly relate to 
accuracy, either directly, or indirectly (first comes mimicry, then contagion, then 
accuracy). Mimicry was even sometimes found to be incongruent with the target’s 
behaviour; and contagion negatively correlated with accuracy. Thus, they concluded 
that “no evidence for the process proposed by Lipps was found” (p.138).  
In brief, these findings suggest that people do not seem to accurately know 
another’s experience as a consequence of mimicry or contagion. Hence, even though 
these phenomena occur, in certain situations, for certain emotions, their causal 
association with accuracy has not been supported. At best, mimicry was found to 
facilitate emotional recognition by increasing the speed, but not the accuracy, of 
women’s emotion recognition of the meaning of a facial expression (Stel & van 
Knippenberg, 2008) - and this was not a causality study, because it only assessed 
mimicry. 
In conclusion, although mimicry and contagion occur, and may interfere with the 
process (facilitating or hindering, as reviewed here), in the light of current empirical 
data, the neurocognitive model in figure 10 is not, for me, a convincing explanation of 
empathy-as-knowing. Not even taking into consideration the critical observations 
                                                 
33 The only criticism to their study and this conclusion, that someone from the Lipps’ school could put forward, that I can 




above, and that the usual assessment of accuracy restricts the empathic knowledge 
and the target’s experience to a verbal, simple, dimension; what is not a faithful literal 
translation of overall multi-faceted experiences. Consequently, the phenomenological 
model, debated throughout this thesis, offers a plausible alternative. Direct empathy 
could amount to an instant intersubjective form of understanding others, as described 
by phenomenology. This is not, obviously, the only possible explanatory alternative. 
At a less neurological, and more psychological experiential level, we find Elliot, 
Watson, Bohart and Greenberg (2011, p.43) description of the “subprocesses” 
commonly involved in ‘empathy’: emotional simulation; conceptual perspective-taking; 
and emotional regulation. This is congruent with the explicit and implicit simulation 
division proposed by Batson (2009). The emotional regulation component, as noted in 
Chapter I, is required because emotional resonance is seen as merging with the object 
of empathy, or an acute reactive experience (e.g., sympathetic distress). 
For these authors, Rogers’ definition of empathy varies from the above, and is 
not sympathy-related. It is to be distinguished from sympathetic reactions. Rather, it is 
related to the understanding of the unfolding moment-to-moment in-relationship 
experience of the other, and it is a near-experience understanding. This is in 
accordance with Stein’s position.  That is, the closer we get to the experiential level, 
the less sympathy (personal reaction) seems to be confused with empathy 
(understanding), even when the understanding involves a strong experiential side – at 
least from the phenomenological, and the experiential-humanistic psychotherapeutic 
standpoints. Thus, it seems relevant to investigate the lived experience of empathy to 
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better understand what its analysis may reveal about ‘empathy’. Moreover, if we want 
to use, teach, and train others about empathy-in-praxis, this is the best level of 
analysis. 
This thesis is then not an investigation of ‘unconscious’ or neural processes, as 
those nominated by implicit simulation theories (these would require the adoption of 
alternative methods). Rather, it is an investigation of the empathy-as-knowing 
experience, and of the involved psychological processes as experienced at that 
(prereflective and reflective) level. It therefore builds a case that there is a question to 
answer, when it comes to direct perception or direct resonance experiences of 
intuitive understandings, without going so far as to speculate what the right 
‘explanatory models’ might be from a neurological standpoint. Any mechanism-related 
consideration included in this thesis is nothing but a critical thought about the way 
current models of empathy-as-knowing resonate with people’s lived experiences; I 
make sense of participants’ claims in the light of available knowledge. 
The lived experience will never be proof of processes that are claimed to be 
‘unconscious’. People’s insights into their experiences can help us understand the lived 
experience of a phenomenon, and sometimes even its underlying mechanisms as given 
in consciousness. But they will never allow for any definite proof about processes that 
are, at the outset, defined as unconscious, impenetrable, or inaccessible through self-
reflection. Yet, they do pave the way to our understanding, in psychological terms, of 
what it is, after all, to ‘empathically’ and ‘directly’ know another’s experience. This 












‘INSIGHTS INTO’ EXPERIENCE: 































                                                                Chapter IV 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the essential qualities of empathy-as-knowing, as 





Among existing meanings of empathy, I chose to immerse myself in the study of 
immediate empathy-as-knowing experiences. These instantly bring the empathee’s 
present experience to the empathizer’s awareness and have been proposed in 
phenomenology to have a direct unmediated character to them (Depraz, 2001; 
Gallagher, 2007; Gurmin, 2007; Scheler, 1913; Stein, 1917; Thompson, 2001; Zahavi, 
2008b; 2007; 2001). This phenomenological conception of empathy is here addressed 
under the name of direct empathy. 
In published empirical work, I detected the presence of this phenomenon, 
though it was, for instance, agglomerated with other “elements of shared emotions” 
(Kerem et al., 2001, p.718); or described as an unidentifiable moment in therapeutic 
settings (Tempel, 2007). Tempel (2007, p.261/2) was concerned with means by which 
clinical social workers were able to empathize with mothers at risk of abusing their 
children. She called these pathways to empathy. In this paper, a transcript was 
included (“but then I saw her together with her child and I had them play a game and I 
could see how she was such a little girl herself—she didn’t really know how to play with 
her child”), which was commented upon as follows: 
Something occurs to cause the worker to view the mother differently. We 
do not know specifically from the above narrative what actually happened 
to cause the shift within this particular worker. (…) I speculate that an 
internal referent within the worker was stimulated to resonate with this 
mother’s plight because of the particular scene created in the office at that 
 174 
 
moment. Since this kind of situation occurred repeatedly with a number of 
workers in different formats (…) 
 
For a reason unknown to Tempel, something particularly important happened 
when the worker was observing the mother playing with her child. As an explanation, 
she suggested that the observed scene ‘stimulates an internal referent’ in the 
perceiver, changing the way the worker ‘saw’, or understood, the mother. This is a 
possible interpretation.  
But, from my present viewpoint, I can shed another light onto that ‘unknown 
something’, by interpreting the worker’s experience as resulting from an immediate 
direct perception of the mother’s present experience. This sudden insight into the 
mother’s experience would have unexpectedly brought to the worker’s awareness a 
never-seen-before quality of the mother’s experiencing: she was just a child herself. 
And this revelation had a great interpersonal impact, allowing the therapeutic bond to 
evolve.  It its absence, the worker would have continued to experience difficulties in 
relating to and helping the ‘bad’ mother. 
For Edith Stein (1917, p.19), “knowledge is blind, empty, and restless, always 
pointing backwards to some kind of experienced, seen act”. When we encounter an 
experience, it is always framed in the context of our past knowledge, and we may at 
first be blind to its novel qualities. This is because we sometimes tend to see again 
what has been seen before, instead of seeing the new and unknown aspects of the 
situation. This is particularly true for our interpersonal relationships. However, if 
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Tempel’s worker had not been open to the unknown qualities of what she took to be 
the mother’s experience, her prejudgemental idea would have prevailed - preventing 
the creation of an authentic therapeutic relationship with the initially censured bad 
mother. 
Thus, immediate empathy appears as a human capacity for being open to the 
unknown possibilities that lie in experience. It is mainly through empathy that we are 
able to really simultaneously see others as a ‘never-seen before’ unique “‘I’ among 
many” (Stein, 1917, p.64), and to relate to others in an authentically open way, 
without the distortions of prejudice and prior knowledge. There is a sense of discovery 
in every Steinian empathic act. 
The adoption of an empathic attitude is important in therapeutic settings, where 
the client must be recognized as a unique person. For the relationship to evolve in a 
nourishing, authentic and therapeutic way, clinicians should “resist the temptation to 
prematurely apply the systematic, jargon-laden concepts (“preconceived ideas”) 
(Arnold, 2006, p.757, cf. Reik, 1948, p.116). For example, Pilgrim and Bentall (1999) 
have written about the dangers of psychological therapists relying too heavily on 
diagnostic models of depression. In such cases, there is a risk of drawing primarily on 
formalised past knowledge, and attempting to fit current foreign experience into an a 
priori frame (or, indeed, seeing only the frame). It is only by relating empathically that 
the therapeutic alliance is enhanced, psychological comprehension achieved and the 
chances of therapeutic success improved (e.g, Arnold, 2006; Duan & Hill, 1996; Elliot, 
2008; Greenberg et al., 2001; Hobson, 1985). ‘Empathy’ is thus very important in 
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therapeutic relationships (it is that which empathy means and is explicated, or what 
this attitude should be called, that lacks consensus). 
In this chapter, participants’ immediate experiences of empathy-as-knowing, as 
they were communicated by both the empathizer (subject) and the empathee (object) 
were qualitatively investigated. These were the two perspectives which participants in 
this study were invited to take, which are here named resonance (subject’s experience) 
and reception (object’s experience), after Barrett-Lennard (1981). Having found 
examples of what appeared to be an immediate (felt/ perceptive) knowing in Chapter 
II, as well as having read studies such as Tempel’s, I was confident that utilizing first 
person accounts, about people’s lived experienced of this phenomenon, could yield 
some interesting results.   
 
Resonance, reception and ‘direct empathy’ 
 
Barrett-Lennard (1981, p.92/4) describes a “cyclical interpersonal model of 
empathy”, which includes stages of resonance, communication, reception and 
feedback. In everyday interactions, these stages are cyclical, and may feedback into 
each other ad infinitum (Chapter I). 
Resonance is the empathiser’s experience of actively attending to another 
person so that an “immediate personal understanding” of another’s experience is 
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allowed to happen. Resonance is, then, an immediate empathic experience; possibly 
partly a direct way of knowing as well.  
Reception is the complementary partner of resonance. It occurs when the 
empathized person is aware of the way the empathizer has understood his/her 
experience. By being defined as a “sense or perception”, it also appears as an 
immediate and direct experience.  However, for reception to exist, that is, in-between 
resonance and reception, Barrett-Lennard establishes the communication stage, that 
consists of ‘showing in some communicative way’ that which was understood of the 
empathee’s experience.  
Psychotherapists are commonly very interested in the outcomes of therapy and 
on improving its efficacy; and they have a preference for valuing the role of 
communication (e.g., Barkham & Shapiro, 1986; Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Bozarth, 2009; 
Carlozzi et al., 2002; Duan & Hill, 1996; Greenberg et al., 2001); or of communication 
and reception (e.g., Elliot, 2008; Greenberg et al, 2001; Pistrang et al., 2002); They are 
interested in knowing what the therapist can say that generates in the client a feeling 
that he/she is understood. The therapists’ resonance experience seems to have been 
given little attention. For instance, in Greenberg et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis of 47 
studies, only 14% used therapist measures (resonance). But communication and 
reception, in Barrett-Lennard’s sense, is always a consequence of a preceding 
resonance experience.  
Communication is here seen as only one of the routes to reception, principally 
when it is assessed as overt verbal communicative behaviour (e.g., Greenberg et al., 
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2001; Pistrang et al., 2002). One does not really need to verbally communicate one’s 
resonance experience. The interpersonal cycle does not necessarily have to go beyond 
resonance either, as with Barret-Lennard’s observational empathy, which occurs at a 
distance, without interaction, and possibly in the absence of the target’s awareness of 
having become the object of another’s empathic act.  
In this chapter, I am then more interested in the ‘whats’ of empathy (resonance 
and reception experiences), rather than in the way these are communicated. As 
Bachelor (1988, p.238) concludes, “the helper’s mode of communication of empathy is 
never synonymous with the essence of empathy”. It is not the verbally discussed 
content, and the type of verbal intervention, that matters.   
This is in accordance with a phenomenogical viewpoint. Phenomenologically, it is 
the experiential side of empathy that is, first and foremost, fundamental. The subject’s 
experience is an unavoidable definitive part of the equation, whereas what they do 
with these experiences afterwards, or how they overtly discussed them, afterwards, is 
not. Applied to Barrett-Lennard’s cycle, this means that what makes the difference, 
and is essential to empathy, is the experiential quality of therapists and clients’ 
resonance and reception experiences, as some psychotherapeutic works argued 






Empathy as an intersubjective process 
 
The ‘subject’ of phenomenology is not exactly a subject at all – not in the 
conventional sense of a contained and discrete individual consciousness. The person in 
phenomenology is understood to be an intersubjective, temporal, embodied and 
embedded ‘being-in-the-world.’ The embodied ‘mind’ of phenomenology is 
intentional, always directed towards an object, co-generated by it and its 
surroundings. While attending to someone, one may directly know another’s 
experience or know that one’s experience is known; this is part of one’s experience of 
being-in-the-world.  
Phenomenologically speaking, empathy is understood not simply as an 
interpersonal phenomenon, but as an intersubjective phenomenon. The term 
intersubjectivity presupposes the self-other linkage and mutual shaping. It expresses 
that empathy happens in the context of an intersubjective relationship, in which object 
and subject’s experiences mutually co-determine each other, shape each other. Using 
Tempel’s example, at a psychological level, a mother who was brought up to believe 
that she is a bad person, will most probably end up acting like one. But if she is seen by 
therapeutic eyes, which do not enclose her identity in the ‘bad’ interpretation box, she 




This empowerment is only possible because the social worker was open to the 
revelation of another quality of the mother’s experience, a ‘child-like’, instead of 
‘cruel’, quality. Both these interpretations are possible. There is also probably some 
truth in both interpretations (bad and child-like). In a Steinian sense, the child-like 
interpretation is faithful to what was immediately given to the perceiver, as well as an 
objective truth concerning the mother’s experience. The question of whether it really 
is the truth, or a fortunate perceptive illusion, is a philosophical debate that will not be 
held here. But, in Stein’s phenomenology, there is an essential truth, and one which 





There is a need for research which explores immediate empathy via empirical 
data and which gives a more central role to resonance. The study in this chapter 
addresses this need, by exploring the qualities of immediate resonance and reception 
in empathy-as-knowing experiences; and their relationship to direct empathy theories. 
When resonance has been studied qualitatively (e.g., Kerem et al., 2001; Tempel, 
2007), it is usually with an accent on “understanding” the object.  Partly because 
‘understanding’ is commonly associated with an intellectual reasoning act (e.g., 
Chapter II; Kerem et al., 2001), I do not believe this to be a very suitable prompt for 
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researching direct empathy. Intellectual acts can be used in addition to empathy. They 
may precede (Stein, 1917, p.65), follow (Depraz, 2001; Stein, 1917, p.27) or replace 
(Zahavi, 2001, p.155; Stein, 1917, p.27; p.65) empathy, and may complement the goal 
of fully understanding an object. But they do not represent a direct knowing act, as 
with direct empathy (phenomenological conception of empathy, outlined in Chapter 
III). 
The first challenge, then, was to delineate an instrument suitable for eliciting 
accounts about possibly direct empathy-as-knowing experiences; and one which, after 
the lessons learnt already, avoided the words ‘empathy’ and ‘understanding’. Here, I 
adopted the expression ‘insight into’ as a means of asking for written narratives about 
a recent interpersonal experience, during which immediate ‘insights into’ a significant 
other’s present experience had been experienced.  
In qualitative research one usually sets out to ‘reveal and reflect upon’ the way 
the researcher affects the study (e.g., Finlay & Gough, 2003). In this case, however, I 
felt that the phenomenon at hand was already too intersubjective; and that it could be 
helpful to minimise the effect of an extra layer of intersubjectivity, if that could be 
done without damaging the quality of the data. Consequently, the online written 
interview format was chosen. After all, “even if verbal reports are necessarily 
incomplete and do not reveal everything, what they do reveal is important” (Hansen, 
2005, cf. Kiraly, 1995 p.41).  
I take the view that “a story (…) is a portal through which a person enters the 
world and by which their experience of the world is interpreted and made personally 
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meaningful” (Clandinin, 2006, p.45). The way stories are told is never about what 
“’really’ happened” (Hobson, 1985, p.xv), if there is even such a thing; but about what 
is meaningful and truthful, for that person, about that event. I here then observed 
probably incomplete, ‘truthful’ and partly interpreted descriptions of interpersonally 
insightful experiences.   
A Steinian phenomenological approach accepts that it is possible to determine 
the essential features of direct empathy through the study of its lived experience (in 
the same way that the child-like interpretation was accepted as a genuine trait of the 
mother’s experience). This was precisely what was attempted here. The goal was to 
investigate the ‘truthful’ experiential qualities of immediate interpersonal 
understandings; and, in particular, what fundamentally conveyed the impression that 
the described insightful experience was a direct empathy-as-knowing experience, an 
act essentially distinctive from other types of understanding.  
This study is thus a qualitative phenomenological analysis of insightful 
experiences. These were partly interpreted in writing by participants themselves, and 
further interpreted in light of the theoretical concepts outlined above. Texts were 
drawn from a non-clinical population and framed in the context of close relationships. 
In this non-therapeutic interpersonal context, empathy is expected to be part of 
people’s daily experiences, in such a way that their resonance and reception roles 
“spontaneously reverse from one cycle or series of cycles, as described, to the next” 
(Barrett-Lennard, 1981, p.94) within the same interpersonal context of experiencing. I 
also asked for descriptions of insightful resonance and reception as experienced 
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towards the same person, in order to have a more complete view of that individual’s 






The sample of 20 participants was drawn from students at the same university. 
These students had a mean age of 20 years, varying from 18 to 26.  They were mainly 
females (N=17; 85%), British (N=18; 90%), undergraduate (N=17; 85%); and psychology 
students (N=15, 75%). These participants provided forty: twenty about resonance, and 
twenty about reception experiences. The mean length of their answers was, for 




I used a simple, four-section online written interview schedule (Appendix V). 
These questions were contextualized with instructions which tried to emphasize the 
insight’s here-and-now quality, and encouraged participants to provide detailed 
situated answers and to write in a free-flowing manner.  
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The first section asked participants to choose a significant other and describe 
their relationship with this person. By forcing participants to elect a particular 
interpersonal context of experiencing, I was able to elicit descriptions of interpersonal 
insights. The second section asked for accounts about the experience of having recent 
there-and-then “immediate insight into what your chosen person was experiencing” 
(resonance). The third section asked for accounts “about a situation where the 
opposite happened, this is, where the chosen person had an immediate insight into 
what you were experiencing?” (reception). The fourth section asked for some basic 
demographic information (age, gender, nationality, education level and area of 
studies).  
The two insight-related questions further specified that their narratives could be 
about ‘sensing’ or ‘feeling’ another’s experience, as well as “thinking as if you were the 
other person”. This wide meaning of the term ‘insight’ foregrounded the possibility of 
direct empathy not being an experience present in their recalled repertoire of 
interpersonal events; and of there being some difficulties in relating to the term 




The proposal was approved by the University’s Research Ethics Committee. 
Three face-to-face pilot interviews (two women and one man from the target 
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population) were conducted and these suggested that the expression ‘insight into’ was 
effective and probably would generate narratives about direct empathy-as-knowing 
experiences. It also culminated in a slight revision of the adopted data collection 
instrument.   
Recruitment was conducted in two stages, between February and March of 
2009. Fifteen participants were psychology students, credit-paid, consent-giving, who 
anonymously and voluntarily completed an online version of the survey, at their own 
convenience, via the School of Psychology’s ‘research participation scheme’ website.  
Five were students from other courses, who attended a School of Psychology subjects’ 
recruitment day, and volunteered to take part in the online version of our written 
interview during that event. These participants had expressed an interest in 
participating in psychology research in return for a small payment, and had then joined 
a participant pool. They were invited by the researcher, one at a time, to review the 
information sheet and consent form. Having agreed to take part, they then completed 
the online interview at a set waiting computer. They were monetarily rewarded by the 
organization committee. 
Participants are here identified by their number (preceded by the # symbol); and 








The approach to analysis was informed by Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009/2010); and by Moustakas’ (1994) 
guidelines for the application of a (comparatively) more Husserlian, descriptive 
phenomenological analysis (DPA).  
IPA is a qualitative hermeneutic approach, with an idiographic-level commitment 
to understanding experience from another’s perspective. It looks for epistemological 
direction for the researcher’s interpretation from within the textual data and it 
involves a reflection on one’s own preconceptions and meaning-making (i.e., 
interpretation) through the establishment of a “‘dialogue’ between the researchers, 
their coded data, and their psychological knowledge” (Smith et al., 2009, p.79). The 
core of IPA’s analysis is the line-by-line iterative and inductive qualitative constitution 
of themes (i.e. coding, patterns and commonalities descriptive of a set of experiential 
qualities present in single and, then, in multiple cases) and the study of their inter-
relationships (via the development of a guiding structure34). 
Yet, the main goal of this study was to define the essential qualities of the 
qualities of participants’ ‘insight into’ experiences, and inspect which of these 
                                                 
34 In IPA, ‘structure’ refers to the hierarchical organization of themes. On the other hand, in Moustakas 
(1994, p.78), ‘structure’ is a concept opposed to ‘texture’. Whilst structure speaks about essential qualities 
of the phenomenon (‘how’ it is experienced), without which the phenomenon would cease to be, textures 
speak about more idiographic qualities of the individual or collective phenomenon (‘what’ is experienced). 
In the present study, the term structure is used in Moustakas’ sense, that is, there is an attempt of 
understanding that which is fundamental in insightful experiences. 
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resonated well with the theoretical direct empathy phenomenon. I wanted to render 
direct empathy-as-knowing as a “clear, explicit and complete” (Bradbury-Jones, 
Sambrook & Irvine, 2009, p.664) concept, defined in the light of its fundamental, 
distinctive, empirical qualities, in order to guide further research. This is, to a great 
extent, the goal of DPA. Therefore, IPA’s analytical procedures were complemented by 
those of DPA; an hermeneutic approach is not incompatible with a more descriptive 
phenomenological approach (Bradbury-Jones et al., 2009).  Each has its own merits 
and purposes, and may complement the other; though they rarely are used in this 
manner.  
Firstly, IPA’s reflective attitude was complemented by an effort towards Epoche 
(bracketing out everything that is not strictly given in writing). Secondly, for the coding 
procedure, a Phenomenological Reduction was conducted, during which each sentence 
is given equal value (Horizonalization), for the extraction of textural meanings and 
invariant constituents of the experience. These were then clustered into non-repetitive 
and non-overlapping abstract themes (recurrent qualities of the experience).  Finally, 
imaginative variation was conducted, that is, alternative scenarios and meanings were 
imagined for each theme, so that structural qualities (features that define the essence 
of the phenomenon) would emerge.  
For instance, if you accept that the phenomenon of sympathy is a congruent 
emotional reaction to someone else’s experience (Chapter I), then you may write that 
someone ‘felt happy for you too’. First, consider the theme of the happiness feeling. 
This is a textural theme because sympathy might have happened even if the quality 
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was not the emotion of happiness, but, instead, of pride. Then, consider the similarity 
theme (the other person was happy ‘too’). Since sympathy might have happen even if 
the other felt pride, then similarity is also a textural theme. In this manner, we found 
two textural themes: emotional similarity and happiness.  
Now consider the theme of responding. If the other person had ‘ignored’ your 
experience, not reacting in any emotional way, sympathy would not have happened. 
Then, there is the congruency of the other’s feelings with your own feelings. If the 
feeling was one of sadness, the experience would cease to be a sympathetic one, to 
become perhaps one of envy or self-pity. Through this process, we found two 
structural themes: emotional reaction and congruent emotion. It is their combination 
that structurally qualifies the phenomenon of sympathy. These are its fundamental 
features; and their interaction is required for the experience to be one of sympathy.  
This is how imaginative variation is conducted.  
For communication purposes, I had to name the phenomenon in a simpler way 
than the listing of its structural qualities (e.g., congruent emotional response). For this 
purpose, I have defined essences, or structures of experiencing, as a set of structural 
qualities that, in conjunction, formed a particular phenomenon.   
In summary, essences defined the overall phenomenon (e.g., sympathy); 
structural themes identified its fundamental ‘hows’ (e.g., congruent emotional 
reaction); and textural themes its non-fundamental ‘whats’ (e.g., happiness and 
emotional similarity).  
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Subsequently, these essences and themes were used to compose individual and 
group structural-textural descriptions (DPA), and then an interpretative narrative 
account of findings (IPA). This allowed for the emergence of the themes’ organization, 
or interrelationships; and their re-embedding in an interpretative framework. It was an 
important part of the analysis because it helped to contextualize the results in a 
broader theoretical framework. This enabled the investigation of the relationship 




In general, interpretations of findings are presented throughout the chapter; and 
exemplified by the use of verbatim quotations from several participants, in order to 
increase the study’s transparency. Furthermore, Appendix VI lists the main structural 
and textural themes, provides illustrative examples for each, and indicates the essence 
associated with each. Confirmability is thereby enhanced.  
Dependability was enhanced by having conducted a pilot study in a face-to-face 
individual interview setting; by having used a standardized questionnaire; and by 
gathering answers in a short interval of time.  
Finally, interpretation was triangulated by submitting a case to the Experiential 
Psychology Group in the West Midlands. In this session, there were eight researchers, 
most of them using IPA and/or grounded theory qualitative methods. I started by 
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asking them to reflect upon the answers provided by Suzy (#6). Suzy was a 21-year-old 
British undergraduate Psychology student. Her case was chosen because her narratives 
seemed structurally exemplary of direct perceptive experiences; and were of 
manageable length, but did not lack detail.  
 After distributing her resonance and reception texts to those present at the 
meeting, I asked them to comment upon manifested qualities, without enlightening 
them about the topic under study, or any other particulars of the study. Most of their 
comments supported my interpretation, though they also revealed new interesting 
themes. The discussion added depth to each of the found themes, and brought new 
angles for consideration, principally because researchers analysing material were not 
informed about the interpretative context adopted here. In fact, the best way of 
describing the triangulation experience is by quoting Moustakas (1994, p.91): “each 




Supporting previous findings (Chapter II), there were only three participants 
using the word “empathy” in their narratives, and never as synonymous with an 
immediate non-intellectual experience (e.g., Louise, a psychology student, whose 
account is described further on). Instead, for this phenomenon, the preferred 
expressions were to see, sense, understand, know, feel, or experience someone else’s 
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experience. They also, though infrequently, used expressions like: “I could tell”; 
‘mindreading’, and “communicating”, among others. But empathy was definitely not 
part of the language-in-use adopted to talk about these experiences. This supports the 
methodological choice of adopting the alternative expression ‘insight into’ for the 
study of immediate empathy-as-knowing experiences.  
In this section, I describe the general essences of participants’ resonance and 
reception experiences, along with their structural qualities. It follows a more detailed 
analysis and a reflection upon their inter-relationships. Finally, a few textural themes, 
of relevance for the present thesis, are explored. 
 
Essences and structural themes of insightful experiences 
 
The essence of resonance was determined in the light of how participants 
described becoming aware of someone else’s experience (e.g., “seeing her so upset", 
#10, resonance); whereas, in reception, what was at the centre of the attention was 
the way participants’ described knowing that the chosen person knew what they were 
experiencing, that is, “the moment when I knew that my sibling was experiencing a 
similar feeling to me” (#4, reception). The attempt to understand the essence of each 
of these roles involves a shift in one’s focus of attention. 
Across resonance and reception answers, the expression ‘insight into’ generated 
four distinctive meaning patterns in data; with each of these having a clear distinctive 
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structure and texture. These were: thinking about another’s experience and thinking 
about another’s resonance (‘thinkers’), listening to another’s experience and listening 
to another’s resonance (‘listeners’), perceiving another’s experience and perceiving 
another’s resonance (‘perceivers’), and experiencing another’s experience and 
experiencing another’s resonance (‘experiencers’). These were the four found essences 
of insightful experiences.  
I will sometimes use the designations included above, in between brackets, but 
this is not a suggestion of human typology. I am not suggesting that, say, participants 
are ‘thinkers’ in their everyday interpersonal life and in every circumstance. I am not 
making any claims that go beyond the texts at hand. I am simply saying that the 
individual is a thinker in that part of the account. Nevertheless, hopefully, if the 
phenomenological analysis was successfully conducted, it is reasonable to assume that 
the essences found here will translate to some people’s significant experiences of the 
way that they come to know another person’s experience, in their daily lives, in the 
context of a close relationship. 
These findings do not even support typological claims, because there were 
narratives that contained every single one of these essences. That is, there were 
participants who described how they thought, listened, experienced and saw another’s 
experience – each of these acts revealing a particular, distinctive aspect of another’s 
experience. Nevertheless, there were also texts which illustrated a single essence. For 
those participants, it was one essence alone which defined the meaning of an 
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insightful experience; and so these texts provided support for their differentiation as a 
distinctive essence.   
Among the participants’, there were those who consistently provided structurally 
similar accounts, that is, with the same essential features, across questions; whilst 
others did not. But even when participants provided texts with divergent structures, 
they usually gave meaning to the empathizer’s experience (whether themselves, for 
resonance; or the chosen person, for reception) in very similar terms, across paired 
narratives. That is, they interpreted the resonance act in the same way, whether they 
were describing a resonance or a reception experience.  Louise, whose account will be 
explored in some detail further on, is an example of this observation. 
 In Table 4, there are excerpts from participants’ texts to illustrate each of these 
essences.  For me, these texts are very suggestive of what each of these essences 
means. They referred to acts in-between which there was little margin for confusion. 
In simple terms, for a thinking act there was a reasoning (‘as I too’); for a listening act, 
there was another’s ‘telling’; for a perceiving act there was a ‘watching’; and for an 
experiencing act there is a ‘feeling’.  Each of these acts amounted to one of that 






Table 4: “Illustrative texts for essences of insights into another’s experience” 
 
Essences Data extract 
Thinking Anyway whilst telling me the story i could completely understand what 
she was going through as i too split up with a partner for no reasons of 
our own but instead that of a third party (…). I knew it was just as hard 
for her as it was for me. [#13: Linda, resonance] 
Listening There was an occasion when i was quite low on self-esteem and it was 
over a girl, and he talked to me and said he knew how i was feeling. 
And it was odd because all the emotions and thought processes i 
thought and went through, he actually named and mentioned and said 
how to combat that to feel better again. [#7: Paul, reception] 
Experiencing  He had an argument with parents who told him they never wanted to 
see him again. i felt how he felt - upset angry etc. - knew what he was 
going through (…). It was like being him for a short while. [#11: Eve, 
resonance]  
Perceiving I watched my sister perform at the Christmas Carol event where she 
was in the choir. I went with my mum to watch her and you could tell 
that she was really proud of herself but really embarrassed at the same 
time. (…) I could tell how she felt. We kept waving to her and she would 
pretend that she didn't really see us. [#14: Judy, resonance] 
 
 
Essences (thinking, listening, experiencing and perceiving), and their structural 
defining themes, were the result of a detailed analysis of many themes. Most of these 
(textural) themes did not survive imaginative variation as fundamental features. 
Nevertheless, some came forward as structural, essential defining attributes. Their 
identification was one of this study’s objectives, because it allowed me to clearly 
differentiate that which defined the concept ‘direct empathy-as-knowing’ in 
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participants’ lived experiences. Figure 11 illustrates essences and their most 
determinant structural themes.  
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Closeness is inscribed in the surrounding box, to illustrate how these experiences 
happened in the context of a close significant relationship. And it is an important 
context, since, in my opinion, it was responsible for bringing to light some recurrent 
textural themes, such as helping.  
The four main boxes represent essences; and each specifies associated structural 
themes (coloured and not capitalized). For example, thinking is a combination of the 
structural themes: a thinking act performed by the self, with another’s experience for 
intentional object, that uses cues as symbols of experience during a logical reasoning 
that culminates in an intellectual understanding experience – it is a thinking essence, 
for short.  
I have also capitalized the underlying conceptual angle of analysis (the question 
posed through imaginative variation) relative to each theme, to facilitate the 
understanding of what each of these structural themes refers to; and Table 4 provides 
illustrative material for each of these essences and qualities. 
Since my question to participants asked for immediate insights, these were the 
essences proposed by participants as ‘immediate’ ways of knowing someone’s 
experience. They had, however, essentially different natures, and largely as a 
consequence the givenness themes, that is, of the act nominated by the participant as 
responsible for their interpersonal knowing (i.e., they knew because they thought, 
listened, experienced or saw), each essence assumed a clear distinctive nature.  
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Location partly referred to the agent of the knowing act. Essences were acts of 
different natures, but which were all performed by the participant. Regardless of the 
role (resonance, reception), it was always the participant who thought, listened, 
perceived, or experienced.  They were all ‘self acts’. These personal knowing acts had 
the known experience for intentional object, either another’s experience (e.g., ‘she 
was upset’, for resonance experiences) or another’s reception experience (e.g., ‘she 
knew I was upset’, for reception experiences). This was a structural theme common to 
all essences, but there was one exception. Experiencing was structurally defined by the 
fact that the participant declared that subject and object were experiencing for 
themselves an intersubjective experience (‘I felt her happiness’, for resonance; ‘she 
felt my happiness’, for reception). This was a fundamental feature in experiencing 
essences - the felt experience had to be described as simultaneously another’s and 
one’s own. Hence, for this essence, the known experience was located in both of the 
involved people.  
The mediacy themes were important and responsible for the creation of two 
groups of essences: immediate (experiencing, perceiving) and non-immediate 
(listening, reasoning). Non-immediate (or mediated) essences were overtly associated 
with an intermediary step or a mediating symbol of experiences: cues, for thinking; 
and words, for listening. Therefore, although these non-immediate essences were 
present in texts about ‘immediate’ experiences (consequent of the question posed), 
conceptually speaking, by being mediated acts, these are not properly seen as possibly 
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direct acts. Non-immediate essences came about as a consequence of nominated 
mediators, they were about the knowing of symbols.  
On the other hand, immediate essences were not explicitly associated with a 
mediator, a symbol that stood in-between the knowing act and the known experience. 
This was how the directness (immediate essences) and non-directness (non-immediate 
essences) revealed itself in this analysis. Since the directness of the experience is 
theoretically a fundamental quality of direct empathic experience (Chapter III), only 
immediate essences were here associated with the phenomenological conception of 
empathy-as-knowing.  
This means that the adopted prompt successfully led to the recollection and 
description of immediate (possibly direct) experiences, as intended, but also seemingly 
non-immediate ones (in the sense outlined above). Since the study of seemingly direct 
experiences was one of the main objectives of this study, thinking and listening 
essences were principally useful as a counter-point, a basis of comparison.  They did 
not help illuminate the qualities of seemingly direct experiences. 
As for the attention themes, all these acts are partly dedicated to another’s 
experience. It is the experience that they knew through the insightful act that is 
mobilizing their attention. However, experiencers and thinkers were attending to their 
experience as well: their knowledge and intellectual opinion, for thinking; and their 
felt-level experience, for experiencing. On the other hand, listeners and perceivers 
were completely focused upon the empathee during the knowing act. 
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The remainder of themes (related to reasoning, understanding, communication, 
embedment and embodiment) are particular to each essence, and will be described in 
the following sections, with the help of a few examples. This is done by presenting the 
two main groups of essences, immediate and non-immediate. The main focus is on 
immediate essences, however. In Appendix VI, you will find more exemplary excerpts 
for these structural, and their associated essences. 
 
Non-immediate essences: Thinking and Listening 
 
Thinking was insight gained by reflecting about another’s experience in writing. 
In these texts, participants sought to understand someone’s experience at an 
intellectual, reasoned level. They considered the reasons for the existence of the 
identified other’s experience by drawing upon clearly identified information sources. 
These most common sources of information were: similar past experience, assumed 
self-other similarity, and familiarity, but there were also instances of thinking about an 
observed behaviour of another. In these examples of ‘inferences from behaviour’, the 
behaviour was a symbol that was subsequently infused with meaning, in a reasoned 
logical manner.  
In their resonance answers, participants who thought were interested in 
understanding someone’s experience, but also the insight experience itself, and in 
making sense of these in an intellectual reasoned manner.  They described why they 
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knew the foreign experience and/or why the knowing came about. For reception, they 
were interested in the reasons for the empathizer’s knowing of their experience 
(and/or, implicitly, how this knowledge made them feel understood and supported).  
This non-immediate structure was to be expected perhaps because of the 
reflective design of this study; the theoretical presupposition that non-immediate ways 
of knowing may complement immediate ones; and the inclusion, in the clarification 
prompt, of a reference that could be interpreted in a perspective-taking sense.   
The second non-immediate structure was listening, and was about becoming 
aware of someone’s experience via that person’s verbal overt communication. During 
this communicative act, the other person spelled out the experience, and the 
participant listened to it. This was how the insight was gained. Listening was associated 
with, and mediated by, an intentional verbal communicative act. 
For resonance narratives, these participants described knowing another’s 
present experience because they were told about it, by the object of the insight, and 
what they did with that knowledge (understand, help); whereas, in reception, they 
described how the other person told them that their experience was known, and the 
impact of that knowledge (feeling understood and helped). 
Although verbal communication is in itself an expressive behaviour, in these texts 
its value for participants was in terms of words as symbols of experience – not in terms 
of a behaviour that is expressive of an experience.  The focus was upon the content of 
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the communicative act. It was what was verbally described that mattered, it was the 
word as a symbol of an experience that was responsible for the knowing. 
 
A thinker-listener: Mary  
 
Mary’s (#3) resonance account illustrates the thinking and the listening 
structures of experiencing. This is because her knowing of her friend’s experience was 
partly a consequence of a thinking structure (inference from a similar past experience), 
but this was also reached via a listening structure. By combining the information 
verbally disclosed by her friend with a reasoning act, Mary is then able to understand 
her friend. Mary is neither a pure listener, nor a pure thinker, but simultaneously both. 
She told the following:  
I suppose that a situation which could be used as a good example was 
when my friend became madly in love with a guy in her school. From the 
day she noticed him, she couldn't stop thinking or talking about him 
although they didn't even know each other by then. She would drag me 
around the school just to catch a glimpse of him for few seconds. The 
situation was becoming more and more ridiculous and tiring but I 
understood her perfectly because few months earlier had exactly the same 
situation. I knew exactly how she felt, what where her thoughts because I 
had went through all that as well and knew what she needed. My great 
empathy was increased by the ability to place myself in her situation. We 
could talk about it, exchanging our views and emotions and I feel like I was 
a great help to her. I think that this experience was putting myself in her 
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shoes and deciding what I would do if I was her and giving honest advice in 
such situation. (#3, resonance, whole) 
 
Mary never specifies the whereabouts (spatial embedment) of her friend or 
herself, or the moment where the insight happens (temporal embedment). Rather, the 
experience seems to have happened during a long period of time, in many places. It is 
not clearly embedded in either of these dimensions. 
The thinking structure was never simultaneously and clearly embedded in a 
particular moment and place. There are exceptions: the two instances about an 
inference from behaviour; and Linda (#13). Linda is both a listener and a thinker, and 
starts her narrative by informing that she went to “our spot” to have a conversation 
with her friend. But in this case, the ‘spot’ is not embedding her thinking. It is rather 
highlighting the closeness of their relationship, and embedding the place where they 
usually discuss things of importance to them. Linda’s example also highlights how the 
embedment of the experience may be more significant for listening essences. That is, 
significant conversations were more often remembered as having happened in a 
particular place, in a particular moment, whereas the insightful thinking was less 
frequently recalled as having happened in a particular here-and-now. 
Mary’s insight is a consequence of being told about her friend’s situation (hence, 
listening) and reasoning about it and her past similar experience (hence, thinking). 
During this intellectual activity, she infers, from her own similar past experience, what 
her friend’s infatuation experience is like. That is, in the way Mary gets to know her 
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friend’s experience, thinking and listening are fundamental. Without thinking and 
listening, her knowing act would cease to be visible to me.  These are the essences of 
her narrative; they structurally define the way that the knowing of her friend’s passion 
was given to Mary. Since there is no immediacy or directness in putting two and two 
together, these were then non-immediate essences.   
As a consequence of these essences, Mary is empowered by the belief that she 
can understand and help her friend; and imagine herself in her friend’s shoes. In her 
case, this helping is done through talking, a common way of helping among people 
who described non-immediate essences. This was a very common conjugation 
(thinking and/or listening and helping). This was perhaps because of the closeness 
context in which these experiences happened. In Mary’s case, she probably would 
have not let herself be ‘dragged’ around the school, or be engaged in “ridiculous and 
tiring” conversations, if the person confessing her crush was not one of her “closest 
friends”, with whom she talks “about literally anything” and who “will always give me 
an honest advice or criticism”. 
Finally, it is her friend who is in love. The experience of love is her friend’s all 
along, from the beginning to the end of the narrative. The known experience is located 
in another person. However, in some thinker’s accounts (but never in listeners’ 
accounts), the experience is sometimes referred to as a ‘we’ experience. For instance, 
Katy (#12) described that “the main similarity between both our situations were that 
we weren’t close to our relatives to passed away, so we sort of felt a guilt". That is, 
thinkers sometimes expressed a thought experience via the use of a ‘we’.  In these 
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cases, the use of the collective person was always a consequence of a self-other 
similarity assumption.  
 
Immediate essences: Perceiving and Experiencing 
 
Perceiving corresponded to an immediate sensitive awareness of an experience. 
It was expressed through perception-related words, such as ‘seeing’, but also sensing, 
knowing or mind-reading. 
Perceivers saw. They could just tell what another person was feeling or thinking, 
in face-to-face situations, as well as in observational situations, during which the 
object was probably not always aware of this seeing, or voluntarily expressing their 
experience to the empathizer. They saw another’s meaningful experience at once, 
another’s authentic experience. What was perceived was another’s experience, and 
that was the end of the story. That is, the ‘perceptive knowing’ recurrently had the 
weight of authenticity, or accepted truth; and this type of certainty appeared to be 
qualitatively different from the more evidence-like certainty associated with non-
immediate acts.  For perceiving to become an insightful, revealing experience, no 
proofs were needed. 
In resonance texts, participants “saw” the close other’s experience, as it 
unfolded, there-and-then; and in reception texts they “could see” how someone knew 
what their experience was; and they never involved any intermediary step or symbol 
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as responsible for this perceptive knowing. The experience was meaningful and 
informative of the other’s experience all along. 
Perceiving did not require a sharing of experiences either, and, for it to happen, 
the subject’s experience, beyond perceiving, was insignificant. On the other hand, 
experiencing was grounded precisely on this sharing of experiences. Experiencers were 
primarily concerned with their own experience, and it was their personal experience 
that was at the centre of their attention. However, an exclusively personal experience, 
(say, sympathy) was not enough for this essence to be found, nor would it be enough 
to describe what the other person was feeling. Rather, experiencers had a 
simultaneously personal (‘I’ experience) and foreign (‘you’, ‘we’) experience. 
Experiencers described feeling for themselves a simultaneously personal and foreign 
experience, that is, they had an ‘intersubjective’ experience. This was what their 
insight into someone else’s experience was all about, its essence. 
Thus, experiencing was a special kind of personal experience because it was 
immediately meaningful and informative of another’s experience; it was an 
“experiential resonation” (Barrett-Lennard, 1981, p.93) that directly acted as an insight 
into somebody else’s experience.  
Experiencers felt. They felt another’s excitement, another’s sadness, another’s 
physical pain, another’s intention. They felt another’s resonance. The extent of this 
personal embodied feeling varied considerably, from feeling an acute pain oneself, to 
simply declaring feeling or experiencing someone else’s experience.  
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Experiencing did not involve any intellectual act, such as an inference from felt-
feeling. There were two possible exceptions to this observation. Michelle (#9, 
resonance) finished her narrative by arguing that “you could really feel what the other 
person was going through because i could feel it myself”. However, this inference from 
felt-feeling was not used to imagine another’s experience, because this experience was 
already known to her. Rather, it was because she felt it herself that she became surer 
that what she sensed was really her boyfriend’s experience. The reasoning was then 
used in a confirmatory manner, to prove to herself the accuracy of her immediate 
experienced and perceptive insight.  
Sarah (#8, resonance) also never questioned whether her friend was really in 
pain. This much was a certainty. Instead, she questioned whether the pain she felt was 
indeed another’s. She questioned her pain’s quality of otherness: “I don't know 
whether I was experienced a part of his pain, but it definitely felt like it”. This sentence 
showed her doubt, but also showed the solution: in the light of the lived experience, 
her experience felt foreign. That is, as a lived experience, it appeared to her that she 
was experiencing her friend’s pain.  This is not really an inference from felt-feeling 
either. 
Therefore, these texts seem to favour phenomenological theories that argue that 
otherness is directly given with the direct empathic experience itself. It is nevertheless 
curious to observe that, although rare, doubts about the otherness of the experience 
and a certain lack of certainty were only observed in the two cases above. The scarcity 
of such doubts emphasises the experiencing essence. 
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An experiencer-perceiver: Louise 
 
For Louise (#20), an insight was to immediately know someone’s experience, and 
this knowing involved both a perceptive and an experiential knowing act. She was both 
an experiencer and a perceiver:  
I probably had an immediate insight into what Pauline was experiencing 
when she took her pregnancy test. I knew in the back of her mind she 
wanted it to be positive, despite claiming the opposite. Both of our hearts 
were beating ridiculously fast, and both of us were too anxious to speak 
but I felt like we were both experiencing the same thing and feeling the 
same emotions despite the fact I wasn’t actually taking the pregnancy test. 
I could read her facial expressions and nervous hand movements, and felt 
like I could feel what she was feeling and think what she was thinking. The 
insight helped me empathise with her situation, as it allowed me to place 
myself in her position to know what she was going through. It probably 
happened because we’re so close as friends, and I could see the difficult 
situation she was in and wanted to help but couldn’t unless I really 
understood what she was experiencing. I didn’t explicitly say to her that I 
had felt this, but she could see by how I was acting that I was experiencing 
the same difficulty as she was.  (#20, resonance, whole) 
 
For Louise’s knowing to come about, she needs not to listen to her friend’s 
experience. She also does not infer from her own heartbeat that her friend was 
probably nervous; or that her friend was nervous because nervous people tend to have 
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trembling hands. Her experience and percepts are immediately meaningful and 
revealing of her friend’s experience.  
In the beginning of her narrative, Louise declares that she knows her friend’s 
unexpressed denied wish. Though she does not necessarily become perceptively aware 
of this thought, she indeed perceives the anxiety of her friend’s gestures (or, better, 
‘reads’ her nervousness). Secondly, she gives meaning to her friend’s reception 
experience as a perceptive one (“she could see by how I was acting”). Hence, for her, 
resonance is partly an immediate perceptive experience. 
This finding is corroborated by her reception account, where she starts precisely 
by explaining that, in that episode, her friend “could see something was wrong 
immediately”.  For Louise, her friend immediately saw, there-and-then, that something 
was not quite right with her. This is how her friend’s resonance experience was 
interpreted - despite the text being about a non-immediate reception experience 
(listening).  The implication is that, although sometimes reception texts did not 
illuminate the way immediate reception was lived, they nevertheless reinforced the 
idea that, for these participants, an insight was an immediate non-mediated way of 
knowing what someone was experiencing, via perceiving and/or experiencing.  
In these texts, perceiving was not always about the seeing of an expressive 
behaviour or gesture, as with Louise’s hand movement – the way most often this act is 
theoretically described (e.g., Zahavi, 2007). This is precisely what I see of importance in 
perceivers’ texts. They recurrently illustrated a knowing that went beyond the 
perceiving of an expressive gesture. In certain cases, the perceived experience had a 
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gestalt quality; or it brought many facets of someone else’s experience to the 
empathizer’s awareness that could not be associated with any particular seen gesture.  
Louise situates the insight in another’s observed action (taking the pregnancy 
test), and highlights the temporal dimension of the event (‘when’; the gerund), rather 
than its spatial dimension. Her experience happened precisely during an observational 
act, “when” her friend was taking the pregnancy text, or, better, it happens while her 
friend was taking the pregnancy text. Her knowing experience accompanies that of her 
friend’s.  
Perceivers were always observers or observers-participants to a scene. There 
was only one participant (#18) who described how she had an intuition about her 
friend’s experience in a non-observational context.  But this is a different matter 
altogether that will not be explored here, because it required a long digression. 
Imaginative variation strongly suggests that, despite this exception, the embodiment 
of another’s experience, not necessarily translated into a specific gesture, is still validly 
considered as a structural quality of perceiving. 
The embodied nature of immediate insights is much stronger in experiencers’ 
texts. Indeed, the majority of Louise’s text deals precisely with the experiential and 
personally experienced side of this episode. For her, they are “both” having a similar 
physical (heartbeat), emotional (anxiousness), behavioural (unable to speak) 
experience, and even thinking (having the same thoughts) experience. Then, her own 
and her friend’s experience are embodied, in a felt-level sense that includes from 
physical to cognitive facets.  
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Self and other experiences are given to Louise as similar, to the point that the 
only recognized difference is the intentional object (“taking the pregnancy test”), 
which is definitely another’s. Therefore, it is a shared experience, in the sense that it is 
a “we” experience, during which subject and object are having the “same” similar 
experience. The experience is located in a ‘we’. However, the “both” in the ‘we’ implies 
that two people are involved, an ‘I’ similar to ‘you’, an ‘I’ and ‘you’ having the same 
experience. The known experience is also described as an intersubjective experience 
(“I could feel what she was feeling”). This leaves the impression that this is not a 
‘merging-with’ fusional experience (oneness). Rather, it appears as an intersubjective 
experience (‘feeling another’s experience’), closer to the notion of direct empathy. 
Finally, in Louise’s understanding, this insight is a result of their closeness, and 
her desire to help and understand her friend. And, as described, the sequence of 
experiencing would be: 1st a context of closeness, and a desire to understand and help; 
2nd perceive and experience the foreign experience; 3rd Perspective-taking; 4th 
Complete understanding. Therefore, Louise has a perceptive-experiential experience 
that acts as the basis of her knowledge of the foreign experience, and which 
supposedly is followed by an imaginative reasoned activity - immediate and non-
immediate structures appearing as complementary for the empathizer’s understanding 
and helping goal. 
Although experiencers usually claimed a helping intention, this was not always 
the case, such as when one felt the happiness of a winner (#4: Molly). Immediately 
knowing someone’s experience did not require any helping intention or action. The 
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importance of closeness, proposed by Louise, is however, another matter; to be 
discussed further on, in more depth.  
 
Relationships between immediate and non-immediate essences 
 
Overall, across resonance and reception texts (N=40), there were eleven 
narratives that described nothing but non-immediate essences, and two that 
illustrated nothing but immediate essences. Consequently, the co-occurrence of 
immediate and non-immediate essences was the most frequent observation. This is 
perhaps suggestive that these acts complement each other for the insight to become a 
meaningful knowing experience. Figure 12 illustrates the incidence of immediate 
(experiencing, perceiving) and non-immediate (thinking, listening) essences per 
perspective adopted (resonance/ reception).   
Immediate essences were less characteristic of reception texts (11/20), when 
compared with resonance texts (18/20); and were never the single essence of 
reception texts (0/20), in contrast with what was observed with resonance texts 
(2/20). This incidence shows that immediate insights were a very common resonance 
experience, observed in the majority of these narratives, and a less common reception 
experience. This was because participants commonly described a reception experience 
that was possible via the thinking or listening structures, principally listening. Indeed, 
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the survey was quite successful in gathering of stories about immediate resonance 
experiences, though not quite so much in terms of immediate reception experiences.  
 
Figure 12: “Incidence of immediate and non-Immediate essences across answers 
(resonance/ reception)” 
 
For reception35, non-immediate acts had more weight.  That is, ‘pure listeners’ 
and/or ‘pure thinkers’ (11/40), who described nothing but non-immediate essences, 
were more commonly found in reception texts (9/20). In reception narratives, 
                                                 
35  For the conference paper, presented in 2009, at International Human Science Research Conference, I 
analyzed and reported upon the phenomenological features of resonance texts alone. Interestingly, 
resonance texts did not suggest that the listening essence should be isolated from the thinking essence. 
Both were mediated experiences, they often concurred in qualitatively similar texts. It was only with the 
analysis of reception texts that listening became an essence on its in right, because it was the single 
essence of a few of these reception texts. This also reinforced my impression that communication was a 
feature that was more important for reception than for resonance. 
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communication seemed to play a very significant part. For example, some participants 
described nothing but the content of the communicative act (e.g., Paul, Table 4), and 
its effects (feeling helped and understood). They elected another’s discourse as the 
only phenomenon responsible for the writer’s reception experience.  
These texts were also sometimes impregnated by a felt sense of amazement at 
the empathizer’s accuracy. This suggests that, there-and-then, the communicative act 
obfuscated everything else - probably contributing to the diversion of attention from 
what the empathizer was, or might be, experiencing in terms of resonance (beyond 
that which was said). It was almost as if the verbal content reduced the importance of 
alternative ways of knowing. In the presence of another’s dialogue, participants did 
not usually relate to another’s experience directly, choosing to concentrate instead 
upon the symbol of an experience, the word.  
It is possible that verbal communication might be a core aspect of some 
reception experiences; and it justifies the inclusion of communication in Barrett-
Lennard’s empathy cycle, as an intermediary stage, between resonance and reception. 
However, Barrett-Lennard acknowledges that communication is not necessarily verbal, 
which leaves space for the emergence of more immediate ways of becoming aware 
that one’s experience is known. These immediate ways of receiving were here called 
resonant receivers, an experience to be detailed further on.  
Among immediate knowers, there were a few ‘pure perceivers’, who did not 
report experiencing the other’s experience; and a few ‘pure experiencers’, who did 
associate their experiencing to a perceptive act. This established perceiving and feeling 
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as two distinctive forms of immediately knowing another’s experience, one 
experiential and another perceptive. The incidence of each of these immediate acts 
across questions is illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: “Incidence of perceiving and experiencing across answers (resonance/ 
reception)” 
 
Experiencing was more important for the description of resonance experiences 
(14/20), than of reception experiences (2/20); and so was perceiving more important 
for describing resonance experiences (13/20) than reception experiences (9/20).  As 
noted, reception was less commonly about immediate essences. However, these 
incidences also reveal that, when reception involved an immediate experience, it was 
more commonly a perceptive receptive experience. There were only two participants 
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involving experiencing in reception, whereas there were nine participants involving 
perceiving in reception. 
In conclusion, resonance experiences commonly involved immediate essences or 
a combination of immediate and non-immediate essences. On the other hand, 
reception experiences commonly involved non-immediate essences; and, when 
immediate essences were involved, there was a preference for perceiving as an 
insightful receptive act. 
 
Textural themes of participants’ insightful experiences 
 
I describe a few textural themes in more depth because they are relevant for the 
present thesis. Appendix VI includes additional textural themes (those which were 
commented upon in the preceding sections), such as the authenticity of the 
immediately known experience, and helping.  
Textural themes allowed me to better understand how these immediate insights 
were lived by certain people, in certain circumstances. This was sometimes more 
revealing of the lived experience than the observation of structural themes; and the 
variability was a rich source of knowledge. Through them, I had a clearer idea about 
what it meant, for these participants, to immediately know another’s experience, in a 




Closeness as the interpersonal context of empathy 
 
In the literature, closeness and related concepts, such as familiarity, have been 
(controversially) proposed as essential features of ‘empathy’ (e.g., Kerem et al, 2001; 
Noller, 2006; Preston & Waal, 2002; Stinson & Ickes, 1992; Zaki et al., 2007).  
Theoretically, I find no reason to believe that closeness is a structural feature. Indeed, I 
gathered stories of empathy (Chapter II) about seemingly direct empathy-as-knowing 
experiences, and a few of these happened in-between strangers.  
In this study, participants reported upon successful immediate experiences. 
Thus, I would be unable to realize whether “the shared world and interdependence of 
the couple may thus facilitate the experience of empathy, as well as impeding it” 
(Pistrang et al., 2002), simply because participants would not describe how, say, 
jealousy blinded them to what the other was actually experiencing. I only had at my 
disposal accounts in which there was a positive association between people’s intimacy 
and the insight experience.  
That is, the topic guide was framed in the context of close relationships, by 
allowing participants to choose, in the opening question of the survey, among one of 
three possible interpersonal contexts of experiencing: friendship, partnership, and 
kinship. In collected narratives, they chose, in descending order of frequency: a friend 
(N=19/40); a family member (N=11/40); and a romantic partner (N=10/40).   
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Consequently, empathy-as-knowing was more frequently described as 
happening in the context of a romantic relationship, than ‘empathy’ in general 
(Chapter II). This could be a by-product of asking participants to first chose a significant 
interpersonal relationship, and then describe insightful experiences. Nevertheless, it 
shows that choosing a romantic relationship did not prevent them from reporting 
upon a meaningful insightful experience that had taken place in such a context. 
Indeed, 25% of the total amount of narratives happened in this context. 
Most participants were able to describe resonance and reception events within 
the same relational context (N=16/20). This means that most people remembered 
exemplary resonance and reception experiences within the same interpersonal 
context. Therefore, resonance and reception appeared as interchangeable roles across 
dyad members, in accordance with Barrett-Lennard’s claim.  
However, there were four people who changed the relationat context across 
questions. That is, the reception account occurred in a distinctive interpersonal 
context, as they indicated. There could be many reasons for this finding. One is 
proposed by Hannah (#2, reception), in the beginning of her reception narrative: 
“Although I feel like I can read my boyfriend like a book, I don't think the reverse 
applies. I don't think he is as aware of my feelings as I am of his”. For her, their 
relationship was asymmetrical (in terms of immediate empathy-as-knowing 
experiences). Of course, it is not possible to infer that her boyfriend was actually 
unaware of her feelings – but that was her impression, in the writing-up moment.   
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Finally, not surprisingly, partly due to the survey’s structure, closeness was an 
ever-present theme. Described insights happened between two close people, with all 
that this interpersonal context entails. There were even those who established 
closeness as the cause (11/40) of the insight, in the sense that, for them, it could not 
have happened in a different context.  Closeness was also nominated as a 
consequence of the narrated episode (4/40), or of the insightful act itself (4/40). In this 
last case, the insight was understood as a sign of the closeness of their relationship, it 
made them feel loved, close, or closer, to the other person – making closeness a 
consequence of the insight. 
The importance of this theme can be observed in Molly’s (#4, reception) text 
about an insightful experience with her twin sibling: “The connection I had with my 
sibling because of my pain was very intimate (…) It was meaningful to know that my 
sibling cared about me that much. Such a close bond could not have been made if they 
didn't love me which meant a lot to me at the time". For Molly, closeness was both a 
cause and a consequence of the insight. Indeed, some participants described the 
relationship between knowing and closeness as an ascending spiral, with closeness 
being both the beginning and the end of the insight, in ever increasing levels of 
intimacy.  
But even when the participants did not express themselves so explicitly about 
the importance of closeness (N=6), it was still an ever present theme. I cannot detach 
these episodes from this context. Implicitly or explicitly; closeness was fundamental in 
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all these narratives, for all these essences. These findings are about insights that were 
experienced within the context of close relationships. 
 
Qualities of the known experience 
 
‘Empathy’ is often associated with emotionally negative and disturbing events 
(Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003; Chapter II).  Although in these narratives most 
insights happened in negatively valenced emotional experiencing contexts (N=31/40) 
as well, there were a few occurring within positively-valenced emotional ones 
(N=9/40). In comparison with Chapter II’s findings, ‘insights into’ were more frequently 
experienced in a positive emotional context, than the having of an ‘empathic’ 
experience in a positively valenced context. This suggests that the valence of the 
underlying emotions matters less for empathy-as-knowing experiences – whereas 
‘empathy’, by being made synonymous with, say, pity, is more frequently limited to 
negatively valenced emotions.  
I have also looked into the quality of the resonated content. Empathy-as-
knowing is usually studied as the knowing of another’s emotions, or thoughts, as with 
Hancock and Ickes’ (1996) approach to empathic accuracy. On the other hand, a more 
phenomenologically coherent position would be that people immediately come to 
know foreign experiences regardless of their quality. That is, people would be able to 
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immediately know many distinctive qualities of experience, instead of just emotions, 
or just thoughts. 
In these texts, I found insights into various aspects of other’s experiences, such 
as sensations, intentions, emotions, judgements and thoughts. An example would be 
Paul’s (#7, resonance) insight: “when i saw the smile on his face i knew what joke he 
was going to say and oddly i felt the same sense of slight excitement”. What was 
important, in this experience, was the knowing of what his friend was about to 
verbally share with the group (intention). The felt emotion of excitement was an ‘odd’ 
side effect.  
There were also foreign experiences which were described as a gestalt, by 
simultaneously including many of the above elements of experiencing, as with Louise’s 
accent. In some cases, then, it makes little sense to say that participants resonated 
with pure emotions, or pure thoughts, because elements constitutive of the 
empathized experience were linked, in their writings, in a gestalt form; and contained 
many elements (e.g., #9: Michele, resonance: “I knew that he was really upset as his 
car got written off and he loves his car but i could sense that he also felt guilty and 







Resonant receivers and communicative acts 
 
Verbal communication was important for reception experiences, a finding that 
provides some support to those researching the effects of verbal communication for 
reception. Nevertheless, in some accounts (11/20), verbal communication was a 
secondary aspect, as proposed in the introduction to this chapter. These texts support 
Barrett-Lennard’s views, in that that communication is not necessarily verbal, as 
usually studied in the context of psychotherapy research. Some people described 
immediately becoming aware of another’s resonance experience, independently of 
any explicit verbal communicative effort, and usually perceptively. These are 
immediate reception experiences produced by ‘resonant receivers’.  
In their texts, reception appeared as a phenomenon no different from 
resonance. Suzy’s (#6) text serves to illustrate this phenomenon:  
(…) it was only after when i saw that she was in as much pain as me that for 
some reason that i can’t really explain other than i just knew, i realised that 
she wasn’t angry with me she realised how much i was hurting and how 
difficult it was for me and how i was angry at myself and the fact that she 
realised this and couldn’t do anything hurt her, for some reason i just know 
she knew how i was feeling. (#6, reception) 
 
In this narrative, Suzy illustrates, as in her resonance text, an immediate 
perceptive essence (“I saw”). The perceptive act brings to Suzy’s awareness her 
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mother’s immediate reception experience (“i just know she knew how i was feeling”), 
but also what appears to be her mother’s present genuine feelings (“she was in as 
much pain as me”; “that she (…) couldn’t do anything hurt her”). It is the knowing of all 
these qualities of her mother experience that makes her feel understood – not just her 
awareness of her mother’s resonance experience.  She is simultaneously receiving her 
mother’s resonance, or empathic understanding of her grief, and knowing that her 
mother is also partly sympathetically hurt. These two knowing acts even appear as one 
and the same insightful act, one which reveals several aspects of the mother’s 
experience, and one of which is a resonance experience.   
Reception, after Barrett-Lennard, is bonded to a prior resonance experience, and 
this cyclical consideration distinguishes it from resonance. Suzy’s narrative is about 
reception, in the sense that it is about ‘knowing that the other knows one’s 
experience’. But describing her experience as a resonance immediate knowing 
experience seems much more representative of her writings. Ultimately, in Suzy’s text, 
these resonance and reception differentiation seems artificial, an exercise of the mind 
– not really representative of her lived experience. 
There were more reception narratives where reception appeared to correspond 
to a resonance experience. In these examples, if communication took place, there-and-
then, it was ‘subliminal’. As Claire (#16) noted, when describing how she was able to 
know her sister’s experience, from a distance, without the involvement of any verbal 
communicative act, “I felt we had a strong connection at the time... although there was 
a large audience, we were communicating with each other regardless of them”.  
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In conclusion, resonant receivers were an example of how “it is impossible to 
consider an empathic pathway as one way” (Tempel, 2007, p.260). In this sense, and in 
the context of immediate acts, the communication stage seems to be better conceived 
as an intersubjective two-way link between self-other experiences. This allows for 
one’s immediate knowing of another’s experience, whether of reception or resonance. 
These are, in the end, intersubjective experiences, that may, at times, be given to 
people at the same time, as they unfold, in an intergenerative dynamic way. This is a 
widespread phenomenological claim about direct empathy (e.g, Depraz, 2001; 2008; 
Gallagher, 2007; Stein, 1917/1989; Thompson, 2001). 
 
Sympathy, empathy and the otherness of immediate essences 
 
There was never any self-other confusion in perceiving acts. However, in 
experiencers’ texts, as with Louise’s, the experiential side of the experience was 
described as a ‘we’, an intersubjective, and an ‘I’ similar to ‘you’ experience. 
Consequently, via the multiple location of the experience, the otherness of it was 
sometimes harder to assess, less often collectively located in a one and only source. 
 There were also a few cases (4/16) where I wondered whether experiencing was 
more suitably understood as a non-empathic sympathetic reaction to another’s 
experience, rather than one which was empathically and experientially informative of 
another’s experience. These participants simply described one personal and one 
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foreign experience (‘I’ similar to ‘you’ location), possibly just coincidently qualitatively 
similar (e.g., #11: “I felt upset in seeing her so upset”). This way of describing personal 
and foreign experiences does not seem enough for me to support that the experience 
is empathic, rather than sympathetic.  
This sympathy-empathy discrimination, in the narratives, was a fine distinction. I 
attempted to formulate, based upon theoretical considerations, criteria that might 
allow for a clear distinction between that which was sympathy, and that which was 
empathy. However, for all criteria, such distinctions seemed to be artificial. John’s 
account helps to illustrate this point. He produced a sympathy-like text for the 
resonance question, in which reasons (personal motives) for his personal response to 
his girlfriend’s experience are enumerated (one of the criteria usually associated with 
the characterization of sympathetic experiences). I then started wondering what in his 
text was about sympathy.  
But it is precisely at this point that he explains that what was appearing to me as 
a sympathetic personal experience, was, for him, an empathetic one, informative of 
the foreign experience and given meaning as an intersubjective feeling  (#1: “She was 
experiencing my pain, living through my loss, as if it was hers. She knew (…)”). For him, 
it was an experience that was a way of knowing what the partner was experiencing, by 
means of an intersubjective feeling – which amounts to an empathic experiencing 
structure in this analysis.  
This one of the reasons that led me to accept that the experiencing structure was 
sometimes better explained as a ‘composite’ experience, possibly involving both 
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empathetic and sympathetic structures of experiencing, as well as an analogical 
reliving of a past experience (#5: Peter, resonance: “I was excited in response to his 
excitement and my memory”).   
Composite or not, it was still, partly, suitably understood as an empathic 
immediate knowing. There was always an awareness of what the other person’s 
experience was; and the experience was partly a knowing act, though never in 
inferential terms to determine another’s experience. For these reasons, I concluded 
that the experiential side of an insight was fittingly conceived, at least partly, as an 
immediate empathetic experience (rather than an unconscious response, or a 
completely personal sympathetic one). 
 
Conclusions, discussion and future research 
 
In participants’ insightful resonance and reception experiences, four essences 
were identified: thinking, listening, perceiving, and experiencing. These were 
embedded in the context of a significant close relationship, and were detected on their 
own (‘pure’ phenomena), as well as together. In most of the narratives more than one 
essence was usually found. The relationship of these appeared to be a complementary 
one, with these essences complementing each other for the participants’ 
understanding experience.  
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Note that we must accept that some processes may have occurred during the 
actual event, which were not described in the participants’ accounts. Participants may 
simply not have included these in their accounts, either because these were 1) 
irrelevant for their understanding of what an ‘insight into’ was; 2) or not salient, or 
inaccessible, in their memory of the event. Nevertheless, the essences which they did 
describe were those which were selected by participants as fundamental to the 
communication of their insight into a close other. And, having found ‘pure’ 
phenomena for each of these essences, we can hypothesise that each is a distinctive 
phenomenon, a distinctive lived experience of an ‘insight into’ experience. 
Regardless of which acts ‘really’ happened, immediate experiences were very 
frequently described in these narratives. Participants interpreted and described their 
immediate insights in a very particular manner, in a non-mediated manner. These 
immediate experiences were about the feeling and/ or perceiving of another’s 
experience, there-and-then. On the other hand, non-immediate experiences were 
described as being mediated (by available symbolic cues or words) ways of knowing 
another’s experience, and were also the meaning of an insight for some participants. 
This was important principally because, in Chapter I, there was an effect 
associated with participants’ area of studies, namely, evidence that psychologists more 
often defined ‘empathy’ as a perspective-taking intellectual act (thinking essence, in 
this study). Moreover, given that psychologists dedicate themselves to the study of 
psychological phenomena, they probably hold a (perhaps trained) tendency to 
rationalize experiences and present them in a group-specific manner, congruent with 
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the more common models of psychic functioning (cognitive, of which perspective-
taking is an example). Therefore, it was reasonable to expect that, in this study too, the 
thinking essence would predominate – which was not the case. There were many 
accounts describing very experiential immediate forms of relating to others’ 
experiences, along the lines of ‘direct empathy’. This also suggests that the term 
‘insight into’ was partly effective in its objective. 
Perceiving and feeling may then be common everyday empathy-as-knowing 
experiences when their intentional object is another’s ‘genuine’ experience 
(resonance). There were also a few examples of resonant receivers, that is, participants 
who described how they immediately received another’s understanding of their 
experience (usually via a perceptive act), but, overall, for reception experiences, 
communication (listening) seemed to play a very important role. Reception texts less 
commonly described immediate essences. This suggested that the role (resonance, 
reception) may exert some influence on which act the knowing becomes grounded. 
The objective of this study was partly to understand what made an empathy-as-
knowing act appear as a direct knowing act; what was it that was important to define 
the concept of ‘direct empathy-as-knowing’? The structural qualities of immediate 
essences found in these accounts were structurally more similar to each other, when 
compared with non-immediate acts. Both perceiving and experiencing were embedded 
immediate acts that, in the manner of attention, brought another’s experience to the 
participants’ awareness in a way that was described as non-mediated.  
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Participants immediately knew what was given as another’s experience all along. 
Their doubts were never as to whether the empathee was experiencing ‘so and so’. It 
is usually only in the neuropsychology field, and some rare interpretations of Husserl’s 
‘paarung’ (e.g., Finlay, 2005) and in some psychotherapeutic theories (Zepf & 
Hartmann, 2008), with the premise of self-other merging, that self-other 
discrimination becomes a puzzle hard to solve, or rather a platonic happening of 
becoming one with the missing half. In these texts, no-one described being one with 
the object of empathy, despite the sometimes very intimate context of experiencing of 
these insights.  
Although this might be an artefact of the clear interpersonal context in which the 
survey contextualized the insightful act, the important is that the oneness experience 
was never part of these participants’ empathy-as-knowing experiences. This otherness 
quality of the known experience, intrinsic to immediate essences, is a common claim in 
both phenomenological and psychotherapeutic theories of empathy (e.g, Barret-
Lennard, 1981; Gallagher, 2007; Rogers, 1957/2007; Stein, 1917/1989; White, 1997). 
Immediate essences were also experiences embedded in the here-and-now. 
Participants recalled the having of an immediate experience which had a temporal 
(now) and spatial (here) dimension, though the temporal aspect appeared to be more 
important that the spatial location itself. This was the reason for having capitalized the 
‘N’ of ‘Now’ in Figure 11. The immediate insight was a contextualized action, spatially 
and temporally embedded, as it has been suggested in phenomenological and 
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psychotherapeutic works (e.g., Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Rogers, 1957; Scheler, 1913; 
Stein, 1917; White, 1997).  
Moreover, there was always someone who was looking, resonating; and 
someone who was being looked at, receiving - even if only in the back of one’s mind. 
Immediate insights were interpersonal experiences. However, this quality is better 
understood via phenomenological intentionality. That is, subject and object are linked 
intentionally, in consciousness. This self-other intentional link that puts in relation two 
(or possibly more) experiencing embodied embedded minds must be present even 
when an empathizer is not consciously and deliberately trying to decipher a foreign 
experience, as in therapeutic settings; when the insight comes as a surprise, as in some 
of these narratives. This is an assumption of most phenomenological and 
psychotherapeutic contemporary ‘empathy-as-knowing’ theories (Barrett-Lennard, 
1981; Dessoy, 2000; Depraz, 2001; 2008; Finlay, 2005; Maturana, 1975; Thompson, 
2001; White, 1997; Zahavi, 2007). 
Finally, participants never nominated a mediator for their immediate knowing. 
There was neither a symbol, carrying a meaning that had to be subsequently decoded; 
nor an intermediary step.   
For these reasons, immediate essences appeared to portray the 
phenomenological conception of direct empathy-as-knowing, one which was lived 
under the form of a feeling or a perceiving of another’s experience. However, in four 
cases, it was difficult to understand whether experiencers were describing a 
sympathetic response or a direct empathic experiential knowing. I solved this dilemma 
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by proposing that experiences were composite, that is, that people might 
simultaneously have a sympathetic experience and a direct felt empathetic experience.   
There would therefore be a benefit in clarifying definitions of sympathy and 
empathy, and their distinction both conceptually and experientially. The adoption of 
alternative data gathering methodologies, that prompted  more detailed and reflective 
data than some of the texts gathered for this study (e.g., face-to-face in-depth 
interviews), would perhaps be more revealing. Moreover, this study’s objective was to 
understand direct empathy as a concept that could be found in people’s narratives. By 
reassuring me that this phenomenon accounted well for some people’s lived 
experiences of an insights into someone else’s experience, my conceptual questions 
were addressed.  
I also realized that textural qualities were specially revealing, perhaps even more 
than essential qualities. In the following chapter, I draw upon some of these findings to 
study, in a more first-person, in-depth manner, the way that people lived and gave 
meaning to immediate empathic experiences. I will thus leave conceptual concerns 
aside. Clearly, there are lived experiences of empathy-as-knowing that coincide with 
direct empathy theories, and I wish to better understand how it feels, to directly know 
another’s experience.   
Here, to address the limitations imposed by the design of this study (online 
answers; indirect means of observation; short accounts), I have tried to stick with 
phenomena as they appear, to me, in the text (Epoche), attempting to “understand 
and make sense of their experiences in terms of their relatedness to, and their 
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engagement with” (Larkin, Watts & Clifton, 2006, p. 109) the expression ‘insight into’. I 
have also looked at texts collectively, de-constructed, and constructed them once 
more, switching constantly between an hermeutics of faith and an hermeutics of 
suspicion (Josselson, 2004). I have looked from different angles for very particular 
characteristics, until qualities started to emerge. However, I cannot give this reflection 
finished. In the end, “no thing-perception is terminal and conclusive; space always 
remains for new perceptions (…)” (Husserl, 1931, p.414, cf. Moustakas, 1994, p.72), 
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                                                                Chapter V 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the interpretative phenomenological analysis of 








“People face Sander’s camera (…) but their gaze is not intimate, revealing. Sander was 
not looking for secrets; he was observing the typical.” 





Figure 14: “Hanging out” 









 ‘Empathy’ is generally studied as a face-to-face dyadic interpersonal phenomenon. 
Although this is not a necessary condition for empathy to be experienced (Boulanger & 
Lançon, 2006; Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Stein, 1917), this is the usual research setting, 
from neurocognitive to psychotherapeutic approaches. This is such a general research 
approach to ‘empathy’ that it has been defined via references to this particular context, 
that is, as an “interaction between any two individuals” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.54). 
Étienne Dessoy, being a professor, researcher and family and systemic therapist, 
dedicated his life to the study of interpersonal relationships. He begins his 
considerations about a primordial level of existence (contact) as follows: 
It is impossible not to communicate.  This world is still the one where one 
experiences the proximal and the distant, the familiar and the frightening 
and also empathy – capacity for feeling sympathy or antipathy – by means of 
a contact which connects by inaugurating communication, perhaps the most 
human, where everything is already ‘said’ in the very same instant of the 
encounter, even though nothing was yet shown nor verbalized.36 (Dessoy, 
2000, p. 219/ 220) 
 
The importance of his message here is that he situates empathic happenings in an 
inaugural communicative encounter between two people, one which is communicative 
                                                 
36 Free translation from the original: “Il est impossible de ne pas communiquer’. Ce monde est encore celui 
où s´éprouvent le proches et le lointain, le familier et l’effrayant ainsi que l’empathie – capacité d’éprouver 
de la sympathie et de l’antipathie – par le biais d’un contact qui fait lien en inaugurant la communication, 
peut-être la plus humaine, où tout est déjà ‘dit’ à l’instant même de la rencontre alors que rien n’a encore 
été ni montré ni mis en mot.”  
 237 
 
even before anything has been overtly shown or said. For him, ‘empathy’ is anchored in 
Heidegger’s being-with-others, a Dasein that is inevitably a Dasein-with-others. Instead 
of saying ‘I think, therefore I am’, Dessoy is saying ‘I am, therefore I communicate’. 
People communicate their experiences simply because they exist, feel, think, relate.  
Consequently, it is this encounter that is fundamental; that allows for empathy-as-
knowing to naturally happen.  During this encounter, the empathic subject has laid 
before him another’s experience. It is there to be read, received, as part of a basic 
“everyday social understanding” (Gallagher, 2007, p.354). It is there to be empathized 
with. In this sense, empathy is then the experience of an empathizer who naturally 
becomes aware of the naturally communicated empathee’s experience, independently 
of that which is objectively said or done. 
From Dessoy’s systemic, hence partly objects relations, perspective37, 
communication is very explicitly not necessarily a verbal act (Chapter IV), but rather a 
natural (perhaps empathic) form of relating to other people and their experiences. For 
phenomenologists, Dessoy’s reflection could illustrate the happenings of an 
intersubjective context of experiencing (e.g., Zahavi, 2001). Moreover, the notion of 
direct empathy (phenomenological conception of empathy, Chapter III) is intrinsically an 
interpersonal and intersubjective concept, by being explained through the concept of 
pairing or coupling (Chapter III) and by being responsible for the empathizer’s direct 
knowing of the empathee’s experience. It is fundamentally a non-intellectual way of 
                                                 
37 In more experimental settings, the object or target of the empathic act is often substituted by a 
photographs or videos, at best of real people, so as to minimize the effects of factors such as social 
desirability (e.g., Noller, 2006); and thereby the association between ‘empathy’, verbal commentary or 
communicative acts is less often investigated. 
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becoming aware of someone’s present naturally intersubjectively communicated 
experience - a conception very close to Dessoy’s description of this primordial form of 
communication that happens during interpersonal encounters.  
The study in this chapter is dedicated to the qualitative investigation of the 
individual experiential qualities and hermeneutic ‘hows’ of a phenomenon which was 
described by participants as a natural intuitive way of coming to know someone else’s 
experience in Chapters II and IV; and that resembles direct empathy and Dessoy’s 
description of the communicative inter-exchange between individuals. I seek to reflect 
upon the experiential “secrets” (Sontag, 1977/2008, p.59) revealed by participants 
themselves, to each other and to me, about what immediate empathy ‘feels like’, about 




In Chapters II and IV, immediate empathy appeared as a perceptive and/or felt 
knowing experience, occurring in-between strangers, as well as close others; in 
emotionally positive experiencing contexts, as well as emotionally negative experiencing 
contexts; and during seemingly troublesome emotional moments, as well as seemingly 
daily episodes. It even amounted to some participants’ definitions of what empathy was. 
The design of this study is shaped in the light of the immediate empathy-as-knowing 
findings outlined above. For example, I assumed that immediate empathy was not 
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restricted to emotionally negative experiencing contexts – in contrast with the pity and 
the emotional distress meanings of ‘empathy’.   
Here, I give some attention to the design due to its novel features. Through it, I 
aimed to reduce the “'explanatory gap' in our understanding of how to relate first-
person, phenomenological data to third-person, biobehavioural data” (Lutz & Thompson, 
2003) by choosing less indirect research methods, broadly consistent with the tenets of 
the neurophenomenology paradigm (Chapter III). There can be only benefits in the 
adoption of several angles of analysis at once. 
This design involved the adoption of several distinctive methodological 
procedures, drawn from very distinctive research areas and had three separate stages. 
The first stage was a ‘pseudo-experimental’ dyadic situation, during which participants 
were asked to share a happiness story from their own experience with a partner they 
barely knew, while being videotaped. The second stage involved an instant recall survey, 
during which both partners were invited to individually describe in writing what had 
been experienced during the first stage. Finally, I invited them to discuss these 
experiences, with the help of the recordings, during a cued recall, same-day, in-depth, 
joint interview.  
The ‘pseudo-experimental’ situation was inspired by Hess’ work on contagion, 
mimicry and empathic accuracy. Among her experiments, there was a study (Hess & 
Bourgeois, 2010) which investigated the occurrence of interpersonal mimicry and 
contagion (and supportive evidence of their occurrence was found), during a videotaped 
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dyadic mixed-gender interactive task. There were listeners and speakers; and speakers 
were responsible for sharing a story about anger or happiness events.  
I adopted a similar procedure here. Participants were invited to participate in a 
videotaped dyadic interaction that involved the relating/ narrating of a personal story, 
about an episode during which happiness had been experienced, to another participant.  
Although an emotion other than happiness could have been chosen, this seemed a 
suitable choice. It reduced the possibility of leaving participants distressed by the 
conversation. If they were to have their feelings inspected like a laboratory mouse, they 
would be better off discussing a positive event. If they were to be contaminated, at least 
they would be contaminated by a positive feeling. 
Hess and Bourgeois’ study was very useful due to its detailed methodological 
explanation (e.g., the mean time participants took to tell their tales). I could therefore 
plan the situation in the light of their design, one which had been pre-tested for its 
efficacy, at least with regard to contagion and mimicry.  
These authors did not adopt an interview procedure; but in-depth interviewing, in 
the present study, was fundamental. Wishing to reduce the explanatory, interpretative 
gap, get closer to people’s immediate empathy-as-knowing experiences, and understand 
their meaning-making from a first person perspective: these were the centrepiece of the 
study.  
For this interviewing stage, the method drew upon Kagan’s (1963, 1990) 
Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR) technique, first developed as a counsellors’ supervision 
and training tool, used to inspected the in-session “dynamics of empathy” (Kagan, 
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Krathwohl & Miller, 1963, p.237). In brief, this technique consists of an in-depth 
systematic process-focused exploration of recordings of therapeutic sessions, conducted 
during individual interviews with one of the video’s protagonists (Larsen, Flesaker & 
Stege, 2008).  
 There are, however, many variations and adaptions of IPR. An example of a similar 
procedure, which also influenced the present study, is Elliot and Shapiro’s (1988) Brief 
Structured Recall (BSR), presently part of what is called “significant events research” 
(Timulak, 2010). This technique addresses some of IPR’s shortcomings by introducing a 
few changes. Namely, the lengthy duration of the detailed individual interviewing, 
associated with the comprehensive viewing, is dealt with by introducing individual 
surveys for instant recall feedback and an emphasis upon significant episodes38 
(meaningful for the protagonist). In BSR, interviews and surveys revolve around these 
significant moments, rather than the whole interaction.  
IPR and BSR have been employed in the study of interpersonal relationships, 
usually therapeutic ones; both utilise participants’ own insights to inform the 
researchers’ analysis; and both do this by (usually) making recordings of a therapy 
session and then inviting participants to individually comment upon these recordings 
(cued recall),usually shortly after (maximum 48h) the therapy session, for recency 
effects. 
                                                 
38 In this approach, an episode, or event, is the videotape’s analysis unit, which is a “discrete interactional 




These techniques are concerned with experiential and processual aspects of 
interviewees’ spoken, and unspoken, experiences occurring during the videotaped 
interaction. They aim to assist with the process of remembering, reflecting and 
verbalizing these experiences on a one-to-one basis (Barkham & Shapiro, 1986; 
Bradbury-Jones, 2009; Darling & Clarke, 2009; Elliott & Shapiro, 1988; Larsen et al., 2008; 
Levenson & Gottman, 1983; Morris, 2001; Seale, Charteris-Black, Dumelow, Locock & 
Ziebland, 2008). It is a technique that is said to be a “unique way of accessing aspects of 
human interaction that are difficult to approach via other research means (i.e., 
“conscious but undisclosed thoughts, feelings, and sensations” (Larsen et al., 2008, p.31). 
This was what was needed here for the in-depth first person investigation of 
recent immediate lived experiences of empathy-as-knowing, and the reduction of the 
explanatory gap. Since this phenomenon is thought to be a natural everyday way of 
knowing someone else’s present experiences, a particular population (e.g., counsellors 
and their clients) was not required; and the absence of a therapeutic session recording, 
the typical centre of the interview discussion, was dealt with by creating the ‘pseudo-
experimental’ situation previously described. Nevertheless, this study opted for the 
conduction of joint interviews, rather than individual ones. This interviewing technique is 







Individual and joint interviews: to each its merits 
 
What and how we remember and communicate an event is a door into our own 
particular way of making sense of the world, in that moment, for a particular purpose, in 
that context. Cued-recall individual interviews then reveal, in a situated manner, with 
the help of the interviewer, the experience and meaning of the recorded event, for that 
particular person, in that moment, in an in-depth, detailed and systematic manner. 
Individual interviews allow closer inspection of an ‘individual’ memory, of ‘individual’ 
views. They reveal the first person perspective, the one which is generally the focus of 
phenomenological approaches, as well as of IPR and its derivatives. 
It has been said that “counsellor and client might come away from the same 
interaction with vastly differing experiences” (Larsen et al., 2008, p. 20).  This is true of 
probably most interpersonal encounters.  And individual interviewing will probably 
accentuate such differences (e.g., Bradbury-Jones et al., 2009; Morris, 2001; Seale et al., 
2008).  
On the other hand, joint interviews, in a more pronounced manner, are in-
between the private and the public. Their outcome is more markedly a co-construction, 
rather than an expression of an individual voice. Then, joint interviews bear in 
themselves a greater risk of generating a consensual co-constructed shared meaning 
account, expressive of a homogenised meaning, non-expressive of any of the 
contributing individual voices, in their idiopathic difference (Bradbury-Jones et al., 2009; 
Kaplowitz, 2000; Morris, 2001; Seale et al. 2008). For example, participants’ may avoid 
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particular sensitive, taboo or highly individualized topics (Gould, Osborn, Krein & 
Mortenson, 2002; Rajaram, 2011; Seale et al., 2008) for the sake of the collective 
account.   
Having acknowledged that joint or group interviews have this potential negative 
effect, it is important to note that they have not been found to necessarily extinguish the 
individual voice, quite the opposite. They have been found to stimulate the dialogue 
between participants and generate richer commentary; hence allowing for a better 
understanding of the phenomenon at hand (Beitin, 2008; Bradbury-Jones et al., 2009; 
Morris, 2001; Raingruber; 2003). That is, there may be a benefit in conducting joint 
interviews and one which is precisely the enhancement of the contribution of those 
sought individual voices. Hence, whilst there is the potential of gathering consensual 
accounts, the opposite effect has been observed. This risk, then, is not a good enough 
reason to belittle the joint interview technique, particularly given the growing conviction 
that empathy is a relational phenomenon, rather than an intra-psychic one. 
Secondly, the belief that it is possible, and desirable, to obtain descriptions of 
‘pure’ experiences, of a strictly individual “‘uncontaminated’” (Bradbury-Jones et al., 
2009) voice, at best could be a tenet of Husserlian phenomenology – not so much of any 
psychotherapy approach that I profess; nor of IPR and derivatives; nor of hermeneutic 
approaches to inquiry and data analysis. These approaches recognize that, at a 
fundamental level, this individual voice is not there to be found (nor in individual neither 
in group interviews). We are in another’s eyes; we are, to a considerable extent, what 
these observing others have seen in us throughout our lives, even when they are not 
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there anymore. Also, that which is shared about our experience, in a particular moment, 
by whatever means, is only a part of that mirrored ball called experience. An account is 
never ‘complete’, no matter how long it is. Consequently, joint interviews are not, at the 
outset, at odds with neither of the techniques that influenced the study; and it is useless 
to avoid the joint interview technique under such justification. 
The shared meaning-making experience of joint interviews, centred around a lived 
interpersonal experience (the ‘pseudo-experimental’ situation), and focusing on an 
interpersonal, perhaps intersubjective, phenomenon (immediate empathy-as-knowing), 
could thus perhaps provide rich and revealing accounts. At once, joint interviews would 
bring the two concerned perspectives (resonance and reception) together, in a free-flow 
collaborative exploration of the same co-lived moment. This is the rationale for opting, 
in this study, for joint interviews, rather than individual ones. 
The objective of joint interviews, at least in this study, was not achieving a 
consensual view, but rather a truly three-way constructed one, enlightened by the two 
perspectives that were living through the event together, with their convergent and 
divergent experiential happenings being brought to the discussion (Bradbury-Jones et 
al., 2009); as well as by my constraint, but still influential set of eyes and guidance. To 
achieve this, some interviewing art is required, so that the individual voice can manifest 
itself in this context and the two individuals can give meaning to their joint experience 
together, in a collaborative manner. The right balance between each individual 
contribution must be created. Both have to be allowed to share their individual 
viewpoint, even if that means disagreeing with one another.  
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These interviews were conducted immediately after the ‘pseudo-experimental’ 
situation had been lived. Participants’ memory of it was still very fresh and malleable. 
The fact that their opinions were not yet solidified could increase the risks of a 
consensual account. For this reason, the instant recall surveys procedure, utilized by 
Elliot and Shapiro, and their emphasis upon significant events, was adopted here. It was 
inserted in-between the happy story interaction and the in-depth interview. It 
established a bridge between the three studies conducted for this thesis (that might be 
useful if their findings were very disparate), but principally it intended to give 
participants the opportunity to first express their own individual voice, to solidify and 
reflect upon their own experience and its meaning, prior to engaging in a three-way 
meaning construction. 
 
Cued recall, joint interviews and embodied prereflective understandings 
 
One relevant example of a study which adopted an overall similar design was 
described by Raingruber (2003). Raingruber described a phenomenological investigation 
method that involved pre-recorded nurse-client sessions; immediately followed by 
individual recall interviews (for the signalization of meaningful events, as with the 
surveys); and thereafter joint interviews.  
I believe that the possibility of conducting an individual cued-recall interview did 
not even cross her mind. Although slightly misguided, in the sense that she cannot 
compare the richness of data obtained via immediate free-recall short individual 
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interviews with the richness of data obtained via cued-recall long joint interviews (if only 
for their dissimilar duration), she compares the outcomes of the two procedures. She 
observes that the cued-recall joint interview procedure was well accepted by 
participants; that it led to rich commentary, ranging from descriptions of another’s 
expressive behaviour to past experiences’ reflections; and, most importantly, that it 
revealed participants implicit “somatic understandings and perceptual experiences” 
(p.1165). That is, the procedure allowed for the emergence of commentary about pre-
reflective understandings.  
This is precisely the interest of this paper for the present study. It shows how the 
overall method, and the joint interviews in particular, seem suitable for the investigation 
of empathy as an immediate embodied interpersonal understanding - that is, in its direct 
or immediate phenomenological meaning (e.g., Finlay, 2005; Gallagher, 2007; Stein, 
1917; Thompson, 2001; Zahavi, 2001). 
 
The lived experience of ‘empathy’ and singing violins 
 
There are examples of studies about lived empathic experiences that seem to 
describe the phenomenon of direct empathy, yet do not distinguish this experience as a 
phenomenon on its own right (Chapter IV). One of these was published by Kerem, et al. 
(2001). They take understanding to be synonymous with empathy, and, by means of a 
phenomenological inquiry method, interviewed participants about their experiences of 
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understanding and being understood by a significant other. It deserves to be explored, 
because their findings are similar to those obtained here.  
The analysis of the interviewees’ accounts revealed that ‘empathic’ 
understandings had two “components” (p.715), cognitive and affective (the most 
widespread binomial organization approach, Chapter I). In most cases, both cognitive 
and affective elements were involved in participants’ everyday experiences of 
understanding and being understood.  
The cognitive element appeared as perspective-taking, though most commonly, as 
a reasoned knowing, as a “cognitive, rational” (p.177) type of understanding that drew 
upon familiarity and closeness as sources of information (as with the studies in Chapters 
II and IV). It helped participants to “infer what the other is thinking and feeling even 
though they think differently” (p.718).  
The affective component was explained in the introduction to their paper as a 
sympathetic responsive phenomenon, but also, in the light of some psychodynamic and 
experiential psychotherapeutic theories, as an immediate experiential resonation or 
knowing, closer to the notion of direct empathy. The analysis revealed that this affective 
component included experiences of “shared emotion or identification” (p.718). It seldom 
was the single way participants understood others; and there were even instances in 
which “the fact that the others did not share their emotions seemed to be the core of 
their empathic experience” (p.725). They explained these findings by proposing that the 
word understanding has perhaps a more cognitive nature (Chapter II), but also by 
arguing that “affective empathy can reside in a nonverbal knowing of the other, which 
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means that there is no language that denotes it” (p.724), and that consists of a “type of 
feeling transferred without words” (p.721), representative of a oneness experience.   
I believe they were close to realizing that, amidst their commentary on affective 
experiences, there was something that was more about an immediate way of knowing 
(once more the phenomenon goes unnamed), than about a sympathetic responsive 
sharing (feeling similarly, ‘oneness’); and that perhaps the term ‘understanding’ 
prevented its more expressive appearance. 
For me, this ‘nonverbal’ way of knowing is not really about feeling sympathy, nor a 
feeling of oneness – but about an intersubjective, intuitive, perceptive or ‘felt empathy-
as-knowing’ experience. In Chapter IV’s study, participants described immediate insights 
that were not presented as responses, or affective reactions to another’s experience, 
but essentially as a way of knowing another’s experience. It felt more like the strings of a 
violin, vibrating to the sounds of the environment, resonating with it, not really being 
played or playing, but none of the less effectively feeling the environment – thereby 
knowing what this environment was all about. Hence, at the most, it was a very 
particular kind of response, because not necessarily about emotions, about personal 
responses, and given meaning as a knowing act. It was a knowing founded in an 
interpersonal encounter much closer to Dessoy’s understanding of communication. 
This is my starting point. I did not set out to question about affective responses, 
even though these might transform the empathy-as-knowing experience into a “fuller 
and more meaningful relational experience” (p.727). Rather, I set out to understand 
knowing experiences alone. 
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In conclusion, this chapter is dedicated to the way that participants elaborate, 
verbalize and communicate a very recent interaction, and their experiences of the 
empathy-as-knowing which occurred there. Even given that what is revealed is a 
retrospective immediate empathy-as-knowing phenomenon, co-constructed during a 
cued-recall joint interview, I argue that this a very good, promising way of studying its 
lived experience; and thereby diminishing the explanatory and interpretative gap 






Eight participants (four dyads), with a mean age of 23.75 years old (SD=3.28), were 
interviewed. Participants were all strangers to the interviewer, and full-time students 
from the School of Psychology of the University of Birmingham. They were mainly young 
adults, women (N=7), postgraduate (N=6), British (N=5), and most had never seen each 
other before being paired up for this study (N=6). The dyads’ closeness is schematized in 
Figure 15, along with the role (listener, teller), fictitious name and demographic features 









The study was approved by the school’s ethics committee. A pilot of two dyads 
(credit-paid undergraduates) was conducted in February 2010. Its aims were testing the 
design, technical procedures and materials; and it originated several critical 
methodological changes and choices.  
Participants were recruited, between April and December of 2010, by advertising 























































of the school of psychology. In addition, two posters were placed in the clinical 
psychology trainees’ information board of that same school; and word of mouth was 
used.  Participants then volunteered and gave their consent. Two of them were credit-
paid, four were monetarily rewarded and two did not ask for any compensation (money 
or credits), although aware of this possibility. 
Pairing up participants was a decision left to chance, in the sense that the only 
intervention was for matching participants according to their schedule preferences, as 
communicated via email, prior to participation. However, given the unforeseen 
recruitment difficulties, it would probably be impossible to have any control over this 
aspect anyhow. Each dyad was seen on a separate day. These interviews lasted for an 
average of 1h40m (SD=20.3m); and the overall data gathering procedure approximately 
2h40. 
  
Design, procedures, and necessary materials  
 
 The data collection design consisted of three stages: happy story, instant recall 
survey and joint interview. Each involved distinctive aims, procedures and materials, and 
a distinctive consent form. Per stage, these are: 
Happy story stage: The information sheet was provided in the beginning of this 
stage. It explained the study as being about experiences of engaging with a partner. This 
broad statement was to approximate the ‘pseudo-experimental’ situation to a 
naturalistic conversational setting. It was important to know whether these immediate 
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empathy-as-knowing experiences occurred spontaneously, without manipulation or pre-
cueing participants’ attention. This stage’s consent form requested permission for key 
ethical issues, relevant across stages, as per standard format.  
Participants’ chairs, with an angle of approximately 135 between them, were 
positioned beside a long table. In the opposite side of the room, stood the principal 
camera, used to digitally record this stage, in mini-DV. This camera videotaped 
participants frontally, and waist-up. Behind participants stood, discretely, a small backup 
camera (one which was fortunately never necessary), that was recording from the 
beginning and was left recording until its memory was full. 
Participants were then explained that there were two roles, ‘teller’ and ‘listener’. 
Telling involved sharing a personal story about an episode from their experience during 
which happiness had been felt, and that they felt comfortable in sharing in this setting. 
Listening involved engaging with the teller and the narrated story. It was emphasised 
that the interaction should be seen as dialogue, sometimes using the metaphor of party 
conversations; and that they could end-up swapping roles, as long as the teller was given 
time to ‘finish’ the story. Thus, any sort of verbal comments and questions, on the behalf 
of the listener, were allowed. The only dyad with which I did not highlight twice or thrice 
this instruction experienced a greater amount of task-related anxiety.   
They were then asked to volunteer for one of these roles; and left alone for a 1539 
minutes videotaped interaction with the partner. The principal camera was set recording 
                                                 
39 BSR was created partly because the duration of a therapy session is usually 50 minutes, and the usual 
associated individual cued-recall interview lasts 2 to 3 hours (Larsen et al., 2008). In non-therapeutic 
settings, the mean length of the videotaped event is much smaller. Namely, with dyads of couples, Darling 
and Clarke (2009) videotaped a 5 minutes interaction; Long, Angera and Hakoyama (2006) videotape a 8 to 
10 minutes interaction; and Levenson and Gottman (1983) a 15 minutes interaction. On the other hand, in 
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right before I left the room. That is, it was not concealed by any means; just accepted for 
its presence and justified purpose. 
Instant Recall: After 15 minutes, I re-entered the room, and immediately 
participants were invited, without any additional instructions, to individually fill in a brief 
questionnaire. There were two laptops, behind participants’ backs during the happy 
story stage, switched on before their entrance, with the survey ready for completion, 
and labelled visibly by the role (listener and teller). The surveys were presented as a rich-
text word document.  
These were purpose-built semi-structured surveys (Appendix VII contains an 
example of the tellers’ survey), inspired by BSR materials available online40, and changed 
to linguistically accommodate the differences in role. Participants were required to 
answer to four sections, composed mainly of open-ended questions. First, they were 
asked about their overall story telling experience in terms of events, thoughts, feelings 
and intentions. The next two sections requested them to describe significant events, if 
any and up until three, during which they immediately sensed the partner’s experience 
(immediate resonance); and then moments when the partner immediately sensed theirs 
(immediate reception). The final section was dedicated to demographics (age, 
nationality, gender, education level, occupation, and relationship with the partner, in a 
five-point scale, from ‘I have never seen him/ her before’ to ‘we are very close friends’).  
                                                                                                                                               
Hess and Bourgeois (2010), the maximum length of time participants (96 dyads) took to narrate their 
recalled story (anger or happy event) was 10.41 minutes. It is true that most of these studies were using 
dyads of couples, whilst in this study participants were generally strangers to each other, and this context 
might change the optimal time necessary. The time had to be just right. Extending the interaction in excess 
might have the non-desired effect of increasing participants discomfort with each other; and shortening it 
in excess could prevent the occurrence of immediate knowing experiences. In the pilot study, the duration 




The adopted prompt to “sense” was inspired by Rogers’ definition of empathy; and 
aimed to direct the participants’ attention to less intellectual or cognitive empathy-as-
knowing experiences. While they were answering the survey, I prepared the room and 
the materials required for the next stage. When they both had finished answering the 
survey, they signed this stage’s consent form, requesting permission for use of the tape 
during the interview, with actual knowledge of its content. 
Cued-recall joint interview: The cued-recall joint interview started immediately 
after the surveys’ stage. An additional laptop was required for viewing the recordings 
gathered during the happy story stage; and a digital audio-recorder was used for 
registering the conversation (part of which was also videotaped by the backup camera). 
This stage’s consent form released gathered data for dissemination procedures. It was 
possible for participants to take part in the study without agreeing to the use of the 
video and audio material in dissemination, and/ or future studies – though no-one ever 
refused.  
Two viewings were necessary. The first refreshed participants’ memory, while 
allowing me to have an idea of what had happened during the happy story stage. For the 
second viewing, participants were invited to ask for the tape to be paused whenever 
they spotted a significant moment during which they were able to know or sense what 
the partner was experiencing, there-and-then, regardless of whether it amount to a 
significant moment signalized in the survey. They usually spontaneously commented 
upon that moment as soon as the tape was paused, being prompted so that richer 
commentary, balanced across protagonists, was provided. Refreshments were available; 
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and the interview finished when none of the participants wished to add anything else 
(or, most frequently, fatigue). 
This implies that the room where these three stages happened was arranged prior 
to participants’ arrival, so that the transitions between stages succeeded each other 
uneventfully and non-disruptively. A sketch of the room and materials’ disposition can 
be seen in Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16: “Room and materials’ disposition, per data collection stage” 
 
As the sketch shows, participants only changed their seats for the completion of 
the instant recall surveys (number 2). Otherwise, they were close to each other, in full 
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view of the camera for the happy story stage; and, for the interviewing stage, with a 
discrete rearrangement, the three interview participants, or co-researchers, were 
equally distanced and close to each other.  There were two cameras; 3 computers and 
several tables and chairs. An effort was made so that the materials necessary for one 
stage would be out of the participants’ direct sight in the other stages. For example, one 
of the computers in Figure 16 is placed outside the long table, to the right, because up 
until the interview stage, during which it was used for playback, it was hidden under the 
table. This was important because an excessive amount of apparatus can have an 





At the outset, I was quite wary about these interviews. I was trained with 
psychodynamic and experiential interviewing techniques, such as Hobson’s 
conversational model (e.g., Graham et al., 2008; Hobson, 1985); my experience was, in 
its vast majority, particular to individual therapy sessions; and, for a few years, I was 
supervised by psychoanalytic and psychodynamic clinicians, some more orthodox than 
others. 
This interviewing technique is partly engrained in me. In many circumstances, it is 
not exercised consciously and effortfully, but it is rather part of my being-in-the world. It 
works as implicit knowledge, just like driving, it becomes automatic. I do not prepare for 
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sessions, I just hope and trust that the engine is running, and that, on that day, on that 
hour, with those people, I am able to deal with any bump in the road.  For example, in a 
blank canvas sort of manner, Freud’s screen-therapist, always says hi. That is, I refrain, in 
every interviewing situation, from giving ‘opinions’ - and every time I incur that 
‘mistake’, all my alarms fire. I am to serve the purpose of a projection canvas, up until an 
interpretation, that expands, reformulates or enlightens the ‘projector’s’ experience, 
perspective and meaning, arises.  I am a tool. This is to say that this inquiry attitude 
manifested itself throughout these interviews, whether or not I wished it to. 
But I have spent the last few years of my life using phenomenological methods. I 
was very focused on my phenomenological goal of understanding the lived experience of 
immediate empathy-as-knowing. I wanted to be challenged and challenge, foment a 
fruitful balanced discussion about these experiences. I wished to listen to participants 
and understand their viewpoints and experiences, there-and-then, in a hermeneutic 
sense. I was also informed about, and briefly trained with, the Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009/2010) interviewing 
technique. 
Finally, I followed Larsen et al.’s (2008) instructions for the conduction of cued-
recall interviews. It was this inquiry method that was in the forefront of my attention. 
Inevitably, all three interviewing techniques shaped the inquiry method adopted in this 
study: IPR; psychodynamic; and IPA. 
As I see it, the attention that each of these techniques dedicates to particular 
events and the way these are interpreted may differ, but, as techniques that aim to 
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guide and stimulate a conversation about a particular theme, there-and-then, they 
resemble each other to a great extent. For example, the screen-therapist is part of IPA’s 
interviewing technique, as it is the interpretative activity: “the researcher is trying to 
make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world” (Eatough & Smith, 
2006, p.485).  And, most importantly, these inquiry techniques relate to the experiential 
material being disclosed in very similar manners, they are keen on listening (rather than 
directing); and none of them argues that there is such thing as a pure non-relational 
non-interpretative experience, demanding for a separation or an avoidance of a 
‘contamination’ between participants’ experiences.  
The interview schedule was produced in the light of the above techniques. These 
guidelines served principally as a memory aid, being revised prior to each interview. 
There-and-then, participants’ leads were usually followed, and the themes brought by 
them to the discussion were explored.  
This schedule listed a few issues (selected from the findings in Chapter V) that I 
could explore, given the opportunity. In addition, it pre-defined instructions and 
information that should be conveyed to participants, whenever possible and relevant. 
For example, it stated that I should emphasise that the videotape’s purpose was simply 
helping participants to remember what had been experienced during the happy story 
stage; and that we were all co-researchers trying to understand the happy story stage 
experience (IPR’s guidelines, congruent with IPA and psychodynamic techniques). It also 
pre-defined an interviewing routine, one which was improved throughout data 
collection, in the light of new observations. For instance, it pre-defined some starting 
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points, namely: address participants’ anxieties relative to the viewing experience, and 
their understanding of the expression ‘to sense’; pass the message that any type of 
‘sensing’ could be explored, as long as it acted as an immediate knowing experience; and 
that the interview’s objective was not to achieve a consensual agreement about these 
experiences, but rather get acquainted with their own individual experiences, regardless 
of their similarity.  
Participants were also allowed to offer comments, at any time, at will, whenever 
they had an insight to offer relative to the happy story stage’s experience and meaning. 
Then, the interview included comments as they came in their felt, sensed or thought 
form. In conclusion, the interview was slightly semi-structured due to the existence of a 
schedule, but, there-and-then, even with regard to the viewing and analysis of significant 





This chapter describes the results of the qualitative analysis of the manually 
transcribed cued-recall joint interviews. These interviews covered several aspects, 
including detailed descriptions of knowing the partner’s experience, and of the meaning 
of this knowing. 
The adopted data analysis method was IPA (Smith et al., 2009). IPA is an analytical 
approach most suitable for the in-depth qualitative psychological analysis of long 
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accounts about experiences and their meaning - precisely the character of the material 
at hand. Secondly, the aim of this study was describing the qualities of participants’ 
immediate empathy-as-knowing lived experiences, from their viewpoint; and how these 
qualities were related to one another and to theoretical issues. This is precisely the 
outcome of IPA. IPA is, for me, an applied hermeneutic “dialogue” (p.79) between 
several perspectives, from background knowledge to participants’ opinions, that 
contextualizes data throughout data analysis. This reinforced the suitability of this 
technique for the present study.  
The steps followed occurred against this background dialogue; and were 
developed in an iterative and inductive manner, that involved four main steps: 
Coding: line-by-line coding of the four interviews, at several levels of analysis 
(descriptive, interpretative, in-vivo, conceptual, linguistic, and even related to the impact 
of a particular excerpt upon the researcher’s analytical experience). This coding dealt 
with individual, second and third-person experiential and hermeneutic perspectives 
upon the happy story and the interview stages.   
Themes identification: during coding, individual and collective patterns started to 
emerge. These themes and subthemes were identified per interview, and then across 
multiple cases, with help of NVivo 9, a software which speeded up the process. It 
memorizes codes and their developing thematic organization; it allows for the 
comprehensive viewing of the text coded in a particular manner, thereby improving its 
overall refinement and consistency; it facilitates the comparison within and across 
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accounts; and it supports quick and flexible rearrangements of the structure and 
relationship between data, codes and themes.  
Themes’ structure: The relationship between codes, subthemes and themes 
(structure) was born out of the thematic analysis. Themes were only ‘solidified’ in their 
final structure after a thorough continuous iterative analysis of the four interviews. The 
theme significant ways of knowing another’s experience, related to participants’ 
immediate ‘empathy-as-knowing’ experience. There were three additional themes, 
recurrently reappearing across narratives (contexts of experiencing and butterfly effects; 
experiencing not really ‘now’ or ‘then’; and the intersubjective communicative flow of 
coming-to-know), which contributed to the cross-comparison of immediate ways of 
knowing.  
Interpretative Narrative: the interpretative account descriptive of findings and 
their meaning, organized theme-by-theme in accordance with the developed structure, 
was produced by means of the dialogue that accompanied the analysis. Nevertheless, 
the background knowledge served principally as a guide, a source of reflection and 
understanding, a breeze of fresh air into the meaning of participants’ claims. This was 
because it was always participants’ expressed understandings that set the tone of the 
themes’ experiential quality and interpretation. They were the ones with “experiential 








To improve the overall trustworthiness of the study, IPA recommends that all the 
steps and materials of the analysis are organized in a manner which allows for a third 
party to trace down the findings, from initial codes and comments, through clustering 
and thematic development, into the final thematic. It is also recommended the use of 
supervision, collaboration, audit, or other processes of triangulation and credibility 
checking, so that the coherence and plausibility of the interpretation is enhanced. It is 
also essential that the analysis is performed with a heightened “sensitivity to context” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p.180); and dedication, rigour and coherence.  
For this study, for practical reasons, it was not possible to adopt any additional 
trustworthiness procedures, besides the use of supervision for triangulation, one which 
was confirmative of the plausibility of the findings of the lived account. Furthermore, 
there was a sensitivity to these interviews’ context (the theme contexts of experiencing 
and butterfly effects is precisely a result of this attention), and data was organized in 
such a way that it is possible to link themes back to the original text (a procedure made 
relatively easy with NVivo9). In Appendix VIII, exemplary transcripts for each subtheme 
and theme were included so as to exemplify these data-theme links. Finally, since this 
study builds upon previous research, for which distinctive methodological approaches 







Figure 17 shows the visual guide to the interpretative narrative account described 
in this section, and it includes the four identified themes, and their subthemes. 
 
 





The first, contexts of experiencing and butterfly effects, regarded the influence of 
methodological choices upon participants’ experiences and discourse. One of its 
subthemes, scenarios leave impressions behind, illustrated the impact of the happy story 
stage and the viewing procedures on participants’ experiences and discourse. The 
• Scenarios leave impressions behind 
• Meanings of 'sensing' can be worlds apart 
Contexts of experiencing and butterfly effects 
• Intuiting (perceiving, feeling) 
• Sharing (shared understandings, shared emotions) 
• Imagining (visualizing, reasoning) 
Significant ways of knowing another's experience 
•  Memories of knowing 'then' 
•  Recounting is like reliving in the 'now' 
Experiencing not really 'now' or 'then'  
• Bridging just through the words 
• Open books and pre-reflective understandings 
The intersubjective communicative flow of coming-to-know 
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second, meanings of ‘sensing’ can be worlds apart, related to the way participants’ 
spontaneously and idiosyncratically interpreted the expression ‘to sense’ (the initial 
interview prompt, used also in the surveys). These subthemes contextualize findings in 
the overall research context, and provide insight for those interested in adopting similar 
procedures. 
The second theme, significant ways of knowing another’s experience, answered to 
the main objective of this investigation. There were three subthemes, that is, three types 
of immediate empathy-as-knowing experiences: intuiting; sharing; and imagining. This 
reference to their immediacy highlighted their instant experiential character; it is not a 
reference to the lack of mediation of the experience, which was the meaning of 
‘immediacy’ in Chapter IV.  
Following this, comes the theme experiencing not really ‘now’ nor then’. This 
showed how all these knowing acts were a memory of knowing ‘then’ (during the happy 
story stage), and how recounting is like reliving in the 'now', that is, the act of sharing a 
still presently personally significant story involved, to a certain extent, a reliving of those 
‘past’ feelings and/or of their significance. Then, every known experience was at least 
partly happening in the ‘now’; and the choice of the emotion of happiness was a sensible 
one, preventive of the re-enactment of emotionally negative states.   
Finally, there was the intersubjective communicative flow of coming-to-know 
theme. Participants often related their knowing experiences with the verbal and non-
verbal dimensions of their communicative interpersonal context. The subtheme bridging 
just through the words suggested that the content, and verbal narrative context, were 
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very important for sharing and imagining experiences, whereas intuiting was more 
strongly associated with the non-verbal side of the communicative context (open books 
and pre-reflective understandings).  
 
Contexts of experiencing and butterfly effects 
 
Before discussing significant empathy-as-knowing experiences, a certain interview 
routine was adopted. This was because there were design-related issues that were 
disturbing participants, and attracting their immediate attention. These discussions 
vividly suggested that various aspects of the background context, from a word to the 
cued-recall procedure, shaped considerably that which was experienced during the 
happy story stage, and that which was said during the interview and the survey. Like a 
butterfly effect, participants’ experiences, and consequently these findings were by-
products of these various contextual details.  
Those context-related effects that were noticed during the interview were dealt 
with there-and-then. I tried to clarify meanings and address participants’ anxieties and 
concerns, so that we could all better concentrate on the reflective task at hand. The 
research scenario, in the end, was nothing but an excuse for immediate empathic 
experiences to happen and be discussed in a more systematic manner. This was the 
message I tried to convey. Participants needed to accommodate the research scenario 
as if it were a support table; rather than it becoming the centre of the discussion in itself.  
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This generated interesting material that illustrated the impact of this study’s 
design and procedures upon their overall experience and these findings. It showed how 
little choices may have an unexpected effect. 
 
Scenarios leave impressions behind 
 
Although some may think that it is the person that leaves impressions in the 
landscape, this is not always the case. Rather, people and scenarios shape each other. 
For this subtheme I was interested in how the scenario (research setting) left its 
impressions in participants’ experiences. In brief, the happy story stage had an 
acknowledged, but surmountable artificiality; and viewing changed the focus of the 
attention to non-behavioural aspects of the interaction. 
During the happy story stage, participants’ most common concern was related 
with their pre-assigned roles. Each role had its inherent stresses, partly derived from the 
instructions, the dyad in question, and the way these roles were interpreted by 
participants themselves. The extremes were Jane and Kayla, who felt no tension at all as 
to whether they were properly fulfilling their roles or as to whether the conversation 
was heading towards the ‘right’ direction; and Megan and Sam, who believed that a 
conversation is normally a “50-50” split of ‘antenna time’ and, by having pre-assigned 
tasks, the natural flow was jeopardized, the conversation becoming ‘formal’, unnatural 
and unilateral. Most tellers felt that they were in the “spotlight” (Sam), having the 
responsibility of ‘filling in’ the 15 minutes, keeping the conversation on topic without 
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boring the other person. Paired listeners avoided interrupting in excess and refrained 
from sharing personal stories, because, in the end, “this is about her, this is her story” 
(Aisha). 
Despite this overall artificiality of this stage, there were usually two turning points, 
around the one minute (e.g., forgetting about the camera) and the 10 minutes (e.g., 
forgetting about the role), give or take, in which the conversation became more fluid 
and natural. 
 As for the viewing procedure, most spontaneous comments were related to an 
increase in their self-awareness. Being confronted by one’s own self-image created a 
mixture of interest, embarrassment and/or awkwardness, which apparently soon 
dissolved with the continuation of the interview.  
In most cases, viewing had an apparently positive influence, by bringing the happy 
story experiences to the participants’ attention, and allowing participants to “put words 
into” some type of implicit knowing that had happened more “subconsciously” during 
the story telling stage. In this case, recordings sometimes illustrated participants’ 
experiences, as recalled, and brought to light certain sides of their experiences that 
could otherwise go unnoticed and uncommented upon. This allowed  
Nevertheless, the tape was not always a faithful registry of every single lived 
experience (e.g., Alicia: “I definitely didn’t notice a point oh this is where she is feeling 
awkward now…”).  That is, their experiences were sometimes invisible on tape, in such a 
way that the recordings could not be used to explain, nor illustrate, their experience. 
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This is interesting because it shows how experiences and recorded visible behaviour are 
two distinctive things from a first person perspective.  
As long as participants trust these two angles as distinctive but inter-related 
aspects of their experience, these in itself does not bias the findings in any particular 
direction. This was not always the case. In particular, Lauren, mid-through the interview, 
stopped using the recordings as a memory-aid. She was sometimes confused about 
whether reality was best reflected in recalling or viewing, with both experiences 
suffering a “kind of an intermerge” that she could no longer separate. For example, 
recorded visible behaviour was used to explain Alicia’s knowing of her experience from a 
viewer-perspective alone:  
Lauren: But you picked it out well, because I am looking at my expression 
there now, and I don’t know if I kind of fully expressed it with my expression, 
but maybe there is just something there. 
   
Here, Lauren used the tape to point out that she did not knowingly or recognizably 
‘show’ her experience, but “maybe” she expressed it behaviourally. There is nothing in 
this comment about her moment-to-moment happy story stage lived experience. She 
was moving away from the lived experiences (the intended focus of the discussion) 
towards an account of a new experience, the viewer/ observer experience.  
This example also shows how viewing might have overinflated the importance of 
behaviour, one which often became the centrepiece of participants’ explications and 
interpretations; and how these behaviour-based explications sometimes seemed to be 
remotely or imprecisely related to the experiential memory. Thus, viewing enriched, but 
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it is also impoverished the participants’ experiential accounts about there-and-then 
interpersonal understandings. Hence, it is important to keep reminding participants, as 
Sontag (1977, p.9) points out about photography, that, although the video can be seen 
as a way of “certifying experiences”, it is also a way of “refusing it – of limiting” it, to 
what is outwardly expressed and thereby observed there. Either way, “watching it back, 
it does give it a different slant, doesn’t it?” (Lauren). That is, that viewing changes one’s 
memory and opinion about a lived past experience.  
 
Meanings of ‘sensing’ can be worlds apart 
 
 Participants gave meaning to the experience of sensing another’s experience in 
varied ways, in such a way that these meanings sometimes seemed to be worlds apart. 
For them, sensing was about: shared understandings (Lauren: “Just a kind of a 
connection, a common understanding); feeling another's experience for oneself, or 
shared emotions (Zoe: “It is just not nearly the same intensity as the way that I am 
feeling it. Just maybe feeling a very a much weaker version of the emotion that I am 
feeling”); imagining another’s experience (Kayla: “Putting ourselves in another’s person’s 
shoes and trying to go through what they actually went through whilst we get a 
description”); and intuiting another experience (Jane: “You just kind of know, you can 
sense what they are thinking or feeling”). These meanings were joined, in the light of 
participants’ remarks, into three main empathy-as-knowing types: sharing (shared 
understandings and shared emotions); imagining and intuiting.   
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This was the range of phenomena that was discussed during these interviews, as 
significant ways of knowing another’s experience.  There was not a single interview 
which investigated a one and only phenomenon, as intended, partly because most dyads 
did not understand the prompt similarly in-between themselves, and had different 
knowing experiences. Sensing was then a word with many meanings. 
It was important for me to address this issue here, so as to point out here that 
these interviews were not that consensual after all. They did not culminate in a 
consensual shared meaning account of a unitary phenomenon. There was usually 
enough space to express one’s individual voice, even when this implied a disagreement 
with the partner, and this lack of consensual agreement started with the meaning of 
‘sensing’.  
 
Significant ways of knowing another’s experience 
 
Participants described three main significant immediate ways of knowing the 
partner’s experience: intuiting (sensitive awareness), sharing (‘we’ sympathetic 
experience), and imagining (ideational acts).  
These worked (also) as immediate interpersonal ways of ‘knowing’ or ‘sensing’ 
another’s experience. Each episode sometimes involved more than one knowing 
experience. That is, participants’ reception and resonance experiences were sometimes 
multi-layered and composed of more than one knowing experience.  
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The inter-relationships between knowing experiences appeared to be episode-
specific, contextualized, situated. For example, intuiting sometimes happened while two 
participants’ were having a shared experience already, but it was also sometimes 
responsible for the occurrence of a shared moment. Secondly, the selected inspected 
episodes were like photographs of an overall continuous interaction. There-and-then, 
knowing acts built upon each other, allowing them to progressively better know the 
partner and the partner’s experiential perspective. Therefore, the study of cause-
consequence inter-relationships between these acts was only of marginal interest for 
this study.  
On the other hand, understanding the particular qualities of each of these 
subthemes or knowing acts was the objective of this study, and is explored the following 
subsections..   
 




Perceiving-as-knowing was a sensitive awareness of the partner’s experience. 
Participants commonly “knew”, “sensed” or “saw” the partner’s experience, but they 
also “picked”, “recognized”, “registered”, “understood”, were able to “tell” or “hear”… 
There was not a single consensual verb which consensually described the act responsible 
for this knowing across participants, perhaps because the least discussed; or, 
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alternatively, because it is lived and given meaning differently by each individual, each 
verb accentuating these individual nuances.  
This intuitive, perceptive knowing experience seemed to be grounded in another’s 
observed behaviour. Sometimes participants nominated one or more meaningful 
behaviour as expressive of another’s experience; or reinforced the idea that it was 
another’s overall dynamic behaviour that created the perceptive impression (Zoe: 
“There was this sort of eye contact while you were making these sort of gestures, or 
compassion movements.”).  
But what was most frequently commented upon was not the ‘quantity’ of 
someone’s behaviour, that is, its overt objective features. Instead, it was its ‘quality’. For 
example, Jane could “hear automatically that that is something she likes, I could hear 
that that was something she was passionate about. I could just tell. I don’t know... The 
tone is different.” That is, via a perceptive act (listening), Kayla’s passion was 
immediately revealed to Jane. This knowing was anchored by Jane in Kayla’s “way” of 
speaking, in a particular ‘different’ quality of Kayla’s ‘tone of voice’. Quantity (tone) and 
quality (different) together were responsible for Jane’s immediate awareness of Kayla’s 
passion. Note that the particular sense organ of the participants’ choice did not seem to 
matter. For example, Kayla “can see passion in the eyes”.   
Behaviour mattered insofar that it had an expressive quality, and carried an 
experiential meaning. It was this intuited meaning that made the behaviour qualitatively 
different from any other superficially and objectively similar behaviour. Every participant 
turned towards the “way” the partner was acting to describe these experiences (e.g., 
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Megan: “But the way he delivered the question I think. He sounded like he was genuinely 
interested and curious”). The “way” the partner behaved was such a recurrent comment 
that it created the impression that the existence of a genuine experience qualitatively 
changed it; that the behaviour became expressive, from the inside out (e.g., Aisha: 
“When you did the physical relief”).  
Just like when we want to express an idea but have a hard time finding the ’right’ 
words to express it, participants sometimes had difficulties with finding the “words” to 
describe the perceived quality of the partner’s experience. They intuited its meaning, 
but were not quite immediately able to find the suitable verbal description that, in their 
view, was an accurate translation of the intuited experience. This reinforced the idea 
that the passible-to-transmit interpretation, this possible-to-communicate verbal 
interpretation of one’s intuition was a distinctive act, an individual additional act, that 
was not always part of the perceiving experience itself. Perceiving brought to their 
awareness an already ‘interpreted’ (with a meaning) experience, even when this 
interpretation was somehow difficult to put into words.   
There were examples of ‘resonant receivers’ (Chapter IV), who perceived 
another’s resonance experience (Kayla: “When someone understands what you are 
talking about, they have this hard moment that strikes the other person. I think that was 
what I saw in her during that time”). For Aisha, as soon as these resonance and 
reception understandings were mutually, non-verbally, recognized by both partners (i.e., 
when both participants were simultaneously, non-verbally, aware of each other’s 
understandings; e.g., Aisha: “For that moment, you looked at me and I looked at you, 
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and we recognized”), they became a shared experience - two people with a common 
understanding in-between them. But shared understandings, in the sense outlined 
above, were not to be confused with the intuitive act:  
Aisha: I don’t think it is the bit about me recognizing what she is feeling and 
her knowing that I have recognized it. It is not so much that. I think that the 
sharing part is just us both (…) that we both know. 
 
 Here, Aisha was clarifying that it is the ‘we’ (both knowing) that was responsible 
for the experience of sharing, rather than the knowing act itself. Secondly, for her, this 
knowing did not require her to feel for herself either Zoe’s experience, or anyone else’s 
(e.g., Aisha: “I am trying to recall my immediate responses to… to feel the feeling. 
Because I don’t know if I do that”). Thus, for some participants more than for others, 
perceiving simply translated a sensitive awareness of another’s present experience, and 
was not accompanied by the feeling of the partner’s experience. This accentuated the 
difference between perceiving and feeling, the two subthemes of intuiting.  
 In this discussion with Aisha and Zoe, the “way” of looking at another person, or 
eye contact, was fundamental. Susan Sontag (1977), while reflecting about Sander’s 
photography, noticed that “people face Sander’s camera (…) but their gaze is not 
intimate, revealing. Sander was not looking for secrets; he was observing the typical”. 
Between this dyad the opposite was observed. They looked at each other’s ‘revealing’ 
eyes, looking for secrets, for idiosyncrasies, for another’s experiential truths. 
 But there was something in this valuing of the “eye contact” that reminded me of 
little children asking for candy; of an attempt to invoke sympathy in another. Zoe was 
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“looking for a reaction” because she had the “hope” that Aisha would sympathize with 
her, and thereby validate her experience. Thus, the eye contact might have become 
fundamental in their interaction for more than one reason. They would be looking for 
secrets, but Zoe was also looking for compassion, for a sympathetic “reassuring” 
understanding. And she succeeded. 
In conclusion, perceiving was claimed to be responsible for one’s sensitive knowing 
of the partner’s experience. It was about the immediate sensing of a set of dynamic, 
qualitatively different, and meaningful behaviours-in-action, in conjunction, in their 
(narrative, relational, historical) context (e.g., Lauren: “It was her body language and just 
the way she looked at me (…) and what she said, that she felt a bit embarrassed”). It was 
observed across dyads, in resonance and reception acts, and was differentiated from 




 Intuiting was commonly a feeling that one felt for oneself. This intuitive feeling, 
this “gut feeling”, this “sort of sense, or intuition” was qualitatively different from other 
types of feelings (e.g., Megan: “It is obviously not… some feeling that I would have 
normally”), and it was “informative” of another’s experience. 
 In the view of the dyad of clinical psychology trainees, gut feelings must be tamed, 
“domesticated”, so that they can perform their counselling role properly. It was however 
after-the-fact that this knowing was transformed into a conjectural assumption, in a self-
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control exercise. For them, intuitive feelings must be taken as a “little” silenced 
hypothesis, one of the many possible interpretations, patiently awaiting for the clients’ 
spontaneous verbal confirmation. This doubting was extremely important because, in 
some cases, the intuited experience was not recognized by clients as their own.  
Nevertheless, the question of accuracy is not so easily resolved:  
Megan: That is a really good question, because I think I am [right], but I am often 
told (giggles) that I am not, so it is really funny (giggles). Because obviously, who is 
the objective one in that, you don’t really know! Because people don’t really want 
to hurt your feelings. Like I say, was that boring, and someone might say, ‘no, no, 
it’s fine’, and you go, ‘yeah, bullshit’ (R, L laugh). I think I am right but… 
 
In her daily experiences with this intuitive feeling, Megan often encountered 
herself in a paradoxical situation. The lived experience of her intuitive feelings had the 
quality of certainty, of authenticity. And this was so much an integral part of her intuitive 
feelings that another’s verbal rejection of her intuition as accurate did not reassure her 
about its inaccuracy. Although this could be a result of her own insecurity, one must 
acknowledge that politeness is an important social rule. Then one validly asks: “who is 
the objective” person in that exchange? 
Most intuitive ‘feelers’ estranged the idea that perceiving contributed to the 
development of this knowing. Nevertheless, their cued-recall interview reflections 
subsequently led them to theorize that perceiving might be involved via the condition of 
it being a “quick”, “subconscious” and implicit perceiving of multiple “microexpressions”, 
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“tiny cues”, or “subtle things”, in a particular context41 (narrative, relational and other). 
For example, Jane hesitated, when asked whether her description of Kayla’s qualitatively 
different actions could be described as Kayla’s expressive behaviour, then remarked that 
she “maybe noticed it subconsciously, or something”. Jane only accepted that Kayla’s 
behaviour could be summarized as expressive under the condition that the associated 
perceptive act was a ‘subconscious’ act.   
This ‘subconscious’ condition was more important for those who primarily lived 
the intuition as a feeling, probably because, there-and-then, as the knowing unfolded, 
they were not actively attending to or aware of the partner’s behaviour (e.g., Jane: “I 
wasn’t aware of the gestures at the time.”). It was the cued-recall reflection that 
sometimes brought another’s expressive behavioural quality into their commentary; into 
the forefront of their awareness and discussion. Therefore, even though intuitive feelers’ 
discourse was full of references to the “way” of “being and doing” of their partners, this 
knowing, for them, there-and-then, was less evidently grounded in another’s particular 
expressive actions, in the perceiving or sensing of a set of revealing expressive qualities. 
This was the main difference between perceptive and intuitive feelings. 
For example, Alicia was commenting upon her intuitive knowing of Lauren’s 
recurrent fear of running out of things to say, one which translated into a feeling of 
“pressure” and was associated with a slower speech rate: 
Alicia: I think it was the times when you slowed down a little bit… so, 
something like that….oh she is running out of things to say (laughs, T: That is 
                                                 
41 Broadly equivalent to Theodor Reik’s (1948, p.137) “minute stimuli”, those which are partly responsible 
for the ability to ‘listen with the third ear’, and thereby be able to gain intuitive access to another’s psychic 
organization and dynamics. 
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right) and then I feel like, I just, I wasn’t consciously feeling (…). I felt that, I 
sensed that from you, that, on occasion, you thought, oh we are running out 
of things to say, but I sensed that from you. It felt like a little bit of a 
pressure, and even though neither of us can see it, in fact, at the time, yeah, 
I certainly had that sense from you, I sensed that from you. It felt like a little 
bit of a pressure. 
 
 Alicia was never confused about who was thinking what or who was feeling what. 
The agent of each of these experiences was very clear.  She also made references to 
Lauren’s decreasing speech rate, though the importance of Lauren’s actions is so 
minimal that these moments were invisible in the recordings. Consequently, there-and-
then, as a lived experience, this feeling was not lived as a perceptive experience; it was 
not even such a “conscious feeling” – it was just a little meaningful ‘pressure’ that 
revealed Lauren’s fear to her.  
In conclusion, there were two main lived experiences of intuiting another’s 
experience, feeling and perceiving. Perceiving was an intuitive sensitive awareness of 
someone’s experience, grounded in the quality of another expressive behaviour; and 
feeling was a qualitatively different felt-feeling, informative of the partner’s experience. 
Their interrelationship, as well as the process that lead to their occurrence, was 
generally difficult to explain, but almost all of them, in one or another point of the 
interview, partly perhaps due to the cued-recall procedure, turned towards the “way” 
the partner was acting and engaging with them as a relevant revealing feature.  
Then, through reflection, for most participants, these two acts were plausibly 
related to one another. There were even those who tentatively proposed one or another 
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type of inter-relationship. For instance, Megan proposed that the intuitive feeling was 
subsequently and concomitantly “informed” by what was seen; whist Kayla proposed 
that the “taking in of sensitive information” came first, and that, such as with the flight 
or flee instinct, one would respond with a felt feeling in a “feedback and feedforward” 
fashion. These explanations suggested once more that there were those who primarily 
lived this intuition as a feeling (experience first), and those who primarily lived it as a 
perceiving (perception first). Either way, the lived experience did not seem to reassure 
participants about the underlying process (e.g., Megan: “I think it is both! I first see it… I 
feel it!”). It just inexplicably happened, “somehow”. 
 
Sharing another’s experiences: shared understandings, shared emotions 
 
Sharing was generally described as precisely that, a “shared” experience. Among 
these shared experiences, there were those more intellectual in nature, such as when 
two people find a common interest during a conversation (shared understandings); and 
those more emotional in nature, as when two people feel they are experiencing similar 
emotions, an interpersonal emotional connection (shared emotions). 
Shared emotions meant that the partners were “both experiencing the same 
emotion at the same time”, even if only a temporary and “weaker version” of the 
partner’s experience. These emotional sharing experiences were apparently synchronic 
emotional responses, being described as two separate “personal” experiences that were 
“similar” to each other, or the “same” as the partner’s. They were ‘we’ emotionally 
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similar experiences (Lauren: “We were happy, just some sort of share in that common 
experience.”).  
Although Lauren was there-and-then aware of her sharing experience, some of 
these shared emotions were only brought to participants’ awareness through viewing. In 
one particular instance, viewing generated a reflection of an experience which 
resembled the phenomenon of contagion: “If you think more about the interaction, 
throughout I picked up from him a sort of ease, this ‘I guess it doesn’t really matter’”. 
With this reflection, Megan, described the catching of Sam’s ease, a responsive 
experience of which she was not aware of there-and-then and that was a direct 
consequence of Sam’s experience. She was only aware of it due to the cued-recall 
interviewing experience. This felt contaminated ease was also not a feeling described as 
informative of Sam’s present experience, as Megan’s intuitions were. There-and-then, 
she was simply contaminated and, without thinking about this feeling or living it as a 
revealing intuitive feeling, acted under its ‘spell’. 
Participants’ cognitive shared experience, their “shared understanding”, was 
experienced when the dyad understood a particular issue in a similar manner, or found a 
conversation topic of mutual interest. During these experiences, both partners knew 
what was being discussed, as well as its importance and emotional significance. It was a 
shared understanding, experienced as an intellectual sharing, but it was not deployed of 
an emotional value. Shared understandings involved a personal emotional dimension for 
both respondents, even when this emotional side was less important for them then the 
intellectual side of the sharing. These were intellectual commonalities that “ran a little 
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bit deeper”. Both teller and listener related emotionally with the common topic, both 
“thought it was terrible as well”.  Shared understandings meant that “you all of the 
sudden are both on the same side”. 
When the emotional valuing of the shared understanding was not emotional 
enough for the experience to be lived as an emotional sharing, participants highlighted 
its intellectual nature, instead of its emotional nature. But without this similarity in the 
emotional value of the topic being discussed, I argue that sharing would not be 
experienced. 
Sharing, in either of its forms, was about the finding of similarities or 
commonalities between partners. Sharing occurred when there was “something that we, 
personally, had in common”, from a present feeling to an understanding of a situation. 
Found similarities came in all forms and shapes, say, believing in “fairies”, a felt 
sensation of “ease” or “occupation group”; and were found during the happy story stage 
or became evident through the interviewing procedure, as Megan’s contagion-like 
comment illustrates. As soon as this commonality was presumed, or found, the two 
partners became a “we” (e.g., Megan: “I picked up from him (…) we were on the same 
page”). They became a group. A group of two, but nevertheless a group, with its identity 
defined in the light of the similarity in question.  
In these interviews, it seemed that it was the constitution of this ‘we’, of this 
collective identity, that transformed sharing into (also) a way of knowing another’s 
experience. Finding a similarity, and thereby forming a group identity was a source of 
knowledge, of interviewees’ presumptions of the partner’s experience. Knowing through 
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sharing was taking for granted that the other elements of the group were similar to 
oneself, that they shared their feelings, their opinions, or at least a certain 
understanding of a certain opinion (Jane: “They are the same as you, you know what 
they are thinking, you know what”).  
For instance, Lauren predicts Alicia’s opinion in regards to Lord Layard based on 
the group identity ‘clinical-psychology-trainees-from-the-same-course’:  
Lauren: I just kind of assumed also that Alicia would think that way, because 
the majority of clinical psychologists tend to really criticize him? On the 
course here it is a question kind of open to criticism. 
 
Although ‘assumption’ was Lauren’s favourite word, applicable to any type of 
interpersonal knowing, in the case of shared understandings, as with the example above, 
sharing-as-knowing was always an experience described as a reasoned knowing, 
deduced from the ‘we’ identity (a ‘we’ made ‘you’, as with Lauren’s example, hence an 
analogical projected-we movement), or generalized from the experience of the ‘I’ (an ‘I’ 
made ‘we’, as with Megan’s example, hence an analogical generalization movement). 
Sharing-as-knowing was always determined in the light of a presumed or found 
similarity, in the light of a presumed or found ‘we’. Consequently, knowing through 
sharing involved an intellectual act. Knowing was a result of an inference (from the ‘I’) or 
deduction (from the ‘we’). This type of intellectual knowing resembles the one described 
relatively to the analogy-as-knowing meaning of ‘empathy’ (Chapter I). 
To review, then, as soon as a similarity between participants was found or 
presumed, a ‘we’ identity was formed and then used to predict, or assume, someone 
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else’s experience (related or unrelated with the “common point”). Shared emotions and 
shared understandings both had an emotional dimension to them, as they were also 
both intellectual acts when used to determine the partner’s experience.   
Sharing-as-knowing was described as an “easy” and useful way of predicting 
another’s experience and views, and a very good substitute for familiarity in the context 
of a relationship with a stranger.  Nevertheless, sharing was not important for them as a 
way of knowing. Rather, this knowing worked in “background”, in the back of one’s 
mind. The significance of sharing was way beyond this premise and promise of knowing 
another’s experience.  
Rather, what mattered was that, through sharing, participants had a sense of 
“being emotional together”, they felt “connected” or ‘bonded’ to another person, a very 
reassuring sense of togetherness and closeness. Its importance and significance was that 
it was a way of “relationship building”, of personally “participating” in another’s story, 
and feeling connected to the partner. This was what was fundamental in the experience 
of sharing, what made it a very significant and personally meaningful experience. The 
interest of sharing was principally the feeling of togetherness thereby created. This was 
what defined the nature of sharing, the experience of having a “special” bond, the very 
safe ‘we’. This was what every participant emphasised. Sharing was in essence an 
emotional response to another’s experience, even when it became a useful source of 
interpersonal knowledge – hence, very close to Scheler’s sympathy. 
Finally, this individual feeling of togetherness was not necessarily a mutual feeling, 
experienced by both partners. The feeling of togetherness was, at least once, unilateral, 
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hence, representative of a non-shared experience. In particular, Aisha described how a 
memory (similar past experience, analogical remembering) was “triggered” by Zoe’s 
discourse, and made her feel that she was sharing Zoe’s experience. However, this 
evoked memory pulled Aisha towards an introspective act. Simultaneously, Zoe was also 
concerned with her reminiscence act, “focused on my own thing”, not even aware of 
Aisha’s experience of connectedness and sharing.  
During the interview, when faced with these two accounts of two individual 
introspective experiences, Aisha concluded that they were not, after all, “connected”, as 
she first thought. They were “actually in separate places. Probably in the same place, but 
very separately”. They weren’t “really sharing”. It was, paradoxically for her, a one-sided 
sharing experience. And in this one-sidedness lies its danger, its potential of becoming 
an inaccurate projective way of knowing.  
 
Imaginatively knowing another’s experience: visualizing, reasoning 
 
Imaginative experiences could have a more reasoned evidence-based logical 
approach to them (reasoning), or a more fantasy-like creative approach to them 
(visualizing), but both served the purpose of imagining another’s experience at once, or 
first imagining another’s situation, and then figuring out what the partner’s experience 
hypothetically was, through an additional perspective-taking act.  
These acts were very useful as a substitute for sharing-as-knowing (similarity-
based assumptions). When participants could not turn towards familiarity or sharing to 
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conjure the partner’s experience, then imagining was a very handy resource (Kayla: 
“Some things, I guess, you have not experience but you can imagine from things maybe 
like television or books or stories or seeing pictures and those things work as a 
replacement for the memory”). The experience of imagining was a qualitatively different 
experience, a “different kind of imagination”, when compared with sharing, and one 
which drew upon a kind of past knowledge not fittingly described as a ‘similar past 
experience’. These experiences were motivated by a desire to know, participants 
“wanted to see first of all” (for visualizing experiences), they wanted to “figure out” the 
partner’s experience (for reasoning).  
Imaginatively knowing was an intellectual experience, it was a “train of thought”, 
sometimes explained as putting the “pieces” of a puzzle together, It was an active act 
that required some “effort”. For example, Megan illustrated how she used an imagined-
self act, in conjunction with her past knowledge about how people usually feel in 
“artificial settings”, to predict what Sam was probably experiencing: 
Megan: It wasn´t so much a realization so much as an expected feeling. I 
would expected it, if I sit there, ‘uh, what should I talk about’, that he is 
feeling a bit awkward as well. Yeah. So I think I just expected. It is the natural 
response to feel sort of awkward because of this artificial setting. 
 
That is, Megan predicted Sam’s probable present experience, by combining two 
sources of information: imagine-self and past knowledge. They both interact, informing 
each other, for the imaginative reasoned prediction to come about. Secondly, Sam’s 
moment-to-moment presence only mattered as the ‘objective’ piece of information of 
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‘sitting’ there, in front of her, while she struggled to find something to say. The quality of 
this sitting is not even mentioned. Imaginative acts were simply the by-product of the 
way one, individually and imaginatively, was able to put the relevant pieces of 
information together.  
According to Megan, whereas imagining was grounded in one’s own past 
knowledge and reasoning, more evidently a personal intellectual experience; intuitions 
were less evidently personal, reasoned or conjectural experiences, more evidently an 
instant result “of him being and doing things in a certain way”. That is, imagining was 
lived as an individual knowing act, a result of one’s own initiative and reasoning, whilst 
intuiting was not.  
The more rational intellectual nature of imaginative acts did not mean that they 
were not immediate or “natural”. Both reasoning (e.g., Aisha: “My immediate thought 
was, ‘oh my God, what would I do if I was in her shoes’.”) and visualizing (e.g., Zoe: 
“Immediately a load of images would pop up”) were described as immediate natural 
experiences, “because I didn’t consciously said, oh, I’ll put some leaves, I wanted it to be 
green. I just pictured it that way.” 
Imaginative ways of knowing were illustrated as simultaneously effortful and 
spontaneous; simultaneously a construction and immediate. This apparently paradoxical 
nature was explained by Aisha and Zoe. For them, “there are things that come to you 
straight away. And you do just imagine as it comes”. However, this immediate 
imaginative experience will be permanently under active intellectual re-construction, in 
the light of unfolding “input” or one’s “own preferences”. Sometimes, it felt as if they 
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were “moving to” another’s discourse, ever-adapting to newly revealed information, 
pace-by-pace.  
This “structure” imposed by the partner, and the continuous adaptation of the 
content of the imagination to that structure, suggested that imaginative acts were also 
not exclusively personal and individual acts. They were shaped in the light of objective 
cues disclosed by the partner. Despite being constructed in this interpersonal manner, 
imagining was still largely an individual experience, majorly informed by one’s past 
knowledge and imaginative abilities. Participants partly “lost the connection” of sharing 
acts, and turned inwards, they “got caught up in my own image as well, I was kind just 
picturing this place”.  
This was the experience about which less material was gathered. Beyond Aisha 
and Zoe’s interview, during which visualization experiences were explored in detail, in 
the rest of the interviews imagining was only briefly mentioned – partly because I did 
not foment the discussion about these experiences, whenever the lead was there.  
Nevertheless, it was an important way of knowing another’s experience, and even one 
of the most significant in Zoe’s and Aisha’s recollection of the happy story stage. 
 
Experiencing not really ‘now’ or ‘then’ 
  
At first, I thought that experiences could be located in the present, when they 
involved experiences responsive to the happy story stage; or in the past, when they 
related to narrated stories. For example, feeling “really excited about this topic, let’s talk 
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about it some more” would be a present experience; and describing how one feared 
being “kicked for anti-social” behaviour during the narrated episode would be a past 
experience. It was very simple; and it would help me to reflect about Stein’s claims 
relative to the here-and-now essential quality of intuitive acts. However, these 
interviews tell a different tale, in regards to a few angles of analysis.  
 First, there is the temporal location of the knowing act itself. Participants generally 
claimed that the act happened in the present (during the happy story stage). They 
imagined, shared and intuited while the interaction unfolded.  With the exception of a 
few of Lauren’s comments (her confusion about the lived and the viewing experiences) 
and shared experiences which were not used as knowing acts (e.g., Megan’s contagion-
like experience), these were said to be either present consciously lived knowing 
experiences, or implicit knowing experiences, being brought into the forefront of 
awareness by viewing.  
 Nevertheless, none of these acts can be properly described as a present act 
because they were being reflectively described. They were participants’ memories of 
knowing ‘then’. Despite the aided-recall and the recency of the experience, this study is 
not an investigation of present acts, just of recent acts described as present by 
participants themselves. In a way, it is possible that Lauren’s acknowledged confusion 
between the viewing and the happy story stage experience was a fruit of a heightened 
awareness about the fact that she was, after all, describing ‘then’ (happy story) acts in a 
‘now’ (interview) sense. In the process of doubting her judgement, her memory, she 
sometimes ended-up giving more weight to the tape as evidence of her experience, than 
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to her memory of the event. She gave more weight to the ‘now’ quality of the 
interview’s task. This is suggestive of the possibility of reconstruction that lies in the act 
of remembering, even with cued-recall techniques. 
The second angle of observation was relative to the temporal location of the 
target’s experiences. Interviewees argued that these occurred there-and-then. 
Participants experienced “discomfort”, feared “running out of things to say”, became 
“interested” in another’s conversation, and so forth. These ‘present’ experiences were 
the object of any of the three knowing acts described here. For example, Megan shared 
Sam’s sense of time past (“shared experience or same emotion or same sense of ‘oh, this 
is so strange, how much time has passed’”), but she also intuited Sam’s amusement (“he 
looked like amused, kind of, that that was the case, do you understand what I mean? It 
was apparent that he was”), and imagined Sam’s tension towards the situation (“I would 
expected it if I seat there, ‘uh, what should I talk about’, that he is feeling a bit 
awkward.”). Therefore, any of these acts appeared in these interviews as useful for the 
knowing of someone else’s ‘present’ experience. 
Nevertheless, participants were also sharing a story from their past experience. 
They were remembering and discussing experiences that, in principle, were “gone and 
past”. Past experiences were at the centre of their attention, they were the ‘excuse’ for 
the interaction, their task. However, these past experiences were not neatly located in 
the past, forgotten and locked away in an attic, bearing no effect on the participants’ 
present experience. The starting topics chosen by tellers were always emotionally-
significant, meaningful past events (an interesting cultural festival; an intense job 
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experience in another country, the engagement day, and the positive news of having 
been accepted by the university). And, most importantly, these events were still 
significant in a present tense. These were episodes that still ‘rocked’ the tellers’ world in 
a ‘now’ sense. 
Sharing a story sometimes affected participants’ present experiences to a great 
extent: “the act of recounting it… brought back the emotion” (Zoe). By sharing a 
significant emotional story, participants were partly reliving the narrated experience, 
experiencing past emotions, with less intensity perhaps, “not quite the same as the 
original emotion”, but none of the less, experiencing them. Chosen episodes were 
simultaneously past and present as a consequence of the act of recounting. This showed 
that there was an intensified relationship between ‘then’ (narrated story) and ‘now’ 
(happy story), the past bursting into the present, with varying degrees of intensity.  In 
brief, it can be said that recounting is like reliving in the ‘now’. 
Interestingly, Zoe and Lauren were two participants who denied partly 
experiencing the narrated experience, in the ‘present’, in one instance each; and both in 
relation to a particular part of the story that curiously revolved around emotionally 
negative experiences (panic for Lauren, grief for Zoe). But this negation was somehow 
not enough for considering that these experiences were not partly located in the 
present. For example, in Zoe’s case, it appeared so much as a negation, a defence 
mechanism, that I tactfully and very carefully, as if tiptoeing for a long time around her 
resistance, insisted on clarifying the temporal location of her experience.   
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Mid-through the interview, Zoe explained that “it is still remembering a bad 
experience. But when I think back to it, I think more of the happy bit afterwards.” But the 
fact the she was repressing the negative side of her experience does not mean that it did 
not exist, or that she did not partly relive it. Even during the visualization experience, 
during which Aisha visualized the swimming pool described by Zoe (i.e., Zoe’s past 
situation), Zoe had “the image here”, in her head.  Then, experiences that, at a first 
glance, could be said to be past, were rather ‘past’ (relived, significant, partly present) 
experiences. And the partners got hold of these past experiences through intuitive, 
shared and imaginative acts. 
In conclusion, knowing acts and known experiences were neither in the ‘now’ nor 
in the ‘then’, for different motives perhaps, but, nevertheless, not neatly in either of 
these temporal locations. This suggests that these acts cannot be distinguished based on 
the temporal location criterion (of the act, or of the known experience) in this study - a 
fundamental characteristic of intuiting for Stein. 
 
The intersubjective communicative flow of coming-to-know  
 
Knowing acts studied here were not decontextualized acts. They were rather 
embedded in an interpersonal communicative context of experiencing (sharing and 
engaging with a story). Although most of these participants were strangers to each 
other, they spent fifteen minutes sustaining a dialogue. They wanted to “connect” with 
this stranger. They were “trying to leave gaps for you to talk….”, “thinking is there 
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somewhere I can pick up where she left it, or that I can offer for her to continue the 
conversation?”, concerned with “being boring”, wanted to have a “really nice juicy 
engagement in a kind of conversation”, and so forth. Participants were motivated to get 
involved, engage, communicate, relate. Furthermore, participants’ choices of starting 
topics set a relatively personally meaningful tone to the overall interaction. 
Consequently, knowing acts were situated in an unfolding communicative 
narrative background; an evolving relationship; and a motivation to know, relate and 
share personally meaningful experiences. These acts were contextualized in a personally 
significant communicative relational background. 
Communicative acts are naturally multi-layered experiences involving many 
communication spheres. Although these are usually divided into two main dimensions 
(verbal and nonverbal communication), phenomenologically speaking, there was no 
reason to separate these here. However, the way participants related aspects of their 
communicative interactions with each knowing act seemed distinctive, and interestingly 
enough, somehow suggested a verbal/ non-verbal division.  
That is, communication was a theme frequently brought to these interviews by 
participants themselves, to illustrate the relationship between their knowing acts and 
the verbal (bridging just through the words) and non-verbal (open books and pre-
reflective understandings) communication spheres. Their analysis suggested that these 
were perhaps two co-existing dimensions that simultaneously passed on sometimes 
convergent meanings, one reinforcing the other; and sometimes distinctive sets of 
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information. These spheres seemed to be dealt with differently by participants during 
their intersubjective communicative flow of coming-to-know. 
 
Bridging just through the words 
 
The verbal narrative context was sometimes proposed as partly responsible for 
their interpersonal knowing to come about, and principally for the genesis of sharing and 
imagining. 
For sharing experiences, it was often the verbal discourse that was said to allow 
the finding of a commonality. Shared experiences were often the result of comparison 
between the listener’s personal opinion or experience and the one being verbally 
described by the teller. For example, Aisha explained that the two known experiences 
(Zoe’s, as verbally described; and her own) represented a commonality, and therefore 
sharing was experienced (Aisha: “Because of the way she told it, and in general, if 
somebody is treating me badly, that is a negative thing”). Note that, in this example, the 
“way” Zoe is describing referred to the overall “coherence” of the verbal narrative 
context (e.g., how Zoe had “laid the scene out”), rather than a nonverbal expressive 
communicative feature. It was an objective quality of Zoe’s discourse that mattered. 
That is, sharing was an act frequently founded upon another’s objective verbal 
discourse, it happened “just through the words. I wasn’t conscious at all of her actions, 
or of her physical anything, at that moment”.  
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 Secondly, most importantly, and regardless of the way commonalities were found, 
their verbal discussion “sealed the bond”, the relationship bond between partners. 
Verbal commentary about a “‘you felt that way. I felt that way too’” made of sharing 
“something really solid”.  From that point onwards, the experience became a confirmed 
two-sided shared experience, and one stopped considering whether the partner was 
yellow or green. One just assumed it to be of the particular ‘we’ colour under discussion: 
“you don’t have to use your imagination any more. You know what it is” (Jane). Kayla 
offered a very effective metaphor to illustrate the importance of the verbal 
communication sphere for sharing experiences:  
Kayla: I always see the conversation as building a bridge. So you have a 
person in either side and when you are empathizing [remembering similar 
past experiences] with someone you are building a little bit more of the 
bridge, consequence towards each other, but when you find something in 
common [communicated similarity] puff (makes gesture of unison; all laugh). 
You used to be putting each one of these plaques of wood, but when you 
find something in common the piles overlap, and the bond becomes more 
complete. 
 
Kayla, who was able to “appreciate people for their differences”, was, nevertheless, 
in pursuit of a ‘complete’ self-other connection, a fully bridged interpersonal relationship 
- and talking about a commonality was a way of achieving this goal. That is, the quest for 
similarities was impelled by the desire for togetherness, bonding, being “the same 
together!” By verbally discussing the similarity, this was achieved, and the partners felt 
that they were “on the same page”, “on the same side”, “experiencing the same”. Thus, 
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verbal communication played a central role in sharing experiences, both for its genesis 
as well as for increasing their sense of self-other similarity and closeness. 
The relationship between imaginative acts and the verbal communicative 
dimension was of a different nature. Aisha visualized the pool being verbally described 
by Zoe in such an immediate way that the experience had, for her, a foreseeing quality 
(Aisha: “Before you even said it was on the edge, I pictured it that way myself?”). 
Although Zoe remarked that this foreseeing quality was consequent of her “gestures”, 
for Aisha, this was not seen as important for visualization to happen. What mattered to 
her was the verbal discourse, that she “did it quick before you said it”.  
Visualizations were said to continuously adapt to the unfolding verbal narrative 
context, so that the image could match the additionally disclosed information. The 
choice of words, their repetition, the detail of the description, these were a few of the 
‘objective’ features repeatedly mentioned as of relevance for imagining experiences. For 
example: 
Aisha: You repeated the word amazing twice, I think, when she talked about 
it. And from there it lead up to her description of this pool (…) and filled that 
with detail, and she just made a picture for me and I visualized it. 
 
Aisha’s visualization experience was grounded by her in the narrative context 
(“from there it lead”) and in the verbal content of the description (repetition, choice of 
words, detail). In brief, imaginative acts were said to be shaped or a by-product of the 
partner’s overt verbal discourse (Zoe: “You said hospital, and I imagined the hospital”). 
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The words-as-symbols of experience created a bridge, not an emotional sharing 
bridge, but nevertheless a bridge between that which one imagined and the partner’s 
recalled and described experience. The establishment of this imaginative interpersonal 
link could be as important for the empathizer as it was for the empathee (Zoe: “I set you 
up. (…) I was imagining, but I was trying to bring you in to it. (…) I wanted her to be as 
happy as I was then, I wanted her to know how good it was”). Finally, visualizations were 
not made more meaningful just because one discussed the imagined picture with the 
partner, as with sharing experiences. 
In summary, participants commonly mentioned that another’s words acted as an 
interpersonal bridge for their sharing or imaginative experiences. However, in contrast 
with sharing, which was a certified two-sided experience through talking, the extent of 
the importance of the verbal communicative act in imaginative experiences did not 
seem to require a second step, a verbal acknowledgment of ‘I imaged it this way, and so 
did you’.  
Conversely, intuitions were not commonly grounded in the content of partner’s 
discourse. These were not experiences during which one made an imagined table round 
just to “fit” another’s description, as with imaginative acts; or which required the 
partner’s experience to be verbally described and discussed for the knowing act to come 
about. Instead, it was the expressive quality of the communicative act, that is, its non-
verbal communicative dimension. At best, participants’ verbal commentary served to 
confirmed or disconfirmed that which one had come to intuitively know; or it 
contextualized the intuition (and thereby perhaps making it more intelligible). 
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 Moreover, the verbal discussion of these intuitions was not always seen as 
beneficial, as it was sometimes subjected to certain rules. An example of one of these 
rules, though there a few, was avoiding the discussion of anything that could cause 
offense (politeness rule): 
Alicia: If I said something like ‘oh dear, you obviously are running out of 
things to say’ then I think I would feel, that would be, that wouldn’t be good 
to say that. Whereas if you said to me I can see you are quite embarrassed 
by this story, I think that would make it worse for me, I think. 
 
This politeness rule determined that, when the intuited experience was a sensitive 
issue, only the experiencer could offer it for discussion – precisely what was observed 
between Megan and Sam. Megan was experiencing the ‘running out of things to say’ 
type of experience and decided to overtly expose what she was feeling. This decision 
had a beneficial unblocking impact upon their interaction.  
Thus, the genesis of intuitive knowing experiences was not commonly associated 
with the verbal content of the communicative act, as verbally discussing these intuitions 
was a rule-bonded and limited activity. Hence, the verbal dimension was less important 
for intuitive knowing acts.  
Finally, verbal communication, in itself, was not as meaningful as when it was 
associated with a significant way of knowing (intuiting, sharing, imagining). For example, 
Zoe was the only participant who chose an episode when Aisha reiterated what she was 
saying. This was a communication-only act, of little interpersonal significance, though 
nonetheless one which meant that Aisha was understanding her:   
 299 
 
Aisha: This one was just communicating, like just talking to each other about 
something not so intense (T: yeah) not so close to home or something, just 
something like ‘oh yeah!’ (…) This was just reiterating what she was saying. 
 
That is, communication for the sake of communication was important for the 
conversation to evolve in a pleasant continuous manner, but it did not transform that 
moment into a significant one, it did not transform the verbal comment into a significant 
one. It was just a “superficial” engagement with another’s discourse, a non-significant 
cross-checking of each other’s understandings.  
In conclusion, the verbal narrative context affected each of these acts, albeit in 
different forms. Words established a bridge between partners that informed and shaped 
their knowing experiences. Sharing and imagining were frequently partly a consequence 
of another’s explicit verbal discourse; whereas intuiting was at best confirmed or 
interpreted in the light of this narrative context. Secondly, discussing shared experiences 
had a beneficial impact upon the relationship (in this context) and intensified the sharing 
experience itself; though the discussion of one’s imagination was not an observed 
occurrence, and the discussion of intuitive experiences was not always regarded as 








Open books and pre-reflective understandings 
 
Intuitive experiences were often associated with the qualitative character of 
another’s expressive behaviour or with the particular quality of one’s felt-feeling. Hence, 
they were in essence nonverbal forms of communication. For example, Megan (“If 
somebody says that just like that, manifesting nothing but the question itself”) remarked 
that there were two ways of making a question: one which looked like an authentic 
manifestation of interest, and one which sounded “fake”.  For her, it was not the verbal 
question itself that allowed her to intuitively feel someone else’s genuine interest – it 
was rather the way the question was made, its nonverbal qualities. Thus, intuitions 
acted as a form of nonverbal communication, via which participant got hold of each 
other’s present experiences beyond that which was said, beyond the word-as-symbol or 
evidence of experience. 
Consequently, intuitive experiences sometimes made oneself feel “transparent”, 
made other people look transparent. Experiences were out there, in the open, rather 
than hidden under one’s skin, in a closed box inside one’s mind: “and the way she 
expressed it, she showed how she felt about it with no barriers. Open. As an open book” 
(Jane). Thus, intuiting created the impression that one got to know the partner’s genuine 
transparent experiences, that the empathee was transparent as an open book – what 
was not always a pleasant feeling for the empathee. For example, Lauren “didn’t realize 
how much you kind of picked up on it”, and was surprised by the revelation that her 
experience had been intuited, despite her hiding efforts.  
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Intuitively known experiences were not necessarily very concrete, defined and 
reflective, such as “some kind of emotion” for which one the descriptive verbal label is 
not readily available. They even sometimes were just an impression about “an overall 
thing hanging in the air”, barely a thought, let alone a discussed thought. They were 
sometimes pre-reflective understandings, implicitly taken as authentic knowing.  
Intuitive understandings, prereflective understandings included, triggered a 
certain amount of actions. Intuiting was responsible for an “unsaid kind of the 
dynamics”. For example, Alicia and Lauren, in two separate episodes, “noticed that the 
other person was feeling uncomfortable, or worried, about the conversation, and we felt 
that we needed to try and recue”. They were both “cooperating” for the goal of 
sustaining a fluid conversation, without having ever once “discussed the process”. They 
simply intuited an experience, and there-and-then acted “in response of that”. 
Intuiting shaped their actions before its authenticity was questioned. It also guided 
the conversation, it determined the particulars of the content under discussion, both for 
the intuitive listener (Kayla: “If passion in her eyes, I try to keep the conversation going”), 
as well as for the intuitive teller (Megan: “If I find that someone is bored or anything with 
something that I am talking about I will definitely use that to guide what I am… So I am 
constantly adjusting my behavior”).  
In summary, intuitions are in themselves a nonverbal form of communication, a 
sometimes pre-reflective understanding of another’s present experience, that is lived as 
the knowing of another’s authentic experience and which determines that which is said 
and done during an interaction. 
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As for the relationship between nonverbal communication and imaginative 
experiences, nonverbal behaviour sometimes was claimed to inform one’s imagination, 
it sometimes acted as an objective “ “input” that fuelled the imaginative act. Although 
sometimes of assistance, for the imagined knowing to come about the nonverbal sphere 
was less important than the verbal dimension.  
Finally, viewing sometimes made participants realize that they were having a 
shared experience, and non-verbally manifesting it (e.g., Lauren: “Sometimes we are 
both kind of laughing”). However, participants did not describe sharing as a 
consequence of nonverbal behaviour. Commonalities were not found, in this study, in 
the light of another’s nonverbal behaviour. There was perhaps an exception. Megan and 
Sam reacted to one of Megan’s remarks with a simultaneous laugh. In this episode, 
Megan intuited Sam’s experience but the simultaneous laughter made Sam’s experience 
“more explicit”, it confirmed that they “both agreed that we were off topic”; and Megan 
finally felt at ease with the decision of allowing the conversation to unfold in a more 
natural manner. Therefore, in this one instance, laughing (nonverbal behaviour) served 
as a confirmation that her intuition was correct; and informed her that hers was a 
shared experience. The similarity between the partners’ nonverbal behaviour and her 
own provoked a sharing experience; and one which also determined the direction of 
Megan’s experience and actions-to-be.  
In conclusion, intuitions were commonly described as the reception of another’s 
nonverbal interpersonal communication and shaped the overall interaction. There was 
also an instance during which sharing was experienced as a consequence of nonverbal 
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communicative behaviour. On the other hand, in these interviews, the nonverbal 
dimension of the communication mattered little for imaginative experiences to come 





 The IPA of cued-recall joint interviews about recently experienced immediate 
interpersonal understandings yield several interesting results. These were organized into 
four main themes. 
 Contexts of experiencing and butterfly effects proposed that these joint interviews 
were successful in obtaining personal non-consensual accounts about several different 
lived experiences of sensing someone’s experience. They also showed that the overall 
adopted procedures were well accepted by the majority, since any discomfort that the 
design caused was surmounted, both during the happy story stage; and the interview.  
Nevertheless, that which was experienced and verbalized during these two stages 
was affected by the research settings. For example, tellers frequently feared running out 
of things to say (happy story stage design) because they felt they should direct the 
conversation throughout the 15 minutes. Viewing (cued-recall procedure) brought about 
commentary about implicit experiences; sometimes made of nonverbal behaviour the 
centrepiece of attention and meaning-making; once became the focus of the 
participant’s experiential reflections and partly substituted the memory of the happy 
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story stage lived experience; and it was not always a faithful registry of participants’ 
experiences – only of what was more overtly said or done. It therefore both enriched 
and impoverished participants’ commentary. 
This is one of the benefits of conducting interviews. Some influential ‘effects’ can 
be managed, and participants’ attention re-directed towards the objective of the study. 
With other procedures, say, surveying, little details go unnoticed and unstudied. The 
understanding of these influences was important in that it helped to understand some 
recurrent experiences and meaning-making.  
 Three immediate significant ways of knowing another’s experience were found: 
sharing, intuiting and imagining. Sharing consisted of a ‘we’ experience, during which the 
two partners had a similar understanding or a similar emotional experience. Sharing was 
always partly an emotional experience, significant because of its effects upon the 
partners’ relationship and their sense of belonging. It was sometimes used to 
intellectually presuppose what another’s experience was. Intuiting was a sensitive 
awareness of the partner’s experience, that could be experience as a perception or a 
feeling and that was immediately revealing of another’s experience, without requiring 
an additional intellectual knowing act. It was the result of a process difficult to explain, 
but usually grounded in the quality of another’s discourse or actions, or of one’s feelings. 
Imagining was about the reasoning or visualization of another’s situation or experience. 
It drew upon available cues and past knowledge, though one which was not apparently 




Discussed episodes involved an  experiencing that was not really ‘now’ nor ‘then’, 
neither as a knowing act or as an experience. This was because these interviews were 
about their memories of experiencing and knowing ‘then’ (during the happy story stage), 
and because the act of sharing a story about a past event re-enacted, with varying 
degrees of emotional intensity, those past experiences.  
 Finally, the happy story stage was an intersubjective communicative flow of 
coming-to-know that put in relationship two partners. Partners were willing to relate, to 
get to know and reveal their experiences. The verbal and nonverbal communicative 
sides of this interaction related differently to each knowing act. The verbal discourse was 
extremely important for imagining, by shaping its content; and for sharing experiences, 
by allowing the finding of similarities, and thereby enhancing their feelings of closeness 
and togetherness. On the other hand, intuiting was in itself a nonverbal form of 
communication that made people’s experiences reflectively or pre-reflectively 
transparent to one another and conditioned their interactions-to-be.  
   
Discussion and future research 
    
So much work and care was put into the planning and design of this study that I 
was slightly disappointed for not having more people interested in participating; 
principally more clinical trainees. This was perhaps partly my fault, since I could have 
been more pro-active or creative in terms of recruitment. Despite this difficulty, I believe 
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that it was worth it, and nothing was lost. However few, it was most interesting and 
revealing, listening and interviewing participants, clinical psychology trainees and other.  
They taught me to be a better researcher-interviewer. For example, the first dyad 
taught me that intuiting was not always the experience one wished to discuss in this 
setting. Rather, discussing sharing experiences was important - perhaps partly because 
of the information sheet, which described the research as about experiences of 
engagement; and partly because they were in an unusual disempowering place, being 
video-recorded, under scrutiny. As Kerem et al. noted, the relationship between 
participants became fuller through sharing, and discussing these successful positive 
sharing moments re-empowered them, from an interpersonal perspective, in the view of 
us all.   
Overall, I believe that the choice of a joint interview was most beneficial. 
Participants contested each other, they expanded upon each other’s views, and did not 
always feel the need to be intra and interpersonally consensual and consistent. This 
increased the variety and depth of discussed aspects. There was only one interview, with 
Megan and Sam, during which I experienced considerable difficulties.  This was because 
Sam was acting as a block, preventing the organic progression of the conversation. He 
wanted to talk of nothing but his own recorded observable experience, never frontally 
disagreed, never once discussed Megan’s experience except by means of a ‘we’ 
confirmable by the tape… After half an hour, I was drained by the effort of managing the 
interview in a fruitful rewarding way for those involved. I was unable to deal with Sam 
effectively, so that he would join a collaborative discussion about lived experiences – 
 307 
 
rather than defending himself against I do not know what threat. Luckily, Megan was 
incredibly direct and outspoken, compensating for Sam’s reduced contribution. 
Individual interviews, in this particular case, on this day, for me, with these participants, 
would have been a better option.  
Viewing influenced interview accounts to a considerable extent, similarly to what 
was described by Long, Angera and Hakoyama (2006). As they argued, it is an overall 
beneficial interviewing technique that increases the depth of our understanding of 
participants’ experiences, with there-and-then surmountable negative effects. However, 
for me, some of the effects detected in this study, unmentioned by them, were less 
positive. Namely, the central role given to behaviour, one which is probably not 
representative of what happens during naturalistic interpersonal encounters. Secondly, 
viewing once confused and distanced the participant from the memory of what had 
been lived - the one that should be under discussion (Larsen et al., 2008).  
 The objective of this study was investigating people’s ways of immediately 
knowing another’s experience, there-and-then. The design succeeded in that three 
significant ways of knowing were found.  These forms of interpersonal understanding 
were similar to those identified by Kerem et al. (2001). A parallel can be drawn between   
their cognitive component and imagining and sharing-as-knowing; and between their 
affective component and sharing-as-responding and intuiting.  
In this study, sharing, as a way of knowing, was always an intellectual act, but one 
which was closer to the notion of analogy, and associated with identification and 
contamination sympathetic responses. As an intellectual act, it appeared to be 
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distinctive from perspective-taking, associated with a distinctive psychological 
experience and a distinctive kind of intellectual knowing mechanism. 
Secondly, there were many examples of intuiting-as-knowing, an experience that 
should be differentiated from sharing experiences, in mine, and in participants’ views. I 
propose that intuiting and sharing amount to distinctive psychological experiences of 
interpersonal understanding, and that intuiting is suitably seen as the lived experience of 
the phenomenological conception of direct empathy. It should perhaps not be merged 
with other types of ‘affective’ phenomena, as the cognitive-affective binomial approach 
professes.  
This additional finding was not unexpected, unsought, or unprovoked. Indeed, the 
prompt sense and the emphasis on immediacy and knowing were not innocent. They 
aimed precisely to gather accounts about this particular experience. This study was 
designed to investigate the lived experience of this particular kind of knowing, and, 
consequently, I always developed leads that were related with intuitive acts; and less 
when these concerned imaginative acts (sharing experiences were always an important 
part of the discussion, as previously acknowledged). This justifies the incidence of each 
act.  
This study expanded upon the knowledge of the qualities of intuiting. For example, 
it was very interesting to listen to their views and experiences relative to the nonverbal 
communicative dimension. I believe that an echo of Dessoy’s views is found in these 
interviews, when participants involved intuiting in an “unsaid kind of dynamics” (Alicia), 
when they felt (too) “transparent” and their hiding efforts unsuccessful (Lauren), when 
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they described the partner as an open book, communicating without “barriers” (Jane), 
when they adapted ‘instinctively’ their actions to what they intuited (Megan), when they 
looked at each other’s eyes and just knew (Aisha and Zoe). All these are examples of 
experiences that illustrate how ‘one is, and therefore one communicates’. 
Participants intuited the experiential meaning of another’s “way of being and 
doing” (Megan), felt that what had been intuitively revealed amounted to another’s 
genuine experience, and acted upon this at times reflective, at times pre-reflective 
knowledge sometimes without giving it a second thought, without ‘putting it into 
words’. This sort of dynamics was born out of these participants’ being-with, and dealt 
with that which was not said. According to Reik, “what is often most telling about a 
phenomenon or discourse is what has been excluded or minimized” (Arnold, 2006, 
p.758). Attending and reflecting about these intuitions then bears a great personal and 
interpersonal understanding potential. Hence, Gallagher (2007) and Zahavi (2001) are 
perhaps right when highlighting that people tend to relate via this more “archaic means 
of communication” (Reik, 1948, p.139); and only use more reasoned forms of 
interpersonal understanding when intuiting for some reason ceases to enlighten them 
about another’s intentions and experiences.  
In this study, and in contrast with Chapter IV, the ‘immediacy’ quality referred to a 
sudden natural quality of the beginning of these acts; and it was found in each significant 
knowing act, rather than intuiting alone. Nevertheless, imagining and sharing were more 
clearly personal acts that involved a considerable personal input for their occurrence 
(e.g., ‘I felt that too, so I know how you feel’; ‘I saw it a movie, so I have an idea of how it 
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feels’); whilst intuitive experiences seemed to be less influenced by one’s personal 
experiences and past knowing (e.g., ‘I saw that he felt so and so’). What was personal, in 
intuiting, was the knowing act. The known experience was not evidently the result of 
one’s personal input, opinion, past knowledge or life experiences. The lived experience 
of not personally contributing for intuitive knowing to come about could perhaps 
translate the ‘direct’ non-mediated quality of intuitive experiences.  
This communicative encounter between individuals is the object of research of, for 
example, studies on nonverbal communication. For them, knowing acts put in relation a 
decoder (empathizer) and an encoder (empathee). They send nonverbal messages to 
each other, a process which is described from a cognitive perspective. Noller’s (2006) 
suggests that there are sometimes reasons to dissimulate one’s experience (as when 
Lauren tried to hide her fear of having nothing to say); as well as reasons to make 
accuracy mistakes, or ‘distortions of perception’ as she put it, in which that which is 
perceived suffers the interference of particular biasing cognitive processes (e.g., 
tendency to ignore or misread threatening messages; sensitivity to rejection).  
Participants were for the majority of the time, discussing positive experiences and 
motivated to relate to and understand the partner, perhaps a context fit for enhanced 
accuracy (Noller, 2006). Perhaps this, in conjunction with the fact that accounts were 
obtained during joint interviews, explains why, in this study, there were not many 
examples of knowing ‘inaccuracies’.  But there were still a few, as acknowledged by 
participants. In accordance with the empathee’s view, these ‘inaccuracies’ occurred 
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when participants abusively generalized a ‘we’ supposedly ‘shared’ experience; and 
twice when the intuiting of another’s negative experiences.  
Given the complexity of social contexts such as these, such claims of accuracy or 
lack of it are questionable, as Megan suggested; and wanting to determine its accuracy 
in this manner a result of a belief that there is an ultimate universal truth. For the 
phenomenological and the humanistic perspectives (e.g., Rogers, 1957/2007), it is more 
reasonable to acknowledge that there might be a bit of truth in both sides, in both of the 
partner’s claims, even when the empathee at first disconfirms the empathizer’s 
communicated understanding. At the outset, in accuracy studies, from these 
perspectives, one should not aim to find the ultimate winner, the holder of an universal 
truth, the one and only accurate description of an experience. 
The clinical psychology trainees commented that they dealt with intuitions by 
silencing them until solid verbal confirmation had been produced by the client. In the 
light of this study, the therapists’ ‘hiding’ attempts can at times be intuited as well and 
they can sometimes generate the impression that the therapist is ‘faking’ (Megan). 
Silencing, faking and disguising are perhaps sometimes limited psychotherapeutic tools 
when it comes to intuitive interpersonal understandings, for both of the involved 
people. There were also instances when this knowing was pre-reflective and pre-
reflectively affected their actions-to-be. One cannot silence a barely a thought 
interpersonal knowing, nor prevent the pre-reflective reaction thereby instigated. 
Secondly, as the resonant receivers showed (those who intuited another’s resonant 
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understanding), an authentic understanding is an experience like any other and one 
which may be intuited by the empathee.  
Reiteration is often seen as an empathy-enhancing communicative tool (Bachelor, 
1988; Pistrang et al., 2002). The only example of reiteration, that is, a verbal 
communicative act performed “just to check that we were both understanding each 
other” (Zoe), was belittled by Aisha as non-meaningful. Thus, it is perhaps valued only by 
certain people (“cognitive-style client”, for Bachelor); or it is the ‘how’ (Arnorld, 2006; 
Bachelor, 1988; Hobson, 1985; Reik, 1948) that makes the difference. In what comes to 
intuitive communicative exchanges, this ‘how’, or the “way” people acted, seemed to 
correspond to the existence of an experiential quality, perhaps of an at least partly 
genuine experience.   
Consequently, the sentence in itself is of little relevance: “statements can feel the 
breach and supplement where empathy fails. Possibly they may even serve as points of 
departure for further empathy. But in principle they cannot substitute for empathy” 
(Stein, 1917, p.65). The focus upon on external aspects alone (the therapists outward 
interventions and the clients’ manifest behaviour), can even have negative 
consequences, contrary to those intended. The client may even see perhaps denied the 
experience of intuitively feeling understood, and one’s individuality recognized (Geist, 
2009). It is this attentiveness to genuine experiences, this authentic and open way of 
relating, that is, I believe, a key aspect of therapy. 
Not everyone was similarly “hypersensitive” to another’s present experience; not 
everyone, in every circumstance, detected every single of another’s experience; and the 
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way one expressed that which was known was not always the best descriptive verbal 
expression, from the empathee’s eyes. But every single dyad was able to identify, 
through reflection and/or viewing, at least one moment, of a fifteen minutes 
conversation, during which they intuitively came to know another’s experience. This is 
what matters.  
  Hence, in these final reflections, I propose that the design, IPA and these 
participants allowed the intuitive phenomenon to emerge in more clarity that ever (for 




































































                                                                Chapter VI 
The aim of this chapter is to describe three types of interpersonal understandings 
(sympathetic, intellectual, and intuitive) and review the argument and findings 




“He hadn’t believed in it in the way that he believed in dining tables, or 
streets, or stomach upsets. It hadn’t been real in the way that love was 
real, or unhappiness, or fear. It was only real in the way that stories 
were real while you were reading them, or heat mirages before you 
got too close to them, or dreams while you were dreaming.” 
 




Empathy is frequently an umbrella term – for experts and non-experts alike. 
Regardless of its meaning, it is a core aspect of interpersonal relationships.  The first 
objective of this thesis was to clarify some of these meanings, as offered by the 
psychology literature and folk psychology; a felt necessity consequent of the confusion 
found within the empathy research field. While answering to these more conceptual 
questions, I hope that Kerem et al.’s (2002, p.713), “fear that adopting this line of 
research might result in losing the very meaning of empathy” did not come true. I hope 
to have kept you with me, allowing you to follow the argument developed here.  
This issue was first addressed in two chapters, where the field’s multiplicity was 
organized via a knowing-responding distinction that is not the most common in 
psychology – where it is usually affective, against cognitive empathy. I proposed that 
empathy-as-responding phenomena amounted to the phenomenon of sympathy. 
Examples of these were affective empathy-as-responding experiences such as sharing; 
identification, contamination, or feeling similarly; emotional distress; fellow-feeling or 
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feeling for another; and altruistic experiences and empathic concern. On the other 
hand, empathy-as-knowing phenomena amounted to social understandings, in a goal 
or outcome sense. Examples of these were direct empathy; intuitively feeling; 
perspective-taking; reasoning; and analogy. That is, ‘empathy-as-responding’ could 
perhaps be investigated under the label sympathy; whereas empathy-as-knowing 
could be investigated under the label empathy – more in line with the oxford 
dictionary online. Chapters I and II showed how this knowing-responding criterion was 
applicable to current theoretical and folk psychology meanings of empathy; and 
moderately efficient.  
This is a way of organizing academic psychology research that has been related 
to ‘empathy’. Through this strategy, I hope to contribute to the clarification of the 
empathy research field, and thereby improve the dialogue across research areas. 
Feeling a distress reaction may be related to imagining someone’s perspective, but 
they are not the same thing. Clarity in language is fundamental for science to advance.  
This strategy allowed me to concentrate exclusively upon interpersonal 
understandings from there onwards, from the experiential and the conceptual 
standpoints.   
 
The rule of experiences and methodological choices 
 
Investigating those phenomena that have been called empathy (Chapters I and II) 
provided the necessary contextual, theoretical and empirical background for the 
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election of one of those meanings as my research object. Direct empathy was my 
principal research object and concern thereafter, and with this choice came the 
preference for a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology, in contrast with 
psychology, has dedicated considerable attention to intuitive interpersonal 
understandings; and this approach is interested in the study of lived experiences.  
I became increasingly more comfortable with this perspective after finding Hess 
and Blairy’s (2001) study (Chapter III). They tested Lipps’ model and found that 
evidence spoke against it. That is, the neurocognitive explanation (the mainstream 
explanation), that proposes that we know another’s experience by means of an 
inference from a contaminated mimicked feeling, did not hold true at an empirical 
level. Consequently, the way we know what other people are thinking and feeling in a 
particular moment must be explained in a different manner – and phenomenology 
provides an alternative viable explanation. 
In the empirical chapters, I have gathered descriptions of lived experiences of 
empathy-as-knowing, both in its oral and written forms; and largely analysed them 
with phenomenological methods. As I see it, studying lived experiences is not studying 
illusions or false knowledge. Rather, studying the lived experience, through self-
reports, is accessing the experiences of the embodied, situated mind.   
Lived experiences often have a character analogous to reality; one experiences, 
and hence ‘believes in love and tables and stomach upsets’ (Salman Rushdie). It is a 
valuable source of knowledge, even if not the most important in our daily lives. This is 
the knowledge to which we have access to and can promptly use; it is the knowledge 
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that pragmatically informs our decisions, from which we learn what the world is, what 
it means, and make sense of it. Experiential accounts illustrate the work of the 
embodied mind, as it goes about its living.  
I am therefore proposing that there is some relevant psychological truth in these 
experiential accounts about how one directly and normally understands someone 
else’s experiences, at least for that individual, for the empathizer; and that studying 
these accounts allows me to understand something of what that truth is. I am 
interested in what works, in ordinary events – and not so much in extraordinary 
events, in exceptions to the rule, or in perceptive mistakes, such as mirages. I have 
studied what I conceive as ordinary acts of perception, interpersonal perceptions, 
intuitive ways of knowing another’s experience, as these are lived and remembered. 
Through their study, I hope to make contributions to the interpersonal processes 
literature in regards to intuiting-as-knowing experiences, from a positive psychology 
perspective (Seligman, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  
The detailed interview accounts obtained for the study in Chapter V were 
decisive in that they provided extensive material about how intuiting was lived and 
given meaning by participants, as they went about their living. It was the lived 
experience of others and their first-person interpretation that showed me that the 
phenomenon at the centre of my attention was indeed part of these participants’ 
interpersonal understandings; and it was not lived as an intellectual, projective, or 
analogical act, which are the psychology literature’s most common arguments. 
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As a consequence of the journey illustrated in these pages, and the consistent 
application of the knowing-responding division, I feel now enabled to better 
comprehend in what ways people believe they understand others. This final chapter 
offers an additional answer to the ‘meanings of empathy’ dilemma, by systematizing 
three types of interpersonal understandings: intuitive, intellectual and sympathetic.  
 
Three types of understanding: intuitive, intellectual and sympathetic 
 
The first concluding observation is that psychological cognitive models of 
empathy-as-knowing vary in the degree to which they emphasise one of two 
mechanisms, as exemplified by Batson (2009). The first mechanism, ‘intellectual 
empathy’, emphasises explicit simulation. This process is usually conceived as a higher-
order process that allows people to think about other people’s experiences, and 
attempt an understanding of their viewpoint. There were echoes of this mechanism in 
descriptions and explications of interpersonal understandings provided by participants 
in this research; and it is in line with the meaning and processes of cognitive empathy 
– hereby, intellectual understandings.  
The second model, ‘sympathetic empathy’, emphasises lower-level implicit 
simulation, reliant upon emotional activation. From the perspective that everything 
that people experience is a response to the environment-as-stimulus, ‘empathy-as-
knowing’ is yet another example of ‘empathy-as-responding’. Consequently, knowing 
and responding phenomena have a less separate nature than the one assumed 
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throughout this thesis. Examples of this perspective were Aisha (Chapter V) and 
Barrett-Lennard (1981, p.93), who argued that empathic understandings are 
“responsive” experiences; and, Davis (2009; 1983), for whom perspective-taking is a 
response to the perception of another’s present experience. This is the reason for 
considering the knowing-responding binomial strategy to be useful, albeit imperfect. It 
does not accommodate everyone’s views. 
I was already aware of this in Chapter I. I addressed this contention by 
nominating the goal or outcome of the activity as the discriminating criterion. 
Phenomena which involved the goal or outcome of knowing or understanding 
someone else’s experience were suitably conceived as a form of empathy-as-knowing. 
Then, sympathy would amount to a knowing act only when this was its outcome or 
purpose. Examples of these were the pair contamination-inference from felt-feeling 
(implicit simulation theories, e.g., Hatfield et al., 2009); and the pair identification-
analogy (e.g., psychotherapeutic theories, Zepf & Hartmann, 2008).  
In my research, although the emotional resonance aspect bore an echo of 
participants’ experience, there was little evidence suggesting that this was experienced 
as a mediated social understanding, involving the processes outlined by implicit 
simulation theories42. It was not possible find examples of how an emotional reaction 
was the basis of one’s reasoned knowledge of another’s present experience.  
                                                 
42
 Note that unconscious mechanisms were not investigated for this thesis. Implicit simulation and projection theorists 
can always argue that the process is as they describe it, although one which, at an experiential level, sometimes 
assumes the qualities identified in this thesis. This does not, however, affect the relevance of these findings at the level 
of the lived experience (one which, to my knowledge, is absent from implicit simulation current investigations). 
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Rather, on the one hand, when an emotional resonance was described, it was 
presented clearly as a sympathetic reaction, and associated with sympathetic feelings 
and actions. These accounts resonated well with developmental models, which are 
dedicated to empathy-as-responding, sympathetic phenomena (Batson, 2009; Scheler, 
2013). There was also evidence of analogical experiences, of how participants used 
their experiences to understand the empathee, usually in association with descriptions 
of a similar past experiences or feelings of identification. This resonated well with 
analogy theories (Chapter I). 
As Scheler (1913, p.3) remarked, sympathy is first and foremost a response. Yet, 
during sympathetic experiences “we seem to have an immediate ‘understanding’ of 
another’s experiences, while also ‘participating’ in them”. Then, sympathetic 
experiences may leave the impression that the sympathizer immediately and 
emotionally understands another’s present experience. Some people feel that they 
know another’s experience as a consequence of their sympathetic responses to it; they 
have the lived experience of sympathetically understanding another. 
Sympathetic understandings appeared as a distinctive kind of psychological 
experience (emotional, personal and reactive), and deserve to be separated from more 
non-reactive intellectual understandings. Sympathetic understandings were 
‘intellectual’ in a very analogical manner. Tito Mukhopadhyay (2003/ 2007, p.154), a 
writer with diagnosed autism, provides a wonderful description of what it means to 
sympathetically understand other people and their experiences:  
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If your heart aches when you see a tear in someone’s eye, if your eyes burn 
when someone is wrongly accused, if you feel the pain, which a person 
who has lost his mind bears, if you are ready to accept such a person and 
help him, you can be sure that you have sheltered sorrow in your heart. So 
you feel it and understand it. 
 
This was precisely how ‘sharing’ appeared in Chapter V. Sympathetic shared 
experiences were the result of having “sheltered sorrow” during the course of one’s 
life (similar past experience). They were a personal sympathetic response of the ‘I’ to 
the ‘you’ experience that the past experience predisposed oneself to have. Sharing 
was about two people having something in common. This response was sometimes 
associated with a comparative or analogical reasoned act (generalizing the ‘I’ 
experience to the ‘We’; projecting the ‘We’ experience to the ‘You’): ‘So you feel it and 
understand it’. Then, the basis of sympathetic understandings was at most a non-
merged collective person (1+1=2), rather than of a merged single person (1+1=1).  
The finding of these sympathetic understandings also provides an explanation for 
the current confusion between empathy and sympathy. Indeed, there is one form of 
interpersonal understanding that is associated with a sympathetic affective response. 
These terms might be seen as partially overlapping with regards to this type of 
understanding.  
Finally, there was also evidence, in participants’ accounts, of an emotional 
resonance experience which was presented as informative of the other’s experience at 
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the outset, in a sensory, intuitive, perceptive manner. This empathic understanding 
had a character that was distinctive from both sympathetic and intellectual 
understandings, and that was consistent with the phenomenological and existentialist-
humanist psychotherapeutic models. That is, at an experiential level, direct empathy, 
or one’s immediate understanding of another’s experience, seemed to be a better 
descriptive construct, and underlying process, for this kind of experience, than 
inference from felt-feeling (implicit simulation) or inference from behaviour and other 
available cues (explicit simulation).  
Therefore, this thesis gathered evidence for a third, new, and distinctive 
experiential and conceptual category for the description of people’s interpersonal 
understandings, namely, direct empathy or intuitive understandings. The uniqueness 
of this category is predicated upon some theoretical models provided by 
phenomenology, and some psychotherapy trends such as the existentialist-humanist; 
and upon people’s descriptions of their own understanding experiences. It is at these 




I here propose that there are three types of interpersonal understanding: 
intellectual, sympathetic and intuitive. Each of these understandings illustrates 
distinctive psychological empathy-as-knowing phenomena and generates a particular 
kind of interpersonal knowledge (respectively, intellectual, projective and sensitive), 
 326 
 
apparently via distinctive mechanisms. It is curious how these understandings were 
recurrent in these studies. 
Table 5 includes a description of its lived experience (discrimination criteria for 
written accounts); some associated research constructs; the hypothetical associated 
mechanism; and exemplary quotes from Amber’s story text as gathered for the Folk 
Psychology study (Chapter II).  





































Intellectual Direct Affectively responsive 
Example 
 
Amber: “I felt 
astounded and lucky 
that - as I emailed my 
father - none of us 
can be got rid of so 
suddenly. I cannot 
imagine how dreadful 
I would feel in a 
similar situation.” 
Amber: “He also 
described apologising 
to the stolen 
generation and 
watching them walk 
into the same 
place/building in 
which he was 
standing speaking and 
how they were 
frightened. He said 
'our job...' and he was 
unable to go on 
talking from emotion, 
for a few moments.” 
Amber: “This was a 
great act of social 
justice that as he said 
was a long time 
coming. I felt deeply 
sorry for him as he is 
a good man who 
cared deeply about 
the people who had 
elected him and the 
unexpectedness of his 
removal by the 
factional party 
machine within 12 
hours was shocking.” 
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The same lived experience text (Amber’s) was chosen to show how it was 
frequently easy to distinguish between these phenomena when confronted with the 
overall text itself. Intellectual understanding was the outcome of an imaginative, 
simulative, logical and/or conjectural reasoning activity (Amber’s imagine-self). 
Intuitive understanding was based on a sensitive, perceptive or felt, experience of 
another’s (Amber’s ‘unable to talk from emotion’); and sympathy was a response, a 
consequence of this knowing (Amber’s pity) – though one which also sometimes 
resulted in a sympathetic understanding. For example, one would fill in some unknown 
blanks of the other’s experience in the light of one’s personal recalled past experience. 
The point here is that one does not need to argue against what is said about the 
colour pink (theories that define empathy via contamination or sympathy and 
sympathetic understandings), because the yellow (perspective-taking or intellectual 
understandings) and the green (direct empathy or intuitive understandings) are 
different. To each, its corner; and, instead of shouting, we might perhaps start 
combining these three colours in a more useful manner; and save a considerable 
amount of time and effort in the process. 
Hence, a sympathetic understanding may then hypothetically be sometimes 
related to a sympathetic feeling of oneness (e.g., Davis, C., 1990; Hart, 1999; Decety & 
Jackson, 2006; Scheler, 1913). In this thesis, this feeling was not, however, described 
by participants as an actual merging of identities, but rather as a special “emotional 
bonding” (Gladstein, 1983, p.469) between two distinctive people, hence a ‘we’.  On 
the other hand, intellectual and intuitive understandings were not so strongly or 
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directly associated with this interpersonal emotional experience sometimes called a 
feeling of ‘oneness’ in psychology literature. Thus, although these understandings 
might be related to each other, and propel each other, they appear to be differently 
associated with certain experiential qualities and processes.  
By accepting these three types of understanding as distinctive phenomena, it 
thus becomes unnecessary to insist that empathy is not about “being in the 
corresponding emotional state yourself” (Zahavi, 2008b, p.517). There is nothing 
inconsistent with current neurocognitive explanations of contamination - except 
perhaps their failure to recognize that some people are aware of the contamination 
experience as it unfolds (and hence the ‘unconsciousness’ is not a defining attribute); 
and that ‘oneness’ is not lived as an actual self-other merging. Consequently, 
sympathetic understandings are perhaps not that reliant upon self-other 
discrimination or agency recognition acts either.  
In conclusion, each model should perhaps leave some space for alternative 
colours – at least in the light of experiential data. When each of the acts is finally 
better understood on their own, then we might finally be able to better understand 
their inter-relationships. This is a practical future research implication of these 
findings; and one which might also propel the cross-speciality’s dialogue. I will do my 






Overview of intuiting-as-knowing experiences 
 
The objective of this thesis was not to elect a single meaning of empathy as the 
one that should prevail above all, or my one true empathy. Words change throughout 
time, adapting to those who make use of them, gaining new meanings, becoming 
embedded in new layers of meanings, so what was once an object of positive awe 
(awful), is no longer. Even the dictionary will change, in the end. If everyone says 
empathy is synonymous with sympathy, who am I to disagree? The point is that the 
word empathy will become what people make of it; and the same will happen to the 
name with which I can baptize this particular meaning of empathy. 
Nevertheless, for scientific and communication purposes, this issue must be 
systematically addressed. Since I wish to do as I preach, I should attend to this matter 
once more, in this chapter, in what comes to the core part of this thesis’ investigations. 
The phenomenological meaning of empathy-as-knowing was named direct empathy in 
Chapters I and III. I argued that this meaning of empathy could be understood in the 
light of Edith Stein’s phenomenological description of how people naturally and 
directly understand another’s experience via an intersubjective non-intellectual 
process.  
In empirical studies, I have, however, avoided the direct empathy designation.  
This was because these studies investigated experiences, and therefore could not 
reassure other researchers that, at a subpersonal, neural or unconscious/ automatic 
level, the experience was literally direct at that level too. Indeed, I can only conclude 
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from the studies conducted here that there was an interpersonal form of 
understanding that had an instant experiential character to it, as commented upon by 
participants themselves. I can also remark that this phenomenon resembles the 
phenomenological conception of direct empathy; that the phenomenological 
argument is a possible and plausible explanation, consistent with the gathered 
evidence. 
Consequently, this phenomenon assumed alternative labels in every chapter 
which dealt with empirical data (Chapters II, IV and V). These labels were: immediately 
knowing, a category which had two subcategories: feeling and perceiving (Chapter II); 
non-mediated insights into someone’s experience, described by perceivers and 
experiencers (Chapter IV); and intuiting, an interpersonal knowledge gained via a 
perceptive and/or felt experience (Chapter V). Overall then, I described this 
phenomenon as direct empathy, immediate knowing, non-mediated knowing, 
perceiving, feeling, and intuiting.  
So far, I have not made it my own responsibility to decide what this experience 
should be called. In a way, this diversity does little for the overall confusing state of 
affairs of the empathy field.  
I hope that I was able to transmit the idea that, although named differently, it is 
still, for me, the same phenomenon. I have refrained from setting its name in stone 
because I was sensitive to the way it appeared in each chapter, study method and 
narrative, sometimes from a slightly different angle, and hence with a different name. 
Yet, as I see it, I investigated the same phenomenon throughout these chapters and it 
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kept reappearing, in different lights, in different forms, with different names, but 
manifesting its presence in what is given to me as essentially the same thing.  
Naming the experience is not a simple task. For example, intuiting was used by 
participants as well as by Edith Stein, Theodor Reik and Waldinger et al.43, though it is 
odd, for me, to consider that there is such a thing as a sense-perceptive intuition. In 
my eyes, referring to the experience of immediately listening to the sarcasm of a laugh 
as ‘intuitive knowledge’ seems somehow far-fetched. Similarly, some participants, 
whose lived experience was closer to a feeling rather than a perceiving, were initially 
surprised with the thought that feeling and perceiving were related. 
But since I must make a stand, I tentatively offer intuiting as a possibility. 
Intuiting-as-knowing would translate the experience of being able to know 
(immediately, perhaps directly, via perceiving and/or experiencing) another’s current 
experience, moment-to-moment, as it unfolds in the present. That is, it would amount 
to direct empathy, as portrayed here.  
The three empirical studies (Chapters II, IV and V) then work in conjunction. 
Spread along these studies there was strong evidence of people’s intuitive knowing of 
other people’s experiences. They experienced an intuitive interpersonal form of 
understanding of others in a manner that was congruent with phenomenological 
views. This is what is important to retain from this thesis. 
                                                 
43
 In Waldinger et al. (2004), and in the light of Rogers’ definition, empathy is defined as a perceptive understanding or 





Intuiting is a type of interpersonal understanding usually absent from 
psychological literature on empathy, and one which I wished to introduce as a 
valuable, meaningful, experiential, useful and ordinary type of understanding. By being 
the least known, I dedicated a considerable attention to conceptual issues. For 
example, Chapters III and IV were intended to provide answers and explications for 
intuiting from an empirical and a theoretical standpoint. I have searched for the 
precise meaning of this phenomenon, for its conceptually defining features. Indeed, I 
only freed myself from conceptual worries in the last study (Chapter V), the most 
insightful and promising of them all. It took the journey described in Chapters I, II, III, 
IV to get there, and hopefully for your benefit too.   
This was the phenomenon I was originally interested in, as a consequence of my 
psychotherapeutic background (humanistic and psychodynamic). It was also the most 
understudied phenomenon, and, when it made its appearance, it was often scattered 
around under different domains. For instance, whilst Kerem et al. included this 
experience in the affective empathy drawer, alongside say pity experiences, Elliott et 
al. (2011) remark that direct empathy is most often regarded as an example of 
cognitive empathy. Indeed, direct empathy does is not suitably accommodated in any 
of these two categories. Then, for me, there are benefits in accepting this additional 
category, such as increasing the homogeneity of the affective (sympathy) and cognitive 
(perspective-taking) categories across approaches, and making each category more 
clearly illustrative of the respective lived experience. 
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I recurrently divided intuitive phenomena into two similar subcategories, 
essences or subthemes: perceiving, or one’s sensitive awareness of another’s 
experience; and feeling, or one’s experiencing of another’s experience with varied 
degrees of ‘responsiveness’. I have also always joined them in the same group of 
experiences, possibly illustrative of direct understandings.  
The following subsections compare the intuiting-as-knowing experiential 
accounts gathered for the ‘folk psychology’ study (Chapter II), for the ‘insights’ study 
(Chapter IV), and for the ‘happy stories’ study (Chapter V). Through this comparison, I 
reflect upon this presumption that feeling and perceiving are suitably understood as 
illustrative of the same intuitive experience, representative of direct empathy. 
 
Folk psychology and Insights studies: a comparison 
 
The folk psychology and the insights studies are methodologically similar, in 
terms of data collection procedures (online purpose-built surveys); and type of data 
(written texts). Nevertheless, the main prompt (empathy, for the folk psychology 
study; and ‘insights into’, for the insights study); the data analysis methods (QCA, for 
the folk psychology study; and a combination of IPA and DPA for the insights study); 
and interests (possible meanings of empathy, for the folk psychology study; and the 
essence of non-mediated understandings, for the insights study) differed. I here 
compare the perceiving and feeling experiences gathered for each of these studies, to 





Examples of the lived experience of intuitive perceptions, assembled for the folk 
psychology and the insights studies, are included in Table 6.  These are framed within a 
broader narrative context than the one provided in Chapter II, because observing their 
situatedness also contributed to my overall understanding of what perceiving was.   
Table 6: “Contextualized examples of narratives involving intuitive perceptions” 
Study 
Folk Psychology Insights 
 
Nina (#40): “I bumped into an elderly man 
who lives in my street. (…) This day, 
however, he was stumbling over his 
words but almost enthusiastically so. His 
voice was also huskier than I recall, but he 
was as friendly as usual but seemed a 
little vulnerable, and trying too hard to be 
normal. It struck me that he is probably 
on some form of medication, just like my 
father is for Parkinson's disease. I 
instinctively felt protective towards him, 
almost maternal. I relaxed from my usual 
'speaking to the neighbours charade' and 




Suzy (#6): “(…) I had been getting closer to 
my nan ever since my granddad got ill, 
and was proud at how well she had been 
coping throughout his illness and his 
death, it was only when she was going 
through bills and papers etc., that i saw 
just how much she was hurting, how she 
had lost the love of her life the person she 
had spent 60 years married to and had 
two children with. it was only when she 
found a diagram of how to write a check 
out, as she couldn’t write check, my 
granddads had left this in with other 
documents that he knew she would have 
to go through, i realised the extent to how 
much she was in pain, and that even 
though she wouldn’t show it she would be 
in pain for the rest of her life, she didn’t 




Nina (folk psychology, to the left) started with a description of a few of the 
qualities of her neighbour’s experiences that she intuitively perceived during that 
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particular encounter (e.g., ‘stumbling unenthusiastically’, ‘seemed vulnerable’). She 
then tried to confirm her intuition in reasoned manner, by comparing these perceived 
qualities with her memory of her neighbour’s past behaviour (‘huskier voice than 
recalled’). In addition, she analogically fabricated an imagined plausible explanation for 
these perceived qualities (he is perhaps under some sort of medication, as her father 
was). 
Therefore, besides perceiving her neighbour’s experience, she reasoned about it 
as well, she tried to intellectually understand her intuitive knowledge. In this text, 
intellectual processes complemented, informed and expanded her intuitive 
knowledge; and helped her make sense of it. She could just have seen that, on that 
encounter, he was not feeling that well, and leave it at that, keep on walking. Instead, 
she tried to understand his qualitative behavioural change.  
There were a few examples as this one, in which intellectual and perceptive 
understandings appeared to complement each other, for the goal of better 
understanding someone’s experience.  But each of these two acts, intellectual and 
intuitive, had a different quality to them; and their contrast, made visible via this wider 
context quotation, was also partly responsible for their demarcation as understandings 
of very particular natures. They were usually easily differentiated in these two studies. 
Intellectual understandings were always described as reasoning, an imagination, a 
conjectural thought – becoming analogical intellectual understandings when analogy 
was involved. Similarly, Nina’s reactions to the perceived and reflected upon 
experience (protective, relaxed, patient and warm attitude) were described precisely 
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as that, sympathetic reactions. These were not informative of the neighbour’s 
experience, as perceptive and intellectual understandings were. 
The relationship between intellectual and intuitive understandings is of a 
different sort in Suzy’s text (Insights, to the right). She described how her imagined 
assumption about her grandmother’s experience (coping well) was disconfirmed by 
her perceptive understanding (overwhelmed with grief). Intuiting thus informed and 
transformed the intellectual act. But this intuition would probably be much less 
significant or important for her, were it not for the existence of an initial divergent 
opinion. It would not have the impact that it had, nor perhaps have arrived to my 
hands. 
In their context, these two lived experiences show how intellectual 
understandings precede (Stein, 1917, p.65) or succeed (Depraz, 2001; Stein, 1917, 
p.27) a perceptive intuition; though the overall relationship between these two acts is 
better described as one of complementarity. Their complementary use also always 
showed how what was perceived had the value of authenticity, of truth. The intuition 
was never questioned as false, even when it was puzzling or unexpected, as with Nina 
and Suzy’s texts. Intuiting was lived as an accurate knowing of another’s present 
experience.  On the other hand, reasoning had the weight of a plausible explanation, 
something which made sense of the overall available information and of the intuition. 
It was sometimes an activity used to expand an interpersonal knowledge that was 
intuitively gained and assumed as precise. 
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For Gallagher (2007, p.354), intellectual understandings are an exception to the 
rule (intuitive understandings), and are only adopted for making sense of someone’s 
“puzzling” experience. This strangeness can perhaps indicate that the empathizer did 
not, for that moment, intuit the empathee’s experience; or refer to an overall 
contextual ambiguity, with available cues and one’s intuition appearing contradictory 
to the empathee (Noller, 2006; Stein, 1917). Indeed, Suzy and Nina’s texts, the 
empathees were trying to conceal or disguise their present experience (the neighbour 
was ‘trying to be normal’, the grandmother ‘wouldn’t show’), and these attempts 
might have created an overall ambiguous context that set the intellectual activity in 
motion (Noller, 2006).  
Perceiving appeared to be associated with a temporal dimension, with a 
particular moment of an interpersonal encounter. For example, Nina perceived that 
her neighbour was not feeling well when they ‘bump into’ each other; and Suzy 
perceived her grandmother’s grief in a single revealing moment, when she was going 
through some papers. Perceiving was born there-and-then, in that particular situated 
interpersonal encounter. It was a moment-specific and situation-specific act.  
This situatedness of an account partly shaped my findings in the insights study. If 
this is not my own interpretative bias, the presence of here-and-know references 
could be a useful indicator of this type of understandings, when the basis of the 
analysis is a written account. On reflection, when thinking about a particular knowing 
experience, if one finds oneself conferring a considerable importance to particularities 
of the here-and-now encounter, and principally to a very particular moment of a more 
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extended interaction, then one should consider the hypothesis that the described 
knowing is intuitive. 
Nina and Suzy’s perceptive experience seem to be distinctive in terms of what 
was immediately given to them. Nina had an overall impression of her neighbour’s 
experience, and one which she clearly associated with her neighbour’s expressive 
behaviour. On the other hand, Suzy described a very specific type of experience and 
never really identified a particular behaviour. She merely embedded her knowing act 
in the overall action of going through some papers.  
‘Going through some papers’, at least for me, does not conventionally mean that 
one is suffering tremendously. But perhaps the way one sorts the papers, say, 
trembling, may leave that impression. A behaviour which could be read along the lines 
of an inference from a behavioural ‘cue’ (after Batson, 2009), seems a far less likely 
interpretation of Suzy’s lived experience. She seems to describe the experience of, 
immediately and non-intellectually, becoming perceptively aware of another’s present 
experience. This observation therefore favours the phenomenological reading of 
events. 
 Across studies, ‘perceivers’ were observers, sometimes observers-participants to 
a scene that involved an empathee. During this observational act they got to know 
another’s present experience, in a way that seemed to involve their senses. Perceiving 
was a sensitive awareness about another’s current experience.  
The description of this particular phenomenon was brought about via different 
prompts and methodologies; and for distinctive purposes. And it kept reappearing, as 
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a perceptive intuitive understanding, a direct empathy-as-knowing experience, not to 
be confused with the sympathetic or intellectual understandings. It was described by 
many participants regardless of their age, education, and gender; it happened in 
particular situated encounters of varied shapes and forms, in varied experiencing 
contexts (emotionally positive or negative; ordinary or personally significant); it was 
helpful in both poles of the interpersonal interaction (while resonating and receiving 
someone else’s understanding); and it was not limited to a particular relational context 
(there were examples of perceiving experiences of a stranger, an acquaintance, a 




‘Feeling’ shared most of the perceiving’s detected qualities.  It was not limited to 
particular relational contexts; nor to a particular valence or intensity of experiencing 
context; it happened there-and-then, as part of a partly observational act; and 
sometimes worked in parallel with more intellectual ways of knowing (e.g., Louise, 
Chapter IV).  
Perceiving and feeling were distinguished because intuitive feelings involved an 
experiential felt-level resonance, whereas perceiving did not involve feeling for 
oneself, in any reported way, the object’s experience (e.g., Suzy, Table 6). Narratives 
about intuitive feelings (Table 7) were about being able to feel for oneself an 
experience that was informative of another person’s experience, with varying degrees 
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of personal physical responsive resonance, from a heartbeat to the simple use of the 
expression ‘feel another’s experience’. 
For instance, Eve (right column, insights study) described her insight as about 
feeling for herself her boyfriend’s experience, and immediately added that this was a 
knowing experience (‘knew’). She never mentioned any particular seen behaviour, just 
like Suzy. More than that, there is nothing in this text to remind me that perceiving 
could be a suitable interpretation. She simply described feeling her boyfriend’s 
emotional state. Note how the otherness of this experience is never an issue, despite 
involving the lived experience of temporarily “being” her boyfriend. 
Table 7: “Contextualized examples of narratives involving intuitive feelings” 
Study 
Folk Psychology Insights 
Carmen (#54): “(…) As the mother told me 
all this, tears started to well up in her eyes 
and I suddenly felt the urge to cry myself 
not because I had experienced such a loss 
personally (I have actually been very lucky 
in this regard), but because the feelings of 
both the mother (and her child) were so 
palpable. I could almost feel what the 
mother was feeling; concern for her 
daughter, sadness at her loss and the fact 
that her daughter had tried to protect her 
feelings. I managed not to cry; I felt that it 
would seem odd and somehow detract 
from the mother's own feelings. I told her 
that I would keep an eye on her daughter 
and, when she apologised for crying 
reassured her that this wasn't a problem. 
This was something that happened a few 
years ago but I have always remembered 
it vividly, in fact, it never fails to make me 
feel like crying. (…)” 
Eve (#11): “He had an argument with 
parents who told him they never wanted 
to see him again. I felt how he felt - upset 
angry etc. - knew what he was going 
through yes this insight was meaningful as 
I understood more about him this may 
have happened due to us having such a 
close relationship. I did not express this 
due to the seriousness of the situation. It 
was like being him for a short while.”  
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In comparison with Eve’s experience, Carmen’s (left column) intuitive feeling is 
more similar to an intuitive perception. Carmen “almost” feels for herself the mother’s 
“palpable” state. There is a sensitive side in this ‘palpable’, in-between feeling and 
sensing, just as when we feel/sense someone’s hands caressing us. We touch and are 
touched in that gesture (Merleau-Ponty?). By claiming that she did not really, but only 
as-if (after Rogers, 1957), feel the mother’s experience, the experiential side of this 
phenomenon becomes less literal, and the distinction between feeling and perceiving 
becomes almost senseless.  
This intuitive feeling is indeed a special type of feeling, and one which was also 
described as another’s experience, which was lived with its otherness. It was an 
experiential knowing that Carmen herself distinguishes from her emotional 
sympathetic response, her urge to cry for the mother’s loss. It was not lived as a 
personal, affective, sympathetic reactive experience - but rather lived as the 
experience of another. 
Perceiving and feeling seemed to be very similar phenomena in terms of overall 
characterizing features, and even difficult to distinguish in particular texts (e.g., 
Carmen). However, some participants described a very strong perceptive side, very 
distant from a feeling (e.g., Suzy, Nina), or strongly emphasised the feeling experience, 
leaving perceived elements aside (e.g., Eve). Therefore, the perceiving-feeling 
distinction seems pertinent. 
Tables 6 and 7 show how the empathy prompt (folk psychology study) frequently 
generated richer accounts, descriptive of longer sequences of events – amidst which 
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intuiting was found. In Nina’s text (Table 6), there is a sentence about her instinctive 
maternal response; and the great amount of text, excluded from the table, described 
her responses and further reflections relative to her neighbour and herself. The same 
was observed with Carmen’s text (Table 7). On the other hand, Suzy (Table 6) and Eve’s 
(Table 7) accounts of their insightful experiences terminated precisely as shown. 
Insight narratives rarely mentioned any aspects that went beyond the knowing 
experience itself.  Then, the insights study, and its comparison with the folk psychology 
study, supports the conclusion that there is such a thing as an intuitive knowing of 
another’s experience that involves an experiential resonant side, with a nature that is 
not described  as a personal sympathetic response.  
In conclusion, the prompt of ‘empathy’ more frequently generated a wider 
narrative that included knowing and responding events. The prompt ‘insight into’ was 
more effective for the purpose of investigating empathy-as-knowing experiences 
alone. This provides some support for the binomial strategy (empathy-as-knowing 
against empathy-as-responding) adopted in this thesis; and is evidence of the efficacy 
of avoiding the term empathy when interested in empathy-as-knowing phenomena.  
  
Intuiting in the light of the three studies 
 
The unity of analysis, in the ‘folk psychology’ and the ‘insights into’ studies, was a 
small amount of text, sometimes even a single word. Perhaps as a consequence of this, 
perceiving and feeling were more arguably one and the same phenomenon. It could 
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even be argued that they were joined together under the label ‘immediate’ or ‘non-
mediated’ understandings as a consequence of my existing interest in 
phenomenological theories about direct empathy.  
Nevertheless, integral texts (those which I read), frequently generated the 
impression that perceiving and feeling, methodologically isolated in the first two 
studies, could be associated experiences or two manifestations of the same intuitive 
phenomenon. But it was through the ‘happy stories’ study (Chapter V) that this 
interpretation became more solid.  
In this study, the unit of analysis was participants’ commentaries about particular 
episodes (discrete empathy-as-knowing moments), from the resonance and reception 
perspectives; and their overall commentaries about particular types of understandings. 
These wider units of analysis proposed that perceiving and feeling were part of the 
same type of understanding, albeit one which was perhaps lived or communicated by 
participants in different manners (as a felt intuition and/ or as a perceptive intuition).  
To illustrate this, a transcript of the interview with Jane (teller) and Kayla 
(listener) centred about the episode ‘hopefully, there is more to everything’, is 
transcribed here. It is a very long excerpt, but bear with me. I have presented it in this 
broader context to illustrate how Jane’s seemingly sensitive awareness of Kayla’s 
passion for her work, was not, for her, lived as a perceptive way of knowing (though 
viewing opens up this explanative possibility). It was rather lived as an intuitive feeling 
(“so I felt what she experienced, felt, there.”). This one remark, that suddenly gave 
meaning to Jane’s experience along the lines of an intuitive feeling, was expressed only 
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after a very long discussion about her sensitive perceptive awareness of Kayla’s 
passion and about her sympathetic reactions to this known passion: 
Jane: We can stop it here. That it was something that she enjoyed doing, 
that she was happy, I thought that she liked dance. There was something 
about her. (…) 
R: Is there a more important moment than another one? (silence) 
Kayla: I guess the beginning is really important when she describes how, 
when she describes how actually she is going to do it in psychology, how 
movement, how we all move, subconsciously and non-subconsciously, 
without having to say anything and things like that. So that was important 
for me I guess because I do Psychology I knew why that would be 
important? So that was kind of cool.  
R: That was important how? In terms of content? Was it important in the 
way you were able to know what her own experience? 
Jane: Yeah, I thought I understood who she was a bit more because it was 
something that she was passionate about. And I was, oh, isn’t that nice? It 
is not often that you see someone, what makes them… that is why she is 
here, there was something rewarding to have come into Birmingham, and I 
thought that was a good reason. (R: laugh, Kayla: Cool) 
R: How could you tell that she had a passion? How are you so sure that she 
was passionate about it? 
Jane: I think now, watching it,  I think she had that look about her, her body 
language, she spoke confidently about it, and if we watch it again, when 
she describes, you can see that she is doing motion talk with dance and the 
way she describes it is very detailed, she could have talked about it for 
longer. That is what she does! (giggles) 
R: So you had the impression that, one, she had a passion; two, that she 
could talk for longer (Jane: Yeah). But then you also said, that ‘now 
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watching it I had the impression that she made all these movements’… So 
when you were there… 
Jane: Yeah, I was not aware about it. (…) I was thinking…like, I hope one 
day I am like that. Because I like Psychology but I don’t mix school and 
other things together. Especially when she talks about ballroom, because 
that is what she likes, but then she mixes it with Psychology, and I thought 
that is so cool, I would. That would be nice to be like that one day (Kayla, R 
laughs). 
R: Beautiful. And did you feel any emotion, did you feel anything. 
Jane: I guess it was excitement. (Kayla: sighted) That is a good word. 
R: Where you excited for her (Kayla: yeah), or for you? 
Jane: Excited just hearing the situation. 
Kayla: Didn’t know these things could actually come true. 
Jane: Yeah! To hear this could happen. Because you wouldn’t have to 
relate to anything if you didn’t want to. So yeah, excited to know there is 
more to everything. (…) I don’t know if during the time…No. I wasn’t aware 
of the gestures at the time. I don’t know where the division was, but when 
you can hear automatically that that is something she likes, I could hear 
that that was something she was passionate about. I could just tell. I don’t 
know... The tone is different. Because before I was talking about me, so I 
wasn’t really, I wasn’t really like… I don’t know, that is the first time I was 
finally finding out about her for the first time, ‘oh, she is like that!’ So that 
is where the excitement came from as well.  
R: A sense of discovery. (Jane: Yeah, a sense of discovery, perfect) Ok. But 
this sense of discovery is yours again (T: uh uh). So how can you hear the 
passion? 
Jane: I think it is to do with tone. Like the weightful way to telling the story. 
I guess it is about information, but information that is said in a certain way, 
with certain tones, like precisely, like she has said it before, or… it was like 
concrete information, it wasn’t  like hums and offs, but it was just (makes 
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gesture of cadence) tururu. This is what I do, this is what I like. I don’t 
know…. 
R: That is beautiful. That is OK. What is concrete information, for you, can 
you try to tell me? 
Jane: Yeah, so.  It’s like information that… it’s like a science, it’s like, this is 
the way it is. The movement is this, and we don’t have to tell each other 
anything. But the way she said it was confident and she knew what she was 
doing: this is actually how we dance and that is facts. But she said it with a 
light tone and that was something that she enjoyed talking about. And you 
could tell that because of her tone, because there were no hesitations or 
anything it was just… 
R: Would you agree if I say that the way she said it was just very expressive 
of her passion? 
Jane: Thank you. Yes! (R, Kayla, Jane: laughs) That’s it. That is not what I 
imagined… No, because… (R: Yes, please, come on!) No actually, it was 
expressive, because expressive is like all these sort of things put together, 
because her gestures did change, and maybe I noticed it subconsciously, or 
something, and her tone was lighter, and I thought it was light, and there 
was no hesitations, and you could tell that she was passionate about it, and 
enthusiastic herself, so the enthusiasm, so I felt what she experienced, felt, 
there. 
R: So you think that you also felt in this experience part of her excit... her 
enthusiasm? 
Jane: Yes, because when people are happy about something… If it makes 
you happy, then I feel. Because you are not supposed to be happy, so I feel 
how she feels about what she does. Like, I can’t relate but I understand. 
Like why that makes you happy, and I can be happy for you.  (…) Because it 
is about how she expressed how she felt. And the way she expressed it she 
showed how she felt about it with no barriers. Open. As an open book. (….) 
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And you go, ‘oh I’m happy for you’. That is really good. That is the feeling 
that I am used to. That is what it is.  
 
 This discussion about Jane’s intuitive awareness was very enlightening in several 
ways, and very revealing of the experience during which she got to know what Kayla 
was passionate about. First, despite the references to perceptive acts and expressive 
behaviour, for Jane, conceiving this experience as a perceptive one was a somehow 
strange thought. It made her hesitate and, after having provided a subconscious 
‘perception’ rationale, she accepted this perspective.  
 Secondly, this intuition provoked a sympathetic reaction. She sympathized 
because she wanted to relate, this was her choice (“because you wouldn’t have to 
relate to anything if you didn’t want to”). Jane sympathized with Kayla’s enjoyment of 
psychology; with the subject Kayla was researching; with the person that Kayla 
appeared to be in the light of that intuition; with the idea that there was a hopeful 
future ahead of her… and so forth. These were many of the reasons for Jane’s 
sympathetic sharing of Kayla’s passion.  
 Thirdly, amidst these sympathetic felt-level responses, Jane isolated an intuitive 
feeling for Kayla’s passion – one which was paradoxically (considering the sympathetic 
reasons listed in the preceding paragraph) justified through the argument that she had 
no reason whatsoever to feel happy in that moment, were it not for Kayla’s present 
experience.   
 Either way, Jane intuited Kayla’s experience in some manner, sensitive in the 
light of her detailed account about Kayla’s behaviour; and felt, in the light of her 
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opinion about her lived experience. Jane’s experience appears to me as a composite 
experience (Chapter IV), one which included both felt sympathetic and felt empathetic 
elements. Accepting that her knowing was intuitive and experiential (i.e., an intuitive 
feeling), when her cued-recall account was, for its majority, about sensitive knowing 
elements (partly as a consequence of the cued-recall technique), implies that 
perceiving and feeling should perhaps be conceived, in essence, as two aspects of a 
one and only intuitive understanding phenomenon. 
 
Proposed relationship between feeling, perceiving and intuiting 
 
 The proposition is that feeling and perceiving both represent an intuitive 
understanding. This was what participants’ commentary suggested. In some 
circumstances, intuiting was lived as a sensitive experience, a perceptive interpersonal 
form of knowing someone else’s present experience, and one which was not 
necessarily accompanied by an experiential felt-level resonance experience. For other 
people, or in other circumstances, intuiting brought another’s present experience to 
one’s experience under the form of a felt-intuition, and one which did not, at least at a 
first glance, seem to be related to any perceptive act.   
Viewing and discussing intuitive feelings suggested that these were plausibly 
associated with an implicit perceptive act. This type of intuitive experience, is 
summarized in Figure 18, as resulting from a combination of a subliminal perceptive 
act with a conscious lived intuitively feeling (first circle, to the left). 
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The alternative way of living one’s intuitive interpersonal knowledge involves a 
perceptive ‘conscious’ sensitive awareness of someone else’s experience (middle 
circle). Participants were actively attending to another’s actions and present 
expressive behaviour, and, there-and-then fully aware of these qualitatively expressive 
perceptive features.  
 
Figure 18: “Proposed relationship: perceiving and feeling as the same intuitive 
empathy-as-knowing phenomenon” 
 
The argument here is that the two perceptive and felt-experiential modes refer 
to the same intuitive phenomenon; and that intuiting is possibly composed by a felt 
and a perceptive side in every circumstance (implicit or not). Hence, a resonance 
feeling would also be experienced during perceptive intuitions, perhaps only in the 
background of experience, but, nevertheless, there. However, there was no clear 
evidence in these studies pointing in this direction; and therefore this hypothesis is 















The idea of implicit processing (situated, quick, subconscious processing of a 
foreign gestalt experience) is present in, for example, Reik’s work (1948). However, 
phenomenological models are concerned with lived experiences, to which one may 
have a reflective access. Turning towards an implicit (hence, non-conscious) act to 
explain intuitive experiences, in not a phenomenological type of explanation. 
Nevertheless, this subliminal character, or background of experiencing as it should be 
described from a phenomenological viewpoint, is also not fated to forever be implicit, 
at least from the phenomenological psychodynamic and humanistic viewpoints. An 
implicit experience can become the focus of attention (i.e., become conscious; Jane’s 
account is evidence of that). For me, the proposal in Figure 18 is not incompatible with 
phenomenological theories. 
Figure 18 is explanatory - as the psychologist that I am, I am also interested in 
explanations, in whys, in processes. It explains the reason for having considered, in this 
thesis, that these two experiences were two sides of the same phenomenon, that they 
were two facets or aspects of direct empathy.  But, most importantly, as a lived 
experience, we do find these two types of experiences: feeling and perceiving.  
It is possible that the differences between feeling and perceiving are situation-
specific (and everyone would be able to have these two experiences). For example, 
perceiving was the intuitive knowing of choice in reception texts in Chapter IV. Then, 
while receiving or resonantly receiving, one would tend to have a perceptive 
experience rather than a felt intuition. 
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It may as well be the case that there are people who are more perceptive, and 
tend to experience their intuitions as being about perceiving; whereas others are more 
sensitive to their experiential resonance experiences and tend to experience their 
intuitions as a felt-feeling. Then, these differences would be person-specific, as 
Churchill and Bayne (1998) proposed via Jung’s typology, and Stein (1917, p.62) via her 
“life-long habits of intuiting and thinking”. They can also be encounter-specific, that is, 
dependent upon the ‘chemistry’ between two people, some becoming more 
perceptively or experientially readable than others to oneself, as implicit to Stein’s 
(1917/1989, p.59) reflection upon the human “types” and to Barrett-Lennard’s (1981, 
p.93) “finite range of natural frequencies”; and to Aisha’s remark about people’s 
“readability”.  
These are possibilities. Further investigation is necessary to understand each of 
these experiences, when and where and why they happen, whether the model above 
is a suitable explanation, whether an experiential resonance is always involved if only 
one was mindfully aware of one’s experiential resonance experience throughout 
perceptive intuitive experiences, and had access to these memories. 
 
Summary of findings about intuiting-as-knowing 
  
 There seems to be two possible, slightly distinctive ways, of experiencing 
intuitive interpersonal understandings: perceiving and experiencing. There were 
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examples of feeling and perceiving in each side of Barrett-Lennard’s empathy cycle, 
although feeling might perhaps be a less common reception experience.  
 Through these acts, participants had the impression of accessing another’s 
genuine sometimes unexpected experience. The intuitive knowledge was seldom 
doubted, and, when it was, it was always after-the-fact, as the clinical psychology 
trainees remarked. Secondly, whenever one questioned the alterity of one’s lived 
experience (thrice across studies), one also used the lived experience to dismiss the 
doubt in a reflective manner.  
These intuitions were studied exclusively in interpersonal contexts, though 
theoretically intuiting is not restricted to the knowing of people’s experiences (e.g., 
Stein, 1917; Thompson, 2001). Indeed, we gathered an example of an intuition that 
concerned the pet’s experience in the folk psychology study. In the happy stories 
study, intuiting appeared as a non-verbal communicative way of interacting with other 
people; and it shaped participants’ actions in a sometimes pre-reflective manner.  
Intuitions were not limited by the experiential type of content. Participants 
described intuiting experiences of varied natures (e.g., thoughts; emotions; sensations; 
attitudes; intentions; gestalt experiences, with many sides to them; overall ‘ambiance’ 
qualities, those things “hanging in the air”; and difficult-to-define experiences).   
Phenomenologically speaking, experiences are embedded body-mind gestalt 
phenomena. A thought manifests itself at least by activating a neural circuit, but its 
content and function are in-relation-to the world, and manifested in the network of 
nerves and blood and so forth. A thought is embodied. A happy thought can make us 
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feel happy, our hearts pumping quicker like obedient musicians. Similarly, emotions 
are minded, a sudden feeling of happiness can literally change the way we think about 
the world, making us look on the bright side of life, as if brand new pink look-through 
lenses were being worn. Accepting this conception leads to the consideration that 
intuiting another’s experience is to know it in its embedded embodiment, to be given 
at once the emotion, the thought, the behaviour, the sensation, and so forth. After all, 
these are different aspects of the same mirrored ball called present experience:  
It involves processes which we habitually separate as ‘thinking’, ‘emotion’ 
and ‘action’. Such watertight compartments are inappropriate to an 
experience which is apprehended as a ‘whole’; an experience that is 
created in the ‘space’ between persons. (Hobson, 1985, p.7) 
 
One may be more sensitive to a particular kind of content. One may be given 
only a partial aspect of that which composes another’s experience (Zahavi). One may 
intuit only the foreground of the other’s experience (Barrett-Lennard). There may be a 
sphere of absolute privacy (Scheler). One may only have a vague gestalt overall 
impression of another’s experience, an intuitive type of experience which was found 
across the three studies, such as that ‘something is wrong’ with another person 
(Chapters II and IV). But even if we do not intuit everything, what we do intuit is 
important. It helps us make sense of all those who surround us and their experiences 
in a more immediate manner. It facilitates everyday understandings. The main findings 







Table 8: “Intuitive understandings: summary of findings” 
Intuiting… 
  Is possible to discriminate from, and works alongside with sympathetic and 
intellectual interpersonal understandings. 
  Is better studied avoiding the prompt ‘empathy’. 
  Is unrestricted to a single relational context (e.g., kinship or strangers). 
  Is unrestricted to a single emotional valence of participants’ experiencing 
contexts. 
  Is unrestricted to very personally significant events. 
  Is unrestricted to a particular aspect of another’s experience (involves the 
knowing of thoughts, emotions, attitudes, intentions, sensations….) 
  Is a here-and-now experience that reveals to the empathizer at least a facet of 
another’s current experience. 
  It is lived as another’s experience, not a personal one. 
  Has two possible experiential modes: perceiving (sensitive awareness about 
another’s experience), and feeling (experiencing for oneself another’s 
experience).  
  Does not necessarily involve a perceptive conscious act (intuitive feelings), or 
an felt-level side (intuitive perceptions) 
  Is very often described by including references to ‘here-and-now’.   
  Is unrestricted to a role in the interaction (resonance or reception). 
  Is frequently experienced as the instant knowing of another’s authentic 
experience. 
  Can be experienced as a non-verbal way of communicating and interacting with 
others. 







Past experiences and intellectual characters 
 
Intuiting was a knowledge that was not gained in a reasoned intellectual manner, 
but rather in an intuitive perceptive and felt manner. I have often described it as a 
non-intellectual act, a non-intellectual experience – in contrast with other forms of 
understanding. Note that this is different from claiming that one’s past experiences 
and knowledge do not shape what people intuitively know. Saying that intuitions are a 
non-intellectual act is not saying that such acts are not informed by past knowledge in 
any way. I have often quoted Stein’s remark about people’s intuiting habits, precisely 
to pass on this message.  But this is different from having an intellectual knowing 
experience. I will unpack this here. 
 Anderson (2003) describes an experiment with kittens raised in the dark. There 
were two groups of kittens, both attached to a basket, and exposed to the same 
amount and sort of visual stimuli. While the first group was allowed to roam freely 
when they were exposed to light, despite being tied to a basket; the second group was 
tied to a basket in such a way that only their heads could move. Both groups 
developed the same motor capacities and physical repertoire. However, the restrained 
second group was more likely to bump into walls, fall off the edges of things, and to 
fail to stretch their paws in the anticipation of the floor. Their perceptive experience 
did not translate into the expected action. As Anderson argues, they were the kittens 
who knew not what the visual stimuli fully meant; they did not recognize the visual 
significance of the visual stimuli. Without such a perception-action previous 
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interaction, at least the kittens were unable to make their visual perceptions whole 
and meaningful (better, their meaning was idiographic). 
Therefore, the meaning of what we see is partly shaped by our past experiences. 
And if what we’ve seen-felt-experienced in the past determines the meaning of what 
we now see, at a very fundamental level, intuiting-as-knowing is no exception. But this 
does not make the intuitive experience less direct, or meaningful; nor does it make 
intuitive experiences intellectual or sympathetic ones. The influence of the ‘personal 
experience’ in intuiting is one of a different sort, more in line with the kitten’s 
example; than with that which is usually meant by personal in the ‘understanding 
someone is the light of one’s personal experience or personal knowledge’ sense. This 
is, I believe, Prinz’s (2006) argument. 
 
Where to draw the line: knowing and responding 
 
There are two theoretical explanations of empathy-as-knowing that involve, to a 
certain degree, feeling for oneself another’s experience (Chapter III): the 
contamination-as-knowing neurocognitive explanation; and the coupling-as-knowing 
neurophenomenological explanation.  Contamination here stands for the lived 
experience of personally responding to another’s experience by feeling it as one’s own 
(sympathetic sharing experience, in accordance with Scheler’s stance, and in this 
thesis); whilst coupling stands for the lived experience of directly knowing another’s 
experience via the intersubjective intuitively-feeling experience.  
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Theoretically, and even empirically, it is simple to distinguish contamination-as-
knowing from coupling-as-knowing experiences: either one feels happy as a 
consequence of another’s happiness, and thereby assumes that the other person is 
probably happy too (contamination); or one has a feeling of another’s happiness, feels 
another’s happiness (coupling). Nevertheless, principally when the narrative was short 
and lacked information, and the feeling described was similar to the empathee’s 
described experience, my decision was not a confident one. These were resonance 
experiences which could validly be interpreted in either of the two ways 
(contamination/ coupling). The question was never, however, whether the knowing 
occurred through the non-observed inference from felt-feeling44. Rather, the question 
was always whether participants’ felt-level experience was in essence an empathy-as-
intuitively-feeling experience (Stein, 1917), a coupling that acted as an intuitive 
understanding; or an empathy-as-sympathetically-responding experience (Scheler, 
1913). 
The question here is where to draw the line between that which is an intuitive 
feeling, and that which is a contamination response. To serve as a point of comparison, 
there is, for instance, Nicky’s story text (#19, Folk Psychology study). It was considered 
to be a description of a sympathetic contamination/ sharing responsive experience, 
though one which was experienced within awareness: 
I was sitting watching someone do a practice project talk earlier today. I 
could tell that she was really nervous, because she was blushing bright red 
                                                 
44 This explanation bore little echo in these studies, except for the projective generalization movement 




everywhere and her hands were shaking slightly. She looked flustered and 
fell over some of her longer words. I became aware during her practice talk 
that I was starting to feel nervous too, my heartbeat and breathing seemed 
to increase watching her and I had this overall sense of anxiety, when there 
was no need for me to feel nervous. I had already done my practice talk). 
This nervousness only ended when she finished.  
 
Nicky gives meaning to her anxiety as a personal responsive felt-level experience, 
and one which is experienced within awareness as such. Moreover, the knowing is 
described as an inference from behaviour, rather than an inference from felt-feeling. 
This knowing, in the text, precedes her response. That is, Nicky responds to the 
observed known anxiety of her friend with a similar experience of anxiety (Scheler’s 
cause-effect model).  
It was considered as an example of a sympathetic experience (contamination/ 
sharing) because Nicky conceptualizes it as a response, she relates the perceptive and 
the felt act in a cause-effect manner. However, contamination is often said to be an 
automatic unconscious response. Moreover, it was an experience during which there 
was no impression of oneness, or of merging. Self and other were differentiated selves 
throughout the experience. Finally, the response was not used as the basis of an 
inference. The knowledge was rather gained via an inference from behaviour. These 
are all features which are incongruent with the phenomenon of contamination as 
theoretically described in neurocognitive psychology. Secondly, some argue that 
intuitively-feeling is a responsive resonation. 
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My question then is why Nicky’s responsive experience should be considered as 
a sympathetic response, rather than an empathetic intuitive feeling. I thus turned 
towards the literature to answer this question, and tested a few discrimination 
hypotheses against available data. First, I conjectured that perhaps intuitively-feeling 
and contamination were the same phenomenon, although being explained in different 
manners by different theoretical approaches; and participants’ meaning-making was 
reflecting these two possible interpretations.  For example, Thompson (2001) and 
Gallagher (2007) use the evidence adopted in neurocognitive psychology to support 
the coupling-as-knowing hypothesis, whereas neurocognitive psychology (e.g., Preston 
& Waal, 2002) usually uses this evidence to support the contamination-as-knowing 
hypothesis. Moreover, in contemporary empathy psychology literature, 
contamination, sympathy and intuiting are usually phenomena that are put in the 
same bag (e.g., Boulanger & Lançon, 2006; Kerem et al., 2001, Tarnopolsky, 1995; Zepf 
& Hartmann, 2008), joined together as an affective type of empathy (but then again, 
this is a very big bag). 
Nevertheless, Stein, Scheler and Zahavi (2008b) all acknowledge that there is 
such a thing as a contamination phenomenon, and that this phenomenon must be 
distinguished from intuiting. Whilst contamination is often said to be an automatic 
unconscious response (in neurocognitive trends; and in extreme cases, for Scheler), an 
intuitive empathizer is said to be aware of the intuitive experience. However, 
contamination is not necessarily an ‘unconscious’ response (e.g., Scheler, Zahavi). 
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Therefore, contamination and intuiting are two different phenomena, and not simply 
because of ‘consciousness’ criterion. Hence, I rejected this hypothesis. 
Then there is the knowing-responding distinction. This distinction, and the inter-
relationship between these two acts, is controversial. Knowing is either the trigger for 
a response (Scheler); a phenomenon to be distinguished from responding though 
related to it in a non-linear manner (Depraz); or a response in itself (e.g., Barrett-
Lennard).  Furthermore, when confronted with participants’ texts, this was precisely 
the most common doubt. It was not always easy to apply this criterion so as to 
distinguish between that which was intuitively-feeling and that which was a 
contaminated feeling, reflectively accessible to awareness. The criterion did not seem 
to work very well in every circumstance. 
Imagine that you are in front of a happy person and you feel happy. Is this 
happiness sympathetic, so that you are happy for another person’s happiness and 
sympathetically understanding it? Is it an intuitive feeling of another’s happiness that 
simply “informs” (Geist, 2009, p.67) you by revealing to you what the other person is 
experiencing? As Jane paradoxically explained, after all those nominated sympathetic 
reasons, she really had no reason to feel any passion, she was simply having an 
intuitive feeling.  
Perhaps the line is drawn precisely in the lived experience of each of these 
phenomena. Sympathetic understandings, when derived from a contaminated or 
shared feeling, are always lived as personal responses to another’s experience, a 
personal way of relating with another person’s experience. They are not lived as 
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‘another’s experience’. In sympathy, contamination included, I personally feel a similar 
state, it is mine, it is my ‘propriety’, to use Stein’s expression. 
On the other hand, intuitive feelings are not really experienced as personal 
responses or as consequent of one’s personal input, say, what I feel and think towards 
your situation (the personal input is at a fundamental level, at the kittens-in-the-dark 
level). I do not have to think that ‘it is terrible too’ to know that you are in pain. I do 
not have to relate in any personal way to what I intuitively understand, as Jane argued. 
Intuitions, felt intuitions inclusively, or coupling-as-knowing, are more clearly simply 
immediately informative, responsively informative perhaps, under the ‘everything is a 
response’ standpoint, but, in essence, foreign feelings, other people’s feelings, and a 
way of knowing. As Stein argues, intuiting is personal insofar that it is the ‘I’ that 
performs the knowing act; but it is not personal in the sense that it is an experience 
born exclusively in the ‘I’. The spring of the emotion lies elsewhere, in another person, 
and one is aware of this. Otherness is a constitutive characteristic of intuitive 
experiences. 
Through this reflection, I may perhaps draw a line between contamination-as-
knowing and coupling-as-knowing. These phenomena would be intersubjective 
experiences, perhaps possible via the same intersubjective mechanism, but 
nevertheless, two different experiences. As long as the ‘responsive’ feeling is 
informative and experienced as another’s, we are dealing with an empathetic intuitive, 
sometimes prereflective, experience. On the other hand, we would be facing 
contamination when these conditions were not fulfilled, when the responsive feeling 
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was lived as a personal feeling, my feelings towards your situation, lived as mine, and 
as responsive. This is how I now draw the line between contamination and coupling: 
the otherness or selfness of the felt experience. 
 However, there-and-then, when dealing with the empathizer’s experience, or 
descriptions of it, I still found composite experiences, inclusively Jane’s. These were 
about moments in which sympathy and intuiting together determined the 
empathizer’s experience. The participant felt sympathetically and intuitively happy at 
the same time, or the happiness one felt was the outcome of both an intuition and a 
sympathetic experience. 
 Arguing that they co-occur (as I did in Chapter IV) is putting them in the same 
bag, while asserting that there is a difference. It is an agglomeration-differentiation 
strategy that does little to clarify the nature of each phenomenon and their 
interrelationship. This means that the experiential distinction used so far requires 
further empirical study; and so does the underlying intersubjective mechanism of 
each. When people simultaneously experience a sympathetic response and an 
empathic intuitive feeling, are these two co-existing phenomena? To my 
disappointment, I still do not have a confident answer to this. 
 I here make a tentative silent offer, but I believe that it is better to try and do 
our best rising up to the challenge, rather than bypassing the issue, or giving up, at the 





Implications and future research 
 
 There are reflections spread throughout these pages that put forward 
unanswered questions and tentative interpretative and explanative hypotheses. 
Moreover, the discussion section of each study points towards a few directions more 
closely connected with that particular study. Here, I expand upon a few of these, so 
that they may serve as points of departure for future research. 
I proposed that the scientific dialogue could benefit from the adoption of a 
distinction between studies on sympathy (interpersonal responses) and studies on 
empathy (interpersonal understandings). I also proposed that the knowing-responding 
criterion is not always theoretical and empirically free from criticism, and thereby 
merits further reflection. 
Three types of empathy-as-knowing phenomena came forward in this concluding 
chapter: intuitive, sympathetic and intellectual. This was an answer that was only 
possible to achieve after having conducted an extensive literature review and three 
empirical studies; and in itself this proposal addresses a few of the knowing-
responding criterion shortcomings. These appeared as distinctive psychological 
phenomena that were associated with distinctive knowing mechanisms, as three of the 
“myriad of methods” (Geist, 2009, p.67) at our disposal for the here-and-now 
understanding of another person. 
With regard to neurocognitive explanations, I suggested that these would 
benefit from revising their sympathy-as-knowing models. First, the ‘unconscious’ 
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criterion associated with their conception of contamination should be dropped, and 
so should the self-other merging assumption and the inference from felt-feeling 
explanation. Sympathetic understandings seemed to be associated with at the most 
we-projective knowing acts: not quite a dissolution of identities, nor an inference 
from the ‘I’ experience. Studies about contagion, sympathy and sympathetic 
understandings, even in this area, could perhaps more often introduce techniques 
that investigate participants’ lived experiences, so that the interpretation of the 
mirror neuron activation may be more clearly informed by the experiencing person’s 
input. There are only benefits in introducing these techniques, as I see it.  
In regards to phenomenological explanations, I suggested that they could 
perhaps dedicate themselves to the study of what direct empathy is and refine their 
evidence-based explanations, so that coupling (intuitively feeling) and contamination 
can be theoretically and experientially differentiated in a more explicit manner, 
inclusively in an evidence-based manner.  
These measures would settle some of my theoretical concerns in regards to 
contemporary empathy psychology research and their explanative models. Since 
science does not advance without a clear ‘universal’ use of scientific jargon, these are 
for me fundamental and practical suggestions.  
Intuitive understandings were the main concern of this thesis; and only these 
were given more considered attention. As a consequence of my academic and 
psychotherapeutic background, I have related many of the practical consequences of 
these studies to the practice of psychotherapy. I have been concerned with ways of 
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helping psychotherapists perform their tasks, and thereby improve the quality of the 
therapeutic work offered to clients.  
If we accept that we have at least three psychotherapeutic tools for the 
understanding  of the person in front us, then we should get acquainted with their 
deceptions and limits; their potentials; when, where and how these can be used to 
enhance the outcomes of therapy; and how each of these is received by the empathee. 
If we keep merging all of them in the general ‘empathy’ bag we will never achieve this.  
A cross-comparison, within or outside a therapeutic context, is most beneficial in any 
area of research. With this, the importance of studying inter-individual differences is 
born once more. 
Along the lines of a practice-based approach (Margison et al., 2000), reflecting 
upon one’s preferential ways of ‘empathically’ relating with others and training one’s 
prompt moment-to-moment distinction between that which is a sympathetic, intuitive 
or intellectual understanding seems, beneficial and possible, in the light of Stein’s 
writings.  
Viewing past interactions is a perceptive act, and the one which was guiding 
participants’ attention and reflection in the happy stories study’s interviews. It was a 
good method for investigating there-and-then, implicit, perceptive experiences, to 
enhance awareness of the perceptive elements that perhaps created the impression 
that the empathee was feeling ‘so and so’. However, this method was less effective for 
the investigation of the hypothetical experiential side of perceiving (if there is one). 
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To understand whether perceiving is always associated with an ‘implicit’ intuitive 
feeling (e.g., an experiential coupling mechanism), one should perhaps use alternative 
methods. Rather than continuing the unsuccessful pursuit of a ‘naturalistic setting’, a 
good starting point would be observing how the findings in Chapter V would change by 
priming participants’ attention, prior to the ‘pseudo-experimental situation’; or 
recruiting participants trained in mindfulness techniques (Hart, 1999) or introspection 
(Boring, 1953). 
Either way, for the study of intuitive experiences, it is fundamental that the 
empathee is genuinely experiencing a ‘state’. A picture of a muscular contraction 
resembling a smile does not count as an experience of happiness. At the most, one 
may intellectually interpret what that contraction probably, or conventionally, means. 
Direct empathy is concerned with genuine experiences – not their mere visible seen 
facet (overt behaviour). The stimulus must be non-artificial, for the intuitive knowing 
act to be possible. For example, for me, Jabbi et al.’s (2007, p.1745) photographs and 
Völlm et al.’s (2005) cartoon strips are, for me, largely illustrative, not expressive. 
There is a great difference between illustrations of emotions, say, a smiley (symbol); 
and a genuine experience-in-context. One can intellectually understand the meaning of 
an illustration, but one cannot intuit its inexistent or distorted experiential meaning.  
There have been increased attempts to approximate the quality of the stimuli 
used to research social understandings to naturalistic situations (e.g., Heavey, Phillips, 
Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 2000; Hess & Blairy, 2001). Despite this, experimental 
situations and tests such as Baron-Cohen’s continue to target intellectual 
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understandings of a single faceted pre-defined portrayed experience. There are 
choices, decontextualized body parts, and the like. Socially understanding another 
person becomes a mind game, a guess work. Although intellectual understandings are 
important, and so is their study, in the light of this thesis, social understandings are not 
limited to this type of experience.  
Intuiting is a here-and-now immediate sensitive and experiential understanding 
that happens naturally during social encounters, and often in a pre-reflective manner. 
Thus, tests and experimental situations that target intuitive understandings have to 
allow for the happening of more sensitive and experiential interactions, in regards to 
the empathee and the empathizer’s experiences (e.g., recordings of psychotherapeutic 
sessions, as with IPR).  
With regard to psychotherapy, I have some reservations about the potentials of 
sympathetic understandings. We are still a person in front of another person, with our 
own personal experiences of the world, engaged in a conversation that seeks to foster 
understanding (Hobson, 1985). But therapy is not a place to find ‘buddies’, to have a 
“warm feeling of togetherness” (Tarnopolsky, 1995). We cannot forget our place, our 
role as a therapist. I once had watery eyes in front of a patient of mine, whose grief 
moved me to such a point that day, for some unexpected reason, and although I 
realized that she was feeling sympathetically understood, I also felt her doubt about 
whether I would have the strength to stare at her grief in the face, along with her, and 
thereby help her. My sympathy was ambivalently received. Thereafter, I monitored 
more closely my sympathetic reactions. 
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Despite this, there are those who found ways of using our sympathetic reactions 
in a useful manner in psychotherapeutic contexts. This concerns the study of counter-
transference mechanism, that is, in simple terms, the therapists’ reactions to the 
clients’ projections (e.g., Hobson & Kapur, 2005). Counter-transferential (sympathetic, 
as called in this thesis; sometime called ‘empathic’, Tarnopolsky, 1995; Zepf & 
Hartmann, 2008) reactions to the clients can be of many kinds, but those easiest to 
understand here are based upon an identification mechanism.  
For example, the therapist feels despair and hopelessness when dealing with 
depressed people; an urge to talk when dealing with histrionic traits; and ego 
fragmentation and isolation when dealing with schizophrenic people. Most of these 
associations are put forward within a practice-based paradigm; it was the clinicians’ 
reflection upon their experiences that allowed for the establishment of these 
pathology-reactions associations. They inform the therapist, in an indirect manner, 
about the patient’s dilemma. Reik (1948) describes wonderfully how his reactions were 
sometimes fundamental and indirectly revealing of the patient’s conflicts.  
The point here is that some of these tools are being studied in fields other than 
those empathy-related, and a clearer, more uniform language could enables us to 
draw upon all this valuable knowledge produced in other speciality areas, and instigate 
the dialogue at least across psychological areas. This issue must be addressed once and 
for all, if we want to call ourselves a science. In parallel, exploring these 
understandings has potential benefits in any area that deals with interpersonal 
relationships, such as supervision, teaching, public relationships, communication, 
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marketing, advertising, performance, and law, just to name a few. More than that, we 
live in a social world, we are social beings. Effectively communicating with others is of 
transversal primordial importance; and an effective dialogue possibly instrument of 
‘peace’ and social agreement. 
Eckman (1996), emotions researcher, saw this potential when he observed that 
particular groups of people (e.g., abused children) were better than others (e.g., 
policemen) at spotting someone else’s emotions and ‘lies’. He proceeded to develop 
the F.A.C.E. training course, with which he trains people at spotting overall facial 
“micro”45 expressive emotional behaviour. This program is used in a wide range of 
fields, from law enforcement to emotion psychology research. It would be interesting 
to understand if what is being trained through this program is partly people’s 
awareness of their intuitive experiences, or exclusively people’s intellectual ‘inference 
from behaviour’ abilities, the  intellectual act that probably enhances the accuracy of  
the interpretation of the intuition (Stein, 1917). 
All these suggestions are my yet silent opinion, because I still feel that this is the 
beginning of something which might, or not at all, be a very interesting and useful way 











This thesis intended to make a contribution to the general empathy literature, 
but also provided a ‘positive psychology’ perspective on the interpersonal process 
literature about social understandings. The interest was upon what worked, upon the 
descriptions, qualities and meaning of intuitive knowing experiences from the 
empathizers and the empathees’ perspectives. For me, at least, this is a step forward, 
in that intuiting is brought into the empathy psychology literature, as a common, 
clearly theoretically and experientially defined, form of understanding others, of being-
with and relating with others.  
This concluding chapter delineates three types of understanding: intellectual, 
sympathetic and intuitive. This simple conclusion appears to me as a wonderful 
starting point for future research. Indeed, if I had this answer from the beginning, this 
would be precisely my opening sentence. It will, however, be my last: 
 
I understood that all things are real and different from each other 
I understood this with the eyes, never with the mind 
To understand this with the mind would be finding them all equal 
Fernando Pessoa46 
                                                 
46 Free and less beautiful translation of  a part of Fernando Pessoa’s  poem “Se, depois de eu morrer” (‘If, 
after I dye’), in Pessoa (1995/2001): 
Compreendi que as cousas são reais e todas diferentes umas das outras 
Compreendi isto com os olhos, nunca com o pensamento. 
































































Figure I.a: “Meneses, R.W. (2010) On Folk Psychology: Everyday Meanings of Empathy, 
Poster presented in the British Science Festival, Birmingham, United Kingdom; and in 
the 4th Annual Graduate School Research Poster Conference, University of 





























Table II.a: “Survey developed for the Folk Psychology study” 
 
 







"Stories of Empathy" 
University of Birmingham, School of Psychology 
Funded by: Hillary Green Empathy Fund 
 
Research student: 








Welcome to our WRITTEN INTERVIEW. The main AIM is to collect your own story of a lived empathic 
experience. We will do so mainly by open-ended questions. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely VOLUNTARY and you do not have to take part if you do not 
wish to. You are free to WITHDRAW, without giving a reason. 
 
There are no known RISKS associated to your participation and you will receive no direct benefit from 
taking part in this study, besides 1 research credit, or whatever has been previously accorded with the 
researchers. Nevertheless, if you encounter any unexpected effect, you can always get in touch with the 
researchers to request for help or information, through the contacts provided in the end of this section. 
 
VERBATIM EXTRACTS from your account may be included in dissemination. We will never use your true 
name, or whatever details included on your writings that may lead to an identification of the author 
(e.g., names of places and people). This is, pseudonyms will be used and the account will be fully 
ANONYMIZED. Every effort will be taken to protect the names of participants. All information you 
provide will be kept CONFIDENTIAL, except as governed by law; and it may be looked at I understand 
that data collected during the study may be looked at by individuals from the University of Birmingham, 
and from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. The interview 
should take no more than 30 minutes to complete. It has 10 questions, spread along 4 pages. Six of 
these questions concern demographics and are concentrated on the last page. 
 
We hope that you find it interesting and rewarding. 
 
If you AGREE to participate in the above conditions, please give you CONSENT by 
ticking the box below. 
1. General Information 
I GIVE my consent 









Here are some tips to help you to answer the next two questions: 
• Choose RECENT situations, if possible; 
• If you can, try to RE-CAPTURE or re-imagine the event. This may help to recall the situation more 
VIVIDLY and in DETAIL. 
 
Please DO NOT WORRY about: 
• Giving a “correct answer” - this isn't a test! 
• Getting the “facts absolutely right” - we are interested in how you now recall the event; 
• How much you have written - please write as much as you need to, in order for us to understand what 
happened accurately; 
• Spelling or grammar. 
 
Please DO include any relevant CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION that you are able to remember. For 
example: 
• When did it happened? 
• Where were you? 
• What were you doing? 
• What was going on? 
 
2. Please tell us a story of empathy from your own experience, that is, about a time when you have 
experienced empathy. 
 
[The box below does not limit the length of your answer. Please write as much as you like] 
 
 
3. A Person 
 
3. If you have described an event involving someone in particular, is this person... 
Acquaintance 












4. A Concept 
  
4. Could you please define empathy? What is empathy for you?  





This is the last page. Thank you for your collaboration. You make this research possible. 
If you find that you feel upset by your participation, or if you would like to discuss any issues relating to 
your participation in the research, you can find us here: Rita Meneses - ; Michael 
Larkin - . 
Alternatively, you can contact the Student Counselling Service: . 
 
5. Please, leave a COMMENT about the experience of doing this interview online. 
For instance, tell us whether 
........it was boring, or, instead, you enjoyed it, 
........the questions were clear, or, instead, unclear, 
........you did not quite know what to answer, or it was easy to answer, 
........there was too much, or too little, information 
........there was a party going on next door and you couldn't quite concentrate 
........you were in a hurry 
...................and so forth. ANYTHING that you might have felt or thought. 
 











8. Nationality  
 




















Table III.a: “Folk Psychology study: non-comprehensive coding agenda for empathy-as-



















When no other 
category, and no 
other procedure, 
can be applied to 
better represent 
the meaning unit. 
 
Lived Experience: 
#2; #3; #8; #13; 
#17; #22; #24; 
#47; #48; #59; 
#60, N=11 
  #2: “I did this and he was happy 
with his new present”;  
 
#3:  “She was clearly upset and 
confused by the situation”;  
 
#13: “He had to have an 
operation and was in a lot of 
pain”;  
 
#24: “At first she was quite 
calm about it” 
 
#47: “Pleased that she felt she 
could tell me because I would 
understand.” 
 
 #59: “The lady had not long 
had an operation on her knee, 






The content of 
subject-object 
conversation is 







#4; #6; #9; #16; 
#24; #28; #31; 
#33; #34; #36; 








#4: “he called me back. His 
whole family was organizing the 
funeral and he was under a lot 
of pressure to be the ‘man’ and 
trying to be stronger than the 
female family members. The 
only thing I could do is 
listening” 
 
#9: “I was on the train to 
university about a month ago 
and was sat next to a really nice 
lady who opened up to me and 
told me about how she has just 
been through the worst 18 
months of her life” 
 
#31: “This upset him greatly (...) 
I found out the information 
from him whilst at work (behind 
a bar) as he came down to have 
a chat.” 
 
#42: “when my housemate 
talked about her dad having a 
brain tumour. how when he 




about it, either to her family, 
who were a part of it too, or her 
friends, who did not 
understand” 
 
 #54: “She said that her 
daughter had been feeling quite 
upset about the recent death of 
a grandparent and that she just 
wanted to keep me informed of 
the situation. It transpired that 
the death had actually occurred 
two months earlier but that the 
little girl had not mentioned 
how she had been feeling until 
the night before her mother 
told me what was happening 
because she didn't want to 
make her mum feel more upset 











#8; #11; #12; 
#14; #15; #16; 
#17;#18; #20; 
#24; #29; #35; 
#37; #40; #50; 
#51; #53; #55; 
#56; #59, N=20 
 
Definition: 
#14; #24; #30; 










related word as 





leaves the visual 
impression of 



















relating these two 
aspects in an 
Perception of experience: 
#11: “to see my mum go 
through so much pain” 
 
#51: “I felt empathy for the 
parents in the family as they 
were finding it difficult to do 
their jobs with a needy toddler 
on hand!” 
 
#59: “I could see she was 
getting worked up and in the 
end sat back down” 
 
Appearances of experience: 
#29: “The dog apparently felt 
very uncomfortable about its 
conditions”;  
 
#40: “he was as friendly as 
usual but seemed a little 
vulnerable, and trying too hard 
to be normal” 
 




#8: “pained voices" 
 
#40: “This day, however, he was 
stumbling over his words but 
almost enthusiastically so.”  
Perception of experience: 
#14: “For instance if my little 
sister cries I feel like crying, 
because it is painful watching 
someone in pain (physical or 
emotional)” 
 
#51: “For me, empathy is 




















#50: “awareness of the 
experience of another person 





explicit form.  
 
 
#55: “when my housemate 
called me in a panic and 
distress” 
 
Behaviour and experience: 
#12: “the speaker stumbled and 
lost their place and became 
flustered” 
 
 #15: “I appreciated how alone 
she was feeling and how she 
was questioning her own 
behaviour” 
 
#17: “and could see the tears in 
his eyes as he tried to get his 
brimming talkative boss off the 
phone (…) I heard his voice 
crack as he was finally saying 
goodbye” 
 
#53: “Well she was sitting 
there, with a friend I presume, 
and she was becoming quite 
upset about it, but didn't do 
anything because of feeling 
intimidated, like the rest of us 
at the front (...) feeling so 
incensed about the whole 
facade, the victim got off the 







Behaviour and experience: 
#24: “or you are upset because  
someone you love is crying 
and upset” 
 
#53: “For me, empathy is 
being able to tell how a person 













#4; #8; #18; #19; 




#1; #3; #4; #5; 
#13; #16; #18; 











#5; #18; #54 
 
#5: “A lady-cleaner was 
following behind and without 
any ask directed me to the right 
way” 
 
 #8: “I feel their desperation in 
their pained voices” 
 
 #18:” After a few minutes I 
looked up and glanced at her 
back and just had the feeling 
that all was not well with her, 
so I sent her an email just 
asking her if she was Ok”;  
 
54: “because the feelings of 
both the mother (and her child) 
were so palpable. I could almost 
feel what the mother was 
feeling; concern for her 
#5: “Empathy for me means 
that another person feels what 






#18: “Empathy for me is when 
you kind of get a feeling of 
how someone's feeling 








#24; #35; #45; 
#54; #57; #61, 
N=16 
 
daughter, sadness at her loss 
and the fact that her daughter 











#1; #2; #4; #6; 
#12; #16; #17; 
#21;#22;  #35; 
#38; #50; #52; 




#2; #3; #4; #6; 
#7; #8; #9; #10; 
#12; #13; #14; 
#15; #16; #19; 
#21; #23; #27; 
#38;#39; #46; 
#49; #50; #54;  






to imagine how 
one would feel 
 
Lived: 




#2; #6; #27; #39; 




Explicitly to put 
oneself in the 
other’s shoes to 
imagine another’s 
point of view/ 
experience; or 





#2; #4; #12; #17; 
#21;#22;  #52; 
#56; #59, N=10 
 
Definition: 
#2; #4; #7; #12; 
#10; #15; #19; 




Whenever it as 
unclear which 
meaning, and it is 








#2: “I thought that, in his 
position I would not have come 
to a work place each day in 
which I was so unfairly treated, 
and that I would have handled 
the situation differently to the 
way he did” 
 
#6: “and led to me considering 
the feeling she was going 
through and how I would cope 
in that situation” 
 
#50: “I cannot imagine how 




#2: “if I had not done this, then 
maybe he wouldn’t have gotten 
into trouble”;  
 
#17: “I knew how bad this 
would be for his confidence in 
his abilities (…). I empathised 
with him and his feelings as i 
knew he would be gutted and 
scared, he's just taken on a 
mortgage and due to the 
previous redundancy, now has 
a patchy cv. (…) and now, for 
the foreseeable, he wasn't 
going to be happy”;  
 
#22: “that I can't imagine what 
I'm going to be like when he 
actually gets the job!”;  
 
#52: “As she comes from a large 
traditional Asian family where 
relatives tend to flock to your 
house at happy and sad times 
(no matter how inconvenient), I 
knew she would like to see 
some friendly faces, and went 




#2: “A feeling that you can 
imagine (…) that you would 
not want to be in that 
situation yourself” 
 
#6: “Being able to put yourself 
into someone else's situation 
and attempt to grasp the 
emotions that they are 
experiencing at that time”  
 
#46: “Could put myself in the 
shoes of these children and try 
to imagine these horrible 




#2: “A feeling that you can 
imagine what it would be like 
for them in a particular 
situation, that you imagine it 
would not feel good for them 
to be in this situation”;  
 
#4: “It creates a safe 
environment, the ability to put 
oneself into the mental shoes 
of another person”;  
 
#7: “For me empathy is 
understanding the feelings and 
thoughts of others from their 
perspective. It is relating to the 
situation the person is 
experiencing and putting 
yourself in their shoes”;  
 
 
#19: “It is 'putting yourself in 
in someone else's shoes' and 
seeing the world from their 
point of view” 
 
#23: “When (…) you can 
imagine how they are feeling if 
something bad has happened 
to them or upset them” 
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#3; #8; #9; #13; 
#14; #16; #38; 
#49  N=11 
 
Imagined Feeling 








#1; #3; #13; #16; 
#35; N=6 
 
#59: “i could imagine that in her 
shoes she had changed from 
being largely independent, to 
reliant on people helping her 
stand, and she felt very down 
about it”;  
 
General: 
#1: “I had empathy for her as I 
was trying to imagine what it 
would be like not to have 
access to parental care when it 
is needed” 
 
#16: “and I really had a strong 
sense of what that must have 
been like”; #38: “The feeling of 
uncertainty engendered by the 
conversation has stayed with 
me for the rest of the morning - 




#35: “The language she was 
using was emotive and strong 
and I couldn't help but reflect 
what she was feeling.” 
 
 #60: “being able to imagine 
someone’s feelings or to be 





#3: “by putting yourself 
hypothetically in their 
situation.” 
 
##16: “For me empathy is 
about walking a mile in 
another FFDV persons shoes.”  
 
#49: “Empathy is literally being 
able to put yourself into 






#1: “Empathy is about being 
able to experience or feel 
something that someone else 
has been through” 
 
#3: “Empathy for me is trying 
to understand how another 
person feels, by putting 
yourself hypothetically in their 
situation (…)  you simply are 










#1; #2; #7; #12; 
#15;  #20; #21; 
#22; #28; #34;  
#36; #38; #39; 
#40; #41; #42; 
#43; #44; #47; 
#49; #53; #55; 
#57; #60; #61; 
#62 N=26 
Literal: 





#2; #12; #15;  
#20; #21; #28; 
#34;  #36; #39; 
#40; #42; #43; 
#44; #47; #55; 




#12; #26; #28; 
#36; #41: #42; 
#43; #55, N=8 
Literal: 
#2: “I was particularly aware 
that he was only imitating what 
I had been doing and if I had 
not done this, then maybe he 
wouldn't have gotten into 
trouble” 
 
#12: “I could empathise with 
the speaker as I have recently 
had to do a talk in which 
towards the end I had a 
moment of confusion because I 
had talked about a point too 
early which 'threw me' when it 
was written on the next slide.”;  
 
#21: “The reason for this is that 
Literal:  
#12: “This is most likely to 
happen when you have 
experienced the situation 
previously yourself”;  
 
#41: “Empathy is having a 
substantial understanding 
(essentially first-hand 
experience) of a situation and 
recognising that it is 
experienced by other people 
too” 
 
#43: “Empathy to me only 
occurs after the same event 
has happened to you directly 





#12; #26; #28; 
#36; #40; #41; 
#42; #43; #47; 














#40; #47, N=2 
 
Identification: 
Self is similar to 

















experience in the 









when I was 14 I lost my best 
friend, and whenever I used to 
get upset about it I used to get 
a tight feeling in my chest, a 
small pain with a feeling of 
breathlessness just because i 
found the situation 
overwhelmingly sad (…) I felt 
like I wanted to cry, even 
though I had never even met 
her brother but just because I 
felt so bad that she was going 
through what i struggled 
through and hated to think that 
she might feel alone”; 28: ”I had 
gone through her exact same 
problem a few months ago 
(both of our boyfriends felt we 
planned our lives too much) so I 
felt I could empathise with 
her”;  
 
#36: “I had been through a very 
similar experience a couple of 
years back and the words she 
was saying echoed my thoughts 
from back then” 
 
#47: “Also she was longing to 
tell someone but didn't want to 
appear to be boasting and I 
knew exactly how she felt, 
having been in similar positions 
when my daughter was 
accepted at Cambridge and 
then, later, successfully 
completed a PhD”;  
 
#60: “I myself went to a very 
small school in the middle of 
the countryside so I feel great 
empathy for him because he 





#7: “I felt that although i could 
empathize with her because i 
have had family members who 
have been sick and others who 
have died, i couldn’t fully 
understand her situation 
the exact same situation must 
have happened or very 
similar”;  
#55: “Empathy is 
understanding how another 
person feels due to your own 
experience of life (…) In a way I 
see it as a way of relating to 







































#40: “Empathy to me means 
the understanding of the 
situation of others by having 
experienced similar oneself. 
This may be by being able to 
translate one situation into 
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because i have not lost any 
close family members” 
 
#49: “Although the deaths were 
difference it was the feeling of 
loss, and in a sense relief was 
very very similar, they also 
occurred at roughly the same 
time. My grandfather died just 
before Christmas. he had been 
in hospital for a couple of 
weeks before he passed away 
in his sleep. He was very old, 
but until his stay in hospital had 
been an average 90 year old 
man, with ok health and no 
need for real medical health. 
However, while in hospital his 
health deteriated so greatly he 
wouldn’t have been able to 
come home from the hospital 
without full time medical help. 
He passed away in his sleep, 
after having his morning wash 
and cup of tea. It was peaceful, 
painless and something i think 
we would all wish for. On the 
other hand my friends 
grandmother had been ill for 
some time and had been in 
pain. My friend had to watch 
her deteriate, it was painful and 
slow. The fact they happened at 
similar times meant i could 
completely empathise with, it 




#53: “didn't do anything 
because of feeling intimidated, 
like the rest of us at the front” 
 
#57: “As a mother found myself 
empathising with her because 
she had tried for all those years 




#43: “It wasn't until I was 18 
and felt true empathy when I 
myself became ill with chronic 
another” 
 
#47: “and is based on having 
had an experience oneself 
which is roughly (sometimes 


































#57: “empathy is when I 
identify with someone else’s  
feelings  to the extent that I 








#61: “Feeling someone else’s 
pain and understanding it to 
the extent you feel it yourself” 
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anxiety and depression that I 
knew exactly how she felt. To 
feel empathy I think not only do 
you have to be near them, you 
have to feel those symptoms 













is, the knowledge 






about the other 














#4; #13;  #18; 
#19; #26; #27; 
#29; #40; #45; 
















#4: “I was calling him back but 
there was no reply. This was 
not a surprise to me; it is rather 
common that he deals with 
difficult situations in such a 
manner” 
 
#19: “I could tell that she was 
really nervous, because she was 
blushing bright red everywhere 
and her hands were shaking 
slightly. She looked flustered 
and fell over some of her longer 
words” 
 
#26: “As I had been in lectures 
with him and were assisting 
each other in doing the 
practical based coursework, I 
knew how much had gone into 
it and how much work he had 
lost” 
 
#53: “On this particular 
afternoon, the people at the 
back were throwing various 
items (food, mostly) towards 
people at the front - I don't 
know why, maybe because they 
wanted to liven up the journey 
or they wanted to give out the 
impression they were tough, 
whatever” 
Reasoning: 
#26: “Empathy is the 
realisation and 
acknowledgment of another 
person’s current bad situation. 
Knowing what has happened 
to them through close contact 
or personal experience of a 







#45: “Simply "The act of being 
able to feel what others are 








usually as an 










#3; #6; #7; #38; 




#1; #3; #4; #6; #7; 
Understand: 
#3: “and I was trying to 
understand how she felt” 
 
#6: “My friend recently suffered 
a miscarriage and during a 
telephone call to her I was able 
to try to understand the 
feelings she was experiencing” 
 
 #40: “That feeling of being 
vulnerable and put on 
medication to make me better 
Understand: 
#3:” Empathy for me is trying 
to understand how another 
person feels, by putting 
yourself hypothetically in their 
situation. This allows you to 
understand the person's 
feelings and thoughts, in a way 
that you couldn't otherwise. 
Empathy is different to 
sympathy in that you do not 
feel badly for the person, you 
simply are trying to feel what 
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#9; #12; #13; #15; 
#16; #17; #19; 
#21; #23; #24; 
#28; #34; #35; 
#36; #40; #41; 
#42; #44; #45; 
#47; #48; #49; 










#7; #21; #22; #28; 
#36; #44;  #55 
N=7 
from an unseen illness, being 
reliant on others, but hiding 
what the matter was, trying to 
be normal. You'd have to have 
been there to understand” 
 
#47: “So I was very pleased for 
her and for him and also 
pleased that she felt she could 
tell me because I would 
understand. Also grateful to my 
daughter who had made me 
able to empathise”; #49: “I 
think because we knew each of 
us knew the pain the other felt, 
it was hard to sit and talk about 








Only twice, never in a as a 
meaning of empathy, rather 
used for narrative purposes: 
#32; #61 
they feel”;  
 
#12: “Empathy is when you 
can understand how a person 
is feeling in a certain situation 
and put yourself in their shoes. 
This is most likely to happen 
when you have experienced 
the situation previously 
yourself” 
 
#17: Empathy is when you 
intellectually understand what 
someone is going through but 
you have not got personal 
experience of their situation” 
 
#34: Empathy for me is when 
you understand (somewhat) 
the emotions someone else is 
going through and feel 
something for them”;  
 
Relate: 
 #22: “Being able to relate to 
how someone feels, regardless 
of whether its good or bad, 
almost as if you feel their 
emotions yourself” 
 
#55: “In a way I see it as a way 














Table III.b: “Folk Psychology study: non-comprehensive coding agenda for empathy-as-
responding categories (personal responses to another’s experience/ situation, 



















#1; #2;  #6; #8; 
#9; #14; #17; 
#20; #23; #25; 
#26; #27; #30; 
#31; #33; #34; 
#35; #43; #45; 
#49; #50; #51; 
#56; #59; #60; 
#61; #62, N=29 
 
#50; #56;  
Definition: #1; 
#2; #8; #10; 
#11; #14; #27; 
#29; #30; 
#31;#33; #34;  
#40; #56, N=14 
Pity: 
To experience a 
negative emotion 





#2;  #8; #14; #17; 
#20; #23; #25; #26; 
#30; #31; #33; #35; 




#2; #8; #14; 




























#1; #6; #8; #9; #27; 
#34; #45; #49; #50; 
#51; #56; #59; #60; 
Pity: 
#2: “I remember feeling very 
bad for the staff member” 
 
#14: “For some strange reason  
I felt really, really sorry for him 
when I saw him walking around 
the restaurant and eating (…) I 
felt so sorry for him” 
 
#17: “I was devastated for him” 
 
#20: “I felt really sorry for her” 
 
#26: “I felt absolutely gutted for 
him” 
 
#31: “and I felt quite sorry for 
him”;  
 
#43: “My mum felt hopeless, 






#22: “so hearing he had got 
through made me so happy for 
him... possibly happier than he 
was himself” 
 





#1: “I experienced strong 
feelings of empathy on Friday 
night (…) I had empathy for her 
as I was trying to imagine”;  
 
#6: “and the sympathy towards 
her” 
 
#49: “i had full empathy for 
her” 
Pity: 
#2: “Empathy Is a feeling of 
sadness for someone else” 
 
#8: “Empathy Is when you feel 
sorry for someone or a group 
of people” 
 
#14: “Feeling sorry for 
someone ...not like pity”;  
#29: “and feel very sorry to 
the man/animal, who is 
experiencing a bad/sad 
things” 
 
#30: “It is when that 
'something' hasn't happened 
to you but you can't help but 
feel sorry for that person” 
#56: “Empathy, for me, is 

















#1: “Feeling for the other 
person””; 
 
#27: “Feeling sympathy for 
someone.” 
 
#31: “Empathy is the emotion 








#1; #10; #11; #27; 
#31; #34; #40  N=7 
 
 
#51: “I felt empathy for the 
parents”;  
 



















#4; #19; #22; 
#24; #38; #39; 




#4; #19; #20; 
#22; #23; #24; 
#25;   #35; #38; 
#39; #50; #52; 








To feel, or think, 




To be connected to 
another person, or 


















#4: “I was in shock and even 
that I only met him few times I 
could feel the pain my 
boyfriend was experiencing” 
 
 #24: “and i shared her feelings 
of uncertainty for her, for we 
were very close” 
 
#44: “The entire group in fact 
appeared to share at least some 
of her experiences/concerns in 
their own relationships” 
 
#57: “I had shared in her pain 
and desperation as she felt she 
was being ignored. When her 
daughter died I shared her 
sense of shock, grief and anger” 
 
Feel similarly: 
#19: “I became aware during 
her practice talk that I was 
starting to feel nervous too, my 
heartbeat and breathing 
seemed to increase watching 
her and I had this overall sense 
of anxiety, when there was no 
need for me to feel nervous I 
had already done my practice 
talk). This nervousness only 
ended when she finished” 
 
 #22: “possibly happier than he 




#58: “(…) allowed profound 
change and immediate 
connection to all the moments 
and interconnected whole that 
ego packaged into bodies, 
nations and days, there was the 
seeing, the feeling without the 
division.” 
Share: 
#4: “It means to share, to 
experience the feelings of 
another person” 
 
#20: “the ability share another 
person’s emotions or feelings 
and how it impacts on you”  
#24: “It is also like sharing an 
emotion or the reason of an 
emotion with someone. For 
example, you and your sister 
are both upset because your 
dog died, or you are upset 
because someone you love is 
crying and upset” 
 







#19: “Empathy is feeling what 
another person is feeling. So if 
someone was really sad about 
something, you would feel sad 
too for [because of] them” 
 
 #22: “almost as if you feel 
their emotions yourself” 
 
 #23: “When you experience 
similar feelings to someone 
else (…) if something bad has 
happened to them or upset 




#24: “Empathy for me is when 
you are on the same 
wavelength as someone else 
on an emotional level. You 




#25: “Empathy is a feeling of 
emotion from one person to 
another and I see it is similar 

























about the other 














#2; #4; #8; #9; 
#10; #11; #14; 
#15; #17; #20; 
#21; #22; #24; 
#27; #30; #35; 
#38; #43; #47; 













#14; #20; #21; #24; 







Any form of 
reaction, in any 
level of 
experiencing, to the 
knowledge of the 
foreign experience; 





#2; #4; #8; #9; #10; 
#11; #15; #17; #20; 
##22; #27; #35; 




#2;#11; #15; #20; 
#27; #29; #30; #37; 
#47; #56, N=10 
 
Emotional distress: 
#14: “I felt so sorry for him that 
I almost felt sick and couldn't 
eat my own food.” 
 
#20: “Seeing her cry made me 
really upset, on the verge of 
making me cry too” 
 
#24: “A lump was brought to 
my throat” 
 
#30: “I started to cry (…) 3 days 
later, and I still can't get over 
the shock of it! (…) and I really 
didn't feel like eating for the 
rest of the evening!”; 
 
 #50: “He began to cry at one 
moment and I wept for him 
myself; and so I wept for him as 
I watched (…) his removal by 
the factional party machine 




#2: “I remember feeling very 
bad (…) about how he was 
being unfairly treated”; #4: “I 
was in shock and even that I 
only met him few times”;  
 
#9: “and most importantly i 
think what stuck with me is that 
she was really looking forward 
to the new year so she could 
put all this behind her. she was 
really nice and somebody who 
you could admire” 
 
#15: “I had similar experiences 
with him myself and so I felt 
annoyed with him that he is still 
treating people in this way. She 
is not manipulative at all and is 
very much a team player so his 
Emotional distress: 
#14: “For instance if my little 

























#2: “and that you would not 
want to be in that situation 
yourself” 
#15: “I don't necessarily feel 
the same emotions that they 
were feeling at the time but I 
have a strong emotional 
reaction to their experience, 
such as feeling angry when 
someone has been hurt and 
upset” 
 
#20: “and how it impacts on 
you”  
#29: “Empathy means 
someone has a kind of 
reaction to the man/animal, 
who is experiencing a bad/sad 
things” 
#47: “This usually involves 
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#2;#11;  #14; 
#15; #20; #27; 
#29; #30; #37; 
#47; #56 N=11 
comments are completely 
unjustified”;  
 
#17: “I heard his voice crack as 
he was finally saying goodbye 
and tears welled up in my eyes. 
I remembered last time he was 
out of work and he just wants 
so much to work hard and do 
well and it seems so unfair”;  
 
#22: “I felt really proud. So 
proud in fact, that I can't 
imagine what I'm going to be 
like when he actually gets the 
job!” 
 
#35: “I felt some strong 
feelings, one being pity. Others 
included sadness, anger and 
frustration.” 
some kind of emotional 
response”; #56: “In this case, I 
also felt grateful that this 
person had put his life on the 











#4; #5; #6; #7; #15; 
#17; #18; #20; #24; 
#28; #30; #32; #36; 
#40; #43; #45; #48; 
#52; #53; #54; #55;  
#61; #62 N=23 
 
Definition: 
#4; #27; #28; #29; 
#30; #32; #43; #45; 
#48; #51; #54; #56; 
#59 N=13 
#6: “This helped in the advice I 
was able to give” 
 
#7: “I decided not to go into 
work and went to her house to 
offer support. I went to hers 
and talked to her and asked if 
she needed anything”;  
 
#20: “It was good in a way 
because I could help and 
possibly explain things but it 
generally made me feel bad 
about what had happened in 
the past” 
 
#30: “I really felt like giving him 
a huge hug” 
 
#36: “i tried to reassure her 
that she would come through it 
ok and listened to her talking it 
through”;  
 
#40: “I instinctively felt 
protective towards him, almost 
maternal. I relaxed from my 
usual 'speaking to the 
neighbours charade' and just 
warmed to him, and gave him 
time” 
 
#28: “Provide genuine support 
to them in order to help them 
out due to your life 
experience”;  
 
#29: “Empathy means I show 
my kindness (…) If possible, I 
would like to offer some help 
to the unlucky man/animal” 
 
#32: “Empathy is the action of 
showing kindness to a 
person”;  
 
#45: “and perhaps includes 
the actions taken which you 
believe will make them feel 
more positive or different”;  
 
#51: “and wanting to help 
them out of that situation”;  
 
#54: “Empathy ought to be 
motivating, it ought to make 
you want to behave in a 
certain way; a way which 
respects the feelings of 
others”; #56: “For me, the 
amazing thing about empathy 
is when it inspires you to take 
some sort of step to prevent 
someone feeling such pain 
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#61: ”My friend calls me when 
everyone is asleep and just cries 
down the phone to me and 
there is nothing i can do but tell 
her i am here for her and try 









Table III.c: “Folk Psychology study: non-comprehensive coding agenda for contextual 
categories (contextual dimensions, that is, not  relative to meanings of empathy)” 
 
Dimension Definition Lived experience Meaning 
units 














#10; #19; #24; 





#2; #4; #6; #9; 
#14; #15; #17; 
#18; #20; #22; 
#24; #26; #27; 
#28; #29; #30; 
#31; #34; #39; 
#40; #41; #43; 
#45; #46; #47; 
#48; #49; #50; 
#52; #55; #57; 
#58; #60; #61, 
N=34 
Fondness: 
Direct references to 
the subject’s 
affective 





to the degree of 





to one’s knowledge 
about the chosen 
object and its life 
experiences, prior 





#9: “I really felt for her and she 
was a lovely lady and most 
importantly i think what stuck 
with me is that she was really 
looking forward to the new year 
so she could put all this behind 
her. She was really nice and 
somebody who you could 
admire” 
 
29:”I like this dog very much”;  
 
#40:” He's a very nice man 
whose name I do not know but 
has always been really bubbly 




 #18:” We are pretty close 
friends so maybe I just picked 
up on some sort of body 
language from her”;  
 
#24:” i shared her feelings of 




#20: “My housemates boyfriend 
recently broke up with her a 
couple of days ago” 
 
Fondness: 
#24: “or you are upset 
because  someone you 
love is crying and upset” 
 
#40: “I think an element of 
likeability comes into this, 
if a dangerous criminal 
with a penchant for the 
torturing or murdering of 
other people was in a 
similar situation, I think 
that knowledge would 
prevent me from 
empathising with him” 
 
#54: “you don't even have 
to like them very much” 
 
Closeness: 
#10: “Empathy (…) is highly 
important in close 
relationships” 
 
 #19: “For me, empathy is 
about connecting to other 
people, both people close 
and not close to you” 
 
Familiarity: 
#26: “Knowing what has 





#61: “It has been ongoing since 
i have known my friend, and is 
trouble with her parents and 
family” 
#54: “I don't think you 
need to know someone in 
order to experience 
empathy,” 
Target’s role Reception  
Descriptions of how 
the participant is 












#5; #25; #32; #N=3 
#5: “I was in a hotel looking for 
a swimming pool. Could not 
find and was distressed. A lady-
cleaner was following behind 
and without any ask directed 
me to the right way. Felt very 
helpful”;  
 
#25: “I received empathy from 
my family then, and then from 
various friends and especially at 
the funeral” 
 
#49: “The fact they happened 
at similar times meant i could 
completely empathises with, it 
was other our first experience 
of loss” 
#11: “Empathy for me is 
sadness and sympathy” 
 
#25: “Empathy is a feeling 
of emotion from one 
person to another” 
 
#58: “Intimate emotional 
connection” 
 Resonance 










all the remainder, 
N=59 
#24: “i shared her feelings of 
uncertainty for her, for we were 
very close” 
#24: “You feel what they 
feel and understand why 












#3; #22; #25; #50; 
#52; #62, N=6 
 
Lived experience 
#22; #47; #58 
#22: “hearing he had got 
through made me so happy for 
him.” 
 
#47: “Pausing in cleaning the 
village primary school a few 
days ago to be told by one of 
the teachers that her son had 
just had his finals results and 
he'd got a first (…) So I was very 
pleased for her and for him” 
 
#58: “Profound and beautiful, 
moments from distant past and 
recent present were equally 
accessible and radiant, whether 
the smile of a stranger or the 
hug from a friend, or the dew 
#3: “Empathy is different 
to sympathy in that you do 
not feel badly for the 
person”;  
 
#22: “regardless of 
whether its good or bad” 
 
#50: “This may be good or 
bad” 
 
#62: “Feeling a similar 
emotion (Usually sadness, 
anger, frustration although 











#2; #8; #11; #14; 
#15; #19; #23; #24; 
#26; #27; #29; #30; 
#33;  #37; #43; #46; 
#48; #51; #55; #56; 
#57; #61, N=22 
 
Lived experience: 
all the remainder, 
N=59 
#48: “Out of work I like to think 
I'm empathetic to anyone - 
family and friends who have a 
difficult situation to deal with - 
bereavement; ill health/hospital 
appointments; job loss; 
relationship break down etc.” 
´#2: “Empathy is a feeling 
of sadness for someone 
else” 
 
#11:” Empathy for me is 
sadness” 
 
#19: “So if someone was 
really sad about 
something, you would feel 
sad too”  
 
#37: “It’s a sad feeling. 
Something that makes me 
feel low” 
 
#48: “someone else's 
difficult situation”; #51: 
“For me, empathy is seeing 
someone in a difficult 
situation” 
 
#55: “This could be 
bereavement, suffering 
from an illness, a breakup 
















#14, #24; N=2 
 
Lived:  
#2; #4; #5; #8; #11; 
#12; #13; #14; #16; 
#17; #18; #19; #20; 
#24; #26; #27; #29; 
#30; #32; #35; #36; 
#40; #43; #45; #50; 
#51; #52;#53; #54; 
#55; #56; #59; #61, 
N=33 
#8: “when a police officer came 
out of nowhere and starting 
hitting the beggars as if they 
were rag dolls” 
 
#43: “my mum was out of work 
as all she was doing was being 
sick and locking herself away in 
her bedroom.” 
 
#52: “A few of the older women 
had even forced her to look at 
her dead mother before the 
body was taken away, even 
though she explicitly said that 
she'd rather remember her 
mum as she was when she was 
alive” 
#14: “if my little sister 
cries”; #24: “someone you 




Reference to verbal 
information about 
another’s situation. 
#1: “I was reading the book (…). 
It detailed how one female 
serial killer had an awful 
#4: “way of listening and 
responding to another 
person that improves 
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 Empathizer a 
listener or a reader. 
 
 
Definition: #4, N=1 
 
Lived: #1; #2; #3; 
#4; #6; #7;# 8; #9; 
#10;#15; #16; #17; 
#20;# 21;#22; #23; 
#24; #25; #28; #31; 
#32; #33; #34; #35; 
#36; #37; #38;#40; 
#41; #42; #44; #45; 
#47; #50; #52;#54; 
#55; #59; #62, 
N=39    
 
upbringing with parents who 
were less than caring and ideal. 
Her father was imprisoned for 
sexual deviance and her mother 
abandoned her when she was 6 
months old (…) I had empathy 
for her as I was trying to 
imagine what it would be like 
not to have access to parental 
care” 
 
#4: “He wrote that his nephew 
just died that morning as he 
was involved in a car crash. His 
birthday was due to take place 
in two weeks’ time” 
 
#44: “I was able to empathise 
with her situation having been 
in a similar position myself 
some years ago.”  
mutual understanding and 




























Table IV.a: “Folk Psychology study: Examples of categorized of paired stories and 
definition texts (chosen randomly by SPSS v.16; ‘exactly’ 10 out of 62 cases, with the 
help of SPSS v.16, incredibly leading to a selection of only nine)” 
 
 
Nr. Lived Experience (L) Definition (D) Categories 
1 I experienced strong feelings of 
empathy on Friday night whilst 
reading a book about the lives of 
serial killers. I was reading the book 
whilst getting ready to go out for the 
weekend. Everyone else was out 
visiting friends in hospital. It detailed 
how one female serial killer had an 
awful upbringing with parents who 
were less than caring and ideal. Her 
father was imprisoned for sexual 
deviance and her mother abandoned 
her when she was 6 months old 
[Verbal information; Emotionally 
negative]. It struck me how very 
different her life must have been to 
my own growing up [Analogy Non-
literal]. I had empathy for her as I 
was trying to imagine what it would 
be like not to have access to parental 
care when it is needed [Imagined 
general; Sympathy for; Resonance] 
Empathy is about being 
able to experience or 
feel something that 
someone else has been 
through [Resonance; 
Feel another’s/ 
imagined]. It involves 
not just understanding 
[Understanding] but 
feeling for the other 
person [Sympathy for]. 
It is a complex feeling 
which I find quite 
difficult to truly 












D: Understand, Feel 
another’s/ imagined 




D. Sympathy for/ feel for 
L:  Sympathy for 
/“empathy for” 
9 I was on the train to university about 
a month ago and was sat next to a 
really nice lady who opened up to me 
and told me about how she has just 
been through the worst 18months of 
her life [Verbally Communicated 
Knowledge]. She had suffered from 
grade 3 cancer and she seemed so 
brave even after all that she had been 
through [Impact]. She'd had many 
operations and she was telling me 
how she felt; she wasn't scared 
anymore because once you have had 
the first treatment you get over 
feeling scared, but she felt sad that 
she had put her family through such a 
traumatic time, especially losing out 
on her son's young teenage years, she 
also felt angry that when she was 
checked 2 years ago, the consultant 
missed the growth. She was going for 
her last radiotherapy treatment and 
she was feeling uneasy because she 
wanted to make sure that it had all 
gone; she was struggling to take the 
to me it is the power and 
the ability to put yourself 
in somebody's situation 
so you can understand 
their feelings and what 
they have been through 
[Resonance; Imagined 
general; Understand by 
Perspective-taking]. 
Empathy IS: Knowing 
Context: 
D:  Resonance 




D: Imagined general, 
Understand by 
Perspective-taking 
L: Communicated   
Response: 
D: - 
L: Sympathy for, Impact 
 
 
1º Be told 
2º Imagine 
3º Understand 
4º Sympathy for, Impact  
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word of her new consultant after her 
previously bad experience. i really felt 
for her and she was a lovely lady and 
most importantly i think what stuck 
with me is that she was really looking 
forward to the new year so she could 
put all this behind her. She was really 
nice and somebody who you could 
admire [Resonance; Emotionally 
negative; Sympathy for; Fondness; 
Impact]. 
10 My friend and I met up and she told 
me that her boyfriend of 12 months 
had kissed another girl [Emotionally 
Negative; Verbal information]. He 
had taken her out to tell her about 
this and then left her there and drove 
off after revealing this. I thought it 
was a terrible thing to do, just to kiss 
someone else, but the fact he left her 
alone afterwards was even worse 
[Resonance; Impact]. This happened 
in November. 
empathy is when you 
may not have been in 
that situation but u are 
able to feel for, imagine, 
the feelings or 
experience the person 
has gone through [NOT  
Analogy; Resonance; 
Sympathy for; Imagined 
General]. Empathy for 
me is a powerful thing 
when it is felt, and is 
highly important in close 
relationships [Powerful 
feeling; Closeness]. 
Empathy IS: Knowing, 
Responding 
Context: 
D: Resonance, Closeness 




D: Imagined other 
L: - 
Response: 
D: Sympathy for 
L: Impact 
 
NOT Analogy: d 
Powerful: d 
 
1º Be told 
2º Imagine 
3º Impact, sympathy for 
20 My housemate’s boyfriend recently 
broke up with her a couple of days 
ago [Familiarity]. Yesterday, he rang 
her at home and afterwards she was 
really upset and crying [Emotionally 
negative; Perception behaviour and 
experience; Observed behaviour]. 
Seeing her cry made me really upset, 
on the verge of making me cry too 
[Resonance; Impact]. I felt really 
sorry for her and we talked over the 
situation in the kitchen as to why he 
may of broken up with her [Pity; 
Verbal information]. About 6 months 
ago, my own boyfriend broke up with 
me for 2 weeks and then we got back 
together. The majority of what she 
was saying brought up bad memories 
and feelings for me [Analogy literal]. 
It was good in a way because I could 
help and possibly explain things but it 
generally made me feel bad about 
the ability share another 
person’s emotions or 
feelings and how it 





Empathy IS: Responding 
Context: 
D: Resonance 












D: Share, Impact 
L: Impact, Pity, Help 
action 
 





what had happened in the past 
[Reasons to justify help: Help action; 
Impact]. 
1º Familiarity 
2º Perception behaviour 
and experience; Share 
2º Impact; pity 
3º Analogy 
4º Help 
21 Recently I was told that my friend had 
lost her brother and would not be 
returning to Uni for a while so that 
she could grieve at home with her 
family [Emotionally negative; Verbal 
information]. When I heard, I felt a 
pain in my chest that I get whenever I 
hear that someone has just lost a 
loved one [Resonance; Impact]. The 
reason for this is that when I was 14 I 
lost my best friend, and whenever I 
used to get upset about it I used to 
get a tight feeling in my chest, a small 
pain with a feeling of breathlessness 
just because i found the situation 
overwhelmingly sad [Analogy literal; 
Reasons to justify Impact: Analogy]. 
So when I heard about my friends 
brother's death I really empathized 
with her because I had the ability to 
put myself in her shoes and imagine 
how she was feeling. I felt like I 
wanted to cry, even though I had 
never even met her brother but just 
because I felt so bad that she was 
going through what i struggled 
through and hated to think that she 
might feel alone [Impact; Imagined 
other; Reasons to justify Impact: 
imagined, analogy]. 
Empathy is the ability to 
put yourself in someone 
else's shoes [Imagined 
general; Resonance]. To 
understand how they are 
feeling and thinking and 
to try and relate to the 
situation they are going 
through, even when you 
haven't been through 
that situation yourself 
[Understand; Relate; 
NOT  Analogy Literal]. It's 
understanding why 
someone is feeling what 
they're feeling, so that if 
you ever go through it 
you can help to 




is, in my opinion, the 
most virtuous human 
ability [“Virtuous human 
ability”]. 
Empathy IS: Knowing 
Context: 
D: Resonance 
L:  Verbal Information, 
Emotionally negative, 
Resonance 
Knowledge:   
D: Imagined general; 
Understand; Relate 










“Virtuous human ability”: 
d 
Reasons to justify impact 
(analogy, imagine other): 
l 
 
1º Be told 
2º Analogy, impact  
3º Imagine other; 
understand 
4º Impact 
5º Improved future self-
understanding 
29 One month ago, my dog hurt heavily 
[Emotionally negative]. It could not 
run as fast as usual [Familiarity; 
Observed behaviour; Reasoned 
Familiarity Observed behaviour]. The 
dog apparently felt very 
uncomfortable about its conditions 
[Resonance; Appearances of 
Experience “apparently”]. I like this 
dog very much [Fondness]. At that 




someone has a kind of 
reaction to the 
man/animal, who is 
experiencing a bad/sad 
things [Impact; 
Knowledge general; 
Person/ Animal object; 
Resonance; Emotionally 
negative]. For me, 
empathy means I show 
my kindness and feel very 
sorry to the man/animal, 
who is experiencing a 
bad/sad things [Altruistic 
Empathy IS: Responding 
Context: 
D: Emotionally negative, 
Resonance; 
Person/Animal object;  












experiences help action; 
Pity]. If possible, I would 
like to offer some help to 




D: Pity, Altruistic 
Experiences Help 
intention, action; Impact 
L: - 
 
1º Know another’s  
2º impact, pity, help 
32 Over the past few months my life has 
changed drastically and it is not 
because of the financial hardships I 
have been faced with, but the fact 
that I got to find a friend, companion 
and lover. This story relates to how 
she helped me recently [Reception; 
Help action as received]. A few days 
ago I was coming back from work and 
I got a call from some my landlord 
saying that he would be coming in an 
hour or so with removal contractors 
to get my things as I did not pay my 
rent. Well, the first person I rang after 
that news was my girlfriend [Help 
request; Verbal  information] who 
came over and supported me [Help 
action] for three hours while I was 
waiting for the landlord in front of my 
house. It was really, really cold 
outside and my entrance key just 
broke into the lock a few weeks 
before that, so we had to stay outside 
and wait [Observed behaviour]. Now, 
you just cannot imagine how I was 
feeling just thinking about the fact 
that my things are going to be taken 
away [Emotionally negative]. Yet, she 
has managed to help me and make 
me look on the bright side [Help 
action, as received]. Now 
everything's solved and I know that 
apart from girlfriend, she is my best 
friend as well [Help enhances 
closeness; Closeness]. 
Empathy is the action of 




Empathy IS: Responding 
Context: 
D: Resonance 








D: Altruistic experiences 
Help action 
L: Altruistic experiences 
Help request, action, as 
received 
 
Help enhances closeness: 
l 
43 My mother fell ill suddenly in 2002, I 
was 14 years old and having a pretty 
tough time trying to look after her. I 
was still in school, my dad was doing 
a degree course and my mum was 
out of work as all she was doing was 
being sick and locking herself away in 
her bedroom. I would finish school at 
3:30 get a bus home, cook dinner, 
give mum her anti-sickness tablets, 
Empathy to me only 
occurs after the same 
event has happened to 
you directly [Analogy 
literal]. Like my mother I 
fell ill and it was only 
then that I feel true 
empathy was displayed 
[Emotionally negative 
e.g.,; Altruistic 
Empathy IS: Knowing and 
responding 
Context: 
D: Emotionally negative 
e.g., Resonance 




D: Analogy literal Similar 
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make a plain dinner for her to see if 
she would eat, make my dad dinner 
before he came home and try and get 
some homework done.  Social life 
sadly could not happen, not enough 
hours in the day. I may sound like I'm 
droning on but it was a pretty tough 
time for me, and for my mum it was 
worse. I could on empathise how 
tough life was for her. She had no 
idea what was her illness, doctors 
misdiagnosed too many times.  She 
would cry and cry and I couldn't help 
but cry with her, for her even. My 
mum felt hopeless, and I felt hopeless 
for her. I felt like no one could help 
her [Emotionally negative; 
Resonance; Familiarity; Altruistic 
experience Help action; Observed 
behaviour; Impact; Pity; ; Perception 
behaviour and experience]. My work 
of running back and forth the doctors 
to pick up prescriptions and making 
the early morning car journeys to 
Accident and Emergency because Dad 
was worried she was close to fainting 
due to being sick so much, it just was 
not enough. She got better after a 
better diagnosis of anxiety. It wasn't 
until I was 18 and felt true empathy 
when I myself became ill with chronic 
anxiety and depression that I knew 
exactly how she felt [Analogy Literal]. 
To feel empathy I think not only do 
you have to be near them, you have 
to feel those symptoms they were 
going through [Closeness; feel 
another’s/ analogy; Reasons to 
justify empathy]. 
experience be 
empathetic]. In order to 
be empathetic the exact 
same situation must have 
happened or very similar 
[Resonance; Reasons to 







L: Perception Behaviour 
and Experience; Analogy 
literal; Feel Another’s/ 
analogy 
Response: 
D: Altruistic experiences 
“displayed”/ be 
empathetic 
L: Altruistic Experience 
help action; Pity; Impact. 
 
Retrospective empathy: d 
Reasons to justify 
empathy (Familiarity; 
Analogy; closeness): d, l 
 
1º Familiarity, observed 
behaviour, Help 
2º Impact; Pity, 
 3º Analogy similar past 
4º retrospective true 
empathy, feel another/ 
analogy, altruistic 
experience 
50 Two nights ago I watched on the web 
the suddenly and unexpectedly and 
ruthlessly deposed prime minister of 
Australia give his last press 
conference at which he stood with his 
wife and children - one son visible on 
the screen [Unexpected experience; 
Resonance]. He described 'our' 
achievements in his brief term. He 
began to cry at one moment and I 
wept for him myself [Impact; 
Emotionally negative; Observed 
Behaviour; Verbal Information] - he 
also described apologizing to the 
Fellow feeling [Share feel 
similarly, d+l]- awareness 
of the experience of 
another person or living 
being and what is 
happening to them and 
how I would feel in their 




Imagined self]. This may 
be good or bad 
[Emotionally positive/ 
Empathy IS: Knowing, 
Responding 
Context: 
D: Emotionally positive or 
negative, Resonance 






D: “awareness of 
experience”/ Perception 
Expressive behaviour d+l; 
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stolen generation and watching them 
walk into the same place/building in 
which he was standing speaking and 
how they were frightened. He said 
'our job...' and he was unable to go 
on talking from emotion, for a few 
moments [Perception Expressive 
behaviour]. 'was to take away that 
fear'. This was a great act of social 
justice that as he said was a long time 
coming [Share feel similarly]. I felt 
deeply sorry for him as he is a good 
man who cared deeply about the 
people who had elected him and the 
unexpectedness of his removal by the 
factional party machine within 12 
hours was shocking [Pity; Reasons to 
justify pity; Fondness; Familiarity; 
Impact]. I felt astounded and lucky 
that - as I emailed my father - none of 
us can be got rid of so suddenly. I 
cannot imagine how dreadful I would 
feel in a similar situation and so I 
wept for him as I watched [Imagine 
self; Reasons to justify pity; Impact; 
Impact]. I felt empathy for him 
because I was so moved by his sense 
of what he wanted to achieve and 
what he had achieved [Sympathy for; 
Reasons to justify sympathy for; 
Impact, Knowledge general]. I was in 
my office at U Bham and had looked 
up the news to see what was 
happening having had an email from 
someone I work with in Australia. 
That led me to search for the speech 




L: Perception Expressive 
Behaviour; Imagined self 
Response: 
D: Share feel similarly 
L: Pity; Share feel similarly; 
Sympathy for/ “empathy” 
for; Impact “shocking”, 
“moved”, “cry for” 
 
Unexpected experience: l 
Reasons to justify responses 
(fondness, familiarity,  
imagine self, perception ): l 
 
1º Awareness, Perception, 





































Table V.a: “Survey developed for the Insights study” 
 
 Interpersonal Insights 
 




Welcome to our WRITTEN interview. 
 
Thank you for you participation. We hope that you find it interesting and rewarding.  
 
The interview should take around 45 minutes, and no more than 1h30, to complete. It has 4 pages and 9 
questions. 
 
On this page, we ask you to choose a person significant to you, and with whom you have experienced 
insights which you can be described on page 2 (your insight into the other's experience) and page 3 (the 
other's insight into you experience). It may be helpful to first recall a situation where this has happened, 
BEFORE DECIDING on a person. 
 




1. Significant Person and Interpersonal Insights 
  
1. Choose a significant person in your life, with whom you have a close and intimate relationship. This 
person can be your partner, a close friend or a family member. You will answer the following 




Who (please specify)  
 
2. Can you describe briefly how you two get along, telling us a little bit about what may be 
characteristic of your relationship? (e.g., for how long have you known each other, whether you live 
together, how close you are, etc.) 
 







Here are some tips to help you to answer the next two questions: 
 
• Choose RECENT situations, if possible; 
• If you can try to RE-CAPTURE or re-imagine the event, this may help to recall a more VIVID and RICH 
description. 
 
Please DO NOT WORRY about: 
• Giving a “correct answer” - this isn't a test! 
• Getting the “facts absolutely right” - we are interested in how you recall the event now;  
• How much you have written - please write as much as you need to, in order for us to understand what 
happened; 
• Spelling or grammar. 
 
Please DO include any relevant CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION that you are able to remember. For 
example: 
• When did it happened? 
• Where were you? 
• What were you doing? 
• What was going on? 
 
2. My insights 
  
3. Bearing the person of your choice in mind, can you tell us about a situation where YOU HAD AN 
IMMEDIATE INSIGHT INTO what your chosen person was experiencing, while the experience was 
taking place? 
 
We are looking for things such as: 
• What happened? 
• What did you sense, feel and/or know about the other person’s experience? 
• Was the “insight” meaningful? 
• What, if any, is the reason for this to have happened? 
• Did you communicate in any way that experience to the chosen person? And if yes, how? Was there 
a reaction to what you expressed? 
• What would you call, if anything, this type of interpersonal experience? 
 
[The box below does not limit how much you can write. Please write as much as you like].  
 
 
3. The Other's Insights 
  
3. Bearing the same person in mind, can you tell us about a situation where the opposite happened - 
that is, where that PERSON HAD AN IMMEDIATE INSIGHT INTO what you were experiencing, while 
you were experiencing it? 
 
We are looking for things such as: 
• What happened? 
• What did the person sense, feel and/or know about your experience? 
• How did you know the person was having an “insight”? 
• Did it have any meaning for you? 





If for some reason you pick a DIFFERENT PERSON, please inform us on the beginning of your answer. 
 
[The box below does not limit the length of your answer. Please write as much as you like]. 
 
 
5. I have chosen... 
I have chosen...   Another Partner 
Another Friend 
Another Family Member 
The same person 





This is the last page. Thank you for your collaboration. You make this research possible.  
 
If you find that you feel upset by your participation, or if you would like to discuss any issues relating to 
your participation in the research, you can find us here: Rita Meneses - ; Michael 
Larkin - . 
Alternatively, you can contact the Student Counselling Service:  
 
 










9. Education Level 
Undergraduate 
Postgraduate 
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Table VI.a: “Insights Study: themes, subthemes, examples and associated essences” 






Givenness Thinking “Until then I had been feeling anxious, 
worried and stressed for her, because she 
had put a lot of effort and time into this 
exam throughout the year.” (#1a) 
 
“Often if I'm upset or something is on my 
mind he won't know until I'm literally 
crying!” (#2b) 
 
“Anyway whilst telling me the story i could 
completely understand what she was going 
through as i too split up with a partner for 
no reasons of our own” (#13a) 
Thinking 
Listening “My boyfriend said he could feel my pain 
and sense in a way what i was going 
thorough although it had never happened 
to him” (#11b) 
 
“When he got off the phone he told me in 
a really disappointing way.” (#15a) 
 
 
“As she told me everything that happened 
it almost felt as if it was my nan it was 
happening to again.” (#17a) 
Listening 
Feeling “She was experiencing my pain, living 
through my loss, as if it was hers.” (#1b) 
 
“I am sure that I experienced the same 
rush of emotion. It was incredibly intense” 
(#4a) 
 
“He said that he was excited, and i 
remember saying that i agreed. But you 
could also see it on his face and i was 
excited by this too.” (#5a) 
Experiencing 
Perceiving “It's as if I can read his mind! Even the 
simplest things like when we went out for a 
meal for my birthday; when we walked into 
the restaurant he immediately stiffened up 
which means that he feels scrutinised and 
watched and he feels the need to 'puff out' 
his chest and act more manly. “ (#2a) 
 
“I felt like she was sensing my emotions 






“When i saw the smile on his face i knew 
what joke he was going to say” (#7a) 
 
“Seeing her so upset" (#10a) 
 
“I could understand how disappointed and 
let down he felt” (#15a) 
 
“She told me about her experiences when 
she lost her grandparents, so I knew she 








“I had this immense pain in my shoulder, 
nothing compared to what he was going 
through, but it was a definite twinge of 
pain.” (#8a) 
 
“I feel that he momentarily felt what i felt 
as we were both so relieved that we could 
stay together” (#9b) 
 
“It also made me very emotional, seeing 
and hearing her so upset” (#17a) 
 
“I seemed to be able to feel when these 
events were going to occur (…). There was 
a sick feeling, I suppose you'd say.” (#18a) 
Experiencers 
‘We’ experience “They were participating in the event and I 
was in the audience but as soon as they 
crossed the finish line, I am sure that I 
experienced the same rush of emotion.” 
(#4a)  
 
“So we sort of felt a guilt towards not 
forming a bond or relationship with that 
member of our family.” (#12b) 
 
“I felt we had a strong connection at the 
time” (#16a) 
 






“In my head all I was experiencing was my 
happiness of my sibling” (#4a) 
 
“I felt as though I shared her experience, 
because I could feel her pain when she 
thought she lost him. We talked, and 
automatically i felt her pain” (#12a) 
Experiencers 
Immediacy  “I just started crying. As I did that, I could 
hear her whimper on the other end.  She 
was experiencing my pain, living through 






“We talked, and automatically i felt her 
pain” (#12a) 
 







“My experience of studying on exchange 
here at Birmingham University for this 
academic year gave me some insight to my 
brother’s experience." (#5a) 
 
“I think this happened because the day 
before she had done the same thing, and 
found it funny that the tables were turned 





“And seen as we are so close (me and my 
friend) we have this understand where i 
know exactly what frustrates her, makes 
her upset and happy, as the same things 
make me upset, frustrated and happy...” 
(#13a) 
 
“She has met my family so knows what 
their like and how we work, and she comes 
from a similar background of traditional 




"Until then I had been feeling anxious, 
worried and stressed for her, because 
she had put a lot of effort and time into 
this exam throughout the year." (#1a) 
 
“I understood how he was feeling because 
many times before his dad had promised 




“I know that they were experiencing this 
because, even though they knew that I was 
scared, they were not offering word of 
comfort to help me, they were frightened 
as well” (#4b) 
 
“She could tell on my face as i opened the 
envelope that i had done well due to the 
huge grin and emotions i displayed as she 






“You could really feel what the other 
person was going through because i could 




“I guess this shared sense of 
excitement was meaningful because i 
could kind of understand what my 
brother was going through, and 






“Anyway whilst telling me the story i could 
completely understand what she was going 
through” (#13a) 
 
“I could relate to her feeling of 'having 
mind blank'.” (#16a) 
 
"I wanted to help but couldn't unless I 
really understood what she was 
experiencing. " (#20a) 
Feeling 
understood 
“Me and a close friend at Uni both 
discovered that we had glandular fever at 
the same time last year. (…) It comforted 
me that i knew someone else had felt the 
way i had and understood.” (#15b) 
 
“He talked to me and said he knew how i 
was feeling. And it was odd because all the 
emotions and thought processes i thought 
and went through, he actually named and 
mentioned (…) It was nice that someone 
understood me completely and that i didn’t 
have to explain any intricacies for them to 




Communication Listening “I remember him telling me of what was 
going to be happening on his mission trip in 
China and he was very excited about it.” 
(#5a) 
 
“He walked into my room, sat on my bed 
and just started asking me all these 
questions, but before i could even respond, 
he'd answered them in exactly the same 
way i was going to. He seemed to know 
what was going on inside my head, like he 
had an insight of the troubles I was 
experiencing.” (#8b) 
 
“...anyway when i told her i remember her 
saying her mums the same and not to 
worry and how she was on my side and 
would have done the same” (#13b) 
Listeners 
Attention Self “Recently, my best friend split up with her 
boyfriend for a short duration. I felt as 
though I shared her experience, because I 
could feel her pain when she thought she 
lost him. We talked, and automatically i felt 
her pain, and it came to me without any 
thought.” (#12a) 
Experiencers 
Other “During a talent contest in secondary 
school my sister was extremely nervous 




family went to watch her, and she forgot 
the words. After a while of silence i called 
out the start of the next line to her because 
I could feel how embarrassed and upset 
she was, and could relate to her feeling of 
'having mind blank'” (#16a) 
Embedment here "We walked into the restaurant" (#2a) 
 
“He walked into my room, sat on my bed” 
(#8b) 
 
“In secondary school” (#16a) 
Perceivers 
Experiencers 
Now “2 months ago, my sister rang me” (#1b) 
 
“After the operation they needed to 
remove a tube from my back without 
anaesthetic which was very scary for me.” 
(#4a) 
 
"At the Christmas Carol event” (#14a) 
Perceivers 
Experiencers 
Vague, absent “Once i had a really frustrating encounter 
with my mum, i was quite young” (#13a) 
 
“She came around to sit with me, and even 




Embodiment Physically felt 
experience 
“And oddly i felt the same sense of slight 
excitement about being able to make a 
witty joke as he did” (#7a) 
 
“He was simply sitting in the kitchen 
shaking in pain, and suddenly i felt all light 
headed and collapsed. When I came to, I 
had this immense pain in my shoulder, 
nothing compared to what he was going 
through, but it was a definite twinge of 
pain. However, the next day, it was gone. I 
don't know whether I was experienced a 
part of his pain, but it definitely felt like it.” 
(#8a) 
 
“I felt like i was feeling the emotions of the 
experience as it happened” (#17a) 
 
Observed scene “You could tell just from her concern and 
facial expression that she knew what i 
meant and cared.” (#5b) 
 
 
“There was one occasion when her was 
talking to a friend of ours and she was 
recalling how she lost her earrings saying 
''I’ve lost my studs'', for some reason when 




he was going to say” (#7a) 
 
“I watched my sister perform at the 
Christmas Carol event where she was in the 
choir. I went with my mum to watch her 
and you could tell that she was really proud 
of herself but really embarrassed at the 
same time.(…) We kept waving to her and 
she would pretend that she didn't really 
see us” (#14a) 
 
“I could tell by the look on her face and the 
emotion of happiness and the hug she gave 
me that i knew how she felt.” (#17b) 
Help Intention "I knew that she herself was worried 
and I tried to be as supportive as 
possible throughout this difficult period” 
(#1a) 
 
“I felt very upset as I was in Birmingham 
and couldn't be there for him.” (#19a) 
 
"I could see the difficult situation she 
was in and wanted to help but couldn't 
unless I really understood what she was 
experiencing” (#20a) 
 
Feeling helped "When a friend died my sister was really 
supportive” (#10b) 
 
“It comforted me that i knew someone else 




“We could talk about it. Exchanging our 
views and emotions and I feel like I was a 
great help to her.” (#3a) 
 
“But definitely sharing this experience with 
Kate helped.” (#5b) 
 
“But I’m so grateful that he gave me a chat 
about my attitudes, because if he hadn’t, 
I’d probably be on the search for a full time 
job.” (#8b) 
 
“As we had both experienced the same 
accident so we could talk about it together 
and help each other get through it. we 
talked about the crash a lot as i kept having 
nightmares about it and had to keep going 
to the doctors because i hurt my neck and 





“They had even adjusted the position of 
their body in a way that it seemed like they 





"We still talk about the event and how 
grateful she was for me to call out the 
words" (#16a) 
Accuracy Amazement at “And it was odd because all the emotions 
and thought processes i thought and went 
through, he actually named and mentioned” 
(#7b) 
 
“He walked into my room, sat on my bed 
and just started asking me all these 
questions, but before i could even respond, 
he'd answered them in exactly the same 
way i was going to. He seemed to know 
what was going on inside my head, like he 
had an insight of the troubles I was 





“I knew that he had sent the message on 
purpose just to spark up a conversation with 
me. He denied sending it on purpose until it 
came up in conversation last night and he 
admitted it.” (#2a) 
 
“So at the end we asked her whether she 
enjoyed it and she said yes…  We then asked 
if she was a bit embarrassed and she just 
ignored the question...” (#14a) 
 
Matter of fact Weight of high 
probability 
“What she must have been experiencing” 
(#1a) 
 
"As i felt i knew how she was feeling" 
(#16a) 
 
Weight of proof, 
of confirmed fact 
“He'd answered them in exactly the same 
way i was going to” (#8b) 
 
“We then asked if she was a bit 
embarrassed and she just ignored the 
question, I knew exactly what she felt, was 





“It was only after when i saw that she was 
in as much pain as me (…). For some reason 
i just know she knew how i was feeling" 
(#6b) 
 
"She felt sad seeing me upset" (#10b) 
 




Closeness Cause “This may have happened due to us having 





"I just think we are so close she can hear it 
in my voice if something is wrong. She said 
that she can look at me and tell if I'm 
feeling well or not. Apparently I look 
different in the eyes. So, it's the closeness 
that has developed these instincts for one 
another.” (#18b) 
Consequence "For me, those moments strengthen the 
relationship with the person and showed 
that we could be there for each other for 
the good and for the bad." (#3b) 
 
“Seeing how happy she was for me had 
a real meaning for me, as it showed 
she is a true friend who did care about 
my feelings and was glad to share this 
type of experience with such a special 
and true person in my life.” (#17b) 
 
Types of known 
experiences 
Sensations “Both of our hearts were beating 
ridiculously fast” (#20a) 
 
“He was simply sitting in the kitchen 
shaking in pain” (#8a) 
 
Emotions “I could see the excitement on his face as 
we talked on Skype” (#5a) 
 
“You could tell that she was really proud of 







“They were thinking of me” (#4a) 
 
“He seemed to know what was going on 
inside my head” (#8b) 
 
Intentions “She could sense how much I wanted to 
help her” (#16b) 
 
Gestalt “I knew that he was really upset as his car 
got written off and he loves his car but i 
could sense that he also felt guilty and 
responsible for hurting me even though it 
wasn’t his fault."” (#9a)  
 
“He feels scrutinized and watched, and he 
feels the need to 'puff out' his chest and act 
more manly” (#2a) 
 
“She can hear it in my voice if something is 
wrong. She said that she can look at me and 
tell if I'm feeling well or not. Apparently I 
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Table VII.a: “Survey developed for the Happy Stories study” 
 
Dyad N.+ Participant Letter  
 
 







This is a brief interview to help you REFLECT UPON your recent interaction. It has three pages with 
questions about this experience, and one concerned with demographics. 
 
 
As you write, please DO NOT WORRY about: 
Giving a “correct answer” - this isn't a test! 
Getting the “facts absolutely right” - we are interested in how you now recall the event. 
Spelling or grammar – we are more interested in the ‘what’ you have to say, than in formal aspects 
 
 
And please bear in mind that the blank space provided below for each question is not limitative in any 
way - write as much as you like. 
3. Overall Experience 
This section is about your overall experience during the interaction you just had. In general terms, 





What were you feeling? 
 
 











4. Significant Events 
On the following pages, you are asked to choose and describe UP TO THREE significant moments related 
to particular aspects of the videotaped interaction. 
 
 









On the following boxes, please describe up to three moments during which you could sense what the 








Did you feel that you were both empathizing with each other on any of the above moments? 
Yes 
No 









6. Being known 
 
There are moments during which the LISTENER COULD SENSE what my inner experience was. 
Yes 
No 
On the following boxes, please describe up to three moments during which the LISTENER COULD SENSE 








Did you feel that you were both empathizing with each other on any of the above moments? 
Yes 
No 





















None of these 





For part-time and non-students, please specify professional area on the box below
 
Please choose the answer that better describes your relationship to the listener: 
I had never seen him/ her before 
I had seen him/her before but never had a conversation with him/ her 
We have held occasional conversations before as colleagues or acquaintances 
We are friends 
We are very close friends 
8. The End 
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Table VIII.a: “Happy Stories Study: themes, subthemes and examples” 


















































Lauren: I was a little bit nervous, I think I 
was a little bit nervous that I was just like 
talking about my own thing.” 
Alicia: In case I felt, so boring (laughing, 
pretends to yawn) 
Lauren: (laughs) A little bit, yeah.” 
 
Aisha: I think I was trying not to talk too 
much. There were points when I wanted to 
say something but then I was like this is 
about her, this is her story. 
 
Zoe: Slightly embarrassing! (…) It’s just 
strange watching it back on the video 
because obviously you don’t, your voice 
doesn’t sound the same, and your head as 
it does coming from video, and that kind of 
thing. I never realized I used my hands so 
much… 
 
Lauren: “As we were doing it I felt like a 
little bit awkward (…) But actually watching 
it, like later on in the thing, we actually 
seem to become really comfortable in each 
other’s company, and just chatting and 
joking, I though (pauses looking at teller) 
 
Sam: I remembered everything that 
happened, the sequence of events, but 
there were some small details of things 
that she had said, or things that I had said, 
that I did not remember precisely has they 
happened. 
 
Lauren: “Can we watch the clip again? I am 
just trying to check Alicia’s reactions. 
[Viewing in silence] I think that both of our 
faces really light up? (pause) I just sort of 
knew that you knew who he was, and it 
would be a quite good talking point….and 
then you were sort of like ‘oh, really?!’. 
And so it must have been in our 
























Self-awareness of sides of the 
experience 
 
for confirmation, short silence) 
 
Megan: I got more at ease because I could 
feel that he was not bored at all. 
R: Can you tell me where did you feel that? 
T: (pause) yeah. If you go back a little. In 
the beginning I was a little bit like… (R does 
as told). Right there. And then you sort of 
say something like “oh! That is interesting! 
[playback] So he started engaging with me 
and asking questions and I felt genuinely 
that he was interested. So there is a 
moment there I guessed I could stop 
rushing over everything. 
 
 
Zoe: Because I didn’t realize I used 
sarcastic cueing…. that I probably was not 
aware of when I was doing the 
questionnaire. 
 
Aisha: I think there is just some little things 
that I didn’t pick up, where (looks to 
window), like little things that I hadn’t 
really written down. Like, I mean, some 
moments that we were really, we were 
both clearly amused (looks to teller) by a 
certain thing 
 Meanings of the word to sense 

















Aisha: To feel, to, like, gather from, from 
their body language and the way they are 
using words to kind of have a feeling of 
what they are saying, or what they are 
going through, or what they went through. 
 
 
Lauren: Just a kind of a connection, a 
common understanding…. uh…  
 
 
Kayla: I think it is a lot of being… uhhh… 
putting ourselves in another’s person’s 
shoes and trying to go through what they 
actually went through whilst we get a 
description. So if they tell us about an 
experience we imagine ourselves being in 
 428 
 
that situation and we can empathize… with 
the other person. (…) I guess that through 
the description of the situation, so verbal 
words and we attach those feelings to 
what we know and try to imagine ourselves 












Perceiving and/or feeling:  
 
Is to feel one knows another’s 
experience 
 
Is knowing without verbally 
discussing Known experience 
 
 
Is knowing what another is 
thinking 
Though was recurrent 
 
Knowing is feeling 
Knowing feels like “pressure” 
Knowing is invisible on tape 







Knowing of another’s passion 
Knowing grounded in 
“something about her” 
Is listening automatically to 
another’s experience 
 
Is difficult to explain 
 
Grounded in quality of tone of 
voice 
Feels like one knows the other 
person better 
Feels like authentic knowing 




Alicia: Then I was watching and then I was 
thinking but what’s the important bits 
were I really felt that I knew what she was 
thinking, or what her experience was… 
That was what I was thinking when I was 
watching. And that is what made me think 
that is was very interesting that there were 
times were you didn’t even said anything 
about the process, 'oh, we are running out 
of things to say', but I felt that, I sensed 
that from you, that, on occasion, you 
thought, 'oh we are running out of things 
to say', but I sensed that from you. It felt 
like a little bit of a pressure, and even 
though neither of us can see it, in fact, at 
the time, yeah, I certainly had that sense 
from you, and you had that sense me, 
yeah, how we were going to… yeah?“ [#3: 
Running out of things to say] 
 
 
Jane: We can stop it here. That it was 
something that she enjoyed doing, that she 
was happy, I thought that she liked dance. 
There was something about her. When you 
can hear automatically that that is 
something she likes, I could hear that that 
was something she was passionate about. I 
could just tell. I don’t know… (R: That is 
beautiful. You could just hear how). The 
tone is different. Because before I was 
talking about me, so I wasn’t really, I 
wasn’t really like… I don’t know, that is the 
first time I was finally finding out about her 
for the first time, ‘oh, she is like that!’ So 
that is where the excitement came from as 








Is seeing another’s recognition 
of one’s experience 
 
Is registering another’s 
experience 
 
Grounded in perceiving of 
“face” 
Grounded in behaviour (nod, 
smile) 
Grounded in narrative context 
Perceiving in another’s “face” 
Grounded in narrative context 
Grounding in behaviour 
becomes more “little”, less 
important 
Feels like another knows one’s 
experience 
Aisha: (short silence) I think there was 
recognition in her face. 
R: What do you mean, recognition? 
Aisha: That what I was feeling was 
registered with her. 
R: How can you tell? 
Aisha: Because her face just like like… You 
know when someone understands what 
you are talking about they go like this, and 
maybe nod a little bit more, and smile? 
Maybe eye contact. And continuing the 
story, there is more. Like there is more to 
it, not said, but there is more. You 
understand? (…) My shock was registered 
on her face. She continued talking and 
then, kind of a little nod maybe… (giggles) I 
don’t know, I felt like she got what I got 
what she was feeling. (R: OK, L: uh) I think. 













Generates assumption about 
another’s understanding 
 
Feels like having a common 
point 
Is a way of connecting 
Is a shared understanding 
 
Is a ‘we’ experience 
Is a shared understanding 
Is having a common interest 
Is having common values 




Lauren: Thought that I could make a joke 
and that you would understand that I don’t 
like he’s approach. And you would kind of 
understand where I was coming from. It 
felt like a common point that we could 
connect on, and have a shared 
understanding about something, which felt 
quite good.  (…) They kind of matched, in a 
way, ‘cause they are a sort of a shared 
understanding about something. We were 
both interested in Lord Layard, and we 
both have that thing that the fire would be 
bad and causing some anxiety? So what is 
similar are our values, or our personality… 
[#3: Lord Layard’s disappointment] 
 Shared experiences: 
 
Viewing brings to light shared 
experiences 
is a ‘we’ experience 
Is a similar experience towards 
common intentional object 
Grounded in visible behaviour 
 
Viewing increases self-




Alicia: Uh, I don’t know, I think there is just 
some little things that I didn’t pick up, 
where (looks to window), like little things 
that I hadn’t really written down. Like, I 
mean, some moments that we were really, 
we were both clearly amused (looks to 
teller) by a certain thing. I can’t remember, 
probably about the sausages, or 
something… [L, T, R: laugh]  




Is a ‘we’ experience 











Is an overall negative 
experience 
There are reason for the 
experience 
 
Is a personal experience 
 
 







Is a personal experience 
didn’t realize I used sarcastic cueing…. that 
I probably was not aware of when I was 
doing the questionnaire. Yes, sometimes 
we are both kind of laughing, as it when I 
was talking about the cooking and the 
main coals and all the man (swings arm) 
[#3: Sausages and sexism] 
 
 
Sam: Oh! But I believe that we were both 
feeling quite the same? 
Megan: yeah, what you are calling the 
second moment, yeah. That was awkward. 
Or just like, a bit tense, yeah. 
Sam: Nothing to talk about, a little time. 
R: So, for your own reasons, you were 
having a similar experience, correct me if I 
am wrong. (T: yeah!) But you had your own 
reasons for feeling this awkwardness (L, T: 
yeah!) 
Sam: You can tell when our experiences 
are exactly the same, it was when you 
broke the ice, which felt quite nice, and 
you don’t have to say anything else, you 
just direct the conversation into a different 
way. 
R: The same? 
Megan: Yes, definitely. I felt awkward and 
just a little bit unsure as to what was going 








Imagine-self not always 
necessary 
 
Imagine-self not always 
necessary or desirable 
Grounded in another’s 
discourse 
Imagine-self is an “immediate 
thought” 
 
Imagine-self is not always 
desirable 
Grounded in discourse 
 
Is having a picture about 
another’s situation 
 
Aisha: I was able to, I just understood. Not 
even seeing myself in that situation, not 
even picturing myself being in that 
position. Just the horror of someone 
treating someone that way, it’s just… Like I 
didn’t necessarily need to be in her shoes 
just to be able to understand because she 
described it so well. (…): Just the idea of 
someone else treating someone in such a 
way, it is like… My immediate thought was, 
‘oh my God, what would I do if I was in her 
shoes’. I didn’t even like… (pause) I didn’t 
even go there. I just… (pause) ‘cause, as 
you describe, everyone did what they 
wanted to. I have never been to Madrid, so 
I got kind of a picture in my head as to 





Grounded in one’s past 
knowledge and imagined 
picture 
 





Feels good to be accurate 
Grounded in discourse 
(repetition, choice of words) 
 





Grounded in discourse (detail) 
Reaction towards visualization 
along the lines of aesthetic 
emphasis 
Feeling another’s experience is 
informed by imagination 
Grounded in discourse 
Grounded in past knowledge 
(schemas) 
Is an automatic experience 
As a foreseeing “funny” quality 
 
Foreseeing quality is 
inexplicable 
 
Visualization adapted to 
discourse 
someone being very barbaric and treating 
a person in such a way, and as you were 
saying, the costumers themselves were 
so… It just feels crazy that her, being a 
woman, in such an environment and be 
treated that way by these costumers, and 
her boss. I just had this negative feeling, 
just too people, one person being bad, and 
the other person being brutalized. [#4: 
Comparison I and II] 
 
Aisha: Good! ‘Cause you said that you had 
the best day, and you said that is was 
awesome, and you said that it was 
amazingly beautiful. And you repeated the 
word amazing twice, I think, when she 
talked about it. And from there it lead up 
to her description of this pool, and I really 
found that description to be so… Like. She 
could have just said that it was a pool. But 
she described it, and filled that with detail, 
and she just made a picture for me and I 
visualized it, yeah (T: giggles). It looked 
beautiful, it looked really really cool. And I 
felt that that was probably a really, really 
good happy thing for her. (…) But the 
words that she used, I guess and my own … 
my own… (sights) Like…‘Cause you have 
schemas in our head, basically, so I kind of 
just pictured it automatically. It was so 
funny, because before you even said it was 
on the edge, I pictured it that way myself? 
(T. uh; R: yes, it is ok) I don’t know why, but 
I did picture it on the edge? (T: yeah!) And 
as you said that it was overlooking, and I 
just kind of pictured this really beautiful 
thing at the edge of a mountain (T: yeah!), 
on the top, kind of overlooking. [#4: 
Painting swimming pools] 
 Reasoning: 
 
Is impelled by personal reaction 
 
Feeling pity towards another’s 
discourse 
 
Imagine-self can immediately 
happen while listening 
 
 
Zoe: I think it is also not just feeling bad for 
that person, because they went through it. 
But also being kind of horrified that an 
human being can act in that way. When… 
‘Cause when you are listening a story 
about one person who has done bad to 
another person, yeah, you do feel sorry for 
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Impelled by desire to 
understand 
Is reasoning about another’s 
motives 
imagining another’s experience 
in a reasoned manner 






Impelled by desire to 
understand 
Grounded in behaviour, “body 
language” 
Reasoning necessary because 
another’s experience  unknown 
Knowing is grounded in overall 
context 
Reasoning is not enough to 
determined authenticity of 
experience 
Reasoning needs to be grounds 
in unfolding gestures 
Grounding in “way” of moving 
silenced 
Is constructing a puzzle 
Inference from behaviour-in-
context as first contradictory 
explanation 
the victim. And you can just suddenly find 
yourself putting yourself in their shoes and 
think, ‘oh, I would feel badly’. 
But possibly even more I think, ‘oh, how 
come the person has done it?’. What is 
going on in their mind that makes them 
behave in that way. That would probably 
be more… I would probably think that 
before putting myself in the shoes of the 
other person who is being hurt. [#4: 
Comparison I and II] 
 
Kayla: If we have the purpose of wanting 
to figure out what that person is feeling, 
that I think I can. You use their expressions, 
their body language uhh… (T: yeah!) (…) I 
would attach some sort of meaning to the 
body language because you don’t know 
what the person is thinking at the 
moment? (..-) I guess we can’t take a thing 
out of context. It has to be seen as a whole. 
If you just see the smile you might not 
know if it’s genuine. Or if that person is 
really happy at that moment. But if you see 
it through the other gestures, the way the 
arms uh uh and so you can put these three 
or four features together and decide that 
this person was feeling really happy. So just 
to see a smile as a smile on its own… [#6: 
The hollocaust] 
Temporal 






Experience is difficult to 
describe 
Is feeling that another is 
listening  
Present experience is feeling 
listened to 
Is feeling another’s opinion 
 
Another’s experience is a 
listening understanding attitude 




Present Experiences _ intuitive acts: 
 
Alicia: I think I kind of didn’t noticed a 
feeling, I didn’t notice an emotion, I felt 
that you were listening. You were using a… 
I kind of, I felt that you were listening to 
what I was saying. I felt listened to and 
heard. I felt that you knew that I felt a bit 
silly, I knew that you didn’t come across as 
you were thinking. You were just listening 
to my own story, and trying to understand 
where it is coming from, really (T: uh uh). 
So but couldn’t put an emotional label on it 
(R: It is OK). It is more like you turn, while 
you are telling your story, oh, I can see she 
is happy about this, or disappointed about 



















Present ‘we’ experience about 
topic 
 
Present ‘we’ experience of 




Present common experience of 













Another’s present experience is 





you just changed, I was the story teller 
then, and you just changed to a kind of 
listener, really. 
Lauren: I think I was really interested 
because I was liking the exchange, I was 
liking to learn. I was doing a lot of talking 
so I was kind of liking to listen to your 
stories. Yes, I guess I was generally very 
interested, just listening [#3: Fairies and 
Gnomes] 
 
Present Experiences _Sharing acts: 
 
Lauren: They kind of matched, in a way, 
because they are a sort of a shared 
understanding about something. We were 
both interested in Lord Layard, and we 
both have that thing that the fire would be 
bad and causing some anxiety? So what is 
similar are our values, or our personality 
(…) That was very... Because we were 
happy, just some sort of share in that 
common experience (L: yeah!)” [#3: Lord 
Layard’s disappointment] 
 
Present Experiences _ Imaginative acts: 
 
Sam: Yes, on that moment where the 
conversation was slowing down bit off 
track but it wasn’t up until then, no. But I 
didn’t feel awkward until then. 
R: OK. Did you realize that he was also 
feeling awkward? 
Megan: I… I… It wasn´t so much a 
realization so much as an expected feeling. 
I would expected it if I seat there, uh, what 
should I talk about, that he is feeling a bit 
awkward as well. Yeah. So I think I just 
expected. It is the natural response to feel 
sort of awkward because of this artificial 
setting.  [#5: Before Ice breaker] 
R: In relation to that, she said that the 
other’s discourse becomes just words. 
Would you say that that happens when you 
have not had a similar experience? 
Kayla: Not really words, some things, I 
guess, you have not experience but you 
can imagine from things maybe like 
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television or books or stories or seeing 
pictures and those things work as a 
replacement for the memory. Not 
necessarily words but I can imagine them 
to be visual or auditory input, not 
necessarily just words but….. 
R: So what you are telling me is that when 
you listen to someone you have all this sort 
of information, all this knowledge that you 
use that can be, in a way, linked to what 
the other person is thinking or telling you. 
(…) 
Jane: If you are there you know them, and 
probably just the fact that they’re listening 
should be enough. But if it is a stranger you 
can’t really tell if they are bored, you can’t 
tell…. Oh yeah! So, I talk to get a reaction. 
But I can assum… guess what the reaction 
is in regards to people I know. So if I was 
talking to mama in a coma, I would keep 
talking because I would know what would 
interest her, what would make her laugh. 
But if it was a stranger I wouldn’t know if 
they were not interested anymore but just 
couldn’t tell me.” [#6: The holocaust] 
 Past (relived)  experiences 
 
Experiences can be “made”, 
overtly and evidently expressed 
behaviourally 
Telling another’s relief 
Feeling another’s past 
experience 
Perceiving of gestalt moving 
body more important than eye 
contact 
 









Relived experience differs from 
“original” emotion 
Relieved Experiences_ Intuitive acts: 
 
Alicia: There was an important bit there. 
When you made the relief (sights)? I could 
tell in your body movements with your 
hands and your body just going like 
relaxed, I felt how much relief you felt from 
that. And although we are looking at each 
other the entire time, yet I think still the 
movements that you made me helped me 
tell. (R: to grasp, understand) To grasp how 
much relief she felt, from that day of 
walking away. 
R: Did you somehow staged, that is, 
overacted the relief, to be sure that the 
message came across?  
Zoe: uh (pause, L: coffs). I don’t think… I 
don’t think it was overreacting. Because I 
think it was it felt like I was really reliving it.  
R: Did you feel relieved when talking about 
it? Were you feeling relieved? 
Zoe: (pause) Almost! It was obviously not 
quite the same as the original emotion, but 
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Is reliving experience 
 
Remembering and reliving 
emotion at the same time 
Relived emotion is at a different 
“level” 
Recounting generates reliving 
 
 
Experience was not overacted, 
exaggerated 









Grounded in another’s  
discourse 
 
Discourse triggers memory of 
similar past experience 
Is feeling another’s experience 
Another’s experience is past 
 
Known experience is 





Feeling another’s experience is 
reliving one’s past experience 
 
Sharing experience is personal 
past relieved  experience 
 
 
Personal experience used to 
“relate” to another’s 




Memory is in the background, 
it was sort of reliving it at some point. I was 
remembering when it happened and 
feeling this emotion at the same time.  
Obviously, not at the same level as when it 
originally happened, but I think I was 
feeling relief, again. 
R: Less intense than the first time, off 
course (L: giggles, T: giggle) 
Zoe: Yeah, yeah. But the act of recounting 
it (pause) brought back the emotion. So I 
think I didn’t do that so much as 
communication, I think. Or not consciously 
anyway. I think I was just remembering 
how it really worked. Uh. Yeah. I think so. “ 
[#4: This is not a staged relief] 
 
Relieved Experiences _ Sharing acts: 
 
Kayla: I chose talking about the sequence 
of events, when she got the good news, 
and sharing it with family and friends, and 
having a meal at the end of the day, it was 
something that I went through as well? So 
it was easy I would say to be able to feel 
the happiness and the joy that she also felt, 
through that experience. (…) 
Jane: yeah, I was happy because you don’t 
really tell that story to people and I 
because they don’t really care? Everyone 
has the same story. So yeah, I like telling 
that story. Yes, happiness (laughs) (…) 
R. What is this to feel, can you try to 
explain it? 
Kayla: uh… I guess I was relieving my own 
experience? uh. When she was talking 
about it. So, that happiness and that sense 
of achievement I was thinking back of my 
own experience upon seeing my results. 
R: So that it was your own happiness that 
you were thinking of, or hers? 
Kayla: I was in a sense pulling that memory 
in order to relate to that experience? (…) I 
think the memory is something that 
happens in the background. I was more 
focused on her story, because I wanted to 
know more about what she was telling. So 
consciously I think I was focusing on her 
story and herself but at the back of my 
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Absence of similar past 
experience 
 
Knowing grounded in another’s 
discourse (“way”) 
 
Knowing grounded in one 
personal valuing of another’s 
situation 
 
Imagine-self is an immediate 
thought 
Imagine-self is not always 
necessary 
Absence of similar past 
experience 
Imagine other situation 
 Imagine other situation and 
experience 
Another’s experience is past 
Knowing grounded in one 
personal valuing of another’s 
situation 





Feels “more” positive 
suggestive of feeling negative 
too 
Reasons for feeling positive 
towards experience 
Experience is past 
 
 
Experience is relieved past 
negative experience 
Focusing on the positive side of 
the experience 
mind my memory was feeding on these 
emotions for me to live whatever she was 
telling me. (…). [#6: I felt it too] 
 
 
Relieved Experiences_ imaginative acts: 
 
Aisha: Yeah. Because I have never been in 
that position, that she was in. So I don’t 
have any kind of personal… I have never 
had this sort of experiences before, but 
because of the way she told it, and in 
general, if somebody is treating me badly, 
that is a negative thing. (….) Just the idea of 
someone else treating someone in such a 
way, it is like… My immediate thought was, 
‘oh my God, what would I do if I was in her 
shoes’. I didn’t even like… (pause) I didn’t 
even go there. I just… (pause) ‘cause, as 
you describe, everyone did what they 
wanted to. I have never been to Madrid, so 
I got kind of a picture in my head as to 
what it was like. You know, I imagined 
someone being very barbaric and treating 
a person in such a way, and as you were 
saying, the costumers themselves were 
so… It is just feels crazy that her, being a 
woman, in such an environment and be 
treated that way by these costumers, and 
her boss. I just had this negative feeling, 
just too people, one person being bad, and 
the other person being brutalized. (…) 
Zoe: uh (pause) Yeah. I think it is still 
(pause) I don’t know, I… (pause) I don’t 
feel… I still feel more positive when I think 
back to it, just because I am looking back. I 
know that it is finished. And I know that I 
have learnt from it. And in a way I am quite 
proud of the way that I dealt with it. So I 
don’t think I have any kind of negative 
emotion linked to it anymore. 
R: Intense, you would say? Because in a 
way it is still a negative experience. 
Zoe: Yeah. It is still remembering a bad 
experience. But when I think back to it, I 
think more of the happy bit afterwards. 
And the things that I got out of it. Rather 
than dwelling on how unhappy I was or 
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Experience is past anything like that.[#4: Seeing the shock] 
Communicati
on 
Verbal Communicative acts 
 
 
Is seeing passion in another’s 
eyes, perceiving 
 
Is a seeing grounded with its 
meaning in familiarity with 
perceived experience 
 
Is intuitively feeling 
Is intuitively feeling what 
another person is verbally 
describing 
Is a feeling not always grounded 
in familiarity 
Is a feeling that might be 
hardwired 
 
Is a knowing that one attends 
to, even if implicitly only 
Is a knowing that can generate 
an action, one choses to pay 
attention or not 
 
 
Is seeing another’s passion in 
contextualized action 
 
Is a seeing that can lead to 
feeling another’s experience 
 
Is a knowing that can be ignored 
Is a feeling that generates an 














Verbal communication _ intuiting: 
 
Kayla: You know how people say you can 
see passion in the eyes? There are just no 
ways of measuring that, or even describe 
it. But most of it we have experienced 
ourselves. We know what enthusiasm is, 
even though we can’t describe it. We know 
what happiness is, we know what 
excitement is, we know what passion and 
dedication is, so we are able to feel 
intuitively when people talk about 
something all these things. (…) I think that 
some feelings we might actually intuitively 
know. I don’t know if we are born with 
such things, if it is hardwired, but 
sometimes we can feel something without 
having gone through it. But I don’t know if 
this one is one of it. (…) I think that some 
parts of the brain do pay attention to it. 
But whether or not we choose, at that 
point in time, to pay attention to that, that 
is the question, I guess. What state we are 
at that moment, and what are our motives 
are for that particular moment. So if I am 
just walking on the street and if I see 
someone really passionate just playing the 
guitar and singing their heart on the street, 
I will stop and look and enjoy the 
enjoyment that that person is feeling. But 
if I am rushing to return a book to the 
library I will get there at once and not care 
about someone who is playing the guitar 
(R, L, T: all laugh). 
R: But you had registered it in a way? You 
think that in a way you would go through 
the busking guy and register, oh, there it is 
a passionate guy (L: yes), and keep on 
rushing. (L: yes!) you think (L: yes) .[#6: 
Seeing the passion] 
 
 
Verbal communication _ sharing: 
 
Lauren: Yes. I would be interested to hear 




Sharing is remembering a 




Verbal remark motivated by 
sharing experience 
 
Fear of having been rude 




Sharing a story grounded in 
another’s verbal discourse 
 
Feels like an attempt to connect 
with another person 
 
Need to reassure another that 
one has understood the verbally 
telling a story as a sharing 





Motivation for sharing similar 
story is bonding 
 
 
Bonding achieved by sharing a 






Visualization is grounded in 
language used (choice of words, 
repetition) 
 
Visualization is grounded in 
narrative context 
 
Visualization is grounded in 
language use (detail) 
you told me that you believed in fairies, it 
was making me, it reminded me of 
believing in Santa Claus (L: uh uh) and 
remember feeling just really deceived? And 
you end up [end visuals] (L: yeah, yeah!) 
feeling like a little bit of an idiot, I mean, by 
not realizing they were just deceiving you? 
And so. But when I kind of said, oh, you’re 
still looking for gnomes and fairies, now I 
was a little bit worried that you thought 
that I was taking a piss? When no, I wasn’t, 
at all, I was probably just having a bit of a 
joke? (…) I understand that you find it quite 
a stupid story, but my experience was that 
it was totally relevant, because I was the 
one that said that the forests were kind of 
magical (L: yeah, yeah, that is true). I felt 
that you were telling a story that really 
connected with what I was trying to say. I 
could sense, maybe, and I didn’t actually 
write this on the questionnaire or judge it 
down here but talking about it is coming 
out. You may think it is quite silly but I 
wanted you to know that I don’t think that 
that was silly, but I was not able to 
communicate that to you….  
Alicia: (laughs) I think I might have written 
down on that thing there that that was one 
of the moments when I thought it was…. I 
don’t know… This was after I told the story 
that I thought it was a silly story. But, at 
the time, the reason I told you, it was 
because I was trying to kind of connect. 
That we both had the same experience, we 
had this shared experience, the experience 
of the forest being quite magical… [#3: 
Fairies and Gnomes] 
 
Communication _ imagining: 
 
Aisha: Because you said that you had the 
best day, and you said that is was 
awesome, and you said that it was 
amazingly beautiful. And you repeated the 
word amazing twice, I think, when she 
talked about it. And from there it lead up 
to her description of this pool, and I really 





Visualization is shaped by 
another’s discourse 
Visualization informs knowing 
of another’s happiness 
 
 
could have just said that it was a pool. But 
she described it, and filled that with detail, 
and she just made a picture for me and I 
visualized it, yeah (T: giggles). It looked 
beautiful, it looked really really cool. And I 
felt that that was probably a really, really 
good happy thing for her.[#3: Running out 
of things to say] 
 Non-verbal Communicative acts 
 
Intuiting is an unsaid kind of 
dynamics 
Useless hiding attempts 
Two episodes with 
complementary pattern, roles 
inversed 
Knowing generates need to 








Is a non-verbally discussed 
knowing assumed to be correct, 
authentic, accurate 
It generates immediate reaction 
prior to confirmation 
 
Is a “certain” knowledge 
 







Some people are less certain of 
the otherness of the experience 
 
Is a gut feeling that is perhaps 




Non-verbal communication _ intuiting: 
 
Lauren: It is a bit unsaid, an unsaid kind of 
the dynamics (L: yeah yeah) Maybe you 
were trying to cover the feeling that it was 
a silly thing to say, and I was feeling a bit 
protective. I didn’t want you to feel… 
Alicia: It’s funny, that we both felt quite 
protective of each other, in a way, if I did 
sense that you…. Running out of things to 
say…. At the same time, you were, oh, she 
has embarrassed herself…..Don’t worry 
about that. I’ll just try to show her that she 
didn’t, but I don’t think… (…) When we are 
actually having a conversation? (short 
silence) Well, I suppose that the running 
out of things to say, I think that I… and the 
fairy one, I think that we had made this 
assumption… I didn’t think….Is it 
important? (pause) I just felt that it was 
true (giggles). I didn’t need to test it, I just 
knew. So I reacted on response of that. I 
didn’t go oh, she… yeah, there was no 
uncertainty.  ‘Cause I just… It was only 
afterwards, when we were discussing it, 
that I thought that I asked if that was what 
you were thinking, and you said yes. But at 
the time (giggles), it felt like fact, right? 
(giggles) I don’t know if it makes sense. 
‘Cause the fairies one, did it feel like facts 
to you, that I felt uncomfortable? 
Zoe: (pause) I just had a sort of a sense, 
really. Not necessarily a fact, I wasn’t sure 
whether that came from you (L: yeah, 
yeah, that is true).  (…) I do really find that 
feeling in the gut. I’ve just mention that of 
micro-expressions? People have all these 
facial expressions (L: yeah…) some sort of 
timing. An unconscious sense of how 















Is feeling another’s interest due 
to another’s questions 
 
Is feeling another’s genuine 
interest 
Is knowing due to the “way” 




Is manifesting more than the 
question itself 
Feels more immediate question 
Feels like spontaneous question 
Feels like more natural question 
 
Is intuiting another’s interest 









Is feeling connected 
 
One does not need to verbally 
communicate felt connection 
 
 
Is feeling connected due to a 
similar past experience 
 
Teller has no reception 
have this intuitive gut” [#3: Running out of 
things to say] 
 
Megan: He started engaging with me and 
asking questions and I felt genuinely that 
he was interested. So there is a moment 
there I guessed I could stop rushing over 
everything. Because I was just going about, 
this is what happened bla bla bla, this is 
not really interesting. But then when he 
asked the question, I would be like oh, ok! I 
can tell a little bit more about that. And it 
happened throughout, I think. Every time 
he asked the question it got easier because 
I felt that he was genuinely interested in 
what I was talking about. 
R: Just because of the questions? 
Megan: But the way he delivered the 
question I think. He sounded like he was 
genuinely interested and curious about. 
(…)  If somebody says that just like that, 
manifesting nothing but the question 
itself… but him, his reaction, just 
immediate. It didn’t feel controlled. You 
know, when you are controlling how you 
act that to me feels more fake. Whereas 
when you just sort of go like, oh yes, ok! 
Then that to me is more natural (…) If I find 
that someone is bored or anything with 
something that I am talking about I will 
definitely use that to guide what I am… So I 
am constantly adjusting my behaviour to 
the person I am engaging with.  [#5: 
Foreigner’s fascination] 
 
Non-verbal communication _ Sharing: 
 
Aisha: I have one moment where I kind of 
felt connected. I don’t know if it registered 
with you because I was not very overtly 
about it. When she said she questioned 
herself (T: uh), you’re boring and you 
questioned whether if it is really you (T: 
uh)? That registered with me, but I wasn’t 
going to talk about it. ‘Cause I’m… I’m kind 
of went through a similar experience, so 
that registered with me? (…)  
Zoe: I didn’t notice, I didn’t realize that you 
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Teller only notices behaviour 
 
Teller is pulled inwards, 
remembering 
 
Telling can be a selfish act 
 
Teller is focus in the memory 
 
Both focused in the memory 
Viewing highlight behaviour 
denunciative of experience, of 
introspective pull 
Lack of reception awareness 
justified by introspective pull 
 
Is sharing but sharing because 
 
 
It is not sharing because there is 
no mutual recognition 
It is not sharing because both 
‘selfish’, pulled inwards towards 
their own memories 







Knowing is a conjecture 
Knowing grounded in another’s 
observed situation and 
imaginative act 
  
stopped, recorded, but I did noticed that 
you like talked a lot more about that and 
you starting talking about how it was like 
(pause) telling me how good it was actually 
I got, that I kind of got over that. I did 
notice that you had lots to say about that, 
but it didn’t clock that it was because you 
had a similar experience. 
I guess I was being more selfish, ‘cause I 
think I was thinking about, I was 
remembering how I felt and (short silence). 
Yeah, I guess I was thinking of myself 
actually at that point that is probably why… 
No, not in a bad way, but I was focusing on 
my own thing?  
L: I think maybe I did the same. 
T: Now that I see it, I was looking down at 
the table (pause). I think I went into my 
own little word, that is probably why I 
missed that she had related to that.(…) 
L: (long silence) We kind of went into our 
own world. When you have your own 
moment! I think that was… We shared it 
but we didn’t really shared it? It was out 
there but I don’t think we really (R: you 
were not sharing, T: No) We weren’t 
recognizing. It was more for ourselves. I 
think that her talking about it was more for 
herself, me thinking about it, it was more 
for myself. Rather than (R: connected?) 
than us hanging on how ‘you felt that way. 
I felt that way too’. [#4: Self-questioning] 
 
Non-verbal communication _ Imagining: 
 
Megan: I… I… It wasn´t so much a 
realization so much as an expected feeling. 
I would expected it if I seat there, uh, what 
should I talk about, that he is feeling a bit 
awkward as well. Yeah. So I think I just 
expected. It is the natural response to feel 
sort of awkward because of this artificial 
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